












Terrorism Against Democracy 
 
By M. Merrick Yamamoto 
 




















Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland 
4113 Van Munching Hall, School of Public Policy 
University of Maryland 


































Terrorism Against Democracy  
 
Based in Part on Stansfield Turner’s 
University of Maryland Course,  

































Preface & Acknowledgements 
 
 
This monograph approaches the problem of terrorism from the perspective of the 
process of a terrorist attack; that is, how terrorism is intended to “operate.” Comprehension 
of the intended process of the terrorist attack can help defeat terrorists, reduce terrorism, 
and avoid the damage that can result from poor responses to attacks.  
Part I of the monograph analyzes terrorism. Chapter 1 analyzes what terrorism is, and 
what kinds of acts are and are not terrorism. Chapter 2 analyzes the ways that terrorism is 
intended to operate on third-parties—the governments, organizations, individuals, and 
groups from which terrorists seek to elicit responses. Chapter 3 analyzes the causes of 
terrorism, and the threats that terrorism poses.  
Part II addresses what to do about terrorism—how to prevent terrorism, respond 
effectively to attacks, and defeat terrorists. Analysis of the steps of the terrorist attack 
shows that terrorism can be prevented and countered at each step. The monograph then 
addresses a general counterterrorism strategy.  
The monograph uses the Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model as a guide to 
comprehending terrorism and how to combat it. The model illustrates the steps of the 
terrorist attack, and shows how terrorism is intended to operate. Adapted forms of the 
model show different aspects of terrorism such as the role of the media in terrorist attacks, 
and why people choose to use terrorism. The model can be used to identify ways to prevent 
terrorist attacks, respond effectively if they occur, and reduce the use of terrorism.  
The model has other uses, such as to identify the characteristics of terrorism. These 
characteristics can show the differences between terrorism and other forms of political 
violence, and can be used to analyze incidents to determine whether or not they are acts of 
terrorism. The model helps identify which characteristics must be included in any 
definition of terrorism, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of different definitions, and 
develop accurate and useful definitions. 
Appendices address the definition of terrorism, the problems involved with trying to 
obtain agreement on a definition of terrorism, analysis of arguments that have been made 
to try to justify terrorist attacks, and the tools of national strategy for the democratic State. 
Analysis shows that terrorism can be accurately defined in more than one way, that 
obstacles to obtaining a widely agreed-upon definition can be overcome, and that none of 
the arguments that terrorists and their supporters use to try to justify terrorism are valid. 
The impetus to prepare this monograph came from Admiral Stansfield Turner’s course, 
“Terrorism & Democracy,” which he taught from 2002–2006 in response to the 9/11 
attacks on September 11, 2001. During the period that he taught the course, he encouraged 
the development of a number of the principles in the monograph and included them in his 
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Part I: What Is Terrorism and How Does It Operate? 
 
Chapter 1: What Is Terrorism?  
 
Chapter Outline 
I. Terrorism and the Terrorist Attack 
II. The Characteristics of Terrorism 




I. Terrorism and the Terrorist Attack 
 
Terrorism as a Form of Political Violence. Terrorism is a form of political violence; that is, 
violence used for a political purpose. “Political” can be described as “concerned with 
government, the State, or politics,” and political violence is used to try to obtain some kind of 
political change, or to prevent political change.  
Political violence is a large category that includes such 
actions as war, civil war, military strikes, insurrection, ethnic 
conflict, genocide, state terror, and terrorism (Fig. 1–1). All 
forms of political violence are methods of struggle that can be 
used alone or with other methods to pursue political goals.  
The borders between forms of political violence are not 
always clear; however, terrorism is a specific form of political 
violence with distinctive characteristics. What sets terrorism 
apart from almost all other forms of political violence is how 
terrorism “operates.” In most forms of political violence, the attackers use violence to pursue a 
goal directly—a military strike is an example. But in terrorism, the attackers use violence against 
one set of targets (the targets of violence) as a means to get other targets—third-party targets 
such as groups, governments, organizations, and individuals—to take actions that will help 
advance a political goal. The extra step, called victim-target differentiation, is shown in Fig. 1–2, 
which compares a direct violence strategy with the strategy of victim-target differentiation. 
 
 
Fig. 1–2. Direct Use of Violence Compared to Victim-Target Differentiation 
 
1. Direct Strategy:          X                                           X                                                    X                   
Example:                     Attacker           Uses               Targets                                    To Achieve the 
Military Strike                                Military Force                                                 Attacker’s Political Goal  
                                                            Against 
                                                                                                                                                                   
2. Victim-Target            X                                            X                                                     X  
Differentiation:          Attacker           Uses               Targets                                            Attacker’s 
(Indirect Strategy)                          Violence         of Violence                                     Political Goal 
Example:                                            Against            (victims)                   X 
Terrorism                                                                               To Affect Third-Party Targets,  
                                                                                                  Who Are Intended to Take 
                                                                                                   Actions That Advance the   
 
























   
The Terrorist Attack. The extra step of victim-target differentiation makes terrorism more 
complex than most other forms of violence, more difficult to comprehend, and harder to counter. 
But terrorism can be understood, and one way is by examining the steps of the terrorist attack. A 
terrorist attack can be described as below, and illustrated as in Fig. 1–3:1  
 
In a terrorist attack: A nonstate attacker uses violence and the threat of 
violence against noncombatants/property to affect third-parties, and elicit 





















The purpose of terrorism is to advance a political goal, and the strategy of terrorism is to 
attack people and property in order to get third-parties to respond in ways that will aid that goal. 
By victimizing people and property, terrorists can be trying to coerce, intimidate, inspire, 
influence, and provoke governments, groups, organizations, the public, the media, supporters, 
and opponents so that these third-parties will choose to take the actions that terrorists intend.  
This intent to trick or induce people into helping terrorists pursue their goals is a strategy that 
must be seen clearly to be combated effectively. Terrorism, and how it is intended to operate, can 
be seen by analyzing each step of the terrorist attack. Dividing the terrorist attack into two phases 
can assist this analysis. 
 
                                                 
1 The Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model was developed in conjunction with Stansfield Turner’s “Terrorism & 
Democracy” course at the Maryland School of Public Policy. The model can be used to analyze many aspects of 
terrorism, and identify ways to combat terrorism. See Appendix A for the primary models used in the monograph, 
and for additional models relating to terrorism and other forms of violence. 
2 In general, “noncombatants” are civilians and certain categories of military personnel. The most precise term for 
the “targets of violence” is “noncombatant targets”; however, the Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model uses 
“noncombatants/property” to be more easily understood. For the purpose of this monograph, “nonstate actor” refers 
to a private (or nongovernmental) individual or group, and not a person or group officially acting for a government. 
The Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model includes clandestine state agents as nonstate actors, since these agents are 
not usually an openly acknowledged part of a government. See Appendix B for an analysis of the characteristics of 
terrorism and other terms relating to terrorism. 


























To clarify: In a terrorist attack: 
 
1. The attack was done by a nonstate 
actor—that is, a private individual or group, 
or a clandestine state agent—not a person or 
group officially acting for a government. 
 
2. The attack aimed or threatened physical 
violence at noncombatant targets—that is, 
civilians (in general), military personnel in 
noncombatant status, or property. 
 
3. The attack was intended to elicit responses 
from third-party targets—that is, people, 
governments, groups, and organizations 
other than the victims/property attacked.  
 
4. The attack had a political purpose—that 
is, the attack was intended to advance a 
political goal. 
 




   
The Two Phases of a Terrorist Attack. The terrorist attack can be divided into two phases—
Phase I, the violent attack, and Phase II, the involvement of third-parties through their responses  
to the attack (Fig. 1–4). Each step of the two 
phases can be analyzed to determine what is 
involved. This analysis shows what terrorism 
is and what terrorists are trying to get third-
parties to do. How to defend against terrorist 
attacks and control terrorism can then be 
identified—for terrorism can be prevented or 
countered at every step of the terrorist attack. 
This analysis is an essential step in rendering 
terrorists ineffective, and can provide a basis 
for effective and comprehensive 
counterterrorism efforts.3 
Phase I: The Violent Attack. Phase I of a terrorist attack is the violent attack—the actual use 
or threat of violence against people and/or property. Phase I has three elements: the attacker, the 
violence involved, and the people and property attacked (the targets of violence). In a terrorist  
attack, the attackers are nonstate actors who use 
violence and the threat of violence against 
noncombatants and/or property (Fig. 1–5). Analysis 
of each element follows. 
Nonstate Attacker. In a terrorist attack, the 
attacker is a nonstate actor; that is, a private 
individual or group, or a clandestine state agent. 
“Nonstate” generally means that the individuals and 
groups are nongovernmental—they are acting on their 
own as private individuals and groups, and are not 
officially acting for a government.4 Nonstate actors 
are not official state actors such as government 
leaders, or soldiers in the armed forces of a country. 
Groups conduct most terrorist attacks. Many of these groups use terrorism as their primary  
method of struggle; however, some groups use terrorism along with other major methods of 
struggle. For example, a group may work to build a support base by providing health, welfare, 
and educational services, but also conduct terrorist attacks.5 During the 1990s, al Qaeda used 
terrorism as its primary tool, along with propaganda, but Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) 
 
                                                 
3 For the purpose of this monograph, terms such as “counterterrorism,” “anti-terrorism,” and “combating terrorism” 
refer to all policies, strategies, programs, and activities directed against terrorism, including offensive and defensive 
measures, proactive and preventive measures, responses to incidents, and investigative efforts. 
4 Similar terms for “nonstate” can include “subnational,” “substate,” and “nongovernmental.” 
5 The designation of groups that use terrorism along with other major methods of struggle has varied. A CIA 
research study used the term “terrorist organization” to mean a group that has employed terrorist tactics—see CIA, 
Research Study, 1976, 10. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism reports generally defined a 
“terrorist group” as any group practicing, or has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. The 
difficulty of characterizing groups that use terrorism along with other methods reflects the fact that groups do not 
necessarily form for the purpose of conducting terrorist attacks, but may be political groups that select terrorism as a 
means of struggle. Groups frequently stop using terrorism when it is perceived as no longer useful. 


















































   
used several primary tools including political activity, social services, guerilla-like attacks 
against military forces, and terrorist attacks against civilians.6 
Instances of individuals conducting terrorist attacks are rare, but have occurred. Eric Rudolph 
is an example—in the 1990s he acted alone in perpetrating a number of terrorist attacks, 
including bombing the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia.  
States can be involved in terrorism in a number of ways, and to varying degrees, such as by 
providing support to terrorist groups or by directly sponsoring a group.7 However, even if a 
government sponsors or supports a terrorist group, the attackers are still nonstate actors—the 
members of the group are not officially part of the government.  
In the context of terrorism, nonstate actors can include clandestine state agents because they 
are not an official part of a government. The government is trying to disguise its actions through  
the use of these agents, and when they perpetrate an attack, it is not 
usually known that a government directed the attack. The 1988 Pan 
Am 103 bombing can illustrate. In December 1988 a bomb planted 
on board exploded as the plane flew over Lockerbie, Scotland, 
killing everyone on board and a number of people on the ground. 
After investigation, warrants were issued for the arrest of two Libyan 
nationals, alleged to be members of the Libyan Intelligence Services, 
and the charges included “the commission of acts of terrorism.”8 
Even after the Libyan government admitted responsibility for the 
attack, the act was still considered to be a terrorist attack, though with State involvement.  
If other than nonstate actors perpetrate an attack, the act is not terrorism but a different kind of 
violence. For example, if a government uses violence against its own people to suppress 
resistance, such as Stalin’s Great Terror, that is “state terror.” If a soldier in war deliberately 
attacks civilians (noncombatants), that is a war crime.  
Violence, and the Threat of Violence. Terrorism involves violence—its use and threat. 
Violence involves physical power used so as to injure, damage, or abuse, and some of the violent 
means that terrorists have used include bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, hostage-taking, murder, 
and assassination. The difference between “violence” and “force” is significant in the context of 
terrorism. Force can be described as the use of physical power to overcome, restrain, or 
physically coerce, and violence as the use of that same physical power to injure, damage, or 
abuse. Violence involves the intent to injure or damage, whereas force may or may not be 
intended to injure. A policeman applying handcuffs is using force, not violence, to physically 
restrain a person—the handcuffs are not intended to injure. One reason the distinction between 
force and violence is relevant to terrorism is because of the legal aspects. Force, even lethal 
force, is lawful when properly used by authorized individuals such as police officers and soldiers 
(soldiers use military force). In contrast, the use of violence by nonstate actors is not lawful 
except in particular circumstances such as self-defense from attempted murder. 
 
                                                 
6 The spelling of names and terms in other languages may vary; this monograph uses both common usage and terms 
as used in sources and quotations.  
7 If a government provides resources or direction to a terrorist group, that is “state-sponsored terrorism” or “state-
supported terrorism.” State involvement with nonstate terrorism can range from inability to act, inaction, and 
unawareness, to permissive neglect, tolerance, and active support or sponsorship. In some cases a government may 
collaborate with a terrorist group: an example was the Taliban government’s relationship in the 1990s with al Qaeda 
in Afghanistan. In this case, al Qaeda helped support the Taliban government.  















   
The threat of violence. Terrorist attacks involve the threat of violence. Sometimes the threat is 
overt, such as the threat to bomb a particular building, or a communiqué that threatens more 
attacks. But even when not openly stated, an attack communicates a threat of further violence, 
and this threat is a critical part of how attacks are intended to operate—governments, the public, 
and other groups generally understand the implied threat of more attacks if the terrorists’ 
demands are not met. The effect of further threatened attacks can be seen in particular when 
terrorists conduct a series of attacks (a 
“terrorist campaign”). The repetition of 
attacks intensifies the impact on third-
parties, particularly governments and the 
public. In 1995 the GIA (Armed Islamic 
Group) claimed responsibility for a series of 
attacks in Paris and Lyon that targeted 
crowded places such as metro stations and 
marketplaces (see map).9 The attacks 
intensified the effect on the French people, 
and the pressure on the government. 
The threat of violence without its actual 
use can be a terrorist attack. Burning a cross 
in front of someone’s house can illustrate—
the act communicates a threat to those in the 
house, and to anyone who shares particular characteristics with those directly threatened.  
Terrorist threats can cause widespread alarm and disruption, such as evacuations in response 
to bomb threats. Most threats are false alarms or hoaxes, but security officials must generally 
take measures to investigate them and protect threatened targets.10 In May 1981, the New York 
City police received 96 bomb threats in 24 hours, and took each threat seriously because 5 live 
bombs had been found in the previous days. Responses included evacuating and searching all 71 
stories of the Chrysler Building and parts of other buildings.11 
The qualities of terrorist violence. Terrorist violence has particular qualities. Three major 
qualities are that terrorist violence is premeditated, unlawful, and random/symbolic.12  
Terrorist violence is premeditated. Unlike accidents and unintentional collateral damage that 
may occur during military operations, terrorist violence is deliberate. Paul Pillar addressed 
premeditation as follows: “Premeditation means there must be an intent and prior decision to 
commit an act that would qualify as terrorism…. An operation may not be executed as intended 
and may fail altogether, but the intent must still be there. The action is the result of someone’s 
policy, or at least someone’s decision. Terrorism is not a matter of momentary rage or impulse. It 
is also not a matter of accident.”13 
 
                                                 
9 U.S. State Dept., Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995, 8. 
10 Because most threats are not credible, organizations use judgment regarding which threats should be included in a 
terrorist record. For example, in 1983 the U.S. State Department counted as terrorist incidents only those threats that 
were explicit, could be directly sourced to a credible terrorist organization, and were involved some form of violent 
expression such as the destruction of property—see U.S. State Dept., Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983, 9.  
11 RAND Chronology, May 19, 1981.  
12 Other qualities of terrorist violence have been identified—see Appendix B. 
13 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, 13. 
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Terrorist violence is unlawful.14 Acts such as murder, conspiracy to murder, kidnapping, 
hijacking, extortion, and arson are crimes in nearly all countries. Even when terrorists claim 
“altruistic” political motives for their actions, their violent acts are still illegal. RAND 
researchers perceived terrorism’s dual criminal and political nature when establishing one of the 
first terrorism databases, and concluded that “terrorism was first of all a crime in the classic 
sense, like murder or kidnapping, but with political motives.”15 
Terrorist violence has a random/symbolic quality. Random can be described as “without 
definite aim, direction, rule, or method.” A bomb exploding on a street illustrates the quality of 
randomness: whoever happens to be passing by is likely to be injured or killed, and the injuries 
sustained will be random as the bomb fragments pierce different parts of their bodies. The 
kidnapping of tourists can also illustrate this random quality—terrorists decide to take some 
hostages, and seize those who happen to be there simply because they are available.  
Terrorist violence is symbolic in that the attack is intended to serve a particular cause, and 
because the target of violence is often chosen for its symbolic value, such as a national landmark.  
The Statue of Liberty has been attacked as a symbolic target—after one 
attack in 1980, several groups claimed responsibility, and the police 
received letters calling for “the world to notice the demands and rights and 
situation of the Croatian people” (the letters were intended to draw 
attention to the desire for Croatian independence from Yugoslavia).16 Lord 
Louis Mountbatten was another symbolic target—after his assassination by 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), an IRA council member said that the 
IRA had no hatred for Mountbatten as a person, but were aiming at “the 
society, the military, and the political machine he symbolized.”17  
Terrorists may target individuals who hold positions viewed as symbolic, such as attacks on 
security forces, police, and gendarmes. In seeking independence from Spain, the Basque group 
ETA attacked Guardia Civil members because of their position as Spanish gendarmes. 
The random and symbolic qualities of terrorist violence are related. The victims may represent 
a specific group, such as the bombing of a café frequented by members of an ethnic group. The 
bombing harms people on a random basis, but the attackers intend for the victims to symbolize 
the entire ethnic group. At other times the victims may be completely random—they may not be 
members of any specific group, or involved with the terrorists’ cause in any way. Yet even 
completely random victims can represent others: “The bombing campaign launched between 
September 8 and 17, 1986, in Paris by a ‘Committee for Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern 
Political Prisoners,’ which killed 11 people and wounded 161, was largely random, hitting 
mainly ‘targets of opportunity.’ Since anybody could have been a victim, everybody felt 
threatened. There was symbolism in the very randomness.”18 Targets chosen for their symbolism 
usually have random qualities in that one target can often be substituted for another. For 
example, the selection of any national landmark may serve the attackers’ purpose.  
 
                                                 
14 “Lawful” has a broader meaning than “illegal,” and suggests conformity to the spirit rather than the letter of the law.  
15 Brian Michael Jenkins, “30 Years and Counting,” RAND Review (Summer 2002).  
16 RAND Chronology, June 4, 1980.  
17 An Phoblacht/Republican News, quoted in Cynthia L. Irvin, “Terrorists’ Perspectives: Interviews,” in David L. Paletz 
and Alex P. Schmid, eds., Terrorism and the Media (London: Sage, 1992), 78–79. For the purpose of this 
monograph, the term “IRA”—the Irish Republican Army—includes the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). 
18 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988, 9. 
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The Targets of Violence: Noncombatants and Property. A terrorist attack threatens, injures, 
or kills noncombatants, and threatens, damages, and destroys property. In the context of 
terrorism, the term “noncombatant” generally refers to two groups of people: civilians, and 
military personnel in noncombatant status. Civilians are generally all persons who are not 
members of the armed forces of a country (note, too, that most civilians are not armed). 
Military personnel in noncombatant status include military personnel who do not engage in 
combat such as medics and chaplains, or who cannot engage in combat because they are 
wounded, ill, captured, or shipwrecked. Military personnel who are outside of a war zone or 
warlike setting (whether or not armed or on duty), or not in combatant status at the time of an 
incident, may be considered noncombatants.19 The U.S. government considered the sailors on the  
USS Cole to be noncombatants when the ship was attacked by 
suicide bombers in 2000. The situation was peaceful—the ship 
was refueling when a small boat blew a large hole in the side of 
the ship, killing and injuring many U.S. sailors.  
Those who may be considered noncombatants can be subject 
to some interpretation, particularly during wartime. To illustrate, 
during war and armed conflicts, civilians who take a direct part 
in hostilities, such as by taking up arms, are no longer 
noncombatants. The actions considered to be taking a “direct part 
in hostilities” during war may be subject to some interpretation. For example, during war, 
civilians providing command, administrative, or logistics support to military operations can be 
subject to attack while so engaged. However, in peacetime—during which the majority of 
terrorist attacks generally take place—most civilians are noncombatants. In addition, during any 
armed struggle, the intentional targeting of noncombatants is prohibited—a prohibition that 
terrorists frequently violate. Terrorists have claimed to be “at war” and therefore their attacks on 
civilians are justified, but this claim is false—terrorism is not “war”—see “War and Military 
‘Justifications’” in Appendix D. But in general, and particularly during peacetime, 
“noncombatant” means civilians and certain categories of military personnel. 
Property as the target of violence. A terrorist attack can threaten, damage, and destroy 
property, property that has been described as “property of a civilian character,” but is more 
accurately called “noncombatant property.” Property of a civilian character includes such objects 
as markets, houses, and churches, whereas “noncombatant property” is a more inclusive term 
that includes property of a civilian character, and military property under certain circumstances, 
such as a military installation when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site.20  
Attacks on property only can be terrorist attacks (and many terrorist attacks have been aimed 
at buildings and institutions). The 1998 Vail ski resort attack can illustrate. In that attack, the 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) destroyed several structures to try to stop the expansion of a ski 
resort in Vail, Colorado, but did not harm any people physically. Attacks that damage or destroy 
only property operate in the same way as attacks on people. And even when only property is 
attacked, there is always an implicit threat that future violence may not be confined to property.  
 
                                                 
19 See, for example, U.S. State Dept., Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, 1; National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 
“WITS—Frequently Asked Questions,” http://wits.nctc.gov/DefinitionOfTerms.do?page=faq (Nov. 2, 2009).  
20 See U.S. State Dept., Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, xii; NCTC, A Chronology of Significant International 
Terrorism for 2004, vii–viii.  
 
 









   
Phase II: Third-Party Involvement. Phase II of a terrorist attack consists of the impact that 
the attack on the victims and property has on third-parties, and the actions that these third-parties 
take in response to the attack—and in response to the implicit threat of more attacks (Fig. 1–6). 
In Phase I, terrorists conduct an attack, 
but the violence perpetrated on the 
victims is not the purpose of the attack. 
Terrorists attack the targets of violence 
for the effect that the attack has on third-
party targets, so that these targets will 
take actions that help accomplish a goal 
or goals. The intent to use third-parties 
to advance political goals is a hallmark 
of terrorism. This “separation” of the 
victims from the third-party targets 
through victim-target differentiation is 
the most distinctive characteristic of 
terrorism and is the primary difference 
between terrorism and almost all other 
forms of political violence. Very few forms of political violence “use” third-parties as the 
primary strategy—most forms involve the pursuit of a political goal directly through the use of 
violence. In contrast, terrorism works through, and relies on, third-party responses to violence.  
There are several key elements in Phase II. These elements include the effect the attack has on 
third-parties, how they respond to the attack, the “mechanisms” used to elicit these responses, 
and how these responses advance (or retard) progress toward the attackers’ goals. Analysis of 
each element follows, beginning with the third-party targets, who are the key to Phase II. 
Third-Party Targets. Third-party targets are the people, groups, organizations, and 
governments that the attackers are trying to get to take certain actions in response to the use of 
violence against the victims. As can be seen in 
Fig. 1–7, third-parties are the true targets of 
the terrorist attack. 
Frequent third-parties that terrorists aim at 
are governments, intergovernmental 
organizations, the general public, companies, 
opponents, supporters, ethnic groups, religious 
communities, and the media. Other third-
parties may be rivals, diasporas, and the 
“constituent community” (the group that the 
terrorists claim to represent).  
A terrorist attack is usually aimed at a 
primary third-party target, such as a 
government or a particular community, but in  
almost all attacks, terrorists are aiming at a number of third-party targets at the same time. For 
example, regardless of what group or government is the primary third-party target, terrorists 
almost always aim at the public, media, and supporters as well.  

























Fig. 1–7. Victim-Target Differentiation: 

























   
Third-party targets can be described in different ways, such as what kinds of groups they 
form—political parties and religious groups are examples. Third-party targets can also be 
described in relation to the political goal that the attackers are seeking, such as whether or not 
third-parties support or oppose the terrorists’ political goal. In this area, third-party targets can be 
categorized in a range including “supporters,” “potential supporters,” “neutrals,” “potential 
opponents,” and “opponents,” as shown in Fig. 1–8:  
 
 
Fig. 1–8. The Range of Third-Party Targets 
 
 
     <------ Supporters  <------------->   Neutrals  <-------------->  Opponents -------> 
 
<----------|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------|----------> 
        Supporters       Potential             Uncommitted/         Potential       Opponents 
                               Supporters            Unconcerned         Opponents 
 
 
Opponents and potential opponents can include governments; international organizations; 
rivals; and individuals who share characteristics with the victims, sympathize with them, or fear 
sharing the same fate. Opponents also include those who oppose the terrorists’ political goal, and 
those who oppose all terrorism even when they support the terrorists’ goal. 
“Neutrals” can include the “uncommitted” and “unconcerned.” Some neutral and 
uncommitted individuals include those who have no knowledge, interest in, or opinion about the 
terrorists or their political goal. Other uncommitted people may be those who do not think that 
the attacks will affect them in any significant way, especially if they believe that they have no 
reason to fear becoming victims. The population of a distant country unconnected to the 
terrorists’ goal can be an example.  
Supporters include those who provide aid—tangible or intangible—to terrorists, such as 
material resources or political backing. Potential supporters include those who may be induced 
into giving support to the terrorists, such as by bringing out latent sympathy. (Note, though, that 
those who support the terrorists’ goals may strongly oppose the method (terrorism) being used.)  
The media is in a special category because it 
is involved in a terrorist attack in two ways: the 
media is the primary means by which most 
people hear about an attack, but is also an 
important third-party target (Fig. 1–9). 
Terrorists aim at the media as a third-party 
target because how members of the media 
present news about attacks can affect how 
other third-parties view the terrorists and their 
goals. Therefore terrorists have often made 
strong efforts to influence, intimidate, or even 
coerce members of the media. To illustrate, 
many terrorist groups have made strong efforts 
to influence the media into presenting the 
group’s goals sympathetically, and project  
how the terrorists want to be seen, such as Robin Hood battling for the oppressed. However, 
terrorists also seek to intimidate members of the media seen as “unfriendly” or as opponents. 





Supporters ↔ Neutrals  ↔  Opponents
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The Eliciting of Responses. The process of affecting third-parties and eliciting responses 
from them involves several steps. Figures 1–10 through 1–13 illustrate this process. 
In Step 1, third-parties find out about the attack, usually through the media, but also though 
other ways such as by being on the scene or by word of mouth. Note that if potential third-parties 
do not find out about an attack, the process 
of eliciting responses stops—the terrorist 
attack does not affect third-party targets, or 
elicit any responses.  
In Step 2, finding out about the attack has 
an effect on people and arouses emotions of 
some kind in many third-parties. Different 
third-parties are likely to feel different 
emotions, and to varying degrees of 
intensity. Members of the general public 
may feel shock, fear, confusion, outrage, and 
anger. Government officials may feel fury, 
alarm, and the pressure to respond swiftly 
and forcefully. Supporters of the terrorist 
group may feel glee, whereas opponents  
may feel rage and vengefulness. Individuals who do not feel that the attack concerns them, such 
as people in distant countries, may feel no more than a momentary interest. In contrast, those 
who feel that the attack was aimed at them may feel very strong emotions. For example, people 
who feel that the victims “represent” them, such as those who share the same ethnicity as the 
victims, are likely to feel threatened, fearful, and angry. 
In Step 3, the emotions aroused by the attack cause third-parties to feel impulses regarding 
how to respond. Gleeful supporters may feel the impulse to go out on the streets and fire 
weapons in the air to show support for the terrorists, their cause, or both. Enraged opponents may 
also feel the impulse to go out on the streets and fire weapons—but at members of the 
community they think the terrorists belong to.  
In Step 4, third-parties decide how they will 
respond to the attack—what they will actually 
do (if anything). Individuals, groups, 
organizations, and governments may make 
these decisions hastily and emotionally, or 
after careful deliberation. (Terrorists are often 
trying to elicit hasty and emotional responses.) 
In Step 5, third-parties actually do take 
action (or no action at all as their response). 
This is a critical step in a terrorist attack. 
People may find it very difficult to control 
how they feel after an attack, or their impulses 
regarding how to respond, but they can  
control what they do. Some responses fight terrorism effectively, but other responses strengthen 
terrorists and move them closer to achieving their goals—and these are the responses that 
terrorists are trying to elicit. 


















































   
“Mechanisms” to elicit responses. To try to elicit the desired responses from different third-
party targets, terrorists use “mechanisms,” such as to coerce, intimidate, provoke, inspire, 
stimulate, and influence supporters, governments, organizations, the public, opponents, and the 
media into choosing to take actions that help terrorists (Fig. 1–12). Some mechanisms involve 
pressure, such as attempts to intimidate third-parties; other mechanisms are intended to elicit 
more willing responses, such as inspiring actions. To illustrate, terrorists may be trying to elicit 
the following emotions and responses: 
— Inspire enthusiasm in supporters 
so that they will increase their 
donations and volunteer to join 
the group; 
— Stimulate interest so that people 
will try to find out more about the 
group’s goals, look sympathetically 
on these goals, and then translate 
that sympathy into support; 
— Influence the media to focus on the 
terrorists’ goals rather than on the 
atrocities perpetrated on victims; 
— Coerce a government into granting 
concessions; and  
— Provoke rage in a community so that members will commit counter-atrocities that drag that 
community closer to the terrorists’ moral level. 
 
These kinds of responses bring terrorists closer to their goals through such means as 
increasing their political support, strengthening them with resources, and weakening their 
opponents. Terrorists intend for the entire range of their third-party targets to respond with 
actions that advance the group’s goals, but any “gain” helps them, as can be seen in Fig. 1–13. 
 
 
Fig. 1–13. Selected Emotions and Responses That Terrorists Seek to Elicit 
                 
         <--------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|---------> 
                Supporters              Potential          Uncommitted/        Potential       Opponents 
                                              Supporters         Unconcerned       Opponents   
 
             Satisfaction;              Desire to          Interest; Fear;         Shock; Horror; Anxiety; Fear; 
      Glee; Greater fervor    support or join        Sympathy           Anger; Outrage; Vengefulness 
 
        More donations;         Become active      Choose sides;             Overreact; Retaliate in kind; 
           New Recruits           supporters        Give political support       Give in to demands 
 
Contribute to Advancing a Political Goal 
 
  
Terrorists also try to advance their goals by manipulating third-party responses, and the 
interplay among these responses, and thus mobilize and channel third-party actions. For 
example, terrorists may exploit the hostility of opponents to increase sympathy from potential 
supporters. Terrorists intend for the combined and cumulative effect of third-party responses to 
advance a political goal. 
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A Political Goal. Terrorist attacks are intended to contribute to a political goal. “Political” can 
mean “concerned with government, the State, or politics,” and terrorism has been employed in 
the pursuit of many different political goals. These goals have included freeing a State from 
foreign occupation (national liberation); creating 
new States (separatism); advancing the interests 
of specific groups of people (nationalism, ethno-
nationalism); repressing specific groups of 
people (racism, vigilantism); and changing 
particular policies within a government (often 
single issues such as the environment).  
The scope of terrorists’ overall goals has 
ranged from the very large to the very small. 
Some groups have had international goals as 
large as completely changing political systems 
worldwide to their preferred model. Marxist 
groups in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s used 
terrorist attacks to try to change the political systems in the United States, Western Europe, and 
elsewhere to a communist model. In the 1990s and into the 21st century, the terrorist group al 
Qaeda sought to replace several governments with an Islamic caliphate.  
Other groups have had national goals, and sought to change the political system in one 
country to their preferred model. Some groups in the Middle East and Africa used terrorist 
attacks to try to change the political systems in their countries to their interpretation of an Islamic 
model. (These groups may state their goals in religious terms, but their goal is political: to 
replace a regime with their own preferred form of government.) 
Some groups have had goals that are within an existing political system. These groups do not 
seek to change the entire system, but only particular policies. For example, groups that 
conducted terrorist attacks in the United States on behalf of animal rights did not seek to change 
the existing democratic form of government, but only certain policies pertaining to animals.  
Sometimes groups have used terrorism to try to prevent change to a political system. Many 
terrorist attacks against the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s were intended to 
preserve the existing political system—one goal of the attacks was to intimidate African-
Americans so that they would stop trying to get discriminatory policies and laws changed. 
Groups may or may not think that they will achieve their goals through the use of terrorism, 
but they do think that that its use will advance those goals. In the 1970s and 1980s, Puerto Rican 
terrorists did not believe that their bombing campaigns in the United States would result in 
Puerto Rican independence, but that the attacks would draw attention to their cause.21  
A group that uses terrorism has an overall political goal or cause, and terrorist attacks have 
specific objectives intended to contribute to that goal. For example, a particular attack may be 
intended to influence a specific government decision, affect an election, discourage tourism and 
foreign investment, obtain the release of jailed terrorists, intimidate a jury, halt a peace process, 
demonstrate government ineffectiveness, or provoke government repression that will alienate a 
particular group in the society. The objectives being pursued in each specific terrorist attack need 
to be seen in the context of how each attack relates to the terrorist group’s overall goals.  
 
                                                 
21 FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1999, 19.  




























   
 
II. The Characteristics of Terrorism 
 
Terrorism Characteristics. By analyzing the steps involved in the terrorist attack, the key 
characteristics of terrorism can be identified. From analysis using the Turner-Yamamoto 
Terrorism Model, terrorism is summarized by the following statements in Table 1–1, with the 
key characteristics underlined.22 
 
 
Table 1–1. Summary of a Terrorist Attack 
 
1. Terrorist attacks are perpetrated by a nonstate actor; that is, a private 
group or individual, or a clandestine state agent.  
 
2. Terrorist attacks involve violence and/or the threat of violence that is 
premeditated, unlawful, and random/symbolic. 
 
3. Terrorist attacks use violence and the threat of violence against 
noncombatants and property. 
 
4. Terrorist attacks are intended to affect third-parties and elicit 
responses from them to advance political goals. 
 
5. Terrorist attacks use mechanisms such as coercion, intimidation, 
provocation, influence, and inspiration to try to elicit desired 
responses from third-parties. 
 
 
These characteristics of terrorism can be organized into three categories: the violent act, third-
party involvement, and political goals, as shown in Table 1–2.  
 
 
Table 1–2. Characteristics of Terrorism 
 
 
I. The Violent Act 
 
 
  -Nonstate 
  -Violence 
      -Threat of violence 
         -Premeditated 
         -Unlawful 
         -Random/symbolic  
  -Noncombatants 






   -3rd-party targets 
       -Affect 
       -Elicit responses 






   -Political 
 
 
                                                 
22 See Appendix B for an analysis of the characteristics of terrorism and the qualities of terrorist violence, and 
Tables 1–8 and B–2 for the required conditions for an incident to be a terrorist attack. 




   
Comparison of Acts/Incidents. The characteristics of terrorism can be used to analyze 
particular incidents to determine whether or not they are acts of terrorism. One way to do this is 
to build a table of “Acts vs. Characteristics.” This technique can be used to analyze any act or 
incident, and Table 1–3 compares the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the 1998 Vail ski resort 
attack in Colorado, and the act of “mugging” (to show the difference between terrorism and 
common crime). This analysis also serves to “test” the characteristics of terrorism (see Appendix 






















I. The Violent Act X X X 
  Nonstate attacker X X X 
  Violence X X X 
     Threat of violence Implicit X X 
        -Premeditated X X X 
        -Unlawful X X X 
        -Random/symbolic X X Random only 
  Noncombatants X  X 
  Property X X X 
    
II. 3rd-Party Involvement X X  
   3rd-party targets X X  
       -Affect X X  
       -Elicit responses X X  
       -Mechanisms X X  
    
III. Political Goals 
 
X X  
 
According to the chart, the 9/11 attacks met all of the characteristics of terrorism. The Vail ski 
resort attack met all but one characteristic, the violence against noncombatants (people). In 
contrast, mugging met only those characteristics involved in the use of actual violence (there is 
no third-party involvement or political goal). A discussion of each example follows.  
The 9/11 Attacks, September 11, 2001. In the 9/11 attacks, 
nonstate attackers used violence against noncombatant victims and 
property. The attackers were members of al Qaeda, a nonstate group, 
and the attackers hijacked four planes, crashing two into the World 
Trade Center in New York City, and one into the Pentagon in 
Washington (the fourth plane crashed into the ground in 
Pennsylvania, killing everyone on board). 
The targets of the violence were noncombatants and property. The 
people injured and killed in the World Trade Center were 
noncombatants (civilians), as were the passengers on all four planes. 
The military personnel injured and killed in the Pentagon were 
noncombatants at the time of the attacks—they were unarmed, and it 














   
The violence perpetrated was premeditated, unlawful, and random/symbolic. The 
premeditation was clear: the attacks had been deliberately planned for a long period of time, 
including the time needed to learn to pilot planes. The violence was unlawful: the hijacking of 
the airplanes, mass murders, and destruction of property were illegal. The violence killed and 
injured people on a random basis—everyone who happened to be on the planes was killed, and 
the explosions in the buildings killed and injured people indiscriminately.  
The violence was symbolic: the buildings attacked represented different aspects of the United 
States. The World Trade Center symbolized economic power; the Pentagon symbolized military 
power; and the target of the fourth plane, headed in the direction of the nation’s capital, was 
likely the politically symbolic White House or Capitol.  
The attacks involved the threat of violence: though the threat of future attacks was not openly 
stated after the attack, the threat was implicit, and clearly perceived (the government, for 
example, instituted extensive protective measures, including the mobilization of military forces). 
The attack was aimed at a wide range of third-parties, and was intended to affect many groups, 
governments, organizations, communities, and individuals, and elicit responses from them.  
The attack had political goals. Though al Qaeda did not immediately claim responsibility, the 
group had stated a number of political goals, such as the expulsion of foreign influences from 
Muslim countries, and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate. 
Vail Ski Resort Attack, 1998. In October 1998, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), a nonstate 
group, used arson to destroy a number of buildings and ski structures to try to stop the expansion 
of a ski resort in Vail, Colorado. The attack caused an estimated 
$12 million in damage, but no people were physically harmed.23 
The violence was premeditated, unlawful, random, and symbolic.  
The violence was random in that any building selected for 
attack would serve the terrorists’ purpose, and also in that the arson 
effects were unpredictable. The violence was symbolic in that the 
buildings destroyed represented the goal of preventing the 
development of wild areas. The threat of further violence was 
explicit. In an email sent to local universities, newspapers, and  
radio stations, ELF warned skiers to choose other destinations until the resort stopped its 
expansion efforts, and threatened further action: “This action is just a warning. We will be back 
if this greedy corporation continues to trespass into wild and unroaded areas.”24 
ELF was seeking to affect third-parties and elicit responses from them. Vail Resorts, the 
company planning the expansion, was a primary third-party target, but other third-party targets 
included skiers, the public, other ski resort companies, environmental supporters, and local 
townspeople. The perpetrators desired to elicit different responses from third-party targets, such 
as to intimidate Vail Resorts into refraining from building more ski resorts; frighten potential 
investors into withholding investment funds; galvanize supporters into contributing funds; and 
energize townspeople who opposed development, infuriate townspeople who supported 
development, and polarize the community by increasing dissension between the two groups. 
The goal was political. The group’s overall cause was the environment, and the specific goal 
was to stop the resort expansion and thereby protect the “last, best lynx habitat in the state.” 25  
 
                                                 
23 FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1998, 4.  

















   
Mugging in a Dark Alley (Common Crime) (not a form of political violence). A mugging is 
common crime, not terrorism. In a mugging, a nonstate attacker uses or threatens violence 
against a victim, but the robbery is not intended to involve third-parties—the victim is the target. 
There is no political goal—the goal is monetary gain. 
Two characteristics generally distinguish terrorism 
from common crime: the absence of a political goal and 
the lack of third-party involvement (Fig. 1–15). The goal 
in common crime is usually personal gain or revenge, 
whereas terrorists claim a political motive for their 
crimes. For example, a kidnapping for the sole purpose of 
ransom is a common crime, but if a political concession is 
demanded as a condition for releasing the victim, the 
kidnapping could be an act of terrorism. 
The intent to arouse fear can cause confusion between 
common crime and terrorism. The perpetrators of both  
common crime and terrorism may intend to cause fear, but in a mugging, the attacker seeks to 
cause fear in the victim in order to rob him, whereas terrorists attack their victims to cause fear in 
third-parties so that they will take actions to advance political goals. A task force report 
explained the difference as follows: “In a robbery, the victim is threatened so that he will 
relinquish his property; his fear, however great and essential to the criminal’s success, is not 
meant to be an example to others…. Such crimes may terrify, but they are not terrorism.”26 
Killing sprees and rampages are not usually acts of 
terrorism. As one example, many people reacted with great fear 
to a series of sniper killings in 2002 in the Washington, DC 
area, to the extent that many planned trips to the capital were 
cancelled. As another example, in April 1999 two students 
killed twelve students and a teacher, and injured twenty-one 
others at Columbine High School in Colorado. But these 
killings were not terrorism—there was no political motive, 
and the attacks were not aimed at third-parties—the victims were the targets.  
There are other differences between terrorism and common crime. For example, both common 
criminals and terrorists usually use stealth to commit their crimes, but many terrorists try to draw 
attention to their acts (and claim responsibility for them), whereas very few common criminals 
do. (Frequently several terrorist groups claim responsibility for the same attack.)  
The differences between terrorism and common crime are sometimes misperceived, 
particularly regarding the common criminal activity that terrorists often engage in, sometimes 
called “precursor crimes” or “auxiliary criminal activity.” For example, a terrorist group may 
commit robberies to obtain the resources needed to continue their operations, but these kinds of 
acts are not terrorism: even though the robberies are intended to serve political goals, the thefts 
are not perpetrated to affect third-parties and elicit responses from them. (Another area of 
confusion is that common criminals may try to recast their actions as political after the fact, such 
as to try to get better treatment by claiming a political motive for the crime perpetrated.) 
 
                                                 
26 National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Disorders and Terrorism (Washington, 































   
 Comparison of Forms of Political Violence. The characteristics of terrorism can be used to 
help identify the differences between terrorism and other forms of political violence. Table 1–4 
compares examples of military attack, factory sabotage, state terror, and assassination. Note that 
military attack, factory sabotage, and state terror are not terrorism, and that an act of 
assassination can be terrorism; a “traditional” political assassination; or a common crime, 
depending on the circumstances. 
 
 




















I. The Violent Act X X X X 
  Nonstate attacker  X  ? 
  Violence X X X X 
     Threat of violence X  X ? 
       -Premeditated X X X X 
       -Unlawful  X ? X 
       -Random/symbolic Partly random  ? ? 
  Noncombatants   X ? 
  Property X X ?  
     
II. 3rd-Party Involvement   X ? 
   3rd-party targets   X ? 
      -Affect   X ? 
      -Elicit responses   X ? 
      -Mechanisms   X ? 
     
III. Political Goals 
 
X X X ? 
 
Military Attack: The Battle of Gettysburg, 1863. The military attacks in the Battle of 
Gettysburg were not acts of terrorism. The attackers were state actors—soldiers—who used 
military force against other armed combatants and military property, and not against 
noncombatants.  
The violence was deliberate, and regardless of the legality of the war or the legitimacy of the 
political goals sought by either side, the soldiers conducted the battle in accordance with the laws 
of war. The violence was not random but directed—the soldiers generally aimed their rifles, 
other weapons, and artillery (even though some of the effects from artillery shells were 
indiscriminate, the shells themselves were aimed). The violence was not symbolic—the targets 
of violence (soldiers) did not represent any other groups—the casualties were the targets.  
The primary intent of the violence was not to elicit responses from third-parties. The 
immediate objectives of the use of military force were to seize and defend territory (the terrain 
around the town of Gettysburg), and to render the opposing forces incapable of physically 
seizing, occupying, or defending territory. 
The military force was used to serve a political goal. Both sides used military force in pursuit 
of their goals, which were to change, or preserve, a political system. 




   
There are a number of differences between war and 
terrorism. A major difference is that war is primarily a 
strategy using the direct application of physical force 
and violence to achieve a political goal. For example, 
seizing the capital of another country may achieve the 
political goal of the war. War may involve nonviolent 
tools such as dropping propaganda leaflets; however, 
the basic strategy is the clash of material forces 
involving the seizure, defense, and control of territory. 
In contrast, terrorists do not use violence to control 
territory but as a means to elicit third-party responses. 
(Fig. 1–16 shows the absence of third-party 
involvement in a military battle.)  
Sabotage: Factories in Occupied Territories, World War II. During World War II, factory 
workers in occupied territories sometimes sabotaged factories to slow down or stop production. 
In these instances the attackers were nonstate actors—civilian factory workers—who used 
intentional violence against property to further a political goal (freedom from occupation and 
win the war). However, the acts were not terrorism: there was no intent to involve third-parties.  
Terrorism vs. sabotage. Sabotage is usually understood 
to be an act or process with the intent of hampering, 
generally aimed at damaging a material target or 
undermining physical infrastructure, and not causing loss 
of life. One example is the deliberate damage of 
equipment or facilities; another is the disruption of power 
supplies or communications. Sabotage may sometimes 
result in injuries; however, they are usually not intentional.  
Terrorism differs from sabotage in several areas. The 
most distinctive difference is that in sabotage there is no 
intent to involve third-parties—the material damage done 
is the object of the attack. Another difference is that  
sabotage does not involve the deliberate targeting of noncombatants, as many terrorist attacks do.  
“Cyberattack,” “cyber-sabotage,” and “cyberterrorism.” Actions such as attacking computer 
systems do not usually involve violence, and therefore are not generally acts of terrorism. Acts 
that are sometimes called “cyberterrorism” are more accurately termed “cyberattack” or “cyber-
sabotage.” However, a cyberattack may be terrorism if the essential characteristics of terrorism 
are met. An example could be if a nonstate group threatened to interfere with a computer system 
in order to wreak physical destruction unless a political demand was met. (The FBI did arrest 
ecoterrorists attempting to topple power line towers involved in the diversion of water from the 
Colorado River, an act that could have caused serious flooding.27) 
Note that once a group is identified as a terrorist group, many common crimes that members 
perpetrate may be erroneously seen as terrorism. For example, some people might see a 
cyberattack by a terrorist group as terrorism, but it is not—though the attack has a political goal 
and may be intended to elicit responses from third-parties, there is no violence.  
 
                                                 
27 FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1989, 20. 






































   
State Terror: Soviet Union, 1930s. During the 1930s, Joseph Stalin perpetrated state terror in 
the Soviet Union through such means as extra-judicial killings by the police, rigged show trials, 
and deportations to gulags. The violence was intended to suppress opposition to the government 
and coerce compliance.  
“State terror” can be described as the violence that governments use to intimidate, subjugate, 
and control their own populations (or the populations of occupied countries/territories), and  
suppress opposition and resistance (see Fig. 1–18, 
which illustrates the use of victim-target 
differentiation in state terror). State terror can 
involve victim-target differentiation, but there are 
significant differences between state terror and 
terrorism. The primary difference is that in state 
terror, the government perpetrates the violence 
using state actors and official institutions such as 
the police, military, and judiciary.  
Note that using the apparatus of government 
can enable state terror to be carried out on a 
massive scale. As an example, during World War 
II, the Soviet government used mass deportations 
in occupied countries to suppress resistance. In  
one instance, the Soviet Union deported tens of thousands of people on one day from Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. The intent to suppress resistance was evident in a 1941 deportation order 
title: “Instructions Regarding the Manner of Conducting the Deportation of the Anti-Soviet 
Elements from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.”28  
Assassination. To assassinate generally means to murder a prominent person by sudden or 
secret attack, usually for political reasons. An assassination can be a “traditional” political 
assassination, an act of terrorism, or both. Assassination can also be a common crime, such as 
between rival gangs for nonpolitical reasons.  
The intent to involve third-parties is the primary difference between a “traditional” political 
assassination such as the assassination of Julius Caesar, and an assassination that is an act of 
terrorism. In a traditional political assassination, the intent is to kill a particular person for a 
political purpose. There are two parties involved: the murderer and the victim, who is the target 
of the violence. However, in an assassination that is a terrorist act there are three parties: the 
murderer, the victim, and third-parties who are intended to respond to the attack in ways that 
advance the attacker’s political goals. The following example illustrates the difference: 
 
When Julius Caesar was murdered in the Roman Senate, it was an assassination of the 
traditional sort, intended to eliminate a specific figure from the political scene; but had he 
been killed there by the representative of a subversive sect, intent on plunging his dagger 
into the first Roman leader he encountered in order to provoke a certain political response 
from the Senate, it would instead have been an act of political terrorism.29 
 
                                                 
28 Quoted in Aleksandras Shtromas, “The Baltic States as Soviet Republics,” in Graham Smith, ed., The Baltic States: 
The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 86. 
29 David Fromkin, “The Strategy of Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs (July 1975). 






























   
Sicarii assassinations in ancient Judea can illustrate assassinations as terrorism. The Sicarii 
(dagger-wielders) were a Jewish group that used a number of methods in their political struggle 
including terrorist attacks of various kinds. One Sicarii technique was to assassinate individuals on 
crowded streets in the heart of Jerusalem—their method was to stab their victims with a short 
dagger hidden under their clothing, and then pretend to be part of the crowd. The attacks were 
aimed at third-parties—primarily the Jewish people and Romans. David Rapoport explained the 
strategy as follows:  
 
The Sicarii normally assassinated prominent Jews, especially priests, who in [the opinion of 
the Sicarii] had succumbed to Hellenistic culture…. These acts were also efforts to create a 
state of war readiness, and, more specifically, to intimidate priests who were anxious to 
avoid war with Rome and whose opposition could prevent it from materializing.30 
 
A traditional political assassination may also be an act of terrorism: the intent may be to kill a 
specific individual and to elicit responses from other groups. Correctly classifying an act requires 
knowing the intent of the perpetrators, which may be difficult to ascertain accurately. Table 1–5 
compares different types of assassinations. 
 
 


















I. The Violent Act X X X 
  Nonstate attacker X X X 
  Violence X X X 
     Threat of violence Implicit? X Implicit 
        -Premeditated X X X 
        -Unlawful X X X 
        -Random/symbolic               X*                X* 
  Noncombatants X X X 
  Property   X 
    
II. 3rd-Party Involvement  X  
   3rd-party targets  X  
      -Affect  X  
      -Elicit responses  X  
      -Mechanisms  X  
    
III. Political Goals 
 
X X  
 
* Sometimes these attacks can be random and/or symbolic. 
 
                                                 
30 Sicarii terrorist attacks also included assassinations, hostage-taking to pressure priests, and attacks on wealthy Jewish 
landowners to try to force land redistribution according to Biblical traditions. The assassinations were often committed 
on the holiest days for the greatest publicity, and to show that no one was safe even on those days. The Sicarii used 
other violent methods that included attacking military forces directly. See David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: 
Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” American Political Science Review (Sept. 1984): 670. Josephus, a 
contemporary of the times, wrote that the first person assassinated was the high priest Jonathan, and after his death 
many were killed daily. See Josephus, The Jewish War, Book 2, Chapter 13. 




   
 
III. Accurate Definitions of Terrorism 
 
Accurate definitions can be constructed from the characteristics of terrorism, the process of a 
terrorist attack, and the required conditions for an incident to be a terrorist attack.31 As shown in 
Tables 1–6 and 1–7, more than one definition can accurately define terrorism. Each definition 
includes the essential characteristics, and some contain optional characteristics.  
 
 









1. The use and/or threat of violence by nonstate actors against 
noncombatants and/or property to elicit responses from third-parties 
to advance political goals. 
 
2. Violence, or the threat thereof, that is perpetrated by nonstate actors, 
victimizes noncombatants/property, and is aimed at obtaining desired 
responses from third-parties for political purposes. 
 
3. Nonstate political violence and/or threat against noncombatant 
targets aimed at third-party responses. 
 
4. Premeditated, unlawful violence or threat of violence against 
noncombatant targets by nonstate actors (individuals or subnational 
groups, or clandestine state agents), to coerce, provoke, intimidate, 
influence, and inspire responses from third-party groups and 












Succinct, but not 
very clear 
 


















I. The Violent Act X X X X 
  Nonstate attacker X X X X 
  Violence X X X X 
     Threat of violence X X X X 
        -Premeditated    X 
        -Unlawful    X 
        -Random/symbolic     
  Noncombatants X X X X 
  Property X X X X 
   3  
 
II. 3rd-Party Involvement X X X X 
   3rd-party targets X X X X 
      -Affect     
      -Elicit responses X X X X 
      -Mechanisms    X 
     
 
III. Political Goals 
 
X X X X 
 
                                                 
31 See Appendix B for an analysis of the characteristics of terrorism, and the qualities of terrorist violence; Tables 
B–2 and B–3 for the required conditions for an incident to be a terrorist attack; and Appendix C regarding the 
arguments for and against defining terrorism. Note that terrorism can and should be defined, and that agreement on 
an accurate definition can be obtained. 




   
Each definition includes all of the characteristics of terrorism that must be included (see 
Appendix B, Table B–2); meets the required conditions for an incident to be a terrorist attack 
(see Appendix B, Table B–3); and includes all that it seeks to define, and excludes all else. Each 
definition excludes war, civil war, military strikes, ethnic conflict, and non-terrorist political 
assassinations. Each definition includes violent acts that have been widely considered to be 
terrorism: anarchist assassinations in Russia; indiscriminate Irgun bombings of civilians in 
British-administered Palestine; anti-colonial FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale) bombings in 
Algeria; Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel; IRA bombings in Northern Ireland; ETA 
assassinations of members of the Guardia Civil in Spain; rightwing anti-ETA attacks in Spain; 
leftwing Red Army Faction kidnappings in Germany; single-issue ELF attacks in the United 
States; and al Qaeda attacks against U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, the USS Cole in Yemen in 
2000, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Sept. 11, 2001). 
The usefulness of a definition for the general public is also a consideration. In addition to 
being accurate, the definition of terrorism should convey the process of a terrorist attack in a way 
that is understandable and easily remembered. The definition should be written so that potential 
third-party targets, including members of the public, can understand what terrorism is, and can 
see clearly in the definition that the attackers are seeking responses that contribute to the  
attackers’ political goals. This understanding is 
necessary for third-parties to be prepared to resist 
terrorist attempts to deceive and manipulate them 
into responding as terrorists intend. In this area, the 
required conditions for an incident to be a terrorist 
attack can help (Tables B–2 and B–3, Appendix B). 
Phrased as a series of questions as in Table 1–8, 
members of the general public (and others) can use 
the questions to identify whether or not an incident 
is a terrorist attack (the answer to all four questions 






A terrorist attack is an attack in which a nonstate actor uses or threatens violence against 
noncombatant targets for the effect on third-parties, in order to get responses that will aid the 
terrorists’ political goal.  
Terrorism is a distinct form of political violence. The most distinctive characteristic is victim-
target differentiation, a strategy in which terrorists attack the targets of violence, but are actually 
aiming at third-parties.  
Terrorism can be defined accurately. Terrorism can be accurately defined in more than one 
way, and can be understandable. 
Terrorism poses particular dangers because of the intent to involve third-parties. By 
examining the strategy of terrorism, and the terrorist attack, people can comprehend terrorism 
and how it operates, and identify the kinds of actions that terrorists are trying to get third-party 
targets to take. This understanding is essential to avoid falling into terrorist traps, and is a first 
step toward devising and carrying out effective counterterrorism measures. 
 
***** 
Table 1–8. Required Conditions for an 
Incident to Be a Terrorist Attack 
 
1. Was the attack done by a nonstate actor?  
 
2. Was the violence aimed at physically 
harming or threatening noncombatant 
targets?  
 
3. Was the attack intended to elicit responses 
from third-party targets? 
 





   
 
 




I. Terrorist “Mechanisms” for Eliciting Responses 
II. The Leverage of Terrorism 





How does terrorism elicit responses from third-party targets? The control of terrorism requires 
comprehending key aspects of terrorism. These aspects of terrorism can be addressed as answers 
to the questions below: 
What “mechanisms” are involved in trying to elicit particular responses from governments, 
groups, organizations, populations, and the media? How do these mechanisms “operate”? 
Why do terrorist attacks have such a strong impact on third-parties and elicit such 
disproportional responses? What is the “leverage of terrorism”? What is the source of this 
leverage?  
Has terrorism been effective in achieving terrorists’ goals? Who controls whether or not 
terrorism advances the attackers’ goals? If terrorism has seldom been effective as a method of 
struggle, why do people choose to use it?  
 
 
I. Terrorist “Mechanisms” for Eliciting Reponses 
 
In order to defend against helping terrorists, third-parties need to understand the different 
ways that attacks are intended to elicit responses from them. These ways can be called 
“mechanisms,” and terrorists use different mechanisms to try to elicit different responses from  
various third-party targets. Major 
mechanisms that terrorists use are 
to coerce, intimidate, interest, 
inspire, influence, and provoke 
third-party groups, organizations, 
and governments (Fig. 2–1). A 



































   
Eliciting Responses Through Coercion. Terrorists use attacks, and the threat of attacks, to 
try to coerce third-parties into taking actions that advance terrorist goals. Frequent targets of 
coercion are governments, international and intergovernmental organizations, the public, 
communities, and the media. For example, terrorist attacks may be intended to coerce a 
government into granting a concession. To illustrate, terrorists may take hostages and demand 
that jailed terrorists be freed as the price of the hostages’ release. Hostage crises put governments 
in the difficult position of giving in to the terrorists’ demands or possibly sacrificing the 
hostages’ lives—and terrorists intend for the government to give in.  
All terrorist attacks have a coercive element because the attack itself contains the threat of 
further attacks (whether spoken or unspoken). Even an intentionally “small” attack that causes 
minor property damage contains this threat—people are aware that there may be other attacks, 
and that these attacks may not be small. Terrorists intend that in order to avert further attacks, 
third-parties will choose to accede to the terrorists’ demands. These demands can be small or 
large, and can be for third-parties to take some action, or to refrain from some action.  
Terrorists may think that a series of attacks—a terrorist campaign—will coerce a government 
or the public into giving in. Groups have used attacks as a way to try to wear out an opponent or 
create enough pressure so that their targets will do what the terrorists want. For example, 
terrorists may be trying to pressure the public, who will in turn pressure the government. The 
IRA used this strategy to try to wear down the endurance of the British people. From 1973 to 
1975 the IRA perpetrated a series of attacks in England—targets included the Tower of London 
and public places in which large numbers of people would be harmed. As an IRA training 
manual stated, one objective of attacks was to cause “as many casualties and deaths as possible” 
so as to create a demand from the public at home to withdraw.1  
Terrorists have used attacks to try to coerce one country into withdrawing from another. 
During the decolonization period after World War II, this strategy was used in a number of 
independence struggles to try to coerce governments into relinquishing control over colonies. In 
a later example, the United States withdrew its peacekeeping forces from Lebanon after a 
massive vehicle bomb killed 241 U.S. servicemen (primarily Marines), and killed 58 French 
paratroopers in a second bombing attack (see photos of the U.S. military barracks before and 











                                                 
1 Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 555. 
 
 
U.S. Marine barracks, Lebanon,  
before the 1983 bombing 
 
 
U.S. Marine barracks, Lebanon,  
after the 1983 bombing 




   
Eliciting Responses Through Intimidation. Terrorists use attacks to try to intimidate a wide 
range of third-party targets—governments, organizations, the public, the media, opponents, 
rivals, and their claimed constituent community. The 2005 London subway bombing can 
illustrate. One purpose of the attack was to intimidate the British government into withdrawing 
military forces from Iraq. Other purposes were to intimidate the British people into pressuring 
their government to withdraw their forces from Iraq, and to intimidate governments worldwide 
into either withdrawing support being provided, or to refrain from giving support.  
The Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama, is an example of a 
terrorist attack intended to intimidate a particular segment of a population. During the U.S. civil 
rights movement, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and other groups used bombings to try to intimidate 
African-Americans so that they would stop pressing for their rights. A particularly egregious 
attack took place a little more than two weeks after Martin Luther King gave his “I Have a 
Dream” speech in the nation’s capital. On September 15, 1963, members of the KKK bombed 
the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church as congregation members were preparing for Sunday 
morning services, wounding more than twenty people and killing four girls. 
Terrorists may try to intimidate particular categories of people such as judges, jurors, and 
journalists. In 2000, ETA bombed a bus, injuring more than sixty people and killing three people 
including a Spanish Supreme Court judge. In Northern Ireland the IRA attacked so many jurors 
that trial by jury became extremely difficult.2 During 1995 and 1996, there were newspaper 
reports of the murder of dozens of journalists in Algeria by the GIA.3 
Terrorists have attempted to intimidate voting in international organizations. In 1976 the 
Jewish Armed Resistance claimed responsibility for bombing the Polish consulate in New York 
for voting for a UN resolution that equated Zionism with racism, and threatened India as well.4 
Rivals and splinter groups may attack each other. Hamas and Fatah sought to intimidate each 
other through attacks as they competed for visibility and influence with the Palestinian people. 
During the summer of 1978, Fatah and a splinter group, the Black June Organization, attacked 
each other on three continents.5  
Terrorists have used attacks against members of their claimed 
constituent community to try to intimidate them and control their 
actions—to suppress dissent; prevent cooperation with the police; and 
ensure continued support such as supplies, intelligence, and safe houses. 
The IRA, for example, threatened people—and their children—with 
knee-capping unless they allowed the IRA to store things in their houses.6  
Terrorists have used violence against group members to maintain 
control and deter defectors. During the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis, 
the terrorist leader reportedly killed two women in the group who 
disagreed about taking children hostage.7  
 
                                                 
2 Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 1983, 14.  
3 Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 1998, 51. (GIA: Armed Islamic Group.) 
4 RAND Chronology, Jan. 16, 1976. 
5 CIA, International Terrorism in 1978, 3. 
6 Richard Clutterbuck, “Terrorism: A Soldier’s View,” in Jennifer Shaw et al., eds., Ten Years of Terrorism (London: 
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1979), 64. 
7 Peter Baker, “Russia Says Siege Leader Brutally Killed 3 Followers,” Washington Post, Sept. 9, 2004. Terrorists 
took more than 1,000 children, parents, and teachers hostage, and caused more than 300 deaths. (Russian Police 
Officer Elbrus Gochichayev carrying Alyona Tskayeva in photo.) 
 
 
Beslan school hostage 
crisis, 2004  




   
Eliciting Responses Through Stimulating Interest and Coercing Attention. Terrorists use 
attacks to try to coerce attention from some groups, and to stimulate interest in others. The 
stimulation of interest, and the coercion of attention, can be seen in Fig. 2–2. 
                  
Fig. 2–2. The Intent to Stimulate Interest and Coerce Attention 
 
                       <------ Positive Interest ----------------- Coercing Attention -----> 
 
                       Supporters                         Neutrals                      Opponents 
       <-------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|--------->    
             Active             Potential          Uncommitted/        Potential         Active 
           Supporters       Supporters         Unconcerned        Opponents     Opponents 
 
                            <---  Positive  <-------> General  <------->   Attention from -------> 
                                     Interest                 Interest                    Anger & Fear        
 
Stimulation of Interest. One purpose of attacks is to stimulate interest in the terrorists’ cause, 
interest that may be increased as the media analyzes possible motives for an attack.8 Attempts to 
stimulate interest are often aimed at those who are neutral, uncommitted, or unconcerned, 
especially those who do not feel personally threatened. In many cases, terrorists are trying to 
induce individuals to examine the terrorists’ cause, look sympathetically on it, and then translate 
this sympathy into political pressure on behalf of the terrorists’ goals. In other instances, 
stimulating attention may bring forth latent sympathy from people who may not have known 
about the terrorists’ cause or grievance, and therefore may become supporters. 
Terrorists also intend that some individuals will wonder what “drove” the attackers into 
committing such heinous acts, and will think that the terrorists “must have been desperate to do 
such a thing.” These kinds of responses benefit terrorists by tending to “excuse” the attacks—but 
nothing drives terrorists into using terrorism—terrorism is a choice from among alternatives. 
Coercion of Attention. Terrorists use attacks to try to force their cause onto the public agenda 
and thereby achieve a gain for their cause in some way. One purpose may be to coerce attention 
so that third-parties will examine—and then redress—alleged grievances. George Habash 
expressed this technique for the Palestinian cause when he said, “We force people to ask what is 
going on, and so they get to know our tragic situation.”9 Terrorists intend that those threatened 
will be fearful enough to look into the terrorists’ grievances and goals, and as a result, decide that 
the terrorists “have a point,” and therefore provide political support for the terrorists’ cause. 
Violence and bloodshed command attention, and terrorist violence attracts particular attention 
because of its image of slaughter and destruction, an image that terrorists try to magnify through 
the media (as an FLN member said, “We must have blood in the headlines of all the 
newspapers”).10 Governments feel forced to pay attention because they are responsible for the 
security of their populations. Opponents are likely to feel threatened both physically and 
politically, and members of the public are likely to feel that they must pay attention for their own 
physical safety, and because attacks can cause so much disruption in daily life.  
 
                                                 
8 For example, after the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, there were many media analyses of issues relating to 
Chechnya, to which the alleged bombers had ties. 
9 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 33. (George Habash 
founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)). 
10 Ramdane Abane, quoted in Mohamed Lebjaoui, Verites sur la revolution algerienne (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), 77, 
quoted in Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism, 1978, 94. 




   
Eliciting Responses Through Inspiration. Terrorists use attacks to try to inspire a number of 
responses from third-parties, particularly supporters, sympathizers, and allies. Terrorists are 
trying to inspire supporters to greater fervor, sympathizers to become active supporters, and 
allies to be bolder. George Habash noted that the spirit of “my people” would shoot “sky-high” 
after a successful attack (or “operation,” as he phrased it).11 Supporters may feel that the 
terrorists are “striking a blow” on their behalf, a response that terrorists seek to elicit. 
Terrorists intend for attacks to inspire diasporas to exert political influence in their present 
countries on behalf of the terrorists and their goals (and to send funds). Terrorists may also be 
trying to induce sympathetic governments to provide resources and support. 
Attacks can be intended to inspire a fighting spirit in a particular community, or to overcome 
the community’s self-image as helpless. Khaled al-Hassan explained that Fatah’s attacks were 
intended to create a fighting spirit in the Palestinians, so that they would arise and fight.12 
Attacks are also intended to inspire members of the terrorist group itself, for terrorist groups 
need “successes” to maintain morale. Blunders do little to attract new members and funds; for 
example, the 1993 World Trade Center attackers were caught after trying to get their deposit 
back for the rental van they had blown up in the attack. 
Terrorist attacks can be designed to inspire emulation from supporters and the like-minded. 
The videos that suicide bombers sometimes made before their attacks are examples (see photo of 
terrorists holding up the names of suicide bombers).13  
Attacks can be intended to inspire hope. Terrorists have 
assassinated prominent authority figures to show that even 
the most powerful individuals can be attacked. As a 
Russian revolutionary wrote, one attack had upset the entire 
governmental machinery and made the “colossus tremble,” 
and therefore “the people observe that the monster is not so 
terrible as they thought [and] hope is born in their hearts.”14 
The strategy of terrorist attacks as inspiration—the 
“propaganda of the deed”—has a long history. Nineteenth 
century Russian revolutionaries thought that terrorist  
assassinations would arouse the population by showing that the government could be challenged, 
and thereby acting as a catalyst for revolution.15 Timothy McVeigh apparently thought that 
bombing the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City would inspire the American people to 
rise up against the federal government.16  
 
                                                 
11 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 34. 
12 Guy Bechor, Lexicon of the PLO (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1991), 279, quoted in Ariel 
Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism & Political Violence (Winter 1993): 235. 
13 U.S. State Dept., Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 57. 
14 Peter Kropotkin, “The Spirit of Revolt,” in Emile Capouya and Keitha Tompkins, eds., The Essential Kropotkin 
(New York: Liveright, 1975), 7. In addition, some commentators pointed out that one purpose for al Qaeda attacks 
against the United States was to try to show that America was not as powerful as may have been perceived. 
15 Nineteenth century anarchists developed the idea of the “propaganda of the deed” as a means of arousing the 
popular conscience, and the realization of an idea through actions. See, for example, Vera Figner, Memoires d’une 
revolutionnaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1930), 206, quoted in Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” in Crenshaw, Explaining 
Terrorism, 2011, 119. 
16 “Opening Statement by the Government,” April 24, 1997, U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, Criminal 





Jordanian Islamists hold banners 
showing names of Palestinian 
suicide bombers, 2002 
 
 




   
Eliciting Responses Through Influence. In the strategy of influence, terrorists are trying to 
manipulate viewpoints and attitudes so that third-party targets will take actions that benefit the 
terrorists, and advance their goals. Through attacks, terrorists try to influence a wide range of 
third-party targets including supporters, neutrals, and opponents.  
The strategy of influence is particularly intended to elicit perceptions of legitimacy. Terrorists 
seek legitimacy to gain recognition, public standing, and political and material support for their 
cause. The achievement of political goals usually requires the willing support of at least part of 
the population, and legitimacy is crucial for obtaining this support. As Martha Crenshaw pointed 
out: “Legitimacy requires recognition by a significant public, and ideally by government 
decisionmakers as well, of the salience and the justice of the terrorists’ cause. What the terrorists 
want must be seen as both important and right.”17 Therefore, an important key for terrorists is to 
be seen as legitimate. For example, if terrorists can get members of the public to see the 
terrorists’ goal as a “just cause,” this can help attract recruits and stimulate supporters to form 
support networks among the population. As George Habash said, “Obviously we are concerned 
with world opinion. When it is on your side it means you are in the right.”18 Terrorists also seek 
to change or reinforce the attitude of key groups such as decisionmakers and the media. 
Terrorist groups need resources to pursue their goals, sustain operations, and maintain their 
group, and the availability of these resources depends a great deal on how the public perceives 
groups and their goals. Few terrorist groups have a state sponsor or private sources of income, 
and therefore usually need financial support from a population or populations—and few people 
willingly support groups they see as illegitimate.  
Terrorists face difficulties in obtaining legitimacy because their views are often extreme, and 
because most people consider their methods heinous. Therefore, they try to cloak their methods 
through such means as using the term “expropriations” for robberies, and publishing manifestos 
in which they seek to explain their goals, justify attacks, and appeal for support.  
The Use of Subtlety. Terrorism is intended to induce changes in attitudes, which in turn can 
result in action by third-party targets. The technique of influence usually involves subtlety, such 
as by seeking to implant thoughts and perceptions in third-parties. An early Russian anarchist 
wrote, “By actions which compel general attention, the new idea seeps into people’s minds and 
wins converts. One such act may, in a few days, make more propaganda than thousands of 
pamphlets.”19 The Red Army Faction later echoed this idea: “The bombs against the suppressive 
apparatus are…thrown into the consciousness of the masses.”20  
Terrorist attempts to influence others pose dangers that third-parties need to be aware of. Paul 
Wilkinson pointed out that terrorists are very skilled at disseminating illusions among the public, 
political leaders, and other groups, adding that “even though terrorist propagandists have not 
generally succeeded in getting their myths and doctrines generally accepted,” they often cause 
confusion that undermines “the political will and unity needed to oppose terrorism effectively.”21 
 
                                                 
17 Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 1983, 27. 
18 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 33. Being seen as 
legitimate helps terrorists to try to justify their actions in their own eyes, for terrorists may experience guilt for the 
harm they cause. 
19 Peter Kropotkin, “The Spirit of Revolt,” in Emile Capouya and Keitha Tompkins, eds., The Essential Kropotkin 
(New York: Liveright, 1975), 7. 
20 Der Spiegel, no. 23 (1972), quoted in Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 95. 
21 Wilkinson, “Ethical Defences of Terrorism—Defending the Indefensible,” Terrorism & Political Violence (Jan. 
1989): 12, 8. 




   
Influence Deception Techniques. Terrorists use a number of deception techniques in their 
attempts to influence third-party targets to take particular actions. Three key techniques follow. 
Focus on goals, not methods. Terrorists try to trick people into focusing on the terrorists’ 
goals rather than their methods. The objective is to get people to acknowledge that the goals are 
legitimate even if they think the method being used is abhorrent. If, as a result, even some people 
decide that the terrorists’ goal is just or that their grievance is legitimate, the terrorists have 
gained. If terrorists can get enough people to agree with the terrorist group’s goal, more tools 
may become available for the group’s struggle. For example, with enough political support, a 
group may be able to foment an insurgency, or win an election as Hamas did in 2006.  
By claiming a political motive, terrorists try to present themselves as unselfishly pursuing 
altruistic goals. The claim of a political goal can attract sympathy and support, and inhibit 
counteraction by governments, international organizations, and other third-parties. To effectively 
influence target groups, terrorists try to present their goals or ideology in terms that target groups 
can support. Frequent ploys are to couch terrorist goals in terms widely-perceived as legitimate, 
such as “freedom,” “justice,” and “liberation,” and to describe themselves in terms such as 
freedom fighters, brotherhood, liberation army, and soldiers of God. However, regardless of how 
they describe themselves, terrorists are using unlawful means. If they use civilian imagery such 
as “brotherhood,” their acts of murder, kidnapping, and extortion violate civil laws in almost all 
countries. If they use military imagery or claim to be soldiers or “freedom fighters,” the 
intentional targeting of civilians makes terrorists de facto war criminals under the laws of war. 
The trappings of statehood. Terrorists often try to enhance perceptions of their legitimacy by 
adopting the trappings of statehood. Examples are issuing so-called “communiqués,” and 
imitating government functions such as the administration of “justice” through “people’s courts.” 
The technique of using the trappings of statehood can serve several purposes. One purpose is to 
create the illusion of power by trying to get people to associate the terrorists with the power of 
the State, since States have a claim to the only legitimate use of force and violence. Another 
purpose can be to create the impression that the terrorists are the legitimate representatives of a 
claimed constituent community—if a group is seen as representing a political entity, nation, or 
country, the group’s actions are more likely to be seen as legitimate. (Yet note that most terrorist 
claims to represent a constituent community are spurious: for example, ETA, in the early 1990s 
had the support of only 6–7.5 percent of the Basque population.22) 
Appear powerful. One goal of the technique of influence is to project an image of power and 
determination. Terrorists have used a number of techniques to try to project power, and the 
technique can operate in a number of ways. Though the great majority of terrorist groups are 
very small, they often adopt names that imply great size and power, such as “army.” A 
particularly shocking attack can magnify the appearance of a group’s strength in the public view. 
After an attack, several groups may claim responsibility for the same attack to try to enhance the 
perception of their determination in the public’s eyes. 
Terrorists also try to create the illusion of a broad base of support. When negotiating with the 
British in the 1970s, the IRA used terrorist attacks to try to make it appear that they were 
negotiating from a position of strength.  
 
                                                 
22 See Wilkinson, “Observations on the Relationship of Freedom and Terrorism,” in Howard, ed., Terrorism: Roots, 
Impact, Responses, 1992, 157. 




   
Eliciting Responses Through Provocation. The provocation of third-parties is a major 
terrorist technique, and a technique that terrorists use for a number of purposes. In this strategy, 
the attackers try to provoke third-parties into taking self-damaging actions, such as to overreact, 
compromise their values, and make mistakes.23 Other provocation objectives can be to militarize 
a situation, induce international involvement, or polarize a community. 
Through the provocation technique, terrorists are trying to induce opponents to take actions 
that will weaken themselves and strengthen the terrorists. This is a subtle and sophisticated 
technique—terrorists are not seeking to destroy their opponents directly, but instead are seeking 
to trick them into damaging themselves and aiding the terrorists’ goal. This technique, therefore, 
poses particular dangers for third-party targets, and the technique is often not well understood, 
which makes it easier to fall into the trap. 
Terrorists intend for responses to provocation to change the relative capability between 
themselves and their opponents—the opponent is weakened and the terrorists are strengthened. 
The provocation of a government to overreact can illustrate. Governments are usually vastly 
stronger than any terrorist group, and can mobilize significant resources not available to 
terrorists. These government strengths are in many areas, including legitimacy and public 
support. Most governments, especially democratic governments, have widely-recognized claims 
to legitimacy that individuals and nonstate actors—particularly terrorist groups—seldom have. 
But if terrorists can provoke a government to overreact or act in ways seen as illegitimate, the 
government has weakened itself by reducing its legitimacy and public support. The same 
overreaction may also result in the terrorists gaining strength through such means as increased 
public support, donations, recruits, and international sympathy. In this way, the relative strength 
between the terrorists and the government can shift in the terrorists’ favor. Fig. 2–3 illustrates a 

















There are a number of provocation strategies. A discussion of several applications follows.  
 
                                                 
23 See, for example, LaFree, “Using Open Source Data to Counter Common Myths about Terrorism,” in 
Criminologists on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2011, 431–435, and the empirical research at START 




























   
Provoke Opponents to Overreact. Terrorists have used attacks to try to provoke opponents 
into overreacting. One technique is below:  
 
Terrorists deliberately commit an act that they know is outrageous, intending that their 
opponents will respond with actions that are even worse. 
 
To achieve their goals, terrorist groups need legitimacy and the popular support that comes 
with it. However, rather than work to build legitimacy, terrorists can try to goad opponents into 
taking actions that will reduce their own legitimacy, and place themselves closer to the moral 
level of the terrorists.24 Terrorists want people to think that a government or community is no 
better than the terrorists.  
Governments are often the targets of provocation to overreact. A terrorist attack demonstrates 
that the government cannot protect its citizens; challenges the government’s monopoly on the 
use of force; and undermines the rule of law, which the government is responsible to uphold. 
Therefore, the government is likely to see an attack as an act that demands a strong response. 
Public and media reactions can intensify this pressure on governments.  
But if the government overreacts, there can be serious consequences. One consequence is that 
public attention may shift away from the terrorist atrocities and to the government’s actions. As 
a result, the government’s actions may overshadow the terrorist attack. Terrorists will try to keep 
this focus on the government, and exploit any negative effects of the government’s overreaction. 
For example, if the government responds with forceful operations against the terrorists and 
collateral damage occurs, terrorists will try to exploit that damage for propaganda and recruiting 
purposes, and to garner domestic and international sympathy. Terrorist casualties can then be 
presented as martyrs—an image that can be amplified by emphasizing any illegal acts that 
security forces may commit. 
Overreaction can result in other consequences such as increased support for the terrorists. In 
many countries only a very small percentage of the population may support the terrorists, but any 
government overreaction is likely to increase that number by channeling new recruits into the 
group and adding supporters.  
The overreaction may also be seen as justifying the terrorists’ criticism of governments. One 
purpose of the 9/11 attacks was to provoke the United States and other democracies into a 
massive overreaction that terrorists could use to support their claim that the West, especially the 
United States, was trying to destroy Islam.  
Another consequence of overreaction is that the government can weaken itself by 
undermining its own legitimacy domestically and internationally. The public is generally 
repelled by terrorist attacks, but if the government uses similar tactics, terrorists gain. A 
government’s overreaction is likely to reduce public confidence, and this trust can erode further 
if the government’s responses are also ineffective. Loss of international legitimacy has negative 
consequences—for example, terrorists may be emboldened if they think that international 
criticism will constrain a government’s response. If the government conducts military reprisals 
without respect for the principles of international law, the State has placed itself closer to the 
terrorists’ moral level. 
 
                                                 
24 Some groups have attempted to build legitimacy through such means as political wings and social services, while at 
the same time perpetrating terrorist attacks. 




   
Provoke a General Repression. Terrorist attacks can be intended to provoke a general 
government repression of the population. After a terrorist attack, the government usually cannot  
clearly identify and find the attackers, and 
therefore, has difficulty in targeting only the 
perpetrators. The government may feel that if it 
is to err, it should err on the side of ensuring 
the physical safety of the population. The 
government may, therefore, respond to attacks 
with repressive measures that affect the entire 
population, including those not associated with 
the terrorists. In response to terrorist bombings, 
kidnappings, and sabotage during 1968 and 
1969, the Brazilian government sometimes 
arrested thousands of people after an attack.  
Many terrorists understand the strategy of 
provoking repression, which appears in 19th 
and 20th century terrorist and revolutionary  
writings. A summarized excerpt below from the widely-read Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla 
describes an intended process of provoking repression: 
 
[As a result of attacks] the government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The 
police networks, house searches, arrests of suspects and innocent people, and closing off of 
streets make life in the city unbearable. The government embarks on massive political 
persecution. Political assassinations and police terror become routine. The people refuse to 
collaborate with the authorities, and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust, 
incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of 
its opponents.25 
 
Repressive measures may erode democratic institutions and diminish citizen freedoms. 
Secretary of State George Shultz expressed this effect: “[Terrorists] can even be satisfied if a 
government responds to terror by clamping down on individual rights and freedoms.”26 
A government can also use an attack as an excuse to crack down on opposition, dissent, and 
liberties. After the 9/11 attacks, a great deal of concern was expressed that governments were 
using the attacks to suppress dissent in their own countries.27 Concern was expressed in the 
OSCE—in which all member States were democracies—that the “war on terrorism” was being 
used as an excuse to suppress legitimate expressions of dissent and limit fundamental freedoms, 
particularly the freedoms of religion and belief, expression, and assembly.28 
 
                                                 
25 Carlos Marighela, Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, 1969, www.marxists.org (Aug. 2, 2011), and “Handbook of 
Urban Guerilla Warfare,” in John Butt and Rosemary Sheed, trans., For the Liberation of Brazil (Baltimore: Penguin 
Books, 1971), 95. The manual was widely translated and became a guide for many militant groups. (“Urban guerilla” 
means terrorist.) 
26 Secretary of State George Shultz, address, “Terrorism and the Modern World,” U.S. State Department Bulletin, 
Dec. 1984. The terms “individual rights” and “human rights” are generally used interchangeably in this monograph. 
27 Human Rights Watch, “Opportunism in the Face of Tragedy,” www.hrw.org (Dec. 29, 2005). 
28 OSCE, Preventing and Combating Terrorism: The Human Dimension, 2003, para. 4.1. (OSCE—Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. Prior to Jan. 1, 1995, the OSCE was the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and this monograph generally uses “OSCE” for clarity.) 
“False positives” and “false negatives.” In the 
context of terrorism, “false positives” are people 
mistakenly identified as terrorists or terrorist 
suspects, and “false negatives” are terrorists not 
identified as such. A problem for governments in 
dealing with terrorism is that in order to identify 
terrorists, government measures may involve many 
people who are not associated with terrorists. 
Some government measures can be compared to a 
“net” to catch certain fish (that is, terrorists). The 
government must determine the size of any “net,” 
how wide to spread it, and the size of the mesh. If 
the mesh is too large, terrorists may slip through 
(“false negatives”). But if the mesh is very small, 
people will be wrongly identified as terrorists or as 
connected to terrorists (“false positives”). 
 




   
Provoke Repression of a Group. Terrorist attacks can be intended to provoke a government 
into repressing a particular group, and drive a wedge between that group and the rest of society, 
and between that group and the government. After an attack, the government may institute 
security measures that affect the general public, but other measures may target individuals who 
share characteristics with the terrorists such as ethnicity or religion.29 Terrorists intend for the 
government to mistreat members of this group, who may then lose confidence in the government 
and shift their support to the terrorists. The government may target not only extremists but 
moderates, who may then become radicalized. In some cases the alternative that the terrorists are 
offering may appear to be more attractive, and in other cases some members of the group may 
think that only the terrorists can provide protection. In 1983 Martha Crenshaw addressed the 
technique of provocation as follows: 
 
In the initial stage of terrorism, it is difficult to acquire useful information about the 
conspiracy. Ignorant of who the terrorists are—and they are typically a small number—the 
government is tempted to arrest the opponents it knows and to arrest indiscriminately. 
Suspects from familiar opposition movements are arrested, interrogated, even held in 
preventive detention. Few of those caught off guard are terrorists (who are the only ones 
prepared for repression). The net effect is to promote recruitment into the terrorist 
organization. British internment centers in Northern Ireland were frequently dubbed ideal 
recruiting camps for the IRA. Prisoners who were not members when they went in were 
when they came out. When the terrorist organization is affiliated with a particular ethnic 
or religious community, government arrests and interrogations risk appearing 
discriminatory and unfair, increasing distrust of the government and sympathy for the 
terrorists, a polarization particularly evident in Northern Ireland and on the West Bank 
under Israeli rule.30 
 
Yet the support of the group that shares key characteristics with the terrorists may be the group 
that is most vital to effective counterterrorism efforts, such as by providing information, denying 
support to terrorists, and having language skills that are needed and may be in short supply. 
Governments need the assistance from the community closest to the terrorists, and measures 
targeting this group are likely to alienate members.  
Attackers sometimes intend for the population or a particular group to lose confidence in the 
government by inducing that government to act outside the law. The 9/11 attacks can illustrate—
one purpose of the attacks was to provoke a government repression of U.S. Muslims so severe 
that they would become alienated and fearful of the government. Had this happened, al Qaeda 
would have been able to use any repression as a recruiting tool, and to try to diminish the United 
States’ legitimacy. As another example, during the week after the July 2005 terrorist bombings in 
London, more than 100 incidents of threats and attacks against Muslims were reported, including 
the murder of one Muslim, and the damaging of several mosques.31 These illegal actions gave al 
Qaeda opportunities that the terrorist group could exploit, and made Britain’s Muslims fearful.  
 
                                                 
29 See, for example, U.S. Dept. of Justice, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held 
on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector 
General, 2003. 
30 Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 1983, 19–20. 
31 Glenn Frankel and Ellen Knickmeyer, “For Britain’s Muslims, a Fear Realized,” Washington Post, July 14, 2005. 




   
Provoke Repression of Debate. Terrorist attacks can be intended to provoke repression of 
debate. After the 9/11 attacks, when concerns emerged regarding the possible loss of civil 
liberties, Attorney General John Ashcroft made statements in congressional testimony that may 
have stifled debate:  
 
To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: 
Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. 
They give ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends. They 
encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.32  
 
These words may have stifled debate because to give aid to enemies is the act of a traitor, and 
to remain “silent in the face of evil” is the act of a coward.  
Debate on policy may be stifled since government critics can be labeled as “terrorist 
sympathizers” or even traitors. When Andrew Bacevich publicly opposed the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, he was accused of providing “aid and comfort to the enemy,” and when his son was killed 
fighting in Iraq, Bacevich received messages that his antiwar writings had directly resulted in his 
son’s death.33 Bacevich noted that the accusation of providing comfort to the enemy had been 
“repeated endlessly by those keen to allow President [George W.] Bush a free hand in waging his 
war. By encouraging ‘the terrorists,’ opponents of the Iraq conflict increase the risk to U.S. 
troops. Although the First Amendment protects antiwar critics from being tried for treason, it 
provides no protection for the hardly less serious charge of failing to support the troops—today’s 
civic equivalent of dereliction of duty.”34 
A population may respond to attacks with increased solidarity and loyalty to the government, 
but that response may also lead people to view critics as being disloyal. This view may dampen 
debate if criticism of the government becomes linked to terrorism in the public view. After a 
newspaper article urged readers to be open and direct about the Iraq War, the author was 
inundated with emails from people who wrote that they were afraid to speak out because they 
might be accused of being un-American, unpatriotic, or unsupportive of the troops.35  
President George W. Bush did accuse critics of not supporting the troops. In 2005 Bush said, 
“Some Democrats and anti-war critics are now claiming we manipulated the intelligence and 
misled the American people about why we went to war…. These baseless attacks send the wrong 
signal to our troops and to an enemy that is questioning America’s will. As our troops fight a 
ruthless enemy determined to destroy our way of life, they deserve to know that their elected 
leaders who voted to send them to war continue to stand behind them.”36  
Dampening debate can increase the chances of mistakes and the adoption of poor policy. 
Good policy depends on foreseeing potential drawbacks, which open discussion can help 
identify. And when passions are high may be the time when people most need to hear all sides of 
a question or policy debate. 
 
                                                 
32 Attorney General John Ashcroft, Senate Judiciary Committee testimony, Dec. 6, 2001. 
33 Andrew J. Bacevich, “I Lost My Son to a War I Oppose. We Were Both Doing Our Duty,” Washington Post, May 
27, 2007. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Diana Abu-Jaber, “The War, As Told to Us,” Washington Post, May 8, 2003. 
36 President George W. Bush, address, “President Commemorates Veterans Day, Discusses War on Terror,” Nov. 
11, 2005. (The context was the questioning of the administration’s rationale for invading Iraq.) 




   
Provoke Government Mistakes. Terrorists intend for opponents, in responding to attacks, to 
make mistakes on which terrorists can capitalize. Governments are particular targets of this 
strategy. In the aftermath of an attack, the government is usually under pressure to respond 
quickly, but seldom has complete information on which to act. National Security Adviser Robert 
McFarlane noted the pressure that terrorist attacks can place on governments, and wrote that 
during the TWA Flight 847 hijacking crisis, the Reagan administration found that “reason or 
logic carried little weight in the charged atmosphere of violence, stress, and excitement created 
by a terrorist attack.”37 Martha Crenshaw noted that government leaders may feel that they must 
be seen as doing something in response to terrorist attacks: 
 
The suspense and horror of terrorism make it instantly newsworthy…. Public officials are 
acutely aware that an act of terrorism will precipitate a crowd of television reporters with 
cameras, waiting to broadcast the terms of the government’s response. Even if inaction—
neither giving in nor intervening with force—should be the best choice, governments find it 
hard not to act. Thus the public reaction to terrorism may limit the government’s options, 
encourage action either to offset an impression of weakness or resolve the crisis at high cost, 
and increase the cost of not acting.38 
 
 
Under pressure, the government can easily take hasty actions that backfire, misallocate 
resources, and adopt counterproductive policies. Terrorists will try to exploit any mistakes, and 
errors can reduce a government’s legitimacy and public support. 
Governments can misallocate and waste resources in response 
to pressure and the perceived need for rapid responses. After the 
9/11 attacks, the U.S. government established the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), and an audit later questioned over 
40 percent of the $741 million spent to assess and hire airport 
passenger screeners (see chart).39 Over-protective measures can 
magnify the importance of the terrorists and the threat they pose, 
and absorb many resources including funds, attention, labor, and 
equipment, and thus the government has reduced its capabilities. 
Many expenses can be recurring: in 2003, the FBI used a $25 
million grant to give computer kits to local bomb squads so that 
they could communicate, but offices stopped using them because 
of the monthly wireless and maintenance costs.40 
In response to each major attack, governments are likely to enact new legislation, which has 
costs. Attacks, especially repeated attacks, pressure policymakers to propose continually farther-
reaching counterterrorism measures. Over time, the cumulative effect of legislation may be 
increased confusion, and cumbersome requirements that hamper counterterrorism efforts. 
Responses to each major terrorist attack in the United States have included an investigating 
commission, hearings, reorganization of parts of the executive branch, and new legislation. 
 
                                                 
37 Robert C. McFarlane, in Neil C. Livingston and Terrell E. Arnold, Fighting Back (Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1986), foreword.  
38 Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 1983, 16–17. 
39 Scott Higham and Robert O’Harrow, “The High Cost of a Rush to Security,” Washington Post, June 30, 2005. 
One item questioned was for “$5.4 million claimed for nine months’ salary for the chief executive of an ‘event 
logistics’ firm that received a contract before it was incorporated and went out of business after the contract ended.” 
40 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Upkeep of Security Devices a Burden,” Washington Post, Aug. 13, 2007. 
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Provoke Destabilized Conditions. Terrorists can use attacks to provoke destabilized 
conditions that can work toward their benefit and weaken opponents. A destabilized situation can 
create opportunities for terrorists, and for others as well. 
Terrorists can use attacks to weaken a government by creating a climate of fear, instability, 
and insecurity that will stir up popular discontent and undermine government credibility. Attacks 
endanger citizens, who may respond with reduced confidence in the government. By 
demonstrating that they can attack at any time, terrorists may be trying to make the government 
appear ineffective and unable to provide security. Early Russian revolutionaries thought that 
periodic attacks would undermine the government’s prestige, and exhaust and paralyze the 
government as it became worn down by continuous tension, followed false trails, and struggled 
against “an invisible, impalpable, omnipresent enemy.”41  
A destabilized situation can create opportunities for terrorists. In an atmosphere of disorder 
and insecurity, ordinary crimes can be perpetrated more easily––and since many groups rely on 
such means as robbery and extortion for funds, destabilized conditions can make perpetrating 
such crimes easier. Organized syndicates such as drug dealers and arms smugglers can also 
operate more freely, and coordination between terrorist groups and organized crime is easier. 
Destabilized conditions from terrorist attacks can create opportunities in other areas. 
Bureaucracies and companies may take advantage of terrorist attacks to gain larger budgets or 
sales. Power may become more centralized as the government responds to terrorism, and power 
within the government may shift to agencies such as the military, police, or intelligence services. 
The general population may form vigilante or paramilitary groups, thus weakening the 
government’s presumed monopoly on the use of force. 
A government may use an attack as an excuse to pursue particular policy goals. For example, 
during 2002 and early 2003, governments, commentators, and analysts expressed concern that 
the Bush administration appeared to be using the 9/11 attacks to pursue a policy of forceful 
regime change in Iraq. After the invasion, Paul Pillar, who had been in charge of coordinating all 
of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding Iraq, wrote that the administration had 
undertaken the military operation in Iraq “primarily for reasons other than counterterrorism.”42 
Special interests may try to co-opt attacks for their own purposes, or promote self-serving 
policies under the guise of fighting terrorism. Agencies and companies may repackage their 
existing programs and priorities in counterterrorism terms. Joseph Cirincione wrote that after the 
9/11 attacks, some organizations were using the “tragedy to justify their existing programs, 
slapping an ‘antiterrorism’ label on missile defense and across-the-board budget increases.”43 
Under the pressure of destabilized situations, extremist policies may be more difficult to 
oppose, and the adoption of such policies may benefit terrorists by dividing societies and 
destroying the middle-ground of compromise. Secretary of State George Shultz noted, “The 
terrorist succeeds if a government responds to violence with repressive, polarizing behavior.”44  
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42 Paul R. Pillar, “Counterterrorism After Al Qaeda,” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004): 108. See also Michael 
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44 Secretary of State George Shultz, address, “Terrorism and the Modern World,” U.S. State Department Bulletin, 
Dec. 1984. 




   
Provoke a Stronger or Weaker Government. Terrorism has been used because the attackers 
think their own government is too strong, or that their government is too weak.  
The political goal of a more authoritarian government. Terrorist attacks can be intended to 
provoke demands for a more authoritarian government. In 1980 Spanish ultra-rightists conducted 
attacks against Basque targets because they believed that the government’s response to ETA 
terrorism was not forceful enough.45 Italian fascists used terrorist bombings to try to create an 
atmosphere of crisis and provoke a government crackdown. As Ariel Merari explained: 
 
In order to create an atmosphere of disorder and insecurity, the terrorists resorted to 
random bombings of public places. Thus, the Italian neo-fascist Ordine Nero (Black 
Order) group placed a bomb on a train on 5 August 1974, arbitrarily killing 12 passengers 
and wounding 48. Another ultra-right Italian group, the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei, was 
charged with the bombing of the Bologna railway station in August 1980, which caused 
the death of 84 and the wounding of 200.46 
 
Some terrorist attacks are intended to provoke the election of a government that will take a 
harder line against terrorism. Terrorists may believe that the new government will overreact, and 
thus enable terrorists to try to justify their attacks and further retaliation, and mobilize supporters. 
Some Hamas attacks against Israel were seen as having been perpetrated for this purpose.47 
The political goal of a less authoritarian government. 
Terrorism has been used because the attackers think a 
government is too strong. Timothy McVeigh considered 
the U.S. government to be a tyranny, and apparently 
thought that his 1995 attack on the Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City would spark a revolution by 
the American people. In his car was a piece of paper that 
read in part, “When the government fears the people, 
there is liberty,” and beneath those words he wrote, 
“Maybe now there will be liberty.”48  
Some terrorist groups have believed that democracies 
were in reality police states, and intended for attacks to 
trick the government into “taking off its mask” and 
revealing its true nature. The Red Army Faction thought that in responding to attacks, the West 
German government would show its “true fascist face,” and as a result, the population would 
reject the government, and adopt a communist government.49 
 
                                                 
45 CIA, Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, 14. In addition, there may be a risk of a military coup or takeover 
from the right, a response that was greatly feared in Spain in response to Basque terrorism. See Crenshaw, 
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46 Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism & Political Violence (Winter 1993): 236. 
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Provoke International Political Involvement. Attacks may be intended to provoke the 
political involvement of other countries, or “internationalize” struggles. In some cases, terrorists 
may be trying to make an “example” of a country, or disrupt its relations with other countries. In 
1985 the Abu Nidal Organization perpetrated more than a dozen incidents in Western Europe, 
one purpose of which was to try to disrupt Israel’s foreign relations.50 
In some cases, terrorists have perpetrated attacks in countries with no connection to the issues 
involved in order to try to draw these countries into the contest. In their struggle against the 
Yugoslav government, Croatian terrorists perpetrated terrorist attacks in many countries during 
the early 1970s. One campaign was in Sweden: attacks included assassinating the Yugoslav 
ambassador to Sweden, seizing the Yugoslav embassy, and attacking Swedish aircraft.51  
In other cases, attacks can be intended to coerce third-party governments into pressuring the 
terrorists’ opponent. In 1973 terrorists took the U.S. ambassador and consul-general to Haiti 
hostage to pressure the Haitian government into releasing political prisoners.52  
The strategy of “internationalizing” struggles, and bringing about the political involvement of 
other countries, has a long history. The Irgun’s struggle in British-administered Palestine can 
illustrate: a major purpose of the 1946 bombing of the King David Hotel was to attract 
worldwide attention to the Irgun’s struggle for the establishment of Israel.53 Regarding this 
strategy, Irgun leader Menachem Begin later wrote as follows: 
 
Israel, in consequence of our revolt, resembled a glass house. The world was looking into 
it with ever-increasing interest and could see most of what was happening inside. That is 
very largely why we were able to pursue our struggle until we brought it to its successful 
climax in 1946–1947. Arms were our weapons of attack; the transparency of the “glass” 
was our shield of defense…. We wanted more and more people to interest themselves in 
what was going on.54  
 
The Irgun’s strategy was successful in inducing governments to 
exert pressure on Britain to withdraw from Palestine, and 
numerous revolutionary and terrorist groups subsequently 
emulated this strategy.55 In the 1950s, the FLN manifesto included 
the objective of internationalizing their struggle by making “the 
Algerian problem a reality for the entire world.”56 The head of the 
Algerian mission in Morocco emphasized the importance of 
international opinion, and noted that international public opinion 
was “sometimes worth more than a fleet of jet fighters.”57 The 
Munich massacre at the 1972 Olympics was an attempt to 
internationalize the Palestinian struggle (see photo).  
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55 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2006, 46. 
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Provoke Military Involvement. Terrorists can use attacks to try to militarize a situation by 
provoking a government into using the armed forces against them. If terrorists can succeed in 
eliciting this response, the government may have transformed a political situation into a military 
one. The government has also elevated the status of the terrorists, and some people may then see 
terrorists and soldiers as morally equal (which they are not). In addition, using military forces 
may cause problems for the government in determining the treatment of captured terrorists.  
Terrorist attacks can be intended to provoke international military involvement such as 
military intervention, the expansion of a conflict beyond a country’s borders, or interstate war. In 
one instance, Jewish extremists planned to blow up the Temple Mount (the Dome of the Rock) in 
order to spark a “cataclysmic war” between Jews and Muslims.58 In another instance, Fatah 
planned to provoke war between Israel and the Arab States, a strategy that Fatah member Khaled 
al-Hassan explained as follows: 
 
The armed struggle technique was ostensibly simple. We called this tactic “actions and 
reactions,” because we intended to carry out actions, the Israelis would react and the Arab 
states, according to our plan, would support us and wage war on Israel. If the Arab 
governments would not go to war, the Arab peoples would support us and would force the 
Arab governments to support us.59 
 
One objective of the 9/11 attacks may have been to provoke a military response. Brian Jenkins 
hypothesized on al Qaeda’s strategy in perpetrating the 9/11 attacks as follows:  
 
Al Qaeda’s leadership probably anticipated that the attack would provoke a major military 
response, which it could then portray as an assault on Islam. This would inspire thousands 
of additional volunteers and could provoke the entire Islamic world to rise up against the 
West. Governments that opposed the people’s wrath, quislings to western imperialism, 
would fall. The West would be destroyed.60 
 
In some cases, terrorist attacks have sparked wars and wider conflicts. The assassination of 
the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand (and his wife), was the spark that set 
off World War I. In June 1982 the Black June Organization attempted to assassinate the Israeli 
ambassador in London, an act that Israel cited as justification for its invasion of Lebanon three 
days later.61 Terrorist attacks such as in Kashmir and Lebanon have been the catalyst for war. 
The 9/11 attacks sparked a military invasion of Afghanistan to end the safe haven in which al 
Qaeda was able to plan and train for terrorist attacks. And even if not intended by the terrorists, 
attacks can generate so much instability that other countries may intervene to restore order or 
protect a particular group. 
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Provoke Democracies into Compromising Their Values. Terrorists have used attacks to try to 
provoke democracies into taking actions that compromise their values. Leftwing groups used this 
technique in their efforts to establish communist governments, and groups such as al Qaeda used 
this technique in their efforts to establish theocracies.  
Sometimes the comment has been made that terrorists hate democracies for their freedoms; 
for example, President George W. Bush said, “America is under attack…because we love 
freedom.”62 Though most people in the world desire freedom, some terrorists do in fact hate 
democratic freedoms, and use terrorist attacks to provoke democracies into attacking their own 
freedoms. In response to the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government took some actions that damaged 
the country’s freedoms, and some citizens took actions not in keeping with democratic values. A 
terrorist attack often arouses an instinctive impulse to respond in kind, a response that terrorists 
intend, and some Americans responded as al Qaeda intended by breaking the law and attacking 
Americans of Middle Eastern descent, U.S. Muslims, South Asians, and others mistaken for 
Muslims. According to FBI statistics, incidents of bias including hate crimes, assaults, and 
vandalism against these groups jumped exponentially from 28 in 2000 to 481 in 2001, with the 
vast majority of the 2001 attacks taking place between September 11 and December 31, 2001.63 
But if a community can be provoked by a terrorist atrocity into committing a counter-atrocity, 
the terrorists have “suckered” that community into forfeiting the moral high ground. The 
community has also given the terrorists another advantage—when perpetrating future attacks, 
terrorists may claim that they are only responding to attacks on them. 
Responding to attacks in ways perceived as illegitimate can result in the loss of domestic and 
international support. The 1987 Iran-Contra scandal can illustrate. The kidnapping of U.S. 
citizens in Lebanon brought great pressure on the Reagan administration, and in an effort to 
obtain the hostages’ release, some administration members embarked on an illegal arms-for-
hostages deal.64 The scandal resulted in a significant loss of support for President Ronald 
Reagan—in one month his approval rating declined from 67 to 46 percent, and reportedly 
reduced his authority, prestige, and self-confidence.65 The scandal decreased his ability to affect 
developments and resulted in the loss of international support for U.S. counterterrorism policy. A 
contemporaneous Congressional Research Service (CRS) report stated: 
 
U.S. efforts to get [countries to cooperate regarding sanctions on Iran] were set back by recent 
disclosures about secret U.S. negotiations with Iran. President Reagan had taken a particularly 
strong stand against terrorism and the Iran affair has apparently damaged his creditability and 
raised doubts among the allies about future U.S. policy against terrorism. Allies particularly 
resented the fact that they had been under pressure from the United States to take a harder line 
against Iran and other countries even while the secret negotiations were going on for the 
release of American hostages in Lebanon.66  
 
                                                 
62 President George W. Bush, address, “President Bush Calls on Congress to Act on Nation’s Priorities,” Sept. 23, 2002. 
63 FBI hate crimes statistics, 2000 and 2001. 
64 The secret arms-for-hostages deal illegally provided weapons to Iran (a country listed as a state sponsor of 
terrorism) in exchange for the release of hostages being held in Lebanon by Hezbollah, and used funds from these 
transactions to support the “Contra” militia in Nicaragua, actions that Congress had proscribed.  
65 “A Look Back at the Polls,” June 7, 2004, CBSNews.com (Aug. 14, 2008); Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power 
and the Modern Presidents (New York: Free Press, 1990), 274; and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 
Strategic Survey 1987–1988 (London: 1988), 10.  
66 James P. Wootten, Terrorism: U.S. Policy Options, CRS IB81141, June 8, 1987, summary. 




   
Provoke Divisiveness and Polarization. Terrorist attacks can be intended to increase 
divisiveness in a population. For example, debate over the legitimacy of responses can be intense 
and exacerbate fissures in societies. French actions in Algeria stirred great controversy in France 
regarding the methods being used, which included torture. 
Attacks can be used to try to polarize societies—to get people to “take sides,” especially those 
in the middle (who are usually the majority). It can be very difficult to remain neutral when 
terrorist attacks occur. Terrorist attacks may polarize the public by energizing supporters and 
enraging opponents, and if those in the middle choose sides, they reduce the center and weaken 
moderates. When random attacks endanger everyone, there may be no way of knowing who may 
be a potential attacker: Josephus wrote that people responded to Sicarii terrorist assassinations in 
ancient Judea with so much fear that men would not even trust friends when they approached.67  
Terrorists can use attacks to exacerbate and exploit tensions among communities. A terrorist 
attack with the goal of secession can illustrate. A terrorist attack may resonate with a particular 
ethnic group and bring out latent sympathy in potential supporters, but evoke hostility from the 
majority who intensely oppose giving up any territory. Thus society becomes polarized over the 
issue, and cooperation among communities may decrease if the division spreads to other areas. 
The FLN terrorist campaign in Algeria in the 1950s can illustrate the polarization process: 
 
One particular tactic employed was the bombing of public transportation. The victims of the 
terrorist act were the relatively limited number of passengers and bystanders in the area of the 
bombing. The [third-party] targets of the bombing were many and varied. The French colons in 
Algeria perceived the attack as aimed at them, became fearful and demanded greater protection 
and an increase in security measures. Many began to question the ability of the French 
government to provide that most basic of governmental services—security. Some formed 
vigilante groups to engage in activity that they perceived the government as unwilling or 
incapable of performing. A campaign of terror aimed at the native Algerian populations was 
initiated [which] only further undermined the legitimacy and authority of the French regime.68 
 
Polarization can take place within a 
community, between communities, within a 
country, and between countries. Al Qaeda’s 
9/11 attacks can illustrate. One purpose was to 
provoke polarization between countries, and 
help bring about a “clash of civilizations” 
between Islam and the West.69 A second 
purpose was to provoke polarization within 
the Islamic community and weaken moderates. 
A third purpose was to exacerbate tensions 
within Western countries by sowing suspicion 
between communities (see cartoon).70 
 
                                                 
67 Josephus, The Jewish War, Book 2, Chapter 13. 
68 Michael Stohl, “Demystifying the Mystery of International Terrorism,” in Charles W. Kegley, ed., International 
Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 83.  
69 Osama bin Laden said that the 9/11 attacks had “divided the whole world into two camps—the camp of the 
faithful and the camp of infidels.” See “Bin Laden Statement,” Oct. 7, 2001, PBS Online NewsHour. 








   
An example of the intended process of polarizing two ethnic communities follows. A terrorist 
attack introduces suspicion and mistrust between communities, and each “withdraws” to the 
safety of its own group, and may form self-defense units. Communication and cooperation 
decrease, leading to misunderstandings, rising tensions, and a higher chance that the situation 
will erupt into violence. In an increasingly polarized situation, extremists can gain support more 
easily and inflame passions further. Terrorists hope that as threats increase, their claimed 
constituent community will turn to them for protection, and that other groups will be intimidated 
and acquiesce to the terrorists. But if violence breaks out between ethnic communities, the 
original problems are much harder to resolve, and are compounded by new problems. The 
violence causes injuries and deaths, which in turn can release new waves of hatred.  
Terrorist attacks can be intended to prevent 
compromises, and the closer parties come to a settlement, 
the more likely are attacks from extremists on both sides 
who want no agreement. The derailment of the Middle East 
peace process in the 1990s can illustrate. In September 
1993 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian 
Chairman Yasser Arafat signed the Oslo Accords (the 
Declaration of Principles (DOP)), and thus initiated a 
period of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian 
leaders. Arafat committed the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) to cease all violence and terrorism, and 
the Patterns of Global Terrorism report noted that for the 
rest of the year, PLO factions loyal to Arafat complied with this commitment except for one or 
possibly two instances.71 However, opposition groups from both sides responded with increased 
violence and terrorist attacks to try to defeat the agreement. The report noted that “Kahane Chai 
reacted to Arafat’s official visit to Paris by exploding two bombs near the French Embassy in Tel 
Aviv on 24 October [and] threatened to attack other French interests in the region. A settler, 
affiliated with the militant Kach group, claimed responsibility for an 8 November drive-by 
shooting that wounded two Palestinians in the West Bank. Israeli settlers opposed to the DOP 
rioted after the murder of [an Israeli settler] by randomly assaulting Palestinians and destroying 
property. One Palestinian was killed, and 18 others were wounded.”72 
As another example, in 1994 a Jewish extremist perpetrated a terrorist attack that killed and 
wounded over 200 Muslims at the al-Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron, and in 1995 another Jewish 
extremist assassinated the Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, who had signed the Oslo 
Accords. These kinds of attacks from both sides contributed to ending the period of 
cooperation.73 Paul Wilkinson noted that Hamas terrorist attacks and the assassination of Rabin 
“undoubtedly dealt a fatal blow to Labor’s chances of winning the key 1996 election,” and after 
the Israeli people elected a government with “a totally different vision of the Peace Process the 
period of cooperation ushered in by the 1993 Oslo Accords almost came to an abrupt end.”74 
 
                                                 
71 U.S. State Dept., Patterns of Global Terrorism 1993, 17.  
72 Ibid., 17–18. Note that Palestinian opposition groups killed a number of Israelis. 
73 U.S. State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism reports, mid-1990s. 
74 Paul Wilkinson, “The Strategic Implications of Terrorism,” CIAO Working Paper, 2000. See also International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey 1996/97 (London: 1997), 143–144, regarding the effect of 
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Mechanisms “Working Together.” The mechanisms involved in terrorist attacks are 
intended to affect a wide range of third-parties and obtain various responses from them.75 
Supporters are to be invigorated and mobilized. The public, potential supporters, neutrals, and 
the unconcerned are to be drawn toward the terrorists through appeals and influence. The 
population is to be induced to take sides, thus reducing the middle and affecting the population’s 
willingness to compromise. Opponents are to be neutralized through coercion and intimidation, 
immobilized by fear, and weakened by the damage that they do to themselves through poor 
responses to attacks. Any of these kinds of responses can help shift the situation in the terrorists’ 
favor and advance their goals, and thus the relationships among the third-party targets have 
changed, making the terrorists stronger and their opponents weaker.  
Terrorism is intended to elicit responses from third-parties through a combination of 
mechanisms that operate in different ways. Influence, for example, elicits responses primarily 
through persuasion and propaganda, whereas mechanisms such as coercion, intimidation, and 
provocation rely primarily on violence and threats of further violence to elicit responses.  
Each terrorist attack has specific objectives involving several different third-party targets. 
Terrorist attacks may be perpetrated to increase the confidence of supporters; sway neutrals; 
embarrass a government; induce a change in a State’s foreign policy; garner foreign support; 
drive a wedge between countries; and weaken a country’s economy by discouraging foreign 
investment and tourism (and thereby reduce support for the government). An IRA training 
manual stated that one objective of a bombing campaign was to make “the enemy’s financial 
interest in our country unprofitable while at the same time curbing long-term financial 
investment in our country.”76  
As third-parties respond to attacks, these responses affect the actions of other groups. Public 
outrage can intensify government responses, and glee on the part of terrorist supporters is likely 
to enrage the public and governments even further. Therefore all of the mechanisms for eliciting 
responses, and the interplay between them, need to be examined and analyzed. 
Terrorism cannot be effectively combated by looking at only one or two mechanisms for 
eliciting responses, or by focusing on the effect on a particular third-party target such as 
opponents. Effective counterterrorism requires a focus on the entire range of intended third-party 
targets, including terrorist supporters; the different mechanisms for eliciting responses from the 
third-party targets; the objectives of each attack; and how each attack relates to the group’s 




                                                 
75As J. B. S. Hardman pointed out, “If terror fails to elicit a wide response in circles outside of those at whom it is 
directly aimed, it is futile as a weapon in a social conflict.” See J. B. S. Hardman, “Terrorism: A Summing Up in the 
1930s,” in Walter Laqueur and Yonah Alexander, eds., The Terrorism Reader (New York: Meridian, 1987), 225. 
76 Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 555. 




   
 
II. The Leverage of Terrorism 
 
What Is the Leverage of Terrorism? Terrorist attacks have the potential to elicit far greater 
responses from third-parties than the actual material destruction may seem to warrant. This 
tendency for the responses of third-parties to be disproportional when compared to the damage 
caused by the attack is the “leverage of terrorism” 
(Fig. 2–4).77 A particular danger involved in the 
leverage of terrorism is that if third-party targets 
are not careful in their responses, they can do 
more damage to themselves than the attack did. 
Third-party responses can be disproportional in 
a number of areas. In the political area, for 
example, the U.S. government responded strongly 
to each major terrorist attack against the United 
States during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The 
president gave his personal attention; government 
agencies were sometimes reorganized; and 
Congress usually held hearings, established a  
commission to study the attack, and passed new legislation. During the first year after the 9/11 
attacks, Congress introduced or passed more than 150 pieces of legislation.78 
In the military area, 
governments have responded to 
attacks by using military forces, 
and sometimes changing their 
mission and composition. In the 
area of individual rights, 
governments have reduced 
freedoms and civil liberties 
through new measures and laws. 
The media have responded by 
allocating significant headlines 
and newscast time to attacks. 
The leverage of terrorism can 
be very visible in economic 
terms, for third-parties have 
often responded to attacks with  
measures that cost much more than the damage sustained in the attack. To illustrate, in response 
to an attack that caused minor property damage, a company may institute new security measures 
that cost several times more than the actual damage incurred.  
 
                                                 
77 There are exceptions to the principle of the leverage of terrorism. For example, if terrorists use nuclear weapons or 
advanced pathogens (germs that have been made very deadly), then the direct damage done by the attack could 
exceed the magnitude of any third-party responses.  
78 Library of Congress, “Legislation Related to the Attack of September 11, 2001,” 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm (March 11, 2007). 
 
 





















   
The 9/11 attacks can illustrate the leverage of terrorism on a large scale. Al Qaeda spent an 
estimated $400,000–$500,000 to perpetrate the 9/11 attacks, which caused the deaths of nearly 
3,000 people and an estimated $34 billion in immediate damage in the United States, as 
measured by damaged and destroyed property, and victim compensation.79 However, the U.S. 
government spent many times that amount in responding. During the first three months after the  
attack, U.S. government funding for 
counterterrorism surged, and the 
government spent billions invading 
Afghanistan to eliminate the safe haven in 
which Al Qaeda had operated. Over the rest 
of the decade, the U.S. government spent 
over $1 trillion in responding, according to 
some estimates (Fig. 2–5).80 
The leverage of terrorism can be seen in 
the ratio between how much terrorists 
spend to perpetrate an attack, the cost of the 
physical damage and destruction caused by 
the attack, and the cost of third-party 
responses. In terms of the cost to perpetrate 
attacks, bombs can be very inexpensive,  
and even “spectacular” attacks can cost far less than the damage done. The 9/11 attacks can 
again illustrate. Using $500,000 as the cost to Al Qaeda to perpetrate the 9/11 attacks, and $34 
billion as the cost of the immediate damage and destruction, means that for every dollar al Qaeda 
spent to mount the attack, the attack caused $68,000 in damage. Using $1 trillion as the cost of 
U.S. government responses in the 2000s, means that for every dollar that al Qaeda spent, the U.S. 
government spent $2 billion in responding—a very large ratio (Table 2–1).  
 
 
Table 2–1. The Leverage of Terrorism: The 9/11 Attacks 
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Note that of the three parts to the leverage of terrorism, third-parties have little control over 
the attack and the damage the attack causes. However, third-parties do have control over their 
responses, and the U.S. government chose to spend the funds in response. (This is not to say that 
particular responses are not justified, only that third-parties decide how they will respond.) 
 
                                                 
79 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 169; Dick K. Nanto, 9/11 Terrorism: Global 
Economic Costs, CRS RS21937, Oct. 5, 2004, 2. The $34 billion figure does not include many indirect costs of the 
attack, such as an estimated $300 billion in broader economic damage. 
80 See, for example, Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations 
Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, Sept. 28, 2009, summary; Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Iraq War Will 
Cost Us $3 Trillion, and Much More,” Washington Post, March 9, 2008.  
Fig. 2–5. The Economic Leverage of Terrorism: 
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What Causes the Tendency for Strong Third-Party Responses? A number of factors 
contribute to the leverage of terrorism. Three important factors are the nonstate characteristic of 
the attackers, the selection of the targets attacked, and 
the qualities of terrorist violence (Fig. 2–6). 
The nonstate attacker. The fact that the attackers 
are nonstate actors causes people to feel anger 
because terrorists have arrogated to themselves the 
“right” to use violence. Terrorist attacks violate the 
presumption that the use of force and violence is to be 
confined to the State. This challenge to the State’s 
presumed monopoly on the use of force makes people 
feel angry and insecure because the purpose of this 
monopoly is to increase everyone’s safety by 
containing violence and controlling the use of force. 
The targets of violence. The selection of the targets to be attacked is a second source of 
leverage. To illustrate, an attack in which children are harmed is likely to arouse intense feelings 
in third-parties, as does an attack on a national landmark. 
The qualities of terrorist violence. The qualities of terrorist violence intensify the impact of an 
attack on many third-parties, and this impact can in turn intensify the impulse to respond 
strongly. Examining some qualities of terrorist violence can show the effect on third-parties. 
The illegality of the attack causes people to feel outrage because terrorists have put 
themselves above the law and arrogated to themselves the power of life and death. The attack 
violates deeply held values regarding respect for life, thus causing shock. The illegality causes 
people to feel insecure because the violence deliberately breaks the law, and damages the 
framework of order on which people depend for security as they go about their daily lives.  
The premeditated callousness of the violence causes people to feel outrage because of the 
deliberate disregard for the rights and lives of others. Terrorists use the blood of their victims to 
try to advance political goals, for the “price” of eliciting responses from third-parties is paid by 
those whose rights have been violated. People have the right to their physical integrity (the right 
for their bodies to be free from injury), and the perpetrators have deliberately dispossessed their 
victims of these rights (and other rights as well). Terrorist attacks also make everyone’s rights 
insecure, and thus can cause widespread anxiety and fear. 
People feel outrage and repugnance because terrorists have debased human 
beings into instruments—a “means.” The victims are usually of little “value” 
to the attacker in advancing political goals, but are used to impact other people 
and elicit responses from them. A reported statement by Timothy McVeigh, 
convicted of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, can illustrate. When asked 
whether he could not have drawn attention to his grievances without killing 
anyone, McVeigh reportedly replied, “That would not have gotten the point 
across to the government. We needed a body count to make our point.”81 Thus 
the victims have been turned into objects used to serve another’s political 
goal, causing shock, outrage, and anger.  
 
                                                 






























   
The random nature of terrorist violence makes people fearful because terrorist attacks and 
their effects are unpredictable. The unpredictability of terrorist attacks makes people feel 
uncertain because the attacks usually occur at unexpected times and places. The clandestine 
nature of the violence contributes to feelings of uncertainty and anxiety. When attacks occur in 
places that are usually safe such as stores and restaurants, no one can be certain that he or she is 
not in imminent danger at any time. Every place seems unsafe, and the contrast between familiar 
surroundings and the perception of danger increases this uncertainty and fear. Attacks that 
involve everyday objects such as bombs in letters can be particularly disorientating.  
If the victims appear to be “selected” on a random basis, 
people are likely to feel fear because the attacks seem to have 
no relation to people’s behavior or the group that they belong 
to. People may, therefore, feel that there is little they can do 
to protect themselves. Everyone feels at risk because anyone 
may be a victim no matter what they do, and the implicit 
threat of more attacks increases this fear.  
The indiscriminate nature of random violence enrages 
people because of its wantonness and amorality—anyone in 
the vicinity of a bomb may be injured or killed, even 
children. (Sometimes children are deliberately targeted. In 
one attack (see photo), terrorists waited for an Israeli patrol to 
pass, then fired four rockets at a crowded school bus, killing 
eight children and four adults, and injuring many others.82) 
If the victims of an attack appear to be “selected” 
because of certain characteristics such as religion, ethnicity, 
or citizenship, then those who share those characteristics may feel fear. These individuals are 
likely to realize that they could have been victims—and may be future targets.  
The randomness of attacks contributes to a sense of not having any control over a situation, 
causing people to feel unease and fear. For example, if an airplane is hijacked by people seeking 
political asylum, the passengers will feel less fear than if the airplane is hijacked to coerce a 
government into making a political concession. As Alex Schmid pointed out: “If you are sitting 
in an aircraft and the hijacker only asks the pilot to fly to Rome instead of Tirana, you will feel 
much less terrorized than when he or she demands the liberation of 700 prisoners from the 
Iranian government. In the first case, the pilot can, through a change of behavior, escape from the 
threat of being killed. In the second case, his and the passengers’ attitude or behavior does not 
matter, since the addressee is not identical with the threatened group of people.”83 
The symbolism of an attack causes many people to feel rage. A terrorist attack may be 
intended to symbolize the goal being pursued, and third-parties usually perceive this symbolism 
(positively or negatively, depending on how the person views the goal, and terrorism itself). An 
attack aimed at a particular political view is likely to cause anger in those holding that political 
position. The destruction of a landmark that is part of a country’s heritage is likely to infuriate 
the entire population.  
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A symbolic attack is likely to create very strong emotions in those 
who feel that the attack was aimed at them. For example, the 
deliberate destruction of a religious building such as a church is 
likely to cause sorrow, rage, and the desire for retaliation on the part 
of co-religionists. If the target of violence is irreplaceable, the 
sorrow, rage, and desire for revenge may be intense (see photo of the 
14th century Lesok Monastery in Macedonia, destroyed in 2001).84  
The unexpectedness and stealth of most terrorist violence strip 
people of the ability to defend themselves. Most potential victims are 
unarmed, and the sense of not being able to fight back can contribute  
to feeling insecure and helpless. When attacks occur in normally peaceful places such as a 
market, this sense of insecurity can be increased.  
The inherent coerciveness of terrorist violence enrages many people. One reason people feel 
angry is because the attacks contain an explicit or implicit threat of continued violence if the 
terrorists do not get what they want. People feel anger because the attackers are attempting to 
subvert the political process and force their goals on others. The 1998 Vail ski resort attack can 
illustrate: when a court case trying to stop the resort expansion was lost and construction was 
scheduled to begin, the environmental group ELF burned down a number of buildings and ski 
structures.85 The attack angered the entire town, including those against the expansion. 
Thus the qualities of terrorist violence are likely to have a powerful impact on many third-
parties, and this impact in turn generates pressures for strong responses. The values attacked and 
the emotions aroused can overshadow the actual significance of the physical destruction, and the 
intensity of the emotions thus engendered affects the political system. Governments see terrorism 
as threatening citizen safety, as well as the reputation and credibility of the government, and 
therefore leaders may feel that the attacks demand strong action. Intensive media coverage can 
increase the impact of attacks on the public, and the pressure on governments—during the 
Iranian hostage crisis, members of the Carter administration “winced” every night when Walter 
Cronkite signed off the news with the number of days the hostages had been held.86 Public 
reaction can also increase the pressure on governments—the public is likely to see terrorist 
violence as a challenge to the rule of law and call for a strong response.  
Rhetoric by leaders can increase the impact of attacks on the public. The word “terrorism” 
itself can evoke fearful images, and rhetoric can paint frightening pictures of terrorism as a 
spreading disease, a wave of engulfing violence, or a threat to civilization itself. Examples are 
these kinds of statements: “Terrorism is a contagious disease that will inevitably spread if it goes 
untreated,” “Like an open wound that is constantly gashed, [terrorism’s] relentless attacks 
continually open up new battlefields,” and “Terrorism poses a direct threat not only to Western 
strategic interests but to the very moral principles that undergird Western democratic society.”87 
Terrorism looms as an ominous specter, and as a result, citizens demand action.  
 
                                                 
84 OSCE press release, “Skopje Mission Strongly Condemns Destruction of Lesok Monastery,” Aug. 21, 2001. 
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Calibration and the Leverage of Terrorism. The leverage of terrorism affects how terrorists 
plan the amount and kind of damage they intend to cause in an attack. Terrorist attacks are 
designed to elicit different feelings and responses from different third-parties from the same 
attack. George Habash noted the intent to elicit different responses from one attack when he said, 
“You [Westerners] should see how my people react to a successful operation! Spirit shoots sky-
high. The more you are upset, the more they are encouraged.”88  
However, eliciting different responses in different third-party targets can be difficult. For 
example, it may not be easy to appear in different lights to different groups. Terrorists knowingly 
commit heinous acts, yet may want to be seen as having the moral high ground in order to attract 
support. Terrorists may strive to appear as an irresistible juggernaut to their opponents so that 
these opponents will accede to demands, but at the same time may try to appear to the public and 
the media as courageous underdogs in order to elicit sympathy and support.  
The need to elicit different responses requires terrorist decisionmakers to consider the likely 
effect on the third-parties they are targeting, and plan the attack in light of the responses they 
want to elicit—and the responses they want to avoid. For example, if the damage done in an 
attack is too horrific, supporters may feel revulsion, and not enthusiasm as desired. But if there is 
too little damage, opponents may not feel the level of fear and rage desired, and the media might 
not give the attack the desired level of publicity.  
Therefore, terrorists generally try to calibrate the amount of damage the attack is intended to 
cause—such as to do enough damage to get attention, but not enough to alienate supporters or 
spark a massive law enforcement effort. The 1998 Vail ski resort attack can illustrate.89 Many 
people sympathized with ELF’s overall political goal of protecting the environment, even if they 
did not approve of the method used. As a result, some supporters may have responded by 
increasing their donations, and becoming actively involved in the cause.90 However, if ELF had 
killed any people in the attack, the responses of supporters would have been very different. It is 
likely that many of the group’s supporters would have ceased their donations, and any political 
leaders in sympathy with the group’s goal would have been severely hampered in their ability to 
speak out for the cause. The law enforcement response would have been more intense, since the 
crimes committed would have included murder in addition to arson and other charges. 
There are other examples. A statement by George Habash can illustrate calibrating attacks so 
as to avoid alienating international opinion: 
 
We will do our best not to harm Europeans: I swear it upon the head of my children that we are 
devoting a lot of attention to this problem. Orders to our commandos always emphasize that 
neutrals should be spared. During the whole of 1969 this order has always been followed, and 
never has a European lost his life as a result of our operations. Let’s take the burning of the 
London store. It would have been very easy for our fedayeen to just throw a couple of bombs 
and kill a lot of people. He waited till night instead, to avoid causing casualties.91 
 
                                                 
88 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 34. Note Habash’s 
use of the term “operation.” 
89 In 1998 the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) used arson to destroy a number of buildings and ski structures to try to 
stop the expansion of a ski resort in Vail, Colorado. 
90 In fact, environmental groups strongly disapproved of the attack—see Robert Sullivan, “The Face of Eco-
Terrorism,” New York Times, Dec. 20, 1998.  
91 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 33 (italics added). 
Note Habash’s use of the terms “operations” and “commandos.” 




   
The IRA generally tried to calibrate attacks to a level that the population would tolerate. A 
former member said that the IRA “tried to act in a way that would avoid severe censure from 
within the nationalist community; they knew they were operating within a sophisticated set of 
informal restrictions on their behavior, no less powerful for being largely unspoken.”92  
Attacks categorized by the level of destruction can illustrate an aspect of calibration. Two 
categories of levels of destruction are “potboilers” and “spectaculars.” “Pot-boilers” are low-
level attacks intended to demonstrate that attacks will continue until the terrorists get what they 
want. These attacks are not intended to elicit strong responses, but to exert continual pressure—
as George Habash said regarding the Palestinians, “You have to be constantly reminded of our 
existence.”93 In contrast, “spectaculars” are attacks intended to cause serious damage and elicit 
strong responses, and to put the terrorists’ cause at the top of the political agenda. The 9/11 
attacks were intended to be a spectacular—the scale of the attacks was exponentially greater than 
any previous attack, and was intended to (and did) provoke massive international responses.  
Terrorists may select the targets of the violence 
based on the intensity of the desired responses. 
Diplomatic targets can illustrate: because they are 
highly symbolic, attacks on these targets have a 
strong impact on third-parties, and usually elicit 
strong responses from the host country, the country 
of the embassy attacked, and the media. Many 
embassies have been attacked: between 1968 and 
1982, 381 diplomats were killed and 824 
wounded—figures that include the assassination of 
20 ambassadors from 12 countries.94  
If terrorists want a particular ethnic or religious 
group to respond with rage and perpetrate a counter- 
atrocity, an attack may be designed to elicit intense outrage from the primary third-party target. 
An attack on an elementary school with children of a particular religion is an example. 
The need to elicit different responses from different third-party targets constrains terrorists to 
some degree regarding the intended damage from attacks. Egregious attacks may turn supporters 
against the terrorists, and spark effective government efforts to root out the terrorists. Large 
numbers of casualties may outrage the public rather than elicit fear as intended, and public fury 
may foreclose any possibility of a negotiated settlement. 
The calibration of terrorism is pertinent when making threat assessments, particularly when 
determining the likelihood that a group would use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in an 
attack.95 Terrorist group leaders study their third-party targets and judge likely reactions, and the 
expectation of public revulsion to the use of nuclear or radiological weapons may deter a terrorist 
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III. Is Terrorism Effective? 
 
Where Does the “Effectiveness” of Terrorism Lie? In examining the process of a terrorist 
attack, where does the “effectiveness” of a terrorist attack lie? (That is, “effectiveness” from the 
terrorist perspective.)  
As can be seen in Fig. 2–7, the “effectiveness” of terrorism lies in the actions that third-
parties take in response to attacks. The terrorist’s goal is only advanced if third-parties respond 
in ways that move terrorists closer to their goals, and third-parties do not have to respond to 


















The effectiveness of terrorism does not lie in the violent attack itself (Phase I of a terrorist 
attack). In Phase I, the violent attack causes harm to victims and material damage, but the 
physical result itself seldom advances the terrorists’ political goal. For example, the destruction 
of a café may contribute very little toward the achievement of the attackers’ goal. Even the 
destruction caused by terrorist spectaculars may not have any greater physical effect than if the 
damage was caused by a natural disaster. (Third-party targets may be weakened by the 
destruction caused in an attack, but that is only part of what terrorists are seeking, and sometimes 
the damage itself is irrelevant to the attackers.) 
The effectiveness of terrorism does not lie in how the attacks affect third-parties (the first step 
of Phase II). Regardless of how people may feel after an attack, emotions, no matter how strong, 
do not of themselves advance the attackers’ goal; nor does publicity and media attention. To 
illustrate, governments, international organizations, and populations have often responded to 
terrorist attacks by examining terrorist grievances; however, publicity and attention do not effect 
the changes that terrorists are seeking unless third-parties make those changes. Responses to the 
1972 Munich massacre can illustrate. Many third-parties responded to the attack with widespread 
attention and examination of the Palestinian goal, and the UN added terrorism to its agenda. 
However, by 2017, more than forty years of attacks had not resulted in Palestinian terrorists 
achieving their primary goal.  
Fig. 2–7. The “Effectiveness” of Terrorism 
 























   
Does Terrorism “Work”? The use of terrorism as a primary strategy has generally been 
ineffective in achieving a goal, as the 20th century and early 21st century record shows.96 
Terrorism “works” only if third-parties take actions that enable terrorists to achieve their goals, 
and third-parties in general have not permitted terrorist campaigns to be successful in achieving 
their overall goal. Third-parties have sometimes allowed terrorists to achieve a specific objective 
such as obtaining a government concession, or halt a peace process. In 1991 Thomas Schelling 
wrote that the most successful terrorist campaign he could think of was the Palestinian militants’ 
campaign against moderate Palestinian leaders—that bombings against mayors and other leaders 
accused of collaborating with Israel had apparently made it exceedingly difficult for moderate 
leaders to survive.97  
In a few cases, governments have responded to 
attacks by withdrawing from another country or 
colony. An example is the United States’ withdrawal 
from Lebanon after the 1983 attacks on the U.S. 
embassy and the Marine barracks (see map).98 
Terrorism also played a significant role in several 
independence struggles during the decolonization 
period after World War II. To cite two examples, the 
end of the British Mandate in Palestine, and the 
French withdrawal from Algeria, can be attributed in 
part (but only in part) to terrorist attacks. (Note, 
however, that not all independence struggles that 
used terrorism succeeded, and many anti-colonial 
struggles succeeded using nonviolent methods.99) 
Why Is Terrorism Difficult to Use “Effectively”? There are reasons why terrorism has 
usually been unsuccessful in bringing about the changes being pursued. One reason is that 
terrorism is a method that attackers cannot control, and a second reason is that the use of  
terrorism can have consequences that impede the 
achievement of a group’s goals. 
Terrorists cannot control third-party responses. 
Terrorists cannot control responses to attacks. As 
shown in Fig. 2–8, terrorism is an indirect method of 
struggle—rather than pursue a political goal directly, 
terrorist decisionmakers choose the “circuitous” 
route of terrorism. Thus progress toward a political 
goal is in others’ hands, and third-parties may 
respond to terrorist attacks in ways detrimental to 
terrorists. There are many examples. Instead of 
becoming polarized by an attack, a population may 
rally to the government and put differences aside, 
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as the American people and Congress did after the 9/11 attacks. Rather than weakening the 
resolve of governments and the public, attacks may increase determination to resist demands—
the reaction to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 intensified the efforts of many countries to 
catch the perpetrators and prevent recurrences. Attacks can alienate the groups whose sympathy 
and support are being sought, and members of a claimed constituent community may dissociate 
themselves from the terrorists. Sympathizers who are themselves at risk of becoming victims 
may turn against terrorists and support government counterterrorism efforts.  
Terrorist attacks can backfire on the attackers. The environmental group ELF perpetrated the 
1998 Vail ski resort attack to try to stop the resort’s expansion, but the responses were not what 
the terrorists expected or intended. Before the attack, the town had been divided regarding the 
planned expansion, but after the attack the townspeople united against the terrorists. As one long-
time resident said, “You can have your arguments. You fight it out, but you don’t destroy,” and 
offers of help poured in from area businesses and residents.100 
Even when a specific attack’s primary objective is to gain attention (and publicize goals or 
grievances), it can be difficult to turn that attention to political gain. Terrorists themselves cannot 
convert attention to the advancement of political goals—only third-parties can do that. And 
publicity from an attack—even massive publicity—may dissipate quickly.  
The use of terrorism can impede the achievement of goals. The use of terrorism can make 
achieving a goal more difficult. For example, the use of terrorism can negatively impact the 
terrorists’ cause, impede dialogue, and cause distrust. 
Terrorism may damage the attackers’ goal. Pope John Paul II wrote as follows regarding the 
use of terrorism in ethnic conflicts: “May those who follow the inhuman path of terrorism hear 
my voice: to strike blindly, kill innocent people, or carry out bloody reprisals does not help a just 
evaluation of the claims advanced by the minorities for whom they claim to act!”101  
The use of terrorism can impede dialogue. The fact that one party has used a “language of 
blood” is an obstacle to dialogue, since opponents are likely to refuse to negotiate with 
murderers. Attacks often contribute to the hatred and bitterness that impede solving problems.  
The use of a form of violence that many people view as heinous causes distrust. Those who 
use terrorism are not likely to be trusted to contribute to stability and security. When terrorists 
perpetrate attacks in the name of a claimed constituent community, third-parties may respond by 
viewing all members of that group with suspicion and stereotyping. President Jimmy Carter 
noted that when he was negotiating peace agreements in the Middle East, some Israeli leaders 
habitually referred to all Palestinians as “terrorists.”102 When an Israeli army officer was “asked 
why bulldozers were knocking down houses in which [Palestinian] women and children were 
living,” he reportedly answered, “They are all terrorists.”103  
The Negative Consequences of Using Terrorism. There can be many negative consequences 
from using terrorism, and these consequences affect whether or not terrorism “works.” Responses 
to attacks have widened conflicts and spread the use of violence. Retaliation has resulted in 
escalating spirals of violence, particularly as both sides argue that the other side only understands 
force. As the result of sustained terrorist campaigns, entire generations can grow up in a climate 
of violence and hostility, thus impeding the accomplishment of many political goals. 
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Terrorist attacks may contribute to increased terrorism. Many groups that desire a political 
goal have studied the campaigns and struggles of other groups, and sometimes when one group 
has been seen as gaining from the use of terrorism, others have taken up the same method. 
Martha Crenshaw pointed out that “Zionist violence against the British in the 1940s is often cited 
as an example of ‘successful’ terrorism, teaching the lesson that violence pays.”104 Bruce 
Hoffman wrote that the Irgun’s methods in British-administered Palestine—methods that 
included terrorism—were emulated by groups around the world.105 The FLN in Algeria was one 
of those groups who adopted the Irgun’s methods, and Palestinians, in turn, used the FLN as a 
model for attacks against Israel.106 Thus the use of terrorism made a full circle.  
Even when terrorism has contributed to achieving or advancing a political goal, there can still 
be negative consequences. One consequence is that it can be difficult to make the transition from 
violence to political leadership. 
Groups may take their methods 
into whatever they do next—see 
cartoon regarding Hamas after 
winning an election.107  
There are other negative 
consequences for those who use 
terrorism—who, so to speak, eat of 
“the fruit of this particular tree of 
knowledge.”108 Those who use 
terrorism can expect that terrorism 
may, in turn, be used against them, 
for by having taken up the tool, a 
group in essence sanctions its use 
by others, and undermines the rule  
of law. And without the protections provided by the rule of law, terrorists themselves are more 
vulnerable to violence from others. Bruce Hoffman wrote of how state terror was turned on those 
who began the Terror during the French Revolution:  
 
[In July 1794] Robespierre announced to the National Convention that he had in his 
possession a new list of traitors. Fearing that their own names might be on that list, 
extremists joined forces with moderates to repudiate both Robespierre and the regime de la 
terreur. Robespierre and his closest followers themselves met the same fate that had 
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Terrorism has a distinctive method of operation. Terrorism uses the indirect method of victim-
target differentiation to try to advance the attackers’ goals by eliciting responses from third-
parties. Terrorism uses “mechanisms” to elicit these responses from third-parties. These 
mechanisms include trying to coerce, intimidate, interest, inspire, influence, and provoke 
particular responses from third-parties such as governments, organizations, populations, groups, 
and the media. These mechanisms operate in different ways depending on whether the terrorists 
are trying to elicit responses from opponents, supporters, or neutrals. Mechanisms can be overt, 
such as from threats, or subtle, such as through influence.  
The “leverage of terrorism” is the tendency for third-party responses to be disproportional in 
comparison to the damage done in an attack.110 Terrorists generally take the leverage of terrorism 
into consideration when calculating the amount and type of damage that they believe will elicit 
the intended responses. This calculation affects the likelihood that terrorists would perpetrate 
attacks that could cause massive casualties, particularly through the use of weapons of mass 
destruction.  
Overall, terrorism has not been an effective method of struggle for achieving a goal. One 
reason that terrorism has been ineffective is that responses to attacks are not controlled by the 
attackers, but by third-parties. The indirect method by which terrorism operates means that the 
“success” of terrorism depends on third-parties responding in ways that advance the attackers’ 
goals, and third-parties in general have not responded to attacks in ways that significantly further 
terrorist goals. A second reason is that the use of terrorism has negative consequences that can 
make the political goal the attackers seek more difficult to achieve.  
Terrorism has been more “successful” in achieving specific objectives in certain 
circumstances. Third-parties have sometimes met specific terrorist demands such as the release 
of jailed terrorists (in order to free hostages). Terrorism has sometimes been successful when the 
immediate objective is to prevent compromises such as peace processes—communities have at 
times responded to attacks with polarization.111 During the decolonization period after World 
War II, in some instances terrorist attacks contributed to a government’s decision to withdraw 
from another country or colony. The record shows that terrorism has been more successful in a 
“negative” way, so to speak—destroying and preventing, but not building. President Barak 
Obama made this point when he said that “the future is won by those who build and not 
destroy.”112 
There can be many negative consequences from using terrorism. Responses to terrorist attacks 
have widened conflicts, increased the general level of violence, and spread the use of terrorism. 
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I. The Cause of Terrorism 





What is the cause of terrorism? What kinds of causes of terrorism have been proposed, and are 
they accurate? Are terrorists rational?  
What is the threat that terrorism poses? How serious a threat is terrorism? How does the threat 
from terrorism compare to other threats? Does terrorism pose a threat beyond the destruction that 
the attacks cause? How is the threat determined? How do terrorists determine how much damage 
they intend to do in an attack? This chapter addresses these kinds of questions. 
 
I. The Cause of Terrorism 
 
What Is the Cause of Terrorism? The cause of terrorism is the decision to use terrorism as a 
method to pursue a goal. Many causes of terrorism have been offered, but the decision to use 
terrorism is the basic cause. Therefore, to find any cause or causes of terrorism, the decision 
process that leads to the selection of terrorism needs to be analyzed. 
Decision Points. Because the selection of terrorism as a method of struggle is a deliberate 
choice, a terrorist attack is always preceded by a decision regarding its use. There is the initial 
decision to use terrorism, usually by group decisionmakers, and a final decision at the point of 
attack. Even when terrorism is a habitual practice, there is still a decision to use the tool.  
The decision to use terrorism can be described in this way: a group or individual desires some 
political goal. This goal may be very small, such as trying to prevent the development of a piece 
of land, or very large, such as trying to replace governments. Regardless of the scope of the goal, 
the decisionmakers consider the array of tools available to them for their struggle, and select the 
tools they will use. Most groups decide to pursue their goal directly through such means as  
voting (Fig. 3–1), however, in a very small 
number of groups, the decisionmakers decide 
to pursue their goals through the indirect (or 
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Fig. 3–2. The Decision to Pursue Political Change 
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Fig. 3–1. The Decision to Pursue Political 















   
Why Do People Choose to Use Terrorism? People usually decide to use terrorism for one or 
more of three reasons, and in addition they have to be willing to use terrorism. The three reasons 
are that they do not think they can achieve their goals using other means; do not feel that they are 
making enough progress toward their goal using other methods and are not willing to keep 
trying, or think that terrorism will make other tools available to them to pursue their goals.  
Group members may not think they can achieve their goals using other means. Members may 
not think that they have the political or military strength to achieve their goals through 
nonviolent methods such as mass protests or voting, or through violent means such as revolution 
or guerilla warfare. These forms of struggle require significant resources and popular support—
more than most nonstate groups have. Few groups have a state sponsor or independent sources of 
wealth; the group’s views may be so extreme that their ability to draw support and attract new 
members is very limited; and members may not have the skills, or patience, to build the support 
required to achieve their goals through such means as mass organization.  
Groups do not feel that they are making enough progress toward their goal using other 
methods and are not willing to keep trying. If, for example, nonviolent methods are perceived as 
not having advanced a group’s goal (or made progress “fast enough” toward the goal), some 
members may press for violent tactics. Martin Luther King wrote that during his civil rights 
campaign he had to continually dampen pressure to adopt more militant methods.2 
Groups may use terrorism as a way to gain enough popular support and resources to make 
additional methods of struggle available. For example, with enough popular support, a terrorist 
group may be able to form a popular movement, win enough votes to get a policy changed, or 
even foment a revolution. When terrorism is used for this purpose, attacks may be intended to 
attract the attention of potential constituencies, whose emotions can be aroused and channeled 
toward a goal. The idea of using terrorism to make other tools available was particularly 
espoused by revolutionaries. Nineteenth-century revolutionaries viewed terrorism as the first 
stage in their struggle—acts of terrorism would raise a banner, spread the word, gather recruits, 
and expand the popular base, thus leading to more effective tools for insurrection—terrorist 
attacks alone were not expected to overthrow the government.3 
In addition, groups have to be willing to use terrorism. Along with any reason why people 
choose to use terrorism, a group must be willing to use a method of struggle that most people 
view as heinous. The vast majority of people are not willing to use terrorism—what makes the 
few willing to do so? Being willing to use terrorism usually involves the belief that it is justified  
(see Appendix D for an analysis of attempts to justify terrorism). For 
example, if a group views a government as corrupt or as having used 
unjustifiable violence, terrorism may seem legitimate. A “triggering 
event” may occur that generates outrage. The unprovoked police 
killing of a student demonstrator, Benno Ohnesorg (see photo) 
contributed to the emergence of leftwing terrorist groups in Germany 
(one terrorist group took its name from the date of Ohnesorg’s death). 
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Being willing to use terrorism involves the belief that the goals being pursued are more 
important than the rights of those who will be victimized in the attacks (or that the victims have 
no rights). In the 1998 Vail ski resort attack, the environmental group ELF believed that 
protecting the environment was more important than the rights of those who would be harmed by  
the attack. In perpetrating the 9/11 attacks, members of al Qaeda 
believed that their goals were more important than the rights of the 
thousands of people the group killed and injured.  
A sense of urgency may contribute to the willingness to use 
terrorism—a situation may appear so pressing that “immediate 
action” is required. When a court decision allowed the expansion of a 
Vail ski resort and construction was scheduled to begin, the situation  
appeared imminent to ELF, who wanted to stop the expansion. In other cases external pressures, 
such as competition from rivals, can contribute to the decision to adopt terrorism. If one group 
appears to have gained support through the use of terrorism, other groups vying to represent the 
same community may feel pressure to take up the same tactic.  
Do “Root Causes” Cause Terrorism? There have been many attempts to explain the adoption 
of terrorism in terms of conditions, sometimes described as “root causes.” Many causes of 
terrorism have been offered, including oppression, subjugation, exploitation, injustice, poverty, 
inequality, discrimination, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, globalization, modernization, 
historical traditions, ideologies that condone violence, religious divisions, ideological 
differences, and lack of democratic institutions to redress grievances. One cause of terrorism 
proposed during a UN discussion was the “indifference of the foreign community towards the 
injustice being visited upon a population.”4 During another discussion, several UN delegations 
said that the underlying causes of terrorism were “capitalism, neocolonialism, racism, the policy 
of aggression, foreign occupation and their consequences,” and that only removing those causes 
would lead to the end of international terrorism.5  
However, no condition, situation, or goal causes the selection of any particular method of 
struggle. Oppression, discrimination, and the infringement of rights do not cause terrorism—not 
all who are oppressed, discriminated against, or treated unjustly turn to terrorism. During 
discussions at the UN, a number of delegations noted that some people chose to “take a terrorist 
path, while his equally wronged brother did not.”6 In fact, very few groups with grievances have 
chosen to use terrorism—some chose other violent means, nonviolent action, or no action at all. 
In Spain, the Basque group ETA engaged in terrorism, but many other ethnic groups did not. 
Deprivation does not necessarily lead to terrorism: several studies found no significant 
correlation between poverty and terrorism, and terrorists have come from all levels of wealth, 
education, and opportunity.7 In West Germany, Japan, and Italy in 1960s and 1970s, the well-off, 
 
                                                 
4 Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/9028, Supp. (18 Dec. 1973), in Bassiouni, 
International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 140–141. 
5 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/34/37 (17 April 1979), para. 38, in 
Bassiouni, International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 309. 
6 Ibid., 318–319.  
7 See Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” NBER Working Paper, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2004; Christopher Hewitt, quoted in Nina M. Serafino, Combating Terrorism: 
Possible Lessons for U.S. Policy from Foreign Experiences, CRS RL31517, Aug. 6, 2004, 12; and Schmid, 
“Prevention of Terrorism,” in Bjorgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism, 2005, 227–229. 
 
 
9/11 attack on the Pentagon,  
Sept. 11, 2001 




   
not the deprived, chose to use terrorism.8 The Saudis who hijacked the four airplanes in the 
United States on September 11, 2001, were from a wealthy Muslim country, had been educated, 
and were from the middle and upper-middle class. Some terrorists such as Osama bin Laden 
have been the sons of millionaires. Sometimes terrorists who are neither oppressed nor poor 
themselves use terrorism on behalf of those they consider to be oppressed or exploited and 
become their self-appointed champions—often without asking whether members of the claimed 
constituency desire attacks on their behalf, or whether terrorism is in their best interest. At other 
times, terrorists use the image of deprivation to make a movement appear more attractive, but the 
vast majority of people working to improve conditions chose other methods than terrorism.  
Forms of government do not cause terrorism. Terrorism has occurred in countries with many 
kinds of governments including democracies and autocracies. Terrorists have sometimes tried to 
justify terrorism on the grounds that there were no democratic channels to voice perceived 
injustices or pursue redress, yet many groups have used terrorism even when such means existed. 
Terrorists in democracies have sometimes tried to justify terrorism on the grounds of a lack of 
“effective” means of redress, but democracy does not guarantee that groups will succeed in 
achieving their goals—only that they have the opportunity to try (using non-violent methods), 
and to keep trying. Many groups in democracies have had to pursue their goals with long-term, 
sustained efforts. 
Specific goals or grievances do not cause terrorism—a wide variety of groups pursuing many 
different goals have used terrorism. For example, groups with same type of goal may either 
adopt or reject terrorism. Some national liberation struggles involved a great deal of terrorism, 
such as in Algeria, while in other liberation struggles terrorism played almost no role. 
Ideologies, secular or religious, do not cause terrorism—terrorists have been revolutionaries, 
nationalists, separatists, anarchists, reactionaries, and religious extremists. Terrorism has been 
used on behalf of many ideologies and religions, and people with the same beliefs can select or 
reject terrorism, and very few people—including those with radical beliefs—become terrorists.  
A climate of violence does not cause terrorism, but can make it easier for people to adopt 
terrorism as a method, and to try to justify it to themselves and others. When people grow up in 
violent situations or an environment of hatred, they may be more likely to believe that violence is 
justified. Similarly, the glorification of violence, or a tradition of violence, may make terrorism 
seem justified. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism claimed that one of the 
causes of terrorism was an “ideology that justifies murder,” but that kind of statement is not 
accurate.9 Ideologies or religious interpretations that condone or justify violence may facilitate 
the adoption of terrorism, but do not cause terrorism. 
In summary, neither conditions nor political goals cause terrorism, and despite a major effort, 
by 2001 researchers had not identified any root causes of terrorism.10 Many groups in similar 
situations have not turned to terrorism. Conditions may be factors that contribute to why people 
decide to use terrorism, but cause nothing. Terrorists and their supporters have often cited 
“causes” as a way to try to justify terrorism, but this argument is not valid. People are able to 
choose their methods of struggle—they are not “captives” of conditions.  
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Are Terrorists Rational? The decision to use terrorism is a deliberate choice.11 Every group 
has a range of tools available for use in any struggle, and based on the group’s estimate of the 
situation and available methods, the decisionmakers decide on the tools that they will use. The 
focus is what can be done to advance the goal: as one Palestinian fedayeen said, “We would 
throw roses if it would work.”12 The decision is the result of a rational process, though the logic 
may be poor, the information on which the decision is based may be inaccurate, and the goals 
being pursued may be wildly unrealistic. Terrorists often miscalculate situations—the Red Army 
Faction thought that terrorist attacks in West Germany would lead to a totalitarian government, 
which would spark a workers’ revolt that would result in a communist government.  
The selection of terrorism as a method of pursuing a goal may seem irrational to many 
observers, but did appear rational to the decisionmakers. And despite the image of terrorists as 
crazed fanatics, many terrorists have been well educated, and study how to manipulate third-
parties—as George Habash said, “This is a thinking man’s game.”13 Christopher Harmon 
addressed this point as follows:  
 
[Many terrorist activities] such as the creation of political front groups, demand unusual 
sophistication. All demand calculation, and at least some skill and education. The most 
successful groups calibrate their use of terrorism to suit the political and social environs, and 
they use multiple means, altering their approach to suit changes caused by the environment, 
government interference, good or bad fortune, and the like.14 
 
Some statements by political leaders and commentators convey the view that terrorist 
behavior defies understanding (for example, calling terrorists “looney-tunes”), but these kinds of 
statements are not accurate. As Brian Jenkins noted, “Terrorism is often described as mindless 
violence, senseless violence, or irrational violence [but] terrorism is a means to an end, not an 
end in itself.”15 Other inaccurate statements convey the idea that terrorists are the product of 
internal evil, such as: “The root cause of terrorism lies…in a disposition toward unbridled 
violence.”16 However, most terrorists are not psychopaths but are relatively “normal” 
psychologically, and have no common personality profile or terrorism-prone pathologies.17 
If terrorists are rational, why do some leaders and commentators promote the view that 
terrorists are irrational? One reason is that many terrorist acts appear incomprehensible, such as 
when the victims are not related to the terrorists’ goal in any way. But another reason is that 
there can be political advantages in calling terrorists irrational. For example, labeling terrorists as 
senseless can preclude discussion and compromise, since there is no point in negotiating with 
people who are not rational. But statements about terrorists as crazed killers can impede the 
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and that terrorist groups set short- and long-term goals.  
12 J. Bowyer Bell, “Terror: An Overview,” in Marius H. Livingston, ed., International Terrorism in the 
Contemporary World (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 38.  
13 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 34. 
14 Christopher C. Harmon, “Five Strategies of Terrorism,” Small Wars & Insurgencies (Autumn 2001): 62. 
15 Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, RAND, 1974, 3. 
16 Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Avon, 1987), 204. 
17 Bjorgo, Root Causes of Terrorism, 2005, 257. 




   
 
II. The Threat from Terrorism 
 
The Two Threats from Terrorism. Terrorism poses two threats. The first threat is the actual 
physical damage and destruction that the violent attack causes in Phase I. The second threat is 
the damage that third-parties may do in their responses to attacks (Phase II). The two areas of 

















Phase I Threats. Phase I threats consist of the physical injuries, deaths, and property damage 
caused by the violence used. The direct physical harm to people and property is the most visible 
and measurable consequence of a terrorist attack—damage can be seen and assessed, and deaths 
and injuries can be counted. Other costs, however, cannot always be easily calculated, such as 
economic losses from disrupted services and business activity. And some consequences are 
irreparable and cannot be fully compensated for, such as an ancient church that has been 
destroyed.  
When the threat from terrorism is evaluated in terms of the physical damage and destruction 
caused in Phase I, terrorism can appear to be a minor security problem. An illustration is the 
comparison between deaths from terrorism to deaths from “ordinary” murder. From 1998 to 
2003, the U.S. State Department reported an average of 1000 deaths per year from international 
terrorism world-wide, but during that same period 16 times more people (16,000) were murdered 
in one country alone, the United States.18 When deaths from international terrorism are 
compared to deaths from wars, the contrast is even greater: an average of more than a million 
people per year were killed in 20th century wars and civil conflicts.19  
However, the physical damage from terrorist attacks is only part of the threat from terrorism. 
Terrorist attacks jeopardize the lives, limbs, and property of individuals, but risk even greater 
damage from responses to attacks—that is, Phase II of a terrorist attack. 
 
                                                 
18 U.S. State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism reports 1998–2003, and FBI, Terrorism in the United States 
reports. Note that the number of deaths from domestic terrorism has been much higher than from international 
terrorism.  
19 See John Steinbruner and Jason Forrester, “Perspectives on Civil Violence: A Review of Current Thinking,” in 
William J. Lahneman, ed., Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 3.  
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Phase II Threats. Phase II threats consist of the damage that third-parties may do in 
responding to attacks. Through their responses, third-parties may damage themselves and others, 
and if third-parties do not respond carefully, they can cause more damage than was sustained in the 
attack itself. 
Responses to attacks can result in significant damage 
and costs in a number of areas. Many of these costs and 
effects can be seen in economic, political, and human 
rights terms. 
In economic terms, the cost of responses to terrorism 
may be the most measurable. After the 9/11 attacks, 
governments and international organizations in many 
parts of the world spent massive amounts of money 
responding to the attack, and continued to spend large 
sums yearly. U.S. business spending for security, 
shipping protection, and insurance rose the following 
year—insurance costs rose 5 percent in the United States, and with higher increases overseas.20  
The cost of responses can be very visible in terms of physical security measures. The West 
German government constructed a special bombproof courthouse in which to try captured 
leaders of the Red Army Faction (the German government was concerned about the possibility of 
attacks to try to free jailed group members). In response to the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers 
in Saudi Arabia, the United States moved military troops to a more isolated area at the cost of 
$200 million (which the U.S. and Saudi governments agreed to split).21 After the terrorist attack 
at the 1972 Olympics, those responsible for international sporting events implemented extensive 
security measures. When Sweden hosted the Chilean Davis Cup tennis team, the resort where the 
matches were to be held was converted into a “veritable fortress protected by floodlights; fences 
up to 35 feet high; and a 1,300-man police force equipped with gunboats, helicopters, scores of 
dogs, and some 50 horses.”22  
Corporations have responded to attacks by increased spending on security measures to prevent 
attacks and protect employees, facilities, and shipments. Airline responses have included the 
expenses of extensive passenger and baggage screening, inspectors, sky marshals, bomb-sniffing 
dogs, and security training for pilots and staff. Company responses have included the increased 
use of private security companies, which may involve higher costs, and result in other 
consequences. For example, the growth of security companies can contribute to the privatization 
of violence, and threaten the State’s presumed monopoly on the use of force. 
Responses to attacks can damage the economies of countries. Investors may withdraw foreign 
capital or decide not to invest in a country, and travelers may change their destinations. Egypt 
experienced a severe drop in tourism after the 1997 Luxor massacre, in which terrorists 
murdered several dozen people, primarily tourists.  
 
                                                 
20 Dick K. Nanto, 9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs, CRS RS21937, Oct. 5, 2004.  
21 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, 27.  
22 CIA, Research Study, 1976, 26. (Sweden had arrested and deported members of the Japanese Red Army in March 
1975, and was concerned about attempts at retribution.) After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, U.S. federal, state, and local 
governments allocated more than $300 million for security for the 2002 Winter Olympics. See White House press 
release, “Preparing for the World: Homeland Security and the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics,” Jan. 10, 2002. 



























   
In political terms, government leaders may respond to attacks by spending their time, which 
has the cost of diverting their attention from other pressing issues. Legislatures may work on new 
legislation, particularly after an egregious attack.23 Government staff may be diverted to monitor 
terrorism, and to develop policy responses.24 Countries have responded to terrorist attacks with 
increased international tensions, such as between India and Pakistan (tensions that were 
particularly dangerous since both countries had nuclear weapons). The United States has 
responded to terrorism by reducing or closing embassies, actions that negatively affected U.S. 
interests and the ability to conduct foreign policy.25 
In response to the threat from terrorism, officials may institute screening for public buildings. 
These measures have economic effects, such as the cost of security personnel and the  
opportunity cost of people’s time to go through screening procedures. 
There are also intangible costs. Working in a fortress-like environment is 
repugnant to many people, and a fortress-like impression can dampen 
the sense of freedom. Security precautions can isolate leaders from the 
public—after an assassination attempt, Pope John Paul II began using a 
vehicle with bullet-proof glass that increased his physical security, but 
decreased his accessibility to people.  
In human rights terms, responses to attacks may undermine values, and damage individual 
freedoms. Hasty legislation may deprive individuals of due process rights, which may result in 
the loss of their physical freedom. Intrusive security measures can decrease personal privacy. 
Private citizens may attack others seen as associated with terrorists, and this private retaliation 
violates the rights of victims, damages the rule of law, and reduces national cohesion. 
Who Controls the Damage That 
Terrorism Does and the Costs 
Incurred? Phase I costs are primarily 
determined by the attackers in their 
attack on the targets of violence, but 
third-parties control the costs and 
damage incurred in Phase II (Fig. 3–5). 
Terrorist attacks may induce, elicit, or 
coerce these responses, but third-parties 
decide what responses they will or will 
not take—no one “forces” any 
responses. (The measures may be 
justified; nevertheless, all measures 
taken are the decision and choice of 
third-parties.) 
 
                                                 
23 Laura Donohue reported that after the 9/11 attacks, “Congress proposed more than 450 counterterrorist 
resolutions, bills, and amendments. (This compared with approximately 1,300 total in U.S. history up to 2003.) 
Within four months of the attacks, more than two dozen new measures became law. President [George W.] Bush 
issued 12 Executive Orders and 10 Presidential Proclamations related to the attacks.” See Donohue, “Fear Itself,” in 
Howard and Sawyer, eds., Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 2003, 275.  
24 For example, in 1985 the U.S. government devoted approximately 18,000 man-years to counterterrorism. See 
Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 1986, 10.  
25 See, for example, Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, 26–27. 
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Evaluating Phase I Threats. How do terrorists decide on the amount and type of physical 
damage they want to cause? There are factors that create incentives for terrorists to increase—as 
well as to limit—the frequency, character, and destructiveness of their attacks.  
What Factors May Lead Terrorists to Increase the Destruction They Intend to Cause in an 
Attack? There are factors that lead terrorists to increase the destruction that they intend to cause.  
The desire for a certain level of publicity and attention. Terrorists may think that a continuous 
upward ratcheting of violence is needed to maintain media and public interest, or that a 
spectacular attack will put their goals at the top of the political agenda.  
Precedents. Changes in the character, method used, and amount of destruction set precedents 
that may lead terrorists to increase the damage they intend to cause. The 9/11 attacks caused 
more than ten times the number of deaths and far greater destruction than any previous attack. A 
change in the character of an attack, such as the first use of chemicals, sets a precedent. A change 
in method sets a precedent, such as the use of secondary explosive devices targeting emergency 
first responders. To illustrate, in January 1997 a bomb exploded at a women’s health facility in 
Atlanta, Georgia, and within an hour, a second bomb wounded several law enforcement 
personnel and emergency first responders.26 This change in method increased the threat to all 
involved in an attack, since the need to check for additional explosives delays responders from 
immediately assisting victims. 
Internal pressures. Pressures may come from within a terrorist group. A group may have 
internal pressures for escalation—younger members, for example, may press for greater 
violence.  
External pressures. Pressures may come from outside a terrorist group. For example, the 
expectations of constituents can pressure terrorist groups to increase their attacks. During the 
struggle for Algerian independence, the execution of FLN prisoners—regarded as heroes by 
many Algerians—led to strong demands for the FLN to retaliate for the executions.27 Groups 
vying to lead a community may strive to outdo each other by more spectacular attacks. Rival 
groups may compete as to which group can perpetrate the most grievous attacks against a mutual 
opponent. If terrorist attacks enable a group to gain supporters, other groups pursuing the same 
goal through nonviolent methods may feel pressure to adopt terrorism. 
The development and dissemination of technology. The development and dissemination of 
technology can enable terrorists to use additional means of violence. These means may enable 
more destructive attacks, and make “spectacular” attacks more attainable.  
The erosion of moral inhibitions. The longevity of some terrorist groups can lead to the 
erosion of moral inhibitions. A group that has been operating for long time may have less 
compunction about killing, particularly if people have grown up in a violent environment. 
State sponsorship. State sponsorship can enable terrorist groups to conduct more lethal and 
frequent attacks by increasing their capabilities through such means as providing funds, 
weapons, intelligence, and technical expertise. State sponsorship can reduce the constraints on 
groups, allowing them to have less concern about alienating perceived constituents, since the 
group’s funds come from the state sponsor, not from supporters. State-sponsored terrorists also 
do not need to take the risks involved with financing themselves through such means as bank 
robberies and kidnappings for ransom money, and can, therefore, conduct more attacks.  
 
                                                 
26 FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1997, 3.  
27 Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism, 1978, 31–32.  




   
What Factors May Lead Terrorists to Limit the Destruction They Intend to Cause in an 
Attack? There are factors that lead terrorists to limit the destruction that they intend to cause. It is 
not necessarily true that deterrence “means nothing” to terrorists because they have no nation or 
citizens to defend.28 Terrorists can be deterred, and are constrained by a number of factors. 
The need to elicit the desired responses. Terrorists decide on the amount and kind of 
destruction they intend to cause in light of the responses they seek to elicit. Most terrorists try to 
do enough damage to get attention, but not enough to alienate the people whose support they 
need or want to attract. Terrorists need publicity, but want to avoid backlash, and an egregious 
act may backfire by causing public revulsion, alienating supporters, and provoking intense 
government efforts to find them. The need to elicit support and avoid backlash creates an 
incentive for terrorists to limit the destructiveness of their attacks—a senior al Qaeda leader 
wrote of the importance of avoiding “any action that the masses do not understand or approve.”29  
The need for legitimacy. To achieve their political goals, terrorists and their goals need to be 
seen as legitimate by at least a significant part of the population. John Steinbruner noted: 
“Terrorists want to win the battle for legitimacy, and too much damage from a terrorist attack 
reduces this legitimacy and with it their potential for support. It is very difficult to justify 
terrorism even if the associated cause succeeds, such as the role that Jewish terrorism against the 
British played in creating the State of Israel. The need for legitimacy imposes a constraint on the 
scope and character of an attack.”30 
It is not necessarily true that there is an inexorable progress toward mass destruction. 
Terrorists are seeking particular responses, and may conclude that massive attacks may not elicit 
the desired responses. For example, one response to the 9/11 attacks was a coalition invasion of 
Afghanistan to remove an al Qaeda sanctuary, a response that the attackers had not expected. 
The odiousness of certain methods. Terrorists are likely to alienate 
many people if they use methods that cause revulsion, such as 
chemical and biological weapons. Thus the widespread sense of the 
odiousness of certain methods can be self-deterring. For example, 
anthrax letters sent in 2001 did not elicit any positive effect.  
The desire for possible negotiation. Terrorists may want to leave 
room for future negotiation and a possible political settlement. An 
egregious attack may destroy the possibility for desired concessions 
or a political settlement. 
The desire to appear as the underdog to Goliath. Terrorists try to “tap into” the moral appeal 
of the underdog courageously battling a behemoth. Weapons that can cause massive casualties 
such as nuclear weapons would preclude the image that terrorists want to project. (However, 
paradoxically, terrorists may also strive to appear invincible and inevitable.) 
The need to avoid getting caught. Terrorists need to avoid getting caught. Every attack 
involves this risk, and the more attacks terrorists perpetrate, the more chances they take of being 
caught. This constraint may lead terrorists to limit the frequency and destructiveness of attacks.  
 
                                                 
28 See, for example, the statement, “Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing 
against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.” President George W. Bush, address, 
“President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point,” June 1, 2002.  
29 Letter dated July 9, 2005, from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ODNI News Release, Oct. 11, 
2005, Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
30 John Steinbruner, terrorism lecture, Dec. 3, 2002, author’s files.  
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Would Terrorists Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction? In evaluating Phase I threats, the issue 
of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) needs to be considered. There are factors that 
affect whether or not a terrorist group would use a 
weapon of mass destruction.  
Why might terrorists want to use WMD (that is, a 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) 
weapon)? Any act associated with the words 
“chemical,” “biological,” “radiological,” or “nuclear” 
would generate a great deal of shock and fear. The  
seizure of a nuclear power plant, for example, would be likely to be widely publicized and cause 
widespread fear of radiological pollution.  
Radiological weapons can appeal to terrorists for the potential of rousing fear, and for area 
denial. The use of radioactive material, no matter how little, would cause significant alarm, and 
people might avoid the location for years. Economic activity would be disrupted, particularly if 
ports or business areas were contaminated.  
A credible threat of detonating a nuclear weapon would have a very high coercive value, but 
terrorists would have to demonstrate possession and the ability to deliver and operate the 
weapon—and might need more than one weapon. (Without more than one weapon, if terrorists 
conducted a demonstration detonation, they might not be able to deter or coerce third-parties.) 
Why might terrorists not want to use WMD? There are constraints and inhibitions against the 
use of WMD in attacks. Terrorists groups generally seek to gain from attacks without reducing 
their support, and attacks involving any type of CBRN might be difficult to convert into political 
achievement—any use would be attention-getting, but the reaction and publicity would be very 
negative for the cause being pursued. The use of a nuclear weapon would cause an enormous 
number of deaths and massive destruction, but there would be an immense public backlash, 
security crackdown, and hunt for those responsible. Terrorists may also fear that a nuclear 
weapon would kill so many people that the terrorists would lose all claim to legitimacy, and 
alienate constituencies.  
All types of CBRN involve significant difficulties in their use, and are unpredictable in their 
effects. For example, all kinds of CBRN weapons are affected by weather uncertainties. 
Most terrorist attacks are intended to produce immediate, dramatic effects—unlike a 
biological attack that produces indiscriminate deaths and illnesses over which the terrorists 
would have little control. Terrorists calculate the risk to themselves of certain methods, and 
handling any kind of WMD increases the physical risk to the terrorists themselves. For example, 
handling biological weapons is highly risky—and a lingering death from a biological agent is 
very different from an instantaneous death in a dramatic explosion. And most terrorists want to 
live after carrying out attacks.  
Terrorists may fear that the weapon might not work. Terrorists cannot afford to look 
incompetent, and therefore generally prefer proven methods with fewer risks. As George Habash 
said, “The main point is to select targets where success is 100 percent assured.”31  
Terrorists do not need to use WMD when they can pursue their goals using low-risk, low-cost 
means such as conventional explosives. For example, the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in 
Kenya killed several hundred people and injured several thousand.  
 
                                                 
31 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 34. 
What Is a “Weapon of Mass 
Destruction” (WMD)? 
 
The term “WMD” has often been used 
to mean any weapon that uses 
chemical, biological, radiological, or 
nuclear means (CBRN).  
 




   
Evaluating Phase II Threats. To prevent the damage sustained in Phase I from being 
increased by third-party actions, the impulses and responses that terrorists intend to elicit from 
third-parties need to be anticipated and prepared for. For example, an attack may be intended to 
elicit rage and provoke members of the public to attack other people, and the government needs 
to anticipate these impulses, and be prepared to prevent counterproductive responses.  
The “leverage of terrorism” plays a role in 
evaluating the threat from Phase II of terrorist 
attacks (Fig. 3–6). The leverage of terrorism is 
the tendency for third-parties to respond to 
attacks in a way that is disproportional when 
compared to the actual damage caused by the 
attack. Through the leverage of terrorism, third-
party targets can do more damage than the attack 
did, and therefore need to be careful in their 
responses. Many characteristics of terrorism 
contribute to the leverage of terrorism, including 
“who” and “what” terrorists select to attack, and 
the qualities of the violence. To illustrate, the 
selection of an outrageous target of violence such 
as an elementary school, or a highly symbolic target such as a national monument, can generate 
impulses for very strong responses. The qualities of the violence that terrorists use—that the 
violence is illegal, unexpected, and often random—contribute to the impulses for a strong 
response. The implicit threat that every attack contains of future attacks further contributes to the 
pressure for strong responses.  
The interplay among third-party responses also needs to be anticipated. As shown in Fig. 3–7, 
glee aroused in and expressed by supporters may further enrage opponents and intensify the 
impulse to retaliate in kind.  
 
 
Fig. 3–7. Example of Interplay of Responses to Terrorist Attacks 
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Contribute to Advancing a Political Goal 
 
 
All of these kinds of factors need to be taken into consideration when evaluating the threat 
from Phase II of an attack. (And to be most effective, these factors also need to be considered in 
government plans.)  





















   
Terrorist Threat Assessments. Accurate and objective threat assessments are essential for 
effective counterterrorism efforts. Overestimated threat assessments can cause unnecessary 
public apprehension, wasteful changes in business practices, and pressure on governments to 
adopt counterproductive measures. Underestimated threat assessments risk public safety, and can 
lead to being unprepared for attacks.  
In evaluating Phase I terrorist threats, assessments need to be based on the likelihood of 
credible threats, yet take low-probability threats into consideration. For example, the likelihood 
that terrorists would use a nuclear weapon may be low, but the potential consequences are so 
high that governments may feel that developing effective countermeasures is imperative. 
However, though many threats are possible, some are more likely than others, and the need to 
consider low-probability/high-consequence attacks should not distort or downgrade the attention 
paid to more likely forms of terrorism.  
It is critical to recognize distinctions in the degree of threat posed by the different forms of 
WMD, and to refrain from conflating the threats from chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear weapons into a single WMD threat—the magnitude and type of threat posed by each is 
different. To defend against the threats from WMD, governments need to analyze the threat from 
each type, and how likely it is that each type of threat will occur.  
Governments can avoid using the discussion of terrorist threats for political purposes. For 
example, a government may minimize the threat to encourage a sense of security in the public, or 
inflate the threat to frighten the public into supporting a particular policy. 
Governments (and the public) can be alert for agencies, organizations, and businesses that 
may have an interest in magnifying, or minimizing, the threat from terrorism. For example, 
“security entrepreneurs” may benefit from emphasizing the terrorist threat in order to gain 
additional markets for equipment, larger organization budgets, or greater government powers. 
There have been periodic discussions of “new terrorism,” but though aspects of terrorism may 
change, the fundamentals do not. The idea of “new terrorism” may be promoted for such reasons 
as to mobilize support for policy changes and new measures. But “terrorism” does not change 
any more than “war” does. The tactics and weapons used in war may change, as may the 
weapons used in terrorism, but war itself does not change and neither does terrorism. 
There is danger in generalizing the threat from terrorism on the basis of particular attacks.32 
For example, some experts have said that terrorists with a religious-political goal may feel less 
constrained because they believe that they are doing the will of a higher being, but secular 
terrorists have also been willing to engage in mass-casualty attacks.33 Timothy McVeigh killed 
168 people—including many children—in one attack. Brian Jenkins noted that rightwing 
terrorists “have shown themselves capable of…indiscriminate violence calculated to create panic 
and a popular clamor for a political strongman who will be able to impose order.”34  
 
                                                 
32 For example, it can be misleading to generalize the threat from terrorism based on attacks against a particular 
country. To illustrate, members of the U.S. population may think that they are the primary target of terrorist attacks, 
but empirical research at START showed that the United States was not, as frequently believed, the target of “an 
inordinate number of terrorist attacks.” See LaFree, “Using Open Source Data to Counter Common Myths about 
Terrorism,” in Criminologists on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2011, 418–421. 
33 CIA, Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, 11. Beginning in 1969, rightwing groups in Italy perpetrated 
urban bombings with high numbers of civilian casualties as part of their “strategy of tension” to keep the Italian 
government and population from moving to the left. See Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” in Crenshaw, 
Explaining Terrorism, 2011, 116–117.  
34 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, RAND, 1985, 8. 




   
There can be a tendency to view the terrorist threat in terms of the most recent attacks, and to 
overlook the potential for attacks to come from unexpected directions. Awareness of this 
tendency can help avoid an over-focus on current threats that might leave a country vulnerable to 
brewing threats. 
Before the 9/11 attacks in 2001, many experts had commented on the low priority that 
governments and political leaders had, in general, given to terrorism. Many governments during 
the 1960–2000 period considered terrorism more of a “nuisance” than a significant threat. 
Experts and scholars noted that for decades terrorism was considered a marginal field of study 
and did not receive priority.35 Martha Crenshaw wrote that scholars engaged in the debate over 
the future of American foreign policy in the 1990s did not consider terrorism an important 
problem for the security studies and international relations fields, or for the development of 
grand strategy.36 The Clinton administrations in the 1990s did give increasing attention to 
terrorism, and between 1996 and 2001 nearly doubled annual counterterrorism expenditures.37 
However, that emphasis did not continue when the new George W. Bush administration began in 
January 2001, and during the first eight months of 2001 the administration took very little action 
regarding terrorism, despite warnings.38 Bush’s national security team met formally nearly 100 
times before the 9/11 attacks, but terrorism was the topic during only two of those sessions.39 
Before the 9/11 attacks, the president, vice president, and national security adviser rarely spoke 
extensively about terrorism. On the day of the 9/11 attacks, the national security adviser, 
Condoleezza Rice, was scheduled to give an address outlining administration policy on “the 
threats and problems of today and the day after,” and the speech as prepared (but undelivered) 
focused largely on missile defense, and argued for an increase in its funding by pointing out that 
the United States had spent nearly twice as much on terrorism as it had on missile defense during 
the previous year.40 
What Should the Threat from Terrorism Be Called? How should the threat from terrorism 
be viewed and called? Is the threat a “what,” a “who,” or both? Is the threat a kind of belief such 
as communism or fundamentalism; a particular kind of goal, such as an independent State; or a 
group, community, or population? The threat from terrorism has been identified (and 
misidentified) in many ways. For example, after the 9/11 attacks, the threat from terrorism was 
variously called terrorist networks, terrorist groups of global reach, totalitarian threat linked to 
WMD, ideological extremism, ideological extremists, Islamic extremism, a fringe form of 
Islamic extremism, radical/totalitarian ideology, radical fundamentalism, radical fundamentalists, 
and a radical ideological movement. But it can be a mistake to identify the threat from terrorism 
in terms of the current threat, for the source of the threat changes as different groups take up—





                                                 
35 See, for example, Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 2005, back cover (paperback edition).  
36 Martha Crenshaw, “Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., 
Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 76–77. 
37 Michael Dobbs, “An Obscure Chief in U.S. War on Terror,” Washington Post, April 2, 2000. 
38 For example, the outgoing national security adviser, Samuel Berger, said that he told the incoming adviser, 
Condoleezza Rice, that terrorism would take more of her time than any other issue. See Barton Gellman, “A 
Strategy’s Cautious Evolution,” Washington Post, Jan. 20, 2002.  
39 Associated Press, Ted Bridis, “Bush Team Didn’t Talk Terror Much Before 9/11,” Sacramento Bee, June 29, 2002.  
40 Robin Wright, “Top Focus Before 9/11 Wasn’t on Terrorism,” Washington Post, April 1, 2004; “Excerpts from 
Rice’s Speeches,” Washington Post, April 1, 2004. 








The cause of terrorism is the decision to select terrorism as a method to pursue a political 
goal. People decide to use terrorism because they think that its use is justified by the goal they 
are pursuing, and that the goal is more important than the rights of those who may be harmed or 
killed in the attack (or that the victims have no rights). More specifically, people generally 
decide to use terrorism for one of three reasons: they do not think they can achieve their goals 
using other methods, they do not feel that they are making enough progress toward their goal 
using other methods and are not willing to continue trying, or they think that terrorism will make 
other tools available to them to pursue their goals—and in addition they have to be willing to use 
terrorism (which most people are not willing to do).  
The decision to use terrorism is a deliberate choice from among alternatives, regardless of the 
accuracy and completeness of the information on which the decision is based. The many “root 
causes” of terrorism that have been offered do not cause terrorism, but can be factors affecting 
the selection of terrorism as a method. No factors cause the selection of any method—people in 
similar situations have chosen or rejected terrorism as a means of struggle. During the 20th 
century and early 21st century, the use of terrorism alone has generally been ineffective in 
achieving a goal, but people who take up the tool think that its use will at least advance their 
goal, and perhaps enable other tools to become available.  
The threat from terrorism consists of the physical damage that the violence causes in Phase I 
of a terrorist attack, and the damage that third-parties may do in their responses in Phase II. The 
leverage of terrorism tends to increase the intensity and scope of third-party responses, thus 
making responses potentially more damaging than the attack itself.  
Threat assessments need to evaluate the dangers involved with Phase I and Phase II of 
terrorist attacks. An accurate threat assessment examines the factors that affect terrorists’ 
decisions regarding the amount and type of damage they intend to cause in Phase I of an attack 
(the actual use of violence). The threat from low-probability/high-consequence attacks needs to 
be considered and planned for, but not overemphasized at the expense of more likely kinds of 
attacks. The threats from each type of WMD need to be considered separately—the threats from 
each kind are different.  
Threat assessments need to be accurate and avoid both overestimating and underestimating 
the threat. Threat assessments need to be objective, and avoid bias from those who have 
commercial interests, political agendas other than counterterrorism, or preferences for certain 
tools because of ideology.  
There can be a tendency to view the threat from terrorism in terms of recent terrorist attacks 
and campaigns. Viewing the terrorist threat in terms of the current threat may result in 
overlooking the potential for attacks to come from unexpected directions.  
The threat from terrorism stems from the decision to use terrorism. The source of the threat 
changes as different groups take up and stop using terrorism on behalf of various goals, which 
have also changed over time.  
The threat from terrorism needs to be labeled carefully. Inaccurate characterizations of the 
threat from terrorism can distort or obfuscate the true threat and thereby make terrorism more 









Part II: The Control and Prevention of Terrorism 
 





II. The Public 





How should governments, populations, organizations, the media, and other third-party targets 
respond to terrorist attacks? As shown in Fig. 4–1, two important areas of third-party responses 
are actions aimed at the attackers, and actions 
pertaining to the demands the attackers make and 
the political goals they are seeking.  
The most immediate priority is for third-
parties to maintain control of their responses. By 
controlling their responses, third-parties can 
respond more effectively to attacks and avoid 
acting on impulses that can harm themselves and 
help terrorists. Third-parties can identify the 
emotions, impulses, and actions that terrorists are 
trying to elicit, and then respond carefully.  
Terrorists control many aspects of the actual 
physical attack (Phase I), but they do not control 
the responses of third-party targets (Phase II).  
Terrorists cannot control who hears about an 
attack, how the news affects them, or how 
they respond—third-parties control all steps of 
Phase II (Fig. 4–2). All terrorists can do is to 
try to manipulate these responses, and third-
parties can refuse to be manipulated. Third-
party targets may think that they must take 
certain responses, and there may be strong 
pressures to respond in certain ways, but third-
parties have control of their responses—what 
third-parties do is their decision. 
Three particularly important third-party 
targets are governments, the general public, and 
the media. The responses of these groups are 
critical to suppressing terrorism. 
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Government responses are critical in controlling terrorism. Terrorists have some kind of 
political goal, and governments have the capability to advance or even implement the policy that 
terrorists seek—governments control large resources and the bureaucracy, lead their populations, 
and interact with other governments. Many important responses that governments can take fall 
into seven categories: to respond carefully and be prepared; attack terrorist groups; lead the 
public; avoid pitfalls; keep within democratic values; support research, development, and 
expertise; and strengthen the international system.  
Respond Carefully and Be Prepared. Governments can respond carefully to terrorist 
attacks, and avoid overreaction, underreaction, and hasty actions. Overreaction can shift the 
focus to the government’s actions, help terrorists gain support, and give them a propaganda 
advantage in trying to justify attacks. Underreacting can make the government look weak, 
embolden terrorists, and contribute to the formation of private self-defense groups if members of 
the public think that the government is not taking effective action. Public reaction can intensify 
pressure on governments to take hasty actions, but finding the right level of response is necessary 
to combat terrorism effectively. 
It is essential that governments identify the major third-parties that terrorists are aiming at, 
and the responses that the attackers are seeking from their third-party targets, and incorporate 
that analysis in formulating responses. Governments need to be careful about responding as 
terrorists intend: “Try not to give your worst enemies what they want but cannot achieve without 
your help, or, if you cannot help doing so, at least be aware of the danger and try to limit it.”1 
Governments can be careful about measures that affect particular communities. After an 
attack, governments may institute measures that target the communities seen as “closest” to the 
terrorists. But repression of the wider group to which terrorists may belong is a response that can 
be counterproductive. Repressive measures can increase resentment, distrust, and a sense of 
marginalization in these groups. A widespread crackdown can foster a sense of grievance, 
strengthen group identity, and push moderates toward the terrorists. Harassment of certain 
groups enables terrorists to try to exploit frustration and discontent among those who feel they 
are being persecuted. Mistreatment can also alienate groups from the broader society and the 
government—and the support of all communities is needed in the struggle against terrorism, 
including the wider groups to which terrorists may belong.  
Governments can be prepared for terrorist crises and the pressures that attacks create. In the 
immediate aftermath of an attack, the extent of the immediate threat may not be known, for an 
attack may be the first of a planned series. This lack of knowledge pressures governments to 
focus on protecting the population, and the government may take widespread actions to prevent 
another attack. Prior preparation and planning can help governments reduce pressure, avoid 
mistakes, and minimize knee-jerk decisionmaking. For example, contingency plans for hostage 
situations can help governments incorporate past experience and prevent mistakes. Hostage 
situations can be very difficult for governments—if a government accedes to terrorist demands in 
 
                                                 
1 Paul Schroeder, “The Risks of Victory: An Historian’s Provocation,” National Interest (Winter 2001–2002). 
Schroeder noted that Osama bin Laden had wanted a war against the United States, but could not achieve this goal 
unless the United States responded with war. (After the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, President George W. 
Bush said that terrorists and their supporters had “declared war on the United States, and war is what they got.” See 
President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Jan. 20, 2004.) 




   
order to save hostages, the government may still lose prestige (and set a precedent that 
encourages more hostage-taking), but holding firm and losing hostages is also a defeat for the 
government. Prior preparation can help governments in these and other kinds of situations. 
Leaders can prevent a crisis atmosphere from developing. Terrorist crises usually come with 
little warning and often require quick decisions, placing stress on policymakers and their staffs. 
During the TWA Flight 847 hijacking, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane noted that 
the Reagan administration allowed a “charged atmosphere” to develop in which “reason or logic 
carried little weight.”2 Extended crises involve fatigue, which increases the chances of errors. 
Domestic preparedness, emergency response programs, partnership between the public and 
private sectors, and a common doctrine can mitigate the effects of attacks, and aid in recovery.3 
Consequence management programs can include domestic threat response and incident 
management, WMD consequence management, and economic consequence management. Plans, 
training, and exercises can help state and local governments respond effectively to terrorist 
attacks. Programs can help equip and train first responders including police officers, firefighters, 
emergency medical providers, public works personnel, and emergency management officials. 
The public can be involved in aiding local communities in their recovery from the consequences 

























                                                 
2 Robert C. McFarlane, in Neil C. Livingston and Terrell E. Arnold, Fighting Back (Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1986), foreword.  
3 For a discussion of public and private sector partnership see Dennis J. Reimer, “Statement by Gen. Dennis J. 
Reimer (Ret.) before the National Commission on Terrorism Attacks Upon the United States,” Nov. 19, 2003. 
“A Common Doctrine” 
 
“Recognizing that all disasters are local, we need a common doctrine that links the national strategy 
and incident management. Without a common doctrine, we face the impossible task of having to adapt 
our support packages to a wide variety of different local command and control procedures. This 
doctrine should primarily deal with the mitigation part of our strategy and is terribly important when 
you consider the large number of towns and communities we have across the nation and the need to 
provide assistance to them in case of a possible disaster, either man-made or natural. This doctrine 
should incorporate four stages: initial response, containment, recovery, and restoration to normalcy. 
 
— Initial Response: The first stage of any mitigation operation is the initial response. The incident 
command has to be established and control of the site achieved. Failing to establish this early on 
will result in great confusion and possible increased casualties. General tasks associated with this 
critical stage must be better identified, distributed, and understood. 
 
— Containment: Control, once established, has to be expanded to contain the damage. The area 
affected must be sealed off, responders must be organized for 24/7 operations, and procedures 
established to keep the public informed. 
 
— Recovery: This phase involves not only continuation of search and recovery, but both the 
consequence and crisis management aspect of such a tragedy. It also must start to 
comprehensively address the human aspects associated with assisting victims and their families. 
 
— Restoration to Normalcy: This phase recognizes the latent effects of such a tragedy upon victims, 
family members, and the community at large. We must not only continue to deal with the sorrow 
and the anger, as well as economic recovery, but also start the memorialization process.” 
 








   
Attack Terrorist Groups. Governments can attack terrorist groups. Governments have many 
tools at their disposal to detect, disrupt, and eliminate terrorist groups. Several follow. 
The Criminal Justice System. Governments can use the 
criminal justice system to investigate, arrest, extradite, and 
prosecute terrorists. The criminal justice system has been 
effective—a RAND study found that policing ended 40 
percent of the 268 terrorist groups studied.4 However, the 
justice system can be slow and costly, it can be difficult to 
gather enough admissible evidence for conviction, and trials 
can give terrorists a platform for their cause. But the legal 
tool has moral force, upholds democratic values and the rule 
of law, and helps counter terrorist claims of legitimacy by 
emphasizing that their acts are crimes. In addition, terrorists 
can be impeded by knowing that they are wanted 
criminals, and trials demonstrate resolve and help sustain public support for counterterrorism.  
Policing, Intelligence, and Covert Action. Law enforcement activities can pursue individuals 
and groups involved in terrorist activity. Terrorist groups have many requirements, such as to 
travel, communicate, obtain weapons and explosives, raise funds, build support, and maintain a 
base from which to plan operations, and each of these “nodes” provides a way to identify and 
attack groups.5 For example, governments can monitor and exploit terrorist communications, and 
tighter controls over illicit money can disrupt money flows and help identify “sleeper cells.”  
Governments can use surveillance to track people and their movements, and technological 
means such as data mining to identify potential suspects. However, it can be difficult to 
distinguish terrorist operations from legitimate activity. The consequences of misidentifying 
people as terrorist suspects can range from minor inconvenience to loss of liberty or worse, and 
can cause resentment and erode the public’s confidence in security efforts. Domestic surveillance 
can diminish personal privacy, and large electronic databases have the potential for abuse; for 
example, by misusing the gathered information for political purposes.  
Intelligence can identify terrorists. The police, security services, and intelligence units can 
collect information on terrorist groups, penetrate cells, and arrest members. But as Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) William Casey noted, “Terrorist groups are very tough nuts for 
intelligence to crack…. They are small, not easily penetrated, and their operations are closely 
held and compartmented. Only a few people in the organization are privy to specific operations, 
they move quickly, and place a high premium on security and surprise.”6 In addition, as Brian 
Jenkins pointed out, “There is a high noise level of threats, few of which materialize, few of 
which can be ignored. The U.S. Marines in Lebanon had received over a hundred bomb threats 
or warnings of possible terrorist bombings prior to the destruction of the Marine Headquarters.”7  
 
                                                 
4 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 2008, 18–19. 
5 Terrorist groups also have “mundane” requirements—captured documents have included purchase forms and 
emails questioning expenses. See Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” Atlantic, Sept. 2004; Edward 
Alden, Stephen Fidler, and Mark Huband, “The West Has Hit Al-Qaeda Hard but Terrorism Is Still a Formidable 
Enemy,” Financial Times, Sept. 11, 2003. Pointing out the banality of terrorists’ daily lives and their incompetence 
can delegitimate their message and help prevent potential supporters from falling victim to terrorists’ messages. See 
Jamie Bartlett and Richard Reeves, “Ridicule Can Be Our Weapon Against Terrorism,” April 16, 2010. 
6 DCI William J. Casey, address, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, April 17, 1985. 
7 Brian Michael Jenkins, “The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony Before the Long Commission,” Nov. 17, 1983. 
Fig. 4–3. Government Actions to 



















   
Governments can use informants to identify terrorists. 
Informers may sometimes provide false information, but 
information programs can be very effective. The U.S. 
“Rewards for Justice” program prevented terrorist attacks and 
led to the arrest and successful prosecution of terrorists.8  
Governments can induce members to defect, and thereby 
weaken groups by reducing the number of members, causing 
distrust within the group, and gaining information that leads 
to arrests. Reduced sentences or amnesty in return for 
cooperation provided valuable information about terrorist 
operations and members in Northern Ireland and Italy, and 
made a major contribution in defeating the Red Brigades. 
Infiltrators can attack terrorist groups from within by 
creating or exploiting vulnerabilities. Infiltration can thwart 
planned attacks by causing them to go awry, thus saving lives 
and damaging the group, which needs “successful” attacks 
for credibility and morale, and to train new members.  
Infiltrators can spread disinformation and doubt about members, encourage defectors, gather 
intelligence that can lead to the arrest of members, exacerbate divisions between factions, and 
exploit conflicts between organizations. (Terrorist groups often have factionalism and may 
compete with other groups, and exacerbating disagreements can reduce group effectiveness and 
the number of attacks. A CIA yearly report noted that “bickering within and among 
organizations” had helped to reduce Palestinian terrorist attacks during that year.9) 
A serious problem with infiltration is that an agent may be required to commit a crime in 
order to gain entry into the organization.10 Terrorist groups may test new members by having 
them perpetrate an attack, an act that binds them to the group, gives the group a threat over 
members, and makes it very difficult for them to return to normal society.  
Covert action can disrupt and destroy terrorist groups. Covert action can be effective, but 
potential drawbacks include blowback, unintended consequences, loss of control of operations, 
confrontations with other governments, and the compromising of a country’s values. After the 
Iran-Contra scandal, President Ronald Reagan directed that any covert activity be in compliance 
with American values.11 Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner echoed this view, writing 
that it is “contrary to the spirit of our constitutional process to carry out foreign policies in secret 
that the public and Congress would not accept if known.” 12  
 
                                                 
8 GAO, Combating Terrorism, GAO-03-165, 2003, 142. Offering compensation for information can also increase 
pressure on terrorist groups, and increase suspicion among group members, and between members and supporters.  
9 CIA, International Terrorism in 1979, 4. 
10 During the Carter administration, the CIA managed to insert an operative into a terrorist group. However, the 
group asked the operative to prove his bona fides by assassinating a particular government official, a request that 
created an ethical dilemma for the CIA: if the agent committed the assassination and thereby remained in the group, 
it would be likely that he would be able to thwart attacks, and thus on balance could save future lives. However, the 
Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, did not allow the assassination—his decision was based on 
several factors, but primarily on the issue of balancing a certain death against the possible saving of lives. Course 
discussion, “Terrorism & Democracy,” Maryland School of Public Policy, 2004, author’s files. 
11 President Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” March 4, 1987.  












   
Measures that target illegal activities can also help suppress terrorism. Terrorists often commit 
common crimes such as robbery and smuggling to fund their operations, and can use the same 
criminal support infrastructure that organized crime groups use. For example, the channels used 
for trafficking drugs, weapons, and human beings may be used by terrorists, and funds raised by 
illegal means can finance terrorism. Spanish officials reported that terrorists had used drug sales 
to finance the 2004 Madrid train bombings (an attack in which more than 2,000 people were 
injured and killed).13 In the United States, a large trafficking ring bought cigarettes in North 
Carolina, a state with a low cigarette tax, sold them in Michigan, a state with a high cigarette tax, 
and sent part of the profits to Hezbollah (Fig. 4–4).14 Transparency in areas such as financial 
transactions can identify terrorist organization funding flows, and also target drug trafficking, 
money laundering, tax evasion, and corruption. Exposing terrorist engagement in criminal 


























Lack of resources can seriously hamper terrorists. Lack of funds helped in the arrest of the 
terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993. The attackers were so low on funds that 
they tried to get their deposit back on the van that they had rented and blown up. After the attack, 
FBI agents found the van vehicle identification number (VIN) in the rubble, and were at the 
rental agency when one of the terrorists called, leading to his arrest and that of others.15  
 
                                                 
13 Dale Fuchs, “Spain Says Bombers Drank Water from Mecca and Sold Drugs,” New York Times, April 15, 2004.  
14 GAO, Terrorist Financing, GAO-04-163, 2003, 12–13. 
15 Dave Williams, “The Bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City,” International Criminal Police 
Review (1998). 
 











   
Reduce Terrorist Support. Terrorists can do little toward achieving their goals without 
political, financial, and material support, and governments can deprive terrorist groups of 
resources of all kinds—material resources such as funds and weapons, and political resources 
such as support and legitimacy. Governments can close down the websites of terrorists and 
thereby reduce their ability to recruit members, and communicate with constituencies and other 
groups. Governments can freeze and confiscate the financial assets of groups and eliminate 
funding sources. However, procedures for identifying and interrupting terrorist funding flows 
can be costly and time-consuming for financial institutions, and terrorists can try to circumvent 
banking systems through illegal underground transfer methods, or through informal or 
nontraditional money movement systems. Legislation can require informal types of businesses to 
register and file reports, but enforcement may be difficult.  
Governments can close down front organizations that terrorist groups use to increase their 
political support and raise money. However, shutting down charities and enterprises that help fill 
social needs can give the impression that a government is callous, and also that all similar 
charities are supporting terrorism. 
Governments can reduce support for terrorists by developing the public’s understanding about 
terrorism, and by exposing and discrediting terrorist propaganda. No terrorist justification is 
valid, and governments can inform the public about these attempts to deceive (see Appendix D).  
Governments can conduct public information campaigns to reduce support provided to 
terrorists from communities. Law-enforcement personnel can strengthen ties to the communities 
from which terrorists are most likely to get support. Local police have in-depth knowledge of 
their communities, and useful intelligence often comes from the places where terrorists hide and 
seek support.  
The government can engage the media, and not try to sideline it. Governments can help the 
media by providing as much information as appropriate in a situation. Establishing an 
information center or assigning a public information officer on the ground can help both the 
media and officials (officials on the scene will be concentrating primarily on resolving an 
incident with minimum risk to life and property, and may find press inquiries or cameras 
distracting). Counterterrorism expert Richard Clutterbuck advised governments as follows: 
 
Action and violence are news, and therefore it is no good trying to stop the media recording 
action and violence. It is better to help them record it…. If you help them to get to the scene of 
the action they will tend to depict the truth, which is usually on your side…. You can help to 
mobilize the majority of people by bringing the truth into the living room…. The government 
and its security forces have one great advantage: the overwhelming majority of people detest 
violence, and the more clearly the truth is presented to them on the media, the more they will 
turn against the terrorists and support the rule of law.16 
 
Regular meetings between government officials and the media can contribute to more 
effective relations. Governments can enlist the media’s help in delegitimizing terrorism and 
reducing support for terrorists (how the media portrays terrorism and terrorist groups can affect 
how the public views terrorists). Governments can include the media in exercises, which can 
help emergency responders and officials understand how to best work with the media. 
 
                                                 
16 Richard Clutterbuck, “Terrorism: A Soldier’s View,” in Jennifer Shaw et al., eds., Ten Years of Terrorism (London: 
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1979), 69–70. 




   
Governments can press other governments to stop sponsoring or supporting terrorism. 
Governments can curtail diplomatic privileges, sever diplomatic relations, and isolate countries. 
Isolating a country by political condemnation can be effective—when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, 
the Iranian prime minister went to the UN for help, but found little support because Iran had been 
holding U.S. diplomats hostage (and this lack of support contributed to Iran’s decision to release 
the hostages). Governments can work through international and intergovernmental organizations 
to pressure state sponsors of terrorism. 
Economic measures can affect the actions of other governments. Economic incentives can 
include credits, guaranteed loans, reduced trade barriers, and licensing the sale of sensitive 
technology. Economic pressure can include economic sanctions; trade embargoes and 
restrictions; denial of foreign assistance, loans, and investments; and prohibited economic 
transactions with businesses. Economic sanctions can be effective, such as those the UN imposed 
against Libya for the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772, but sanctions have 
potential drawbacks. Sanctions generally need international cooperation to be effective because 
many products can be replaced (even though countries with large economies will usually have 
some economic leverage with most countries). Embargoes can enable a dictator to blame internal 
problems on the sanctions and other governments. Sanctions may have unintended effects and 
may damage the economies of countries that normally trade with the target country, or injure 
vulnerable groups within the target country (though international cooperation can help mitigate 
any unintended negative effects, such as by providing compensation for economic damage to 
trading partners, or allowing supplies such as medicines).  
Governments can use lists to combat terrorism. The U.S. State 
Department, for example, maintained a number of lists including 
the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and the Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO) list. A country placed on the State Sponsors 
of Terrorism list was automatically subject to a wide range of 
military, economic, and political sanctions (see “State Sponsor: 
Implications” in box).17 Members of groups listed in the FTO 
were denied entry into the United States (and were subject to 
deportation if found there), and the Treasury Department could 
seize organization funds in the United States.  
Being placed on a list can be stigmatizing, and is likely to 
reduce support, especially for organizations with activities that 
may appear to be legitimate such as charity façades. However, 
lists may be difficult to change, are subject to political pressures, 
and are likely to involve competing foreign policy priorities. For 
example, a counterterrorism office may press for a country to be 
placed on a list at the same time that a trade office is seeking 
expanded commerce with that country. Any inconsistencies can 
reduce a list’s credibility by giving the impression of hypocrisy 
(discussions regarding whether or not the IRA should have been 
on the FTO list can illustrate).18 
 
                                                 
17 U.S. State Dept., Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 85. 
18 U.S. State Dept., “Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 1999 Report,” Oct. 8, 1999; National Commission on 








   
Military Force. Governments can use military force wisely for counterterrorism, and avoid 
potential pitfalls. A major terrorist attack arouses the desire to “do something,” and military force 
is a swift response that has high visibility, demonstrates seriousness, and makes a government 
appear active. The use of military force can satisfy public demand for action, improve national 
morale, and boost popular support—in a poll, two-thirds of Americans approved of the airstrikes 
on alleged terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998.19  
Military force can support counterterrorism efforts in many ways including surveillance, 
deterrence, transport, blockades, rescue operations, and retaliatory strikes. The use of military 
force can complement political, diplomatic, legal, and economic counterterrorism efforts, and 
can back up all other options—even knowing that military force may be used can complicate 
terrorist plans, for terrorists must consider the risk of being attacked. Military forces can assist 
the police in situations that exceed the capabilities of normal policing, and can help failing States 
prevent their territory from being used as a safe haven for terrorists.  
However, the use of military force involves risks and limitations. Military force is difficult to 
use effectively against terrorist groups—most groups are small and hidden, and have few 
facilities that can be targeted.20 No matter how carefully used, military force will almost always 
cause collateral damage, which terrorists can then use for propaganda purposes. An overreaction 
or a judgment error by military forces on the ground may turn the population against the military, 
or trigger civil violence. The motives for the use of force may be misinterpreted, and generate 
hostility that aids terrorist recruitment. The use of military force can give terrorists publicity, 
increase their sense of importance, and reinforce their message that an opponent is evil. As Brian 
Jenkins pointed out regarding the use of military force in counterterrorism, “It’s not in our 
interest to enter the battlefield of our opponent, where he has all the advantages.”21 
Planning and preparation are required for military 
operations, and complexity increases the risks in 
execution. The use of military force may require 
international cooperation, such as to fly over another 
country’s airspace. In 1986, refusals of permission to 
overfly territories for airstrikes against Libya required 
the aircraft to fly a much longer route (see map) that 
greatly increased the difficulty of the operation.22  
Military strikes can arouse unrealistic public 
expectations, escalate a situation, and be imitated by 
others. Strikes carried out without international 
support may strain alliances, contribute to the decline 
of international standards, and lower a country’s 
moral stature. Intelligence on terrorists can be 
imprecise and perishable, particularly since terrorists 
may move frequently—for example, the 1998 strikes 
in Afghanistan missed Osama bin Laden.  
 
                                                 
19 Keating Holland, “Most Americans Support Sudan, Afghanistan Strikes,” CNN.com, Aug. 21, 1998. 
20 A RAND study found that military force was the primary cause for the end of 7 percent of terrorist groups, and 
was most effective against large insurgent groups. See Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 2008, 19, 31.  
21 David K. Shipler, “Terror: Americans as Targets,” New York Times, Nov. 26, 1985. 
22 Map from Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, 1991, 218. 
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Preemptive and preventive strikes require a level of intelligence that is seldom available, and 
may result in the attacker being seen as an aggressor. Yet releasing the evidence to justify a 
strike may compromise the intelligence method used. [Note the difference between “preemptive”  
and “preventive,” terms that have sometimes been 
misused (see definitions in box). The 2003 Iraq War, 
for example, was a preventive war, not a preemptive 
war as it was sometimes called—the intelligence did 
not show any imminent threat from Iraq.23 Yet 
regarding the decision to invade Iraq, Condoleezza 
Rice said, “The question of imminence isn’t whether 
or not someone is going to strike tomorrow, it’s 
whether you believe you’re in a stronger position 
today to deal with a threat.”24 However, her statement 
describes preventive war, not preemptive attack.] 
Military, police, and special counterterrorism forces can successfully rescue hostages, but 
these kinds of operations involve high risk. German counterterrorism forces successfully stormed 
a Lufthansa jet hijacked to Mogadishu and rescued all passengers and crew, but in Malta, dozens 
of passengers were killed during a rescue attempt on a hijacked Egyptian aircraft.25 Unsuccessful 
rescue attempts can cause the deaths of civilians and damage public morale, but successful 
rescues can resolve the situation—and diminish terrorist groups and their support. The 1982 
rescue of kidnapped Brigadier General James Dozier by Italian security forces helped reduce 
support for terrorism, and weakened terrorist groups through defections.26  
Responses to military force are unpredictable, and may deter terrorism, or provoke increased 
violence.27 There was a marked increase in anti-American terrorist activity in response to the 
Persian Gulf War, the 1998 airstrikes on suspected terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan, 
and NATO’s 1999 military action against Serbian targets.28 After the 1986 U.S. airstrikes, Libya 
temporarily stopped sponsoring terrorist attacks, but then resumed in a more circumspect 
manner. (The 1986 airstrikes did have an unexpected effect: in order to deter additional strikes, 
European allies took stronger action against terrorism and Libya.) 
The use of military force can eliminate terrorist sanctuaries. In the 1990s, the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan provided al Qaeda a safe haven in which the terrorist group could 
maintain training camps and plan attacks. After the 9/11 attacks, coalition forces invaded 
Afghanistan, overthrew the Taliban government, and eliminated the terrorist training camps.29 
 
                                                 
23Joseph Cirincione, “Powell Proves Deception, but Not Imminent Threat,” Feb. 5, 2003, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace; Senate Intelligence Committee press release, “Senate Intelligence Committee Unveils Final 
Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence,” June 5, 2008. 
24 “Former CIA Director Breaks Ranks with Bush, Rattles Washington,” ABC News, April 30, 2007.  
25 RAND Chronology, Oct. 13, 1977, and Nov. 23, 1985. 
26 Richard Clutterbuck, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” in Schmid and Crelinsten, eds., Western Responses to 
Terrorism, 1993, 274.  
27 See, for example, LaFree, “Using Open Source Data to Counter Common Myths about Terrorism,” in 
Criminologists on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2011, 431–435. 
28 U.S. State Dept., Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans 1997, 39; FBI, Terrorism in the 
United States 1999, 24; and U.S. State Dept., Political Violence Against Americans 1999, 55. 
29 In 2002 the Director of Central Intelligence said that nothing had done more for U.S. counterterrorism capabilities 
than sending military forces into Afghanistan to end al Qaeda’s safe haven—see DCI George Tenet, “Written 
Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the Joint Inquiry Committee,” Oct. 17, 2002. 
Preemption vs. Preventive 
 
Preemptive attack: “An attack initiated 
on the basis of incontrovertible evidence 
that an enemy attack is imminent.”  
Preventive war: “A war initiated in the 
belief that military conflict, while not 
imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay 
would involve greater risk.” – Department 
of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, 2001, as amended through 2004 
 
 




   
However, the costs and consequences of military action can easily be underestimated, and 
governments can be wary of those who advocate the use of military force without acknowledging 
the potential difficulties, hazards, and repercussions. When President Ronald Reagan signed 
NSDD 138, which made responding to terrorist attacks with force easier, Brian Jenkins wrote 
that even within the Executive Branch some were “very critical of the new directive saying that it 
represents the bellicose instincts and naive ambitions of dilettantes who ignore or overlook the 
problems of applying military force to terrorism.”30 The 2003 invasion of Iraq can illustrate. 
Some advocates for invading Iraq declared that overthrowing the Iraqi regime would be a 
“cakewalk,” and that Iraq could pay for its own reconstruction.31 Numerous statements by the 
president and senior administration officials reflected the assumption that the occupation of Iraq 
would be short and inexpensive—indeed, the White House’s initial title 
of President George W. Bush’s May 2003 address onboard the USS 
Abraham Lincoln was, “President Bush Announces Combat Operations 
in Iraq Have Ended” (an address made with a “mission accomplished” 









Yet there had been many warnings about the difficulties involved with invading and 
occupying Iraq, warnings from many sources that included leaders of allied countries; 
organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the EU; Congressional leaders; military leaders, both 
active and retired; policy experts and scholars; think tanks; religious leaders; columnists; and 
intelligence agencies.33 In January 2003, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced and 
disseminated two Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) that addressed the likely 
consequences of invading Iraq and challenges in postwar Iraq.34 The ICAs assessed that invading 
Iraq would fuel support for extremism and terrorist groups, and that Iraq would be “a deeply 
divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict 
with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so.”35 
 
                                                 
30 Brian Michael Jenkins, Combatting Terrorism Becomes a War, RAND, 1984, 5. (NSDD–National Security 
Decision Directive.) 
31 See, for example, Ken Adelman, “Cakewalk in Iraq,” Washington Post, Feb. 13, 2002. Andrew Natsios, the 
administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), said that U.S. taxpayers would not have 
to pay more than $1.7 billion to reconstruct Iraq. See Nightline: “Project Iraq,” ABC News, April 23, 2003. 
32 President George W. Bush, address, “President Bush Announces Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,” May 1, 
2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html (June 20, 2003). The White House later 
edited the original headline and inserted the word “Major” before “Combat”—see Dana Milbank, “White House 
Web Scrubbing; Offending Comments on Iraq Disappear from Site,” Washington Post, Dec. 18, 2003. 
33 For examples of warnings, see the 9/11 attacks and responses section of the bibliography.  
34 ICAs were research papers on key national security issues that summarize in one document the views of the 
Intelligence Community (IC) as a whole, and were fully coordinated within the IC before their publication. The two 
January 2003 ICAs were widely disseminated among senior policymakers including in the White House.  
35 National Intelligence Council, Principal Challenges in Post–Saddam Iraq, Jan. 2003, 5, and Regional 
Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, Jan. 2003, 13, in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of 
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Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Army Chief of Staff General Eric 
Shinseki testified to the U.S. Senate that several hundred thousand 
troops would be required to occupy Iraq after the invasion.36 However, 
the administration dismissed the idea that the forces required to invade 
Iraq and overthrow the government might be inadequate to stabilize 
the situation and maintain security, and the top two defense officials 
contradicted Shinseki. The secretary of defense said that the estimate 
of several hundred thousand U.S. troops required to provide stability in Iraq was “far from the 
mark,” and the deputy secretary of defense said “wildly off the mark.”37 
U.S. coalition forces successfully overthrew the Iraqi government, but the lack of adequate 
forces to establish security after the invasion led to continued violence and terrorism, and  
military forces were not withdrawn as planned (Fig. 
4–5).38 In 2005, a CIA report assessed that Iraq had 
become the training ground for the next generation 
of terrorists.39 A 2006 National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) assessed that the Iraq jihad was 
“shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and 
operatives,” and that the Iraq conflict had “become 
the cause célèbre for jihadists, breeding a deep 
resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim 
world and cultivating supporters for the global 
jihadist movement.”40 
Military force can control territory and what 
happens on that territory, but cannot usually solve 
political problems: as Milton wrote, “Who 
overcomes by force, hath overcome but half his 
foe.”41 Yet military force can create the security 
conditions on the ground in which political 
solutions can be found. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Select Committee on Intelligence on Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq, 2007, 3, 27, 57. A 
year after Bush declared (in May 2003) that major combat operations were over, the violence in Iraq had increased 
tenfold. The number of insurgent attacks in Iraq went from about 1,750 in June and July 2004 to more than 3,000 in 
August 2004. See Bob Woodward, State of Denial, 2006, 336. 
36 General Eric K. Shinseki, Senate Armed Services Committee testimony, Feb. 25, 2003: “We’re talking about 
post–hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly significant with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could 
lead to other problems. And so, it takes significant ground force presence to maintain [a] safe and secure 
environment to ensure that the people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along 
with administering a situation like this.”  
37 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability with Afghan President Karzai,” 
DOD News, Feb. 27, 2003; Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, House Budget Committee testimony, Feb. 
27, 2003. Shinseki repeated his estimate when he testified again March 12, 2003, House Appropriations Committee. 
38 Walter Pincus, “Iraqi Forces Are Better Trained, Study Says,” Washington Post, Dec. 22, 2004; Michael R. 
Gordon, “The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War,” New York Times, Oct. 19, 2004. General John 
Abizaid testified later that General Eric Shinseki had been right that more forces should have been available 
immediately after major combat operations—see Senate Armed Services Committee testimony, Nov. 15, 2006, 119. 
39 Douglas Jehl, “Iraq May Be Prime Place for Training of Militants, C.I.A. Report Concludes,” New York Times, 
June 22, 2005; Reuters, “Iraq Is a Terrorist Training Ground, CIA Says,” June 22, 2005.  
40 National Intelligence Council, “Declassified Key Judgments (from April 2006 NIE).” 
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Lead the Public. Government leaders can help people control their actions and respond in 
ways that defeat terrorists. In particular, leaders need to prevent private retaliation and help   
members of the public control the impulse to take the law into 
their own hands. Three hours after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, John Steinbruner said during a Washington 
Post online discussion that Americans needed to be calm and 
wise, and avoid lashing out.42 On September 12, 2001, Secretary 
of State Colin Powell said that the attacks “should not be seen as 
something done by Arabs or Islamics [but as] something that was 
done by terrorists.”43 The next day President Bush and the U.S.  
attorney general urged the American people not to hold Arab-Americans and Muslims 
responsible for the attacks, and to treat them with respect, and pledged a swift response to  
violence against them.44 The Justice Department publicized that it 
was illegal to discriminate against those thought to be Arab, 
Muslim, Sikh, or South-Asian; provided information about 
discrimination and how to file a complaint (see a notice placed in 
newspapers); and established a working group whose 
responsibilities included outreach to vulnerable communities.45 In 
a major address, the president asked Americans to be calm and 
resolute, and to uphold the values of America.46 
Good leadership is particularly needed when people are frightened, for people do not always 
react well when they feel threatened—after the 9/11 attacks, a wave of anti-Muslim incidents and 
violence occurred in many countries including the United States.47 Harassment and attacks can 
enable extremists to exploit fear and alienation among groups. Brian Jenkins noted that “the 
greatest threat posed by terrorists…lies in the atmosphere of alarm they create, which corrodes 
democracy and breeds repression.”48 
The government can develop the public’s understanding regarding terrorism, especially about 
what responses terrorists are seeking. The concept that one purpose of attacks is to elicit self-
damaging responses from the terrorists’ opponents is not always well understood, and this 
comprehension is critical for the public to help control terrorism. Many terrorist campaigns have 
ended through the loss of popular support, and increasing public understanding can reduce 
support for terrorists. In addition, the government can be as open with the public as is consistent 
with security—the public needs this transparency in order to help the government. 
 
                                                 
42 John Steinbruner, “Breaking News,” Washingtonpost.com: Live Online, Sept. 11, 2001, 12:30 p.m. 
43 Secretary of State Colin Powell, “Interview on NBC’s Dateline,” Sept. 12, 2001. 
44 U.S. State Dept., “The United States and the Global Coalition Against Terrorism, September–December 2001: A 
Chronology,” Dec. 26, 2001. 
45 U.S. Dept. of Justice, “Civil Rights Division National Origin Working Group Initiative to Combat the Post-9/11 
Discriminatory Backlash,” Jan. 16, 2002; U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 
1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2003, 21.  
46 President George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” Sept. 20, 2001. 
47 “Anti-Islamic Violence Breaks Out Around World,” Guardian, Sept. 13, 2001. See also “Domestic Response to 
the Attacks,” Keesing’s Record of World Events, Sept. 2001—United States. Note that fear can lead to great 
injustices: after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government forcibly incarcerated more than 120,000 Japanese-
American men, women, and children in guarded internment camps because of their ethnicity. Terrorist attacks can 
lead to the impulse to take similar responses. See the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, 
www.fdrlibraryvirtualtour.org (April 5, 2017).   










   
Leaders can guide public impulses into productive channels. After the 9/11 attacks, responses 
in the United States included not only patriotism, but widespread compassion, consideration of 
others, and generosity.49 The American Red Cross said that the unprecedented stream of 
donations expressed “the greatest wave of compassion” the organization had ever experienced 
(people donated $102 million to the Red Cross in the first week alone).50 President George W. 
Bush encouraged this spirit, saying that “one of the best weapons, one of the truest weapons that 
we have against terrorism is to show the world the true strength of character and kindness of the 
American people.”51 The administration initiated a number of programs to involve the public, 
and the president asked every American child to contribute one dollar to help Afghan children. 
And leaders can try to sustain the public’s nobility and honor. 
Leaders can honor victims and lead mourning. After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush directed 
U.S. flags to be flown at half-staff, and proclaimed a National Day of Prayer and Remembrance. 
Six months after the 9/11 attacks, a “Tribute in Light” memorialized 
the World Trade Center victims. Olympic flame torchbearers for the 
2002 Winter Olympics included family members of 9/11 victims. 
Political leaders can support private efforts to honor victims. For 
example, legislatures can provide for the building of memorials, 
such as the legislation that allowed a memorial cairn (using private 
funds) to be placed in Arlington Cemetery in memory of the victims 
of the attack on Pan Am Flight 103. Government leaders can 
express compassion for victims and families, but avoid becoming 
emotionally involved. This balance can be difficult to maintain—both Presidents Jimmy Carter 
and Ronald Reagan said that they had become emotionally involved with hostage families.  
Governments can provide support to terrorism victims and their families. This support may be 
emergency assistance, such as the U.S. government provided after the 9/11 attacks, or sustained 
support. During extended hostage crises, the State Department had family liaison program for 
hostage families. Programs have included outreach activities such as visits, hot-lines, information 
on private counseling services, and a personal contact for each family. These kinds of measures 
can be proactive, such as calling a hostage’s family even when there is nothing new to report. 
Governments can ensure that charitable organizations are legitimate, and that donations are 
handled properly. A record amount of money was raised after the 9/11 attacks, and when 
concerns arose regarding these funds and the number of charities (many of which were new), 
Congress held hearings addressing 9/11 charitable contributions.  
Note that equity for terrorism victims can be an issue—victims of some terrorist attacks have 
received more compensation than victims of other attacks.52 Legislation can address more 
equitable treatment for victims of terrorist attacks.53  
 
                                                 
49 See, for example, April Witt, “Kinder, Gentler Since Sept. 11,” Washington Post, Oct. 14, 2001; Judith Martin 
noted the profound effect that the 9/11 attacks had had on society in terms of caring and civility: “Not only were 
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Judith Martin, “Changing, for Good,” Washington Post, Sept. 15, 2002. 
50 Jon Christensen, “Tools for the Aftermath; Relief Agencies Retool to Handle Online Flood,” New York Times, 
Sept. 26, 2001.  
51 President George W. Bush, press conference, “President Holds Prime Time News Conference,” Oct. 11, 2001. 
52 See, for example, Rob Blackhurst, “Add Insult to Injury,” Financial Times, July 1, 2006.  
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Leaders can focus on a positive vision. A “War on Terrorism” can illustrate. To declare a 
“War on Terrorism” identifies what a country is against, but what is the nation for? What goal is  
a country trying to achieve? It is important to know what is not 
desired, but goals need to be expressed in a positive way for 
the tools of national strategy to be used most effectively—a 
positive vision exerts a “pull” that can help focus and direct 
efforts toward a goal. A demonstration in Lebanon after the 
9/11 attacks shows that the demonstrators were against 
terrorism and for freedom (see photo).54  
Government leaders can foster public determination and 
will, strengthen the bonds between leaders and the public, and 
increase community cohesion. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush  
administration established programs to involve the public in counterterrorism efforts, and 
encouraged public service. Three months after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush said as follows: 
 
Many ask, what can I do to help in our fight. The answer is simple. All of us can become a 
September the 11th volunteer by making a commitment to service in our own communities. So 
you can serve your country by tutoring or mentoring a child, comforting the afflicted, housing 
those in need of shelter and a home. You can participate in your Neighborhood Watch or Crime 
Stoppers. You can become a volunteer in a hospital, emergency medical, fire, or rescue unit. You 
can support our troops in the field and, just as importantly, support their families here at home, 
by becoming active in the USO or groups and communities near our military installations.55 
 
Leaders can ensure that sacrifices involving the public, and the risks and burdens of defense 
are shared. In answer to the question of how much sacrifice Americans would have to make in 
their daily lives as a result of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush answered that the administration 
hoped that “they make no sacrifice whatsoever.”56 In 2006 Bush said that victory in Iraq would 
be difficult and require more sacrifice; however, the primary sacrifice was being made by 
military servicemembers and their families, with little asked of the general population.57 The 
issue of shared sacrifice prompted William Galston to ask, “Can freedom be sustained by a 
handful of troops cheered on by a nation of spectators?”—a question that echoed Army Chief of 
Staff General Edward Meyer’s statement that “an Army does not fight a war, a nation does.”58  
Leaders can bring forth the inner resources of the people, and develop and sustain moral force. 
In the United States, the values and principles in the Constitution and core documents are a 
source of moral force, and the ethical system in the nation flows from these values and 
principles. In difficult times, the ethical element of leadership bonds leaders and the people, 
enabling them to withstand stress and achieve moral ascendancy. Moral force engages the will to 
succeed and provides the strongest form of action, and thus is an essential tool in the fight 
against terrorism. 
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55 President George W. Bush, address, “President Discusses War on Terrorism,” Nov. 8, 2001. 
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Avoid Pitfalls. Governments face a number of pitfalls in responding to terrorist attacks. 
Terrorist attacks create pressures that can lead governments to make mistakes, damage their 
countries, and aid terrorists. A discussion of several areas follows.  
Control Rhetoric and Political Prominence. Leaders can limit the political prominence given 
to terrorism. After an attack, leaders need to demonstrate resolve to combat terrorism and show 
support for victims; however, excessive rhetoric can help terrorists by raising their profile, giving 
them the publicity that can help recruit new members and garner support, and increasing the 
pressure on public leaders to take unwise measures. Emotional rhetoric can encourage impulsive 
behavior in the public, and discourage the dispassion needed to select the most effective tools 
and responses. Excessive rhetoric may exaggerate the threat to public safety, and thereby 
increase public anxiety beyond the actual threat.  
Leaders can avoid elevating the importance of terrorists. Brian 
Jenkins pointed out that the United States had contributed to Osama 
bin Laden’s reputation by denouncing him as “the preeminent 
organizer of international terrorism.”59 The public needs to hear from 
their leaders after an egregious attack, yet attention from a head of 
state can increase terrorists’ sense of importance in their own eyes and 
those of supporters. When President Bush was asked if he wanted bin 
Laden dead, Bush replied, “I want justice. And there’s an old poster 
out West, as I recall, that said, ‘Wanted: Dead or Alive.’”60  
Leaders can be careful how they characterize attacks, for the terms they use can affect 
responses. For example, calling terrorists “mindless” encourages the view that terrorists are 
irrational psychopaths to whom the only appropriate response is force.  
Governments can be particularly cautious about using military and war terminology in 
reference to terrorism, such as characterizing terrorist attacks as “acts of war.” The day after the 
9/11 attacks, President Bush said that the attacks were more than acts of terror—they were acts 
of war.61 But when other nations experienced egregious attacks, the United States did not 
consider those nations to be “at war,” and as German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping said, 
“We do not face a war. We face the question of what is an appropriate response.”62 An egregious 
attack may initiate a new kind of struggle, but not “war.”  
Declaring “war” on terrorism can benefit terrorists by making it appear that they are important 
enough to have a war declared on them. Walter Pincus noted that after the 9/11 attacks, an 
intelligence officer told him, “We have turned 16 clever al Qaeda terrorists into a worldwide 
movement, seemingly more dangerous to Americans than the communist Soviet Union with 
thousands of nuclear missiles.”63 
War terminology can convey a sense of urgency and determination, but can also create the 
expectation that military force is the primary counterterrorism tool to be used, and that the right 
amount of force will solve the problem. And war terminology can serve terrorists’ interests—
many terrorist groups want their struggles to be seen as war, since that focuses attention on their 
goals, and can be seen as elevating their stature from criminals to soldiers (which they are not).  
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Avoid Hasty Legislation. Legislatures can resist the pressure to pass hasty legislation. After 
an egregious attack, legislators may feel that they must do something, and measures—including 
those previously rejected—can be passed quickly in response to emotion and pressure.64 
Legislation can include sunset clauses, but it may be difficult to allow these measures to expire. 
The cumulative effect of legislation can make counterterrorism more difficult if laws are 
inconsistent and unwieldy (though legislative bodies can review and harmonize laws).  
Spend Carefully. Governments have responded to terrorist attacks by spending large sums on 
counterterrorism measures, some of which may be wasteful. Governments can be alert for 
attempts by special interests to use attacks for their own purposes, such as by recasting existing 
programs in the guise of counterterrorism. A year after the 9/11 attacks, Jessica Mathews noted 
that like most major crises, the attacks had “unloosed a spasm of knee-jerk federal spending,” 
some of which was necessary; some was linked only in name to counterterrorism; and “some, 
perhaps much, would be wasted.”65 In 2002, the media reported many grants that appeared to 
have little relation to counterterrorism, such as $500,000 for “homeland security rescue and 
communications equipment” for an Alaskan town of 1,570 residents.66 Redundancy also affected 
costs—by 2010, thirty-three building complexes for top-secret intelligence work were either 
under construction or had been built in the Washington, DC area since September 2001 (and 
some policymakers said they were overwhelmed by the number of intelligence reports).67 
Reorganize Carefully. Any reorganization of agencies and 
processes can avoid potential pitfalls. For example, poor 
reorganization of intelligence agencies may make combating 
terrorism more difficult. Diverting resources to one area of threat 
may reduce an organization’s ability to combat other threats. After 
the 9/11 attacks, a number of FBI law enforcement activities were 
reduced as agents were transferred to counterterrorism tasks.68 
Privatize Governmental Functions Carefully. Privatization can 
have advantages, but also has risks and drawbacks. Privatization can  
increase costs, reduce transparency, and circumvent Congressional oversight. After the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, there were many reports of poor contractor performance in a wide range of 
activities.69 The privatization of inherently governmental functions involves particular concerns. 
The delegation of government security functions to nonstate actors such as private contractors 
undermines the State’s monopoly on the use of force, and contributes to the privatization of 
violence. The use of armed contractors to perform security functions involves transparency, 
accountability, legal, symbolic, and cost issues.70  
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Avoid Politicized Responses. Leaders can avoid allowing counterterrorism efforts to become 
politicized. In 2006, Vice President Dick Cheney said that the suggestion that the United States 
should withdraw forces from Iraq “validates the terrorists’ strategy.”71 A year after the 9/11 
attacks, when the Democratically-controlled Senate refused to support a measure that Republican 
President George W. Bush had requested, Bush said that the Senate was “not interested in the 
security of the American people.”72 
Governments can avoid using terrorist attacks for political purposes. A government can use 
the term “war” to claim extraordinary powers and to dampen discussion. During Congressional 
testimony in 2004, the attorney general said that it was not good government to debate 
presidential powers in wartime.73 A 2002 Justice Department memo (the “Bybee memo”) argued 
that a U.S. law “would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached on the President’s 
constitutional power to conduct a military campaign.”74 
Avoid Playing on Public Fears. Fear can be used as a tool; for example, arousing fear can 
help political leaders mobilize the public to support desired policies. Prior to the 2003 invasion  
of Iraq, senior administration members emphasized the Iraqi 
WMD threat, and invoked the specter of nuclear attacks. The 
president said, “Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait 
for the final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the 
form of a mushroom cloud,” and the national security adviser 
said, “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom 
cloud.”75 But others accused the administration of playing on 
fear to promote support for invading Iraq—Senator Robert 
Byrd said that the administration was using “sound bites based 
on conjecture…designed to prey upon public fear.”76  
Many Americans were fearful about further attacks, but as two senior military leaders pointed 
out, the commander in chief’s duty was “to lead the country away from the grip of fear, not into 
its grasp,” as Franklin Roosevelt did when he said that there was nothing to fear but fear itself. 77 
And as Eugene Robinson wrote, a great wartime leader does not use threats to national security 
for political gain, but instead rallies the public by informing and inspiring them.78 
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Avoid Using Terrorist Attacks to Pursue Other Policies. Terrorist attacks can create 
opportunities that governments can exploit. For example, several months after the 9/11 attacks, 
concerns were expressed in Europe that the administration was using the war against terrorism 
“to pursue broader and more controversial foreign policy goals.”79 Former President Jimmy 
Carter wrote that some new approaches in response to the tragedy of 9/11 seemed to be 
developing from a group “trying to realize long-pent-up ambitions under the cover of the 
proclaimed war against terrorism.”80 One of these goals was regime change in Iraq, and the 
administration used the 9/11 attacks and the War on Terrorism as justifications for invading Iraq.  
In building a case for invading Iraq, the administration asserted that the Iraqi regime had an 
operational relationship with the al Qaeda terrorist network.81 Senior administration officials 
made statements that appeared to link the 9/11 attacks with Iraq, and encouraged the view that 
the Iraqi president had been directly involved in the attacks. President Bush said that the Iraqi 
government had aided, trained, and harbored terrorists, including al Qaeda operatives, despite the 
fact that there was no evidence to support these statements, and U.S. intelligence did not support 
the allegations.82 In addition, the State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism reports 
on international terrorism had not included any Iraq/al Qaeda link, and as former National 
Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft pointed out, there was “scant evidence” linking Iraq to 
terrorist organizations and even less to the 9/11 attacks, and little incentive for the Iraqi president 
to make common cause with terrorists.83  
Avoid Distorting Intelligence to Support 
Policy. Paul Pillar, the U.S. national intelligence 
officer responsible for the Middle East from 2000 
to 2005, wrote that regarding the invasion of Iraq, 
intelligence had been publicly misused to justify 
decisions that had been already made.84 In 2004 
and 2005, polls found that a majority of 
Americans believed that Bush had exaggerated 
evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 
destruction (Fig. 4–6), and had deliberately misled 
people to make the case for war with Iraq.85 
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Avoid Overreach. Overreach can be a major pitfall for governments. One of the challenges 
facing the United States in responding to the 9/11 attacks was to avoid overreaching. The U.S. 
Naval War College addressed this challenge (before the 2003 invasion of Iraq) as follows: 
 
Al Qaeda may already have overreached itself on 9/11, adopting a self-defeating course of 
action. The United States, though operating from a position of much greater strength, must 
also avoid over-reaching itself (either militarily or politically) with self-defeating actions, 
even as it deals thoroughly with the grave threat to its security. For example, it might be 
self-defeating to proceed in ways that stretch American forces too thin or that risk leaving 
the United States isolated in the world or that enable al Qaeda to recruit new terrorists in 
sufficient number to replace terrorists killed or captured.86 
 
After the 9/11 attacks, it appeared that al Qaeda had miscalculated the responses of its third-
party targets, and that the attacks were, initially, a serious mistake with major negative 
consequences for the terrorist group. First, there was an immediate backlash against al Qaeda—
the overall worldwide reaction was overwhelmingly in favor of the United States and against al 
Qaeda. Though some groups expressed support for al Qaeda and the attacks, there was a massive 
worldwide outpouring of support for the United States and sorrow for the victims.87 “We are all  
Americans” (Nous sommes tous Américains) 
said a headline on the front page of France’s Le 
Monde on September 12, 2001. The American 
national anthem was played in a number of 
capitals and at the changing of the guard at 
Buckingham Palace. People in all countries 
prayed for the victims, Palestinian leader 
Yasser Arafat gave blood for the victims, and 
Montreal flew the American flag from every 
fire truck. For the first time in its history, 
NATO invoked Article V of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, thereby considering the 9/11 attacks to 
have been an attack on all member States.  
Second, the scale and egregiousness of the 
attacks expanded the range of responses that 
would be seen as acceptable—the magnitude of 
the attacks in effect removed barriers to 
response. There was widespread support for 
ending the Taliban regime, which had allowed 
al Qaeda to operate freely on Afghan territory. 
Thus the 9/11 attacks made it politically  
possible to invade Afghanistan, an action that had not been feasible before. (For example, the 
1998 missile strikes against al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and Sudan had elicited criticism from 
many countries.)  
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However, by invading Iraq, the United States lost its strategic advantage, and gave up much of 
the international support and solidarity that was the world’s overall response to the 9/11 attacks. 
A PEW survey after the Iraq invasion found that opinions of the United States in most countries 
were markedly lower than a year earlier, and that the war had widened the rift between America 
and Western Europe, further inflamed the Muslim world, reduced support for the war on 
terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for the UN and NATO.88 In 2006, 
the CIA reported that anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment was on the rise and fueling other 
radical ideologies.89  
There were additional negative consequences. The costs of the invasion and aftermath had 
been severely underestimated. Cost projections by senior administration officials had ranged 
from $10–200 billion,90 but by March 2008 the Iraq War had cost an estimated $3 trillion, more 
than any war since World War II (Fig. 4–7).91 The U.S. military death toll reached 4,000, 
thousands of Iraqis had lost their lives, and nearly 2 million had become refugees in other  
countries.92 Lack of security after the 
invasion allowed widespread looting that 
included weapons and munitions (that 
were then used against U.S. and 
coalition forces and their Iraqi partners), 
radiological materials, and ancient 
artifacts from the National Museum of 
Iraq.93 The lack of security reportedly 
made establishing democracy in Iraq 
extremely difficult.94 The focus on Iraq 
drew attention and resources away from 
other areas of the world, including 
Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden 
perceived the damage that some U.S. 
responses had caused, saying that the 
results of the 9/11 attacks had “exceeded 
all expectations,” and that al Qaeda 
would continue the policy of “bleeding 
America to the point of bankruptcy.”95  
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Avoid Setting a Climate That Condones Abuse. Leaders set the standards and tone in which 
people act, as the Abu Ghraib scandal can illustrate. In April and May 2004, revelations of abuse 
and torture by U.S. personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq caused worldwide shock. 
Administration officials acknowledged the great damage that the scandal had done: President 
Bush said that it was a stain on the country’s honor and reputation; the Secretary of Defense said 
it was “a body blow.”96 But many people saw the climate set by the administration as the source 
of the scandal. Some military officials believed that the proximate causes of the scandal were 
Justice Department legal opinions that sanctioned abusive interrogations.97 David Ignatius wrote 
that the “dry, lawyerly way” in which one memo explained why the “mere” infliction of pain or 
suffering on another is not torture was as shocking as the Abu Ghraib photos.98 Though some  
tried to blame a 
“few bad apples,” 
many rejected this 
argument. The Army 
Times editorialized 
that responsibility 
for the scandal  
extended “all the way up the chain of command to the highest reaches of the military hierarchy 
and its civilian leadership.”99 E. J. Dionne noted that the soldiers and contractors involved “were 
operating within a set of assumptions about what they were and were not supposed to do,” and 
Lawrence Wilkerson said, “You don’t have this kind of pervasive attitude out there unless 
you’ve condoned it [and] whether you did it explicitly or not is irrelevant.”100   
Avoid Trying to Justify Noncompliance with Standards. Governments can avoid trying to 
justify noncompliance with standards by comparing their actions with those of terrorists. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted a large number of editorials about the Abu Ghraib 
scandal and detainee issues, but relatively few about “the beheading of innocent civilians by 
terrorists, the thousands of bodies found in mass graves in Iraq, the allegations of rape of women 
and girls by U.N. workers in the Congo.”101 However, Fred Hiatt wrote that if Americans have to 
defend ourselves by pointing out that we are “morally superior to terrorists, it’s a loss.”102 An 
Army captain in Iraq echoed this statement when he wrote, “When did al Qaeda become any 
type of standard by which we measure the morality of the United States? We are America, and 
our actions should be held to a higher standard, the ideals expressed in documents such as the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.”103 Some individuals, including members of 
Congress, tried to justify the treatment of the prisoners, but as Eugene Robinson wrote, 
“Civilized nations do not debate slavery or genocide, and they don’t debate torture, either.”104  
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Keep within Democratic Values. Democratic governments can ensure that measures to 
combat terrorism are in keeping with national and international standards, and comply with 
international law. Terrorist attacks create pressures to circumvent laws; curtail liberties; and 
suspend rights for suspected terrorists, including those who may have tenuous or unknowing 
links with terrorists, or even no links with terrorists. These pressures need to be resisted. 
After an egregious attack, there are pressures to conclude that the current methods of dealing 
with terrorism are obsolete, and the “rule book” needs to be changed. Former Senator Warren 
Rudman expressed this attitude when he said, “I think in the war on terrorism there are no rules. 
They, the terrorists, have none and we have to take whatever risks you have to take to make them 
fear us.”105 To hear that terrorism can be stopped by “taking the gloves off” can resonate with a 
frustrated and angry people, but democracies cannot adopt methods on the level of terrorists 
without becoming more like them. To act on the moral level of terrorists is a capitulation to base 
standards—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted that if the United States responds to 
attacks by curtailing U.S. freedoms, “the terrorists will have won.”106  
After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush said that this is a “new kind of war,” and “a different 
kind of war than our nation has seen in the past.”107 However, though an attack may initiate a 
new kind of threat, a new threat does not necessarily justify changing the “rule book.” Nothing 
about terrorism makes the threat greater than many challenges democracies have faced.  
The argument that the threats being faced require rights to be abrogated has been used many 
times and over a long period of time in the United States, for there have always been threats that 
may have appeared to be reasons to curtail rights and liberties. Every American generation in the 
20th century faced new threats—some that threatened the very existence of the United States—
and the argument was made many times that the danger was so severe that Constitutional 
liberties and freedoms no longer applied. In the 1950s, Senator John Kennedy expressed concern 
about people who regarded the safeguards provided by the Bill of Rights as “legal technicalities” 
that should not be available in times of danger.108 A generation later, President Jimmy Carter 
spoke of the temptation to abridge rights during times of tension (a temptation that he said 
needed to be resisted).109  
Still another generation later, members of the George W. Bush administration spoke of the 
need to change basic rights because of the threat from terrorism. Regarding the issue of habeas 
corpus and “preventive detention,” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, “We have never 
fought a war like this before where...you can’t allow somebody to commit the crime before you 
detain them, because if they commit the crime, thousands of innocent people die.”110 But this is 
the same logic that led the U.S. government to incarcerate over 120,000 Japanese-American  
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men, women, and children in guarded internment camps during 
World War II because of their ethnicity.111 
It is particularly for crises that some rights cannot be 
derogated, thus preventing democracies from giving way to the 
pressures of the moment. “It is during our most challenging and 
uncertain moments…that we must preserve our commitment at 
home to the principles for which we fight abroad,” wrote 
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.112 Many leaders 
have expressed this view, including Senator Patrick Leahy who 
asked, “Why would we allow the terrorists to win by doing to 
ourselves what they could never do and abandoning the 
principles for which so many Americans today and throughout 
our history have fought and sacrificed?”113  
This view has been criticized through statements such as, “A well-functioning government 
will contract civil liberties as threats increase.”114 This kind of statement assumes that security 
and liberty operate as a zero-sum equation, and that any increase in threats requires a 
corresponding decrease in freedom—an error that Jeremy Manning answered as follows: “A look 
at the oppressive regimes of the Middle East, which allow few civil liberties yet still experience 
terrorism, shows that such an equation bears little relation to reality.”115 
During times of armed conflicts or serious public emergencies, a government can assume 
special powers and temporarily derogate certain rights such as the freedoms of movement, 
association, and assembly. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provides for derogation as follows: “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, [States] may take measures derogating 
from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations 
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, 
sex, language, religion or social origin.”116 However, some rights are non-derogable and 
therefore are not to be restricted or suspended in any circumstances, including during times of 
emergency—examples are the prohibitions against slavery and retroactive laws.  
Laws giving special powers can clearly specify that these measures are in effect during a 
particular situation or state of mobilization, as opposed to “normal” times. The British called 
these kinds of situations “emergencies,” as Michael Howard explained:  
 
[The term “emergencies” meant that] the police and intelligence services were provided with 
exceptional powers and were reinforced where necessary by the armed forces, but they continued 
to operate within a peacetime framework of civilian authority. If force had to be used, it was at a 
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minimal level and so far as possible did not interrupt the normal tenor of civil life. The objectives 
were to isolate the terrorists from the rest of the community and to cut them off from external 
sources of supply. The terrorists were not dignified with the status of belligerents: they were 
criminals, to be regarded as such by the general public and treated as such by the authorities.117  
 
Democracies damage themselves by not maintaining standards. Terrorists may be trying to 
provoke governments and communities to take actions that are illegal or undemocratic, actions 
that give terrorists a propaganda victory and aid them in many ways. Terrorists can try to show 
that core beliefs will not stand up when a situation is difficult. Two senior leaders discussed this 
issue as follows: “Sometimes you make a rule during smooth waters, and when you hit rough 
waters the temptation is to say, ‘I’ve got to change this,’ but if you do, you are treading on very 
thin ice. It is easy to get to the point where you want dump a rule because of a crisis. You must 
stand up for your principles especially when they are hard. Otherwise, they mean very little.”118  
Failure to maintain standards can undercut government policies, and damage governments, 
leaders, and countries. During the struggle in Algeria in the 1950s, the French response to 
terrorist attacks included widespread torture, and the more people were abused, the more support 
for the French eroded.119 The use of torture challenged France’s democratic values, undercut 
support for the struggle in Algeria, and created deep divisions within the officer corps.120 The 
abuse helped discredit the French cause at home and abroad, and increased support for the FLN. 



















                                                 
117 Michael Howard, “What’s in a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs (Jan.–Feb. 2002).  
118 Stansfield Turner and George Thibault discussion, Jan. 18, 2003, author’s files.  
119 By one estimate, in 1956 and 1957, 40 percent of the adult male population of Algiers were either tortured or 
threatened with torture. See Lou DiMarco, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the 
Algerian War,” Parameters (Summer 2006): 72–73.  
120 For example, General Jacques de Bollardiere resigned his command in Algiers over the issue of torture, and 
wrote in a letter published in L’Express that it would be a terrible danger “for us to lose sight, under the fallacious 
pretext of immediate expediency, of the moral values which alone have, up until now, created the grandeur of our 
civilization and of our army.” See Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 2006, 203.  
“Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose the War” 
 
“During the Algerian war of independence between 1954 and 1962, French leaders decided to 
permit torture against suspected insurgents. Though they were aware that it was against the law 
and morality of war, they argued that: 
  — This was a new form of war and these rules did not apply. 
  — The threat…was a great evil that justified extraordinary means. 
  — The application of torture against insurgents was measured and nongratuitous. 
     This official condoning of torture on the part of French Army leadership had several 
negative consequences. It empowered the moral legitimacy of the opposition, undermined the 
French moral legitimacy, and caused internal fragmentation among serving officers that led to 
an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1962. In the end, failure to comply with moral and legal 
restrictions against torture severely undermined French efforts and contributed to their loss 
despite several significant military victories. Illegal and immoral activities made the 
counterinsurgents extremely vulnerable to enemy propaganda inside Algeria among the Muslim 
population, as well as in the United Nations and the French media. These actions also degraded 
the ethical climate throughout the French Army. France eventually recognized Algerian 
independence in July 1963.” – U.S. Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2006, page 7-9 
 
 




   
The repercussions of the Abu Ghraib scandal illustrate the consequences of not maintaining 
standards. The abuse and torture of prisoners by U.S. personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq 
shocked the world and did enormous damage to America’s image and reputation worldwide. 
Martin Wolf noted that after the 9/11 attacks, a “huge proportion of humanity viewed the U.S. as 
the victim of an outrage,” but after the treatment of Iraqi prisoners came to light was seen “as a 
perpetrator of them.”121 Some people tried to defend the treatment, such as Senator James 
Inhofe, who said that he was “more outraged by the outrage” than by the treatment of the 
prisoners, but as a naval midshipman said, “We are supposed to be liberating these people, yet 
we are doing the exact same thing Saddam Hussein did.”122 
The actions that caused the scandal gave aid and comfort to America’s opponents, and 
endangered Americans. George Will wrote that because of actions at the Abu Ghraib prison, 
“Americans are almost certainly going to die in violence made worse in Iraq, and not only there, 
by the substantial aid some Americans, in their torture of Iraqi prisoners, have given to our 
enemies in this war.”123 The issue was not theoretical: within weeks of the scandal, a group 
linked to al Qaeda kidnapped a westerner, and posted a statement claiming the right to treat 
hostages the same way that others were treating “our people.”124 Three years later, a number of 
military officials believed that by stimulating the recruitment and fielding of jihadists, the Abu 
Ghraib scandal was one of the top two causes of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq.125  
The scandal damaged President George W. Bush domestically, and reduced support for his 
policies. For the first time his approval rating fell below 50 percent, and popular support for the 
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Banning abuse is both a practical and moral issue. Director of National Intelligence Dennis 
Blair wrote that the damage that abusive techniques did to U.S. interests far outweighed any 
benefit gained, and had not been essential to U.S. national security.127 Senator John McCain, 
who had been tortured as a prisoner of war, addressed the morality and practicality of torture: 
 
Torture, or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment [is] unworthy of and injurious to our 
country…. It is difficult to overstate the damage that [these practices] by Americans does to 
our national character and historical reputation…. This is not about the terrorists. It is about 
us…. I do not believe [torture or abuse is] in the best interests of justice or our security or the 
ideals that define us and which we have sacrificed much to defend.128  
 
Abuse encourages reciprocity, and the American people do not want their soldiers to be 
subjected to abuse. Several dozen retired military leaders wrote that “it is vital to the safety of 
our men and women in uniform that the United States not sanction the use of interrogation 
methods it would find unacceptable if inflicted by the enemy against captured Americans.”129  
Abuse by democracies strengthens 
terrorists and dictators, who may then claim 
that their methods are vindicated (see 
cartoon).130 Violations by democracies 
undermines the moral authority to press 
other countries on human rights—UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary 
Robinson said that when raising issues of 
human rights abuses, countries tried to 
justify violations by pointing out actions 
that the United States and Europe had taken 
since 9/11.131 Thus abuse may spread. 
There are many questions regarding 
countenancing torture. In America, how  
would knowing that U.S. policy permits torture affect U.S. moral authority and international 
leadership? How would this knowledge affect the relationship between the American people and 
their government, and public trust and confidence in government? Generations of American 
soldiers have sacrificed and fought for the rights of others, including the right not to be tortured. 
Self-respect is a strength, and national honor is an important value as well as a form of power: 
“Americans really want their soldiers to not only come home, but come home with honor.”132  
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The argument may be made that harsh interrogation techniques will only be used on 
“terrorists,” and not on law-abiding citizens, but legalizing abuse, even in controlled situations, 
risks expansion through the pressure to use all available tools. Director of Homeland Security 
Michael Chertoff said, “You cannot afford to fight that battle [against terrorism] if you don’t use 
every single legal tool to the full extent that you’re entitled,” but investigators seldom know who 
has useful information, and therefore to allow abuse during interrogations will tend to make 
every suspect the key to defusing a potential ticking bomb.133  
The “ticking-bomb” argument often uses the utilitarian argument by referencing a large 
number of lives that are in danger and presumably could be saved through the abuse of a suspect, 
and that there is not enough time to resolve the situation using normal policing methods. But if 
abuse is allowed, what if it does not work? Should the suspect’s family then be abused? Should 
neighbors, coworkers, or anyone who might know something useful be abused? And if abuse can 
resolve a ticking-bomb situation, why limit it to those situations—aren’t all potential victims 
equally entitled to the protection that abuse would provide? The police cannot know in which 
situations normal policing methods would work, and thus pressure to abuse would build. 
The ticking bomb scenario has been used to try to justify abuse, but in relation to terrorism, 
this scenario is no different from any similar situation in which life is in danger and time is short. 
If a kidnapped child being held for ransom is believed to be in danger, should the police abuse 
suspects (and other people) for information about the child’s whereabouts? If abuse in certain 
situations were to be authorized by law, would abuse become routine? Would police officers 
who did not abuse suspects be considered derelict in their duty if they did not use every tool?  
The discussion of abusing suspects is based on protecting the rights of potential victims to life 
and to be free from injury, rights that terrorists violate. Corporal Charles Graner, charged with 
prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison, reportedly said that he was told that Americans were 
dying in bombings in Iraq, and that unless he helped, their blood was on his hands as well.134 
General Jacques Massu tried to justify torture in Algeria by saying that “the innocent [the next 
victims of terrorist attacks] deserve more protection than the guilty.”135 But suspects may also be 
innocent, and how can guilt or innocence be determined through abuse? A U.S. Army manual 
noted that the use of force (abuse) “yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection 
efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.”136  
Does a democracy (like the United States) want to institutionalize abuse, and therefore have it 
become, so to speak, part of the “American way”?137 The United States did not authorize soldiers 
to torture for information, or authorize the abuse of POWs when American POWs were being 
tortured. The argument has been made that information obtained through abuse may save lives, 
but this argument can be used to justify many actions, policies, and programs. Many policies can 
save lives, such as more police officers and safer roads—the “greater good” argument can be 
applied to any number of situations. And the utilitarian argument can lead to the situation in 
which a government can abuse any and all citizens in the name of the greater good.  
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Is there a “trade-off” between freedom and security? Sometimes the assumption is expressed 
that there is a balance to be struck between freedom and security. The balance or trade-off image 
is based on the assumption (a false assumption) that freedom can be traded for security—if 
security threats increase, civil liberties must be correspondingly reduced. The 2011 OSCE 
Annual Security Review Conference noted the tendency of States “to pit the ideas of human 
rights and counterterrorism against each other, considering that human rights must give way 
before the imperatives of security” (a tendency that the OSCE stated was erroneous).138  
But the discussion about a “balance” between freedom and security is misleading because 
security cannot be achieved without liberty. Terrorism threatens the physical security of 
individuals, but so does the curtailment of liberties. To illustrate, the rights enumerated in the 
U.S. Bill of Rights guard both freedom and security by prohibiting such acts as arbitrary arrest, 
detention, and imprisonment; denial of due process rights, including the right to a fair and public 
trial if charged with an offence; and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Everyone’s 
security depends on a baseline of individual rights that cannot be derogated—no one is secure 
when the threat of abuse or arbitrary arrest by the government exists. For example, if the 
prohibition against cruel treatment is suspended, then anyone can be abused during questioning, 
regardless of how tenuous any link to terrorism or other crime may be. 
People with fewer rights may be safer from 
terrorist attacks than those with more rights, but 
their actual physical security may be less. If the 
right of habeas corpus is suspended, suspects 
may be held indefinitely, thus impacting their 
physical security and freedom. If the right to be 
presumed innocent is suspended, anyone and 
everyone may be treated as a potential terrorist or 
sympathizer—especially those who may be 
members of a particular group or religion. As a  
French officer in Algeria said, “Either you consider a priori that every Arab, in the country, in 
the street, in a passing truck, is innocent until proven guilty—and allow me to tell you that if 
that’s your attitude you’ll get your men bumped off—[or you] treat every Arab as a suspect, a 
possible [fedayeen], a potential terrorist.”139  
When the choice is put in terms of rights or security, people may choose security, but the 
choice is false. To illustrate, the U.S. Constitutional structure of civil liberties was established on 
the Founding Fathers’ belief that liberties are essential for both freedom and security, and that 
freedom and security are mutually reinforcing. Democratic governments have the responsibility 
to maintain both individual rights and security—to deal with threats to the population and 
property, and at the same time maintain basic liberties, the democratic process, and the rule of 
law. In the United States, this dual Constitutional responsibility is expressed in the Preamble by 
the right to liberty (“the blessings of liberty”) and the right to security (“domestic tranquility”). 
Director of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said that the government’s “first responsibility 
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democracy and the rule of law [overrides] 
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violence if he is prepared to sacrifice all 
consideration of humanity, and to trample 
down all constitutional and judicial rights.  
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is always to prevent further harm,” but that is not so—the first responsibility of democratic 
governments is to protect and promote the individual rights of the members of the State.140 The 
issue is how to effectively combat terrorism while preserving freedom—to devise a 
counterterrorism strategy that will maximize the rights to both liberty and security. General 
Dennis Reimer addressed this issue after the 9/11 attacks as follows: “We are dealing with two 
sometimes competing demands—the responsibility of government to protect its citizens and the 
responsibility to protect the individual liberties that have made our nation great. There will be 
changes but we must find a cure that is not worse than the disease.”141 
If democratic rights are seen as weaknesses, it can be easy to try to abandon them. But though 
democracies may be limited in the means they can use, this constraint is a strength. A UN 
Security Council resolution expressed this principle: “Effective counterterrorism measures and 
respect for human rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and are an essential part 
of a successful counterterrorism effort.”142 Gerard Stoudmann, the director of the OSCE Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), noted that “after 11 September we need 
more respect for human rights, not less.”143 
Democracies can defeat terrorists while remaining within the framework of the democratic 
process and the rule of law. Keeping responses consistent with democratic values can help retain 
the moral high ground, deny legitimacy to terrorists, and maintain popular support for 
governments. The Italian government defeated the Red Brigades using a multi-pronged approach 
that included police work, intelligence, infiltration, arrests, trials, convictions, and reduced 
sentences for cooperation. The government reduced public support for the terrorists through 
political reform and a public information campaign that exposed the terrorists’ true ideology and 
disdain for the public.  
The government and police can set the example of operating clearly within the law, and 
thereby avoid undermining respect for the rule of law—if the government does not follow the 
law, why should anyone? Leaders have called terrorists the “enemies of the civilized world,” but 
respect for individual rights and adherence to the rule of law are part of being civilized. A 
government may argue that indiscriminate measures are needed because terrorists hide among 
the population, but this kind of expediency is an argument that terrorists also use. And to adopt a 
policy of indiscriminate reprisals against a group for the actions of a few is to move closer to the 
moral level of terrorists. Former Vice President Al Gore summarized the issue as follows: “We 
can effectively defend ourselves abroad and at home without dimming our core principles. 
Indeed, I believe that our success in defending ourselves depends precisely on not giving up what 
we stand for.”144   
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Support Research and the Development of Expertise. Governments can take a number of 
responses in the area of knowledge. Governments can use and develop expertise, fund research 
and study, and encourage accuracy and objectivity in research.  
Research, and Research & Development. Government-sponsored research and development 
(R&D) can increase the capabilities to prevent and combat terrorism. The State Department’s 
Counterterrorism Research and Development Program addressed R&D responses to the threat 
posed by the equipment, explosives, and technology available to terrorist groups. Major project 
areas included chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures; measures to 
detect explosives and defeat improvised devices; infrastructure protection; forensics; personnel 
protection; physical security measures; and support for surveillance operations.145  
Governments can increase the role of national academies and laboratories. National academies 
and laboratories can develop new technologies and systems to counter specific threats, and 
coordinate the involvement of scientific communities in assessing threats, developing 
countermeasures, and designing responses to terrorism. 
Governments can fund research to study and deal with terrorism. Governments can allocate 
constant funds for this research—in 2004 Martha Crenshaw noted that in the thirty years she had 
been studying terrorism, money seemed to follow a crisis but then dry up when the crisis was 
perceived to have passed, thereby undermining efforts to understand the phenomenon.146 Other 
experts have noted that terrorism research was fragmented, and consistent funding can help 
research to be conducted in a systematic and comprehensive way. In addition, research institutes 
need to be in place before crises occur, as the Oklahoma City Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) can illustrate. MIPT was established after the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing, and in 2001 was able to be expanded after the 9/11 attacks to function as a center 
for terrorism research and information, and help deal with the threats from terrorism.  
After the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Homeland Security established a network of Centers 
of Excellence (COE), an extended consortium of universities that worked closely with academia, 
industry, government organizations, and first-responders to improve the nation’s homeland 
security. The COE developed solutions to problems, organized experts and researchers to 
conduct multidisciplinary research and education, and provided training to the next generation of 
homeland security experts. In 2012 twelve COEs in the United States focused on many areas 
including public health, microbial hazards; threats to agriculture; border security; the disruption 
of terrorist groups; the risks, costs, and consequences of terrorism; and catastrophic disasters. 
Skilled Personnel. Governments can help develop a community of counterterrorism experts to 
address the problem of terrorism. Governments can offer incentives such as educational grants 
that provide financial assistance to students to study in areas such as foreign languages in return 
for a commitment to serve in counterterrorism and intelligence-related fields. Intelligence, 
security, and diplomatic services need people with extensive language skills, which can require a 
long lead time to develop, but may be needed quickly since crises can erupt with little warning. 
Lack of language skills has hampered State Department efforts in cases, such as during the 
occupation of Iraq.147 
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Advisory Commissions. Governments can appoint advisory commissions to study problems 
and make recommendations. Advisory commissions have advantages and disadvantages. Brian 
Jenkins pointed out that advisory commissions can address difficult issues, provide fresh 
perspectives, bring together individuals inside and outside of government to combine experience 
and expertise, be impartial and rise above partisan politics, help government officials and the 
public understand events, alert the country to new threats, help leadership avoid hasty decisions, 
and take time for thoughtful recommendations, but that commissions can also enable political 
leaders to delay decisions, include eccentric recommendations because of courtesy among 
commission members, and make too many recommendations and “exhortations.”148 
Reports. Government reports can be a counterterrorism tool, and inform the public, provide a 
means for tracking terrorism, and pressure state sponsors. However, government reports have 
the potential pitfall of politicization, and political pressures can result 
in bias. The U.S. State Department’s annual report on international 
terrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, was periodically accused of 
being a partisan document that administrations used to support certain 
policies and programs.149 
Reports can focus on the entire problem of terrorism. Governments, 
scholars, and authors may focus on the types of terrorism perceived as 
most threatening to their own societies, and this has drawbacks. For 
example, analysis based only on one type of terrorism can be 
misleading, and thereby contribute to the adoption of poor policy. To 
illustrate, some databases have tracked only international terrorism,  
but the vast majority of terrorist attacks have been domestic, and therefore international terrorism 
statistics alone cannot show an accurate picture of worldwide terrorism trends.150 The results of 
analysis based on international terrorism statistics may result in inaccurate conclusions: the 2000 
National Commission on Terrorism concluded that terrorist attacks were becoming more lethal, 
but this conclusion was based on the number of international terrorist attacks, and therefore was 
not representative of terrorist attacks worldwide.151 Statistics in reports can involve other 
problems—for example, simply totaling the number of attacks does not measure the effect of 
attacks—many are not comparable in their impact on governments and populations. 
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Objective Research. Governments (and experts and scholars) can promote objective and 
accurate research and writing on terrorism, areas in which many problems have been noted. 
During the latter decades of the 20th century, there were many criticisms of the quality of 
research. A CIA report stated that much terrorism research suffered from narrowly focused 
concerns, or institutional and personal biases.152 William Waugh noted that “ideological 
baggage” was common in the policy literature.153 Martha Crenshaw wrote that many statements 
about terrorism were “partial analyses, limited in scope [and with] a narrow historical or 
geographical focus.”154 Augustus Norton wrote that “some of the writing on terrorism…is more 
akin to special pleading and downright deception than dispassionate and objective analysis. 
Books and articles are filled with unsubstantiated claims that confound independent confirmation 
and play to public opinion rather than to accuracy. Scholarly studies are not immune to this 
charge, and some of them are particularly egregious examples.”155 Alex Schmid echoed these 
observations:  
 
Much of the writing in the crucial areas of terrorism research…is impressionistic, 
superficial, and at the same time often pretentious, venturing far-reaching generalizations 
on the basis of episodal evidence…. There are probably few areas in the social science 
literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little research. Perhaps as much as 
80 percent of the literature is not research-based in any rigorous sense.156  
 
The 9/11 attacks precipitated a deluge of articles and books, much of which was written by 
people with very little expertise or knowledge about terrorism, thus lowering the quality of 
writing on terrorism and adding to the confusion about terrorism. But the 9/11 attacks also 
stimulated government funding for scholarship and research on terrorism, and in 2011 Martha 
Crenshaw wrote that the interdisciplinary field of “terrorism studies” had become impressive in 
terms of quality, scope, and variety, but also that the level of theoretical development was still 
inconsistent and uneven, and there was still an acute need for a solid empirical foundation.157 
Data Accuracy. Accuracy in terrorism trends depends on the accuracy of the data being used, 
and this data may be questionable. Most information on attacks is obtained from open sources, 
and accuracy is limited by the availability of reliable open source information.158 Specific 
information about victims, damage, perpetrators, and other details may not be fully reported in 
open source information, particularly for incidents involving small numbers of casualties. The 
accuracy of open source reporting varies greatly from country to country—in some countries 
every attack is reported in detail, but in countries in which the media is not well developed or 
welcome, attacks may not be reported. In countries experiencing conflict there may be few media 
members to report terrorist attacks, or the conflict may mask attacks. These kinds of differences 
in reporting are likely to skew database records. However, consistent funding can help data 
accuracy, such as the funding the U.S. government provided for data collection at START 
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism). 
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Strengthen Diplomacy and International Cooperation. Governments can strengthen 
international counterterrorism efforts, and foster international solidarity and determination to 
combat terrorism. International cooperation is required to combat international terrorism because 
more than one country is involved, and often several countries.  
A comprehensive international approach to terrorism involves the active participation and 
cooperation of States and intergovernmental organizations. Through intergovernmental 
organizations, States can coordinate their actions in a multinational and multi-pronged strategy. 
Governments can develop patterns of cooperation to strengthen their response to terrorist 
threats and other security challenges. After the 9/11 attacks, coordination intensified between 
U.S. and EU officials at all levels including the ministerial level. The EU established a high-level 
policy dialogue on border and transport security to address issues such as passenger data-sharing, 
cargo security, biometrics, visa policy, and sky marshals. 
Countries can support each other’s struggles against terrorism, and overcome obstacles to 
international cooperation. Ignoring the terrorism problems of other countries is one obstacle to 
international cooperation; another is having double standards by viewing some terrorists as 
“freedom fighters.” Governments can avoid making unofficial “deals” with terrorist groups, such 
as making concessions so that terrorists will conduct attacks only in other countries. 
Assist Other Countries. Assistance to other countries can increase the ability of other 
governments to combat terrorism. The U.S. State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) 
Program helped countries improve their antiterrorism capabilities. Training included such areas 
as crisis prevention, management, and resolution; airport security management; bomb detection 
and deactivation; the prevention of money laundering; and terrorist crime-solving.  
Some countries may not have the capacity to adopt effective counterterrorism measures 
without assistance. A small country may be reluctant to actively pursue terrorists for fear of 
reprisals and attacks to free jailed terrorists. To assist nations with insufficient capacity to fight 
terrorism, the G-8 leaders established a Counter-Terrorism Action Group. 
Governments can address issues such as poor governance and corruption. Governments can 
eliminate safe havens—a failing State may not be capable of exercising control over its territory, 
thereby allowing terrorist organizations to maintain training facilities and bases. 
Share and Use Best Practices. Governments can identify, 
collect, disseminate, and draw on best practices, experience, and 
lessons learned in many areas such as police and judicial 
cooperation, border controls, document security, and the 
suppression of illicit financing. International organizations can 
facilitate contacts between experts to promote exchange of 
information and best practices. The ODIHR developed a manual 
that addressed the human rights issues involved in addressing 
terrorism, and ways to ensure the protection of rights in line with 
international standards and OSCE commitments (see box).159 
After terrorist attacks, governments can review the incidents, 
and provide lessons learned. Examples are State Department 
Accountability Review Boards. 
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Strengthen the Counterterrorism Regime. Governments can strengthen the international 
counterterrorism regime. Governments can improve international laws, agreements, treaties 
(multilateral and bilateral), conventions, and standards for controlling and dealing with terrorism.  
International standards can increase the effectiveness of many physical security and travel 
measures. More effective and harmonized standards and controls over the issuance of travel 
documents can inhibit the movement of terrorists, and international conventions can provide 
common standards that aid cooperation when two or more countries are involved. One agreement 
on aircraft hijacking identified procedures and responsibilities in responding to incidents which 
involve different countries.  
Bilateral and multilateral agreements can strengthen international cooperation and capabilities. 
Formal bilateral agreements can increase cooperation between individual countries. The United 
States expanded its bilateral extradition treaties with other nations in order to facilitate 
antiterrorism cooperation through international law—an example was eliminating the “political 
exception” clause that had enabled terrorists to avoid extradition by claiming political motives 
for their crimes.160 Bilateral agreements can be effective, but multilateral agreements provide a 
framework that can increase the perception of the legitimacy of bilateral cooperation. For 
example, UN resolutions can strengthen the international consensus against terrorism. 
Governments can improve international law enforcement and intelligence cooperation, and 
reduce barriers between law enforcement authorities. To illustrate, law enforcement-related 
treaties promoted increased international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes, and the exchange of evidence and apprehension of terrorist suspects. Intelligence 
agencies can share intelligence; however, fear of compromising sources or ongoing 
investigations can hamper cooperation—an intelligence agency that penetrates a terrorist 
organization can be very reluctant to share information that could compromise an agent inside 
the terrorist group. 
Governments can harmonize national laws. The Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) gave OSCE States technical assistance and advice on the 
implementation of international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols, and on the compliance 
of legislation with international standards. International organizations can prepare compilations 
of national legislation dealing with the combating of domestic and international terrorism. In 
2003, the ODIHR compiled the major anti-terrorism legislation from all OSCE States.161 
Governments can strengthen the international justice system, and advance international law 
and the international system in general. Chris Patten, the EU’s external affairs minister, 
addressed the importance of strengthening the international framework built after World War II:  
 
The mixture of containment and establishing an international rule book by and large 
encouraged democracy, the rule of law, and open markets throughout the world. Why 
should anyone think that that approach was somehow less relevant after September 11th? I 
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II. The Public 
 
The public is essential for the control of terrorism, and there are a number of important actions 
that members of the public can take, and can refrain from. The public can be aware of factors 
about terrorism that stimulate the impulse for hasty, 
misguided responses—an example is a terrorist attack that is 
designed to enrage the public and provoke angry, illegal 
acts. The public can be aware of what responses terrorists 
are seeking from them, and by controlling their actions, can 
respond in ways that help defeat terrorists. A number of 
actions follow that the public can take, or can refrain from. 
Refrain from Assaulting Others. After a terrorist attack, 
some individuals may feel the impulse to assault others, 
especially members of groups that share characteristics with 
the terrorists (such as ethnicity or religion), or groups that 
are seen as supporting terrorists. Individuals may make these  
assaults for reasons such as rage and revenge, or with the idea that assaults may prevent further 
terrorist attacks by signaling that attacks will result in harm to communities that terrorists may 
care about. (Members of the public may not know if more attacks are planned, and individuals 
who believe that their families are in danger may feel pressure to respond with violence or in 
ways that threaten others.) 
However, terrorists seek these kinds of responses, and those who respond to terrorism by 
attacking others can worsen the situation. Groups seen as connected to terrorists are likely to be 
fearful of being mistreated, as many Muslim-Americans were after the 9/11 attacks. Assaults by 
private individuals and vigilante groups are illegal, violate the rights of the victims, undermine 
the State’s monopoly on the use of force, and contribute to widening violence. Assaults can also 
benefit terrorists by providing propaganda material, and enable terrorists to claim that further 
attacks are only in self-defense. In democracies, terrorists may claim that democratic values will 
not stand up when under pressure. The public can be careful to keep the distinction between the 
perpetrators and any wider group the perpetrators may belong to, and not consider other people 
“guilty by association” on the basis of their membership in any group or community.  
Responses to the 9/11 attacks can illustrate the different kinds of actions taken by members of 
the public. Upon hearing of the attacks, Americans felt many emotions, including vengefulness, 
and those people who assaulted others were responding as al Qaeda intended. One purpose of the 
9/11 attacks was to create tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, and in some instances 
these tensions spilled over into violence. But other people did not respond as al Qaeda intended 
and took different kinds of actions. One church started an escort service for Muslim women who 
wore the hijab; another citizen established a fund to assist low-income Muslim victims of hate-
inspired vandalism.163 Members of the public can keep in mind the kind of responses that 
terrorists want, and the kinds of responses that are most in keeping with democratic values—and 
can keep their compassion. Dan Balz pointed out that after the 9/11 attacks, there had been “a 
period of genuine unity across the political spectrum,” but that “within a year, the nation had 
snapped back to its more partisan divisions and there has been no turning back.”164 
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Keep Respect for the Right of Political Dissent. Democracies have a great strength in that 
the population will unite to defend the government when under threat, but that unity may also 
result in the charge of “supporting terrorists” if government policies are questioned. For 
example, those who question particular counterterrorism responses may be seen as being “for” 
terrorism. But as Senator Chuck Hagel said, “To question your government is not unpatriotic—to 
not question your government is unpatriotic.”165 Susan Borcherding further noted that 
questioning government policies supports democracy because people are thinking about policy 
and want to participate in the process of government.166 The development of good policy 
depends on foreseeing potential drawbacks, and free discussion is needed to identify possible 
pitfalls.167 Objections to policies are likely to have at least some validity, and a person or agency 
left out of a discussion may have important information that can prevent mistakes. 
The difficulty for the public regarding government criticism is exacerbated when military 
forces are involved. In these situations, the public is likely to feel strongly that the troops should 
be supported, which may result in pressures to withhold debate. During the Iraq War, American 























Yet perhaps the best support the public can give soldiers is to ensure that their lives are not 
risked as the result of policies that have not been carefully thought out, and open debate is 
needed to ensure this. An important question is whether or not policies are worthy of the 
sacrifices that soldiers make, and the sacrifices of their families. 
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Deter and Dissuade the Selection of Terrorism. The public can help deter and dissuade 
terrorists from using terrorism as a method of struggle. As shown in Fig. 4–11, the public can 
focus on dissuading terrorists directly, and by impacting the political goal that terrorists seek.  
The public can delegitimize the use of terrorism, 
and thereby dissuade groups from choosing or 
using terrorism, and reduce the potential supply of 
new recruits. The public is a very important third-
party target, and terrorists pay attention to public 
responses. In February 1970, a sabotaged Swissair 
plane crashed on takeoff, killing all passengers on 
board. The PFLP first claimed responsibility for 
the attack, and then disclaimed it when the public 
responded with revulsion.169  
Political leaders and parties, the media, 
churches, schools, universities, and other groups 
and organizations can convince potential terrorists 
and their supporters that terrorism is an illegitimate  
means to use. Major nonviolent movements have often had violent fringe elements, but leaders can 
discourage and reject this violence. Intergovernmental organizations such as the UN can reinforce 
the unacceptability of terrorism.  
The public can emphasize the amorality, ineffectiveness, and cowardice of terrorism. Despite any 
possible “drama” of explosions, the public can express that it is more courageous to work daily for 
a goal than to murder people and destroy the careful and creative work of others.  
The public can affect the decision to select terrorism as a method of struggle by helping to 
ensure that groups do not achieve their goals through the use of terrorism. The public can 
respond to terrorist attacks with pressure for policies that deny terrorists their political goals. An 
increase in international terrorism in France led to calls for changes to the country’s liberal 
political asylum policies.170 After an attack at the Paris airport, French newspapers suggested 
that the government’s pro-Arab policy should be changed because it had not prevented the attack 
(upon which the PLO dissociated itself from the incident and condemned the attack).171 Terrorist 
groups that find that attacks are not advancing their goals may choose other methods of 
struggle—a RAND study found that the decision to abandon terrorism was the most frequent 
reason that terrorist groups ended.172 
Deny Support to Terrorists. The public can deny terrorist groups funds, supporters, and 
recruits, and help the authorities. Most terrorist groups need the tacit or overt support of at least 
part of the population, and if the public withholds this support, terrorists will have fewer 
resources with which to operate. Negative public reaction can affect groups that use violence— 
after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, negative public perception helped to reduce the number 
of militia groups.173 
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Demonstrate Against Terrorism. In the 1990s, the largest political demonstrations in Europe 
were by Basques in Basque regions protesting ETA terrorism, and the size of the demonstrations 
showed the public’s determination to defeat the terrorist threat to democracy.174 After the March 
2004 terrorist attack in Madrid, an estimated 8–11 million 
people demonstrated on the evening of March 12—the 
largest demonstrations in Spain’s history.175 After the 
9/11 attacks, there were demonstrations all over the world 
to express support for the United States and sorrow for 
the victims. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, “The 
sight of people gathering in cities in every part of the 
world from every religion to mourn—and to express 
solidarity with the people of the United States—proves 
more eloquently than any words that terrorism is not an 
issue that divides humanity, but one that unites it.”176  
Resist Terrorist “Justifications.” The public can 
reject all attempts to justify terrorist attacks. Common 
criminals and organized crime groups usually do not 
make a political claim or moral justification for their 
violence, but many terrorists and terrorist organizations 
do claim that their acts are politically and morally 
justified. This appeal to justice and morality increases the 
difficulty of countering terrorism because of the need to 
separate the legitimacy of a goal from the legitimacy of 
the means used. But members of the public can resist the 
trick of trying to get them to focus on the terrorists’ goal  
rather than the means being used, and can keep viewing terrorists as criminals—“base 
criminals,” as President Ronald Reagan called them. And those who do not feel personally 
threatened by attacks can be particularly alert, for the “farther away” people feel from any danger 
of becoming victims, the more credible the terrorist claim of legitimacy may appear to be. The 
public can guard against this illusion, and remain focused on the heinous methods used. None of 
the justifications that terrorists use are valid—including the erroneous claim that “one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (see Appendix D).  
Resisting terrorist attempts to justify attacks also involves understanding that many terrorists 
despise the public, even the constituent communities on whose behalf the terrorists claim to be 
acting. Brian Jenkins, for example, noted that “rightwing terrorists generally regard the people as 
a disorganized, despicable mass that requires strong authoritarian leadership.”177 
Condemn Political Groups with Terrorist Wings. Some groups have terrorist wings, and 
use political work to try to cloak their activities with the illusion of legitimacy. The public can 
expose these attempts at deception, for a political group can be a political organization, 
charitable organization, and a terrorist organization.  
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Assist the Government. The public can help the government fight terrorism. Members of the 
public can assist counterterrorism efforts in their local communities, and can avoid pressuring the 
government to adopt counterproductive policies.  
The public can help governments use military force wisely. Military force can contribute to 
counterterrorism, but involves significant potential pitfalls, and the public can be alert for those 
who underestimate the problems involved. Statements made prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
can illustrate. Vice President Dick Cheney, a former secretary of defense, said that he believed 
U.S. forces would be greeted as liberators in Iraq, but William Odom pointed out that “the issue 
is not whether the Iraqi people will greet U.S. soldiers as their liberators, but what will they do 
six months after that.”178 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “It’s not logical to me that 
it would take as many forces [after] the conflict as it would to win the war,” and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said that some people were “foolishly suggesting” that the 
United States would “have to occupy Iraq for years.”179 However, there were, in fact, insufficient 
military forces to establish security after the invasion, and the United States did occupy Iraq for 
years (and with continual violence). As former Senator Chuck Hagel wrote, “It is easy to get into 
war, not so easy to get out.”180 
The public can keep in mind Samuel Johnson’s observation that “every man thinks meanly of 
himself for not having been a soldier, or not having been at sea.” Vice President Dick Cheney, a 
strong advocate for invading Iraq, received five deferments from military service during the 
Vietnam conflict.181 Thomas Ricks reported that some believed that Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz and his hawkish colleagues would have acted “differently if they had ever been 
in combat.”182 Advocates of using military force to invade Iraq sometimes questioned the 
patriotism of opponents, including combat veterans, prompting Daniel Schwimer to respond that 
it was hypocritical of “so many of our leaders who did everything they could to avoid combat 
when they were young, but now seem eager to engage our forces in combat around the globe, 
and have the chutzpah to question the patriotism of those who disagree with them.”183  
The public can be alert for actions that appear to be using military action for personal gain. 
Richard Perle, Defense Policy Board chairman and a vocal proponent for invading Iraq, advised 
on possible investment opportunities resulting from a war with Iraq in a Goldman Sachs-
sponsored conference call entitled “Implications of an Imminent War: Iraq Now. North Korea 
Next?”184 In contrast, when Franklin Roosevelt proposed a military spending increase before 
World War II, said that no one should try, or be allowed, to get rich out of defense programs.185 
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View the Threat Realistically. The public can be aware of the factors that can make 
terrorism appear to be a greater threat than it may actually be.186 For example, shocking attacks 
and “spectaculars” generate a perception of a high level of terrorism. Attacks in places that are 
normally peaceful are likely to generate a stronger reaction than attacks in places where conflict 
is already occurring. “Gaps” between attacks can increase the impact of any resumption, and a 
single attack can make it appear that counterterrorism efforts are ineffective. 
The public can keep aware of the real 
level of violence in the world. Media reports 
can give a sense of increasing global 
disorder, which may not be the case. For 
example, by many measures, the world 
became more “peaceful” in the 1990s and 
2000s—as shown in Fig. 4–12, the number 
of armed conflicts worldwide rose during 
the Cold War, and then fell after 1992.187  
The public can keep the threat from 
terrorism in perspective. Many countries 
have combated threats from terrorism that 
included long and destructive campaigns. In 
the 20th century, the United States faced far  
worse threats than terrorism. During the Cold War, the entire U.S. population lived under the 
threat of annihilation from nuclear missile attack. 
A sense of history can help the public view the threat realistically. In the United States, a wide 
range of groups pursuing many goals committed hundreds of terrorist attacks during the 1960s, 
’70s, and ’80s. In addition to attacks by domestic groups, a number of groups with goals that 
involved other countries perpetrated many attacks in the United States, including Croatian, 
Jewish, Middle-Eastern, Puerto Rican, and Turkish terrorist groups. 
The U.S. Capitol has been attacked—in 1954 Puerto Rican 
separatists fired from the House of Representatives gallery and 
wounded five congressmen.188 The U.S. Senate and State 
Department have been attacked.  
Yet most terrorist groups do not last long, and terrorist threats 
and ideologies come and go.189 During the 1960s and 1970s, 
leftwing groups posed the most serious U.S. domestic terrorist 
threat, but law enforcement dismantled many of these groups in 
the 1980s. In the 1990s leftwing groups diminished even further  
when communism collapsed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the groups lost their 
ideological support as Marxist-Leninist ideology was discredited.190  
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View Government Options Realistically. Governments are usually at a disadvantage in 
dealing with terrorist attacks. The public sees that the government has not protected its citizens, 
and therefore may view the government as incompetent and reactive. The public can be aware of 
the characteristics that make terrorism particularly difficult for governments to combat. For 
example, the fact that the attackers are nonstate actors makes it difficult for the government to 
focus the State’s resources and power on the threat that terrorists pose. Terrorists can hide among 
the population, and can be difficult to identify without repressing the entire population. The 
secretiveness of terrorist groups means that attacks can occur nearly anywhere, making it 
difficult—and costly—for governments to guard against. When terrorists from other countries 
are involved, the complexity for a government is increased because of the need to coordinate 
with other governments. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane noted the difficulty and 
pressure that terrorist attacks can place on governments: “The hijacking of TWA Flight 847 
[showed that] the possible responses to an act of terrorism may not be swift, or simple, or 
satisfying. When the [TWA] 847 case was resolved, we were all grateful that our people were 
free. We were frustrated, though, because no forthright rejoinder to the cold-blooded murder of 
one American and the confinement of thirty-nine others seemed ready to hand.”191  
Courage and Determination. Courage and determination can help defeat terrorism. General 
Dennis Reimer spoke of the courage of the United Airline Flight 93 passengers who prevented a 
hijacked plane from being used as a missile 
to attack the nation’s capital: “There is no 
doubt that airline travel in the post–9/11 
world is different. Anyone who has flown 
since then knows that the code of conduct for 
passengers on a hijacked airplane has 
changed. We may not talk about it a lot, but 
the ‘let’s roll’ model invented in 
Pennsylvania has become standard operating 
procedure.”192 Courage and determination are 
needed in daily life as well as in times of 
immediate danger, as Brian Jenkins noted:  
 
The less panic, the less paranoia, the less public demand there will be for responses that could 
threaten our liberties. We should not be swept up in the sound and fury of misleading 
rhetoric…. Our most effective defense against terrorism will come not from surveillance, 
concrete barriers, metal detectors, or new laws, but from our own virtue, courage, continued 
dedication to our ideals of a free society, realism in our acceptance of risk, stoicism, 
intelligence, and the skepticism that comes with it, the avoidance of extremism, [and] 
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III. The Media 
 
Media actions have a significant impact on many aspects of terrorism, and the media has a 
unique position regarding terrorism. The media affects how terrorist attacks affect third-parties 
and what kinds of responses they take, and can 
impact terrorists themselves (Fig. 4–13). 
The media can keep the public informed and at the 
same time avoid giving advantages to terrorists. The 
media can also be aware of terrorist attempts to 
manipulate them. Terrorists need the “oxygen of 
publicity” that the media can provide, and seek to use 
the media to gain attention, elicit desired responses 
from third-parties, and set intended events in motion. 
For example, terrorists want the media to amplify 
responses such as a government overreaction.  
Media coverage is an important measure of 
success for terrorists, and through attacks can receive 
millions of dollars’ worth of free publicity for their cause. Terrorist groups often claim 
responsibility for bombings they did not commit in order to obtain publicity—in 1984 nearly 
every Palestinian group claimed credit for at least one attack in Israel or the occupied territories 
as groups competed for visibility and influence in the Palestinian movement.194 
Terrorists try to manipulate the media in a number of ways to get their views publicized and to 
try to shape media presentations. Terrorists have given press conferences, provided videotapes 
and recordings, arranged press pools, granted exclusive interviews, and timed news releases to fit 
media cycles (sometimes waiting until after the press reaction to tailor their statements).  
Terrorists design their attacks with the media in mind—one reason Timothy McVeigh 
selected the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City as a target was that the open space 
around the building would assist news photos and television footage. But terrorists cannot 
control the level and kind of attention that the media give to attacks—the media control these 
areas. Members of the media control how they present terrorists and their aims, and can avoid 
conferring legitimacy on terrorists. Presenting terrorists as criminals fosters the viewpoint that 
terrorist acts are crimes regardless of the attackers’ goal. The media’s effect on public opinion 
can impact not only governments and the public, but also terrorist groups themselves.  
The media can avoid broadcasting terrorist propaganda. Paraphrasing terrorist statements and 
demands can prevent terrorists from using the media to disseminate the group’s views. The 
media can avoid intense coverage, for such coverage can encourage imitation from other groups 
to obtain publicity for their causes. By careful analysis, editorial supervision, and guidelines, the 
media can avoid magnifying the terrorists’ importance.  
The media plays a key role in public responses to attacks, and can help the public (and 
governments) respond wisely to attacks. The media can avoid sensational reporting, and can be 
careful about speculating about perpetrators. Media speculation about the possible role of Middle 
Eastern terrorists began soon after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and Americans of Middle 
Eastern background were subjected to harassment, vandalism, and assaults.  
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The media can refrain from increasing the pressure on governments. For example, if the media 
makes it seem that no immediate response from a government means that the government is not 
responding effectively to an attack, public pressure may increase on officials to act hastily.  
The media can keep control of the story, and conduct no live coverage without coordinating 
with supervising editors who are in contact with government authorities. Live coverage may 
cause the media to fall into the trap of providing terrorists an unedited platform. Close 
coordination between the media and the government can help the media avoid disclosing 
information that can endanger lives, and supervisory editors can determine what, if any, 
information should be withheld or deferred. Press coverage guidelines can help for general and 
specific situations, and participating in government exercises can improve coordination. 
Media members can avoid becoming part of an incident, such as by 
participating in negotiations without coordination with the authorities. 
During the TWA 847 hostage crisis, the negotiator for the hijackers became 
a regular on American TV, and thus the media became participants in the 
situation, not just reporters—and made resolution of the crisis more difficult 
for President Ronald Reagan and the government.195  
During hostage crises, the media can help the authorities and avoid 
helping terrorists. During hostage crises, terrorists use media reports for 
news about what is happening, and the media can refrain from providing 
information on rescue plans and police movements. During the 1977 hijacking of Lufthansa 
Flight 181, the plane’s captain, Jurgen Schumann, was able to pass on information about the  
hijackers while the plane was in Dubai, but 
when the fact that the captain had done so 
was revealed during questions between 
journalists and the Dubai defense minister, 
the hijackers threatened to kill Schumann 
(and did kill him later—see map).196 In 
another instance, when the hijackers of a 
Kuwaiti airliner in Algiers heard on the 
radio that the British had sent commandos 
(a report that was erroneous), the terrorists 
killed a hostage.197  
The media can avoid talking about 
specific hostages, and avoid giving out 
information on hostages that may result in 
their selection for harm, such as nationality 
or official positions. During the Iranian 
hostage crisis, two major U.S. newspapers 
published detailed descriptions of how to 
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distinguish CIA personnel from other embassy employees based on records that the hostage-takers 
had access to after taking over the U.S. embassy in Tehran. After a terrorist incident, the media 
can refrain from revealing techniques on how operations were performed (such information can 
help other terrorist groups). 
In some hostage situations, media attention and restraint has helped to protect victims. 
Journalists can have a calming effect, and during a hostage crisis the media may have more 
access to the terrorists, who may refuse to speak to officials. Media restraint has saved 
hostages—during the Iranian hostage crisis, some Canadian and American media deduced that 
American diplomats were hiding in Tehran, but withheld publishing this conclusion. (This restraint 
helped these individuals escape successfully.) 
Some media actions have exacerbated dangerous situations. In March 1977, a group calling 
itself the Hanafi Muslims seized several buildings in Washington, DC, and took dozens of people 
hostage. During the resulting crisis, some journalist actions endangered hostages.198 Pictures 
broadcast on television showed that uncaptured employees were hiding in a building occupied by 
the terrorists. A reporter interviewing the terrorist leader on the phone suggested that police 
negotiators might be trying to trick him, and the terrorist responded by threatening to execute 
hostages. When law enforcement officers were seen bringing something (which was food) into a 
building occupied by the terrorists, it was reported that the police were preparing for an assault, 
and the terrorists broke off negotiations. 
The media can aid response and recovery efforts, such as by helping while emergency 
managers cope with the immediate aftermath of an attack. After the Oklahoma City bombing, the 
media communicated emergency information, publicized warnings about dangers such as 
exposed electrical lines, provided information that helped relatives locate missing persons, and 
broadcasted information about blood donation and food donation centers. 
The media can help preserve democratic freedoms. The media can scrutinize government 
responses to terrorism, for during times of threat governments may take measures to limit 
freedoms, and members of the public may take actions not in keeping with democratic values. In 
the political climate that can result from terrorist attacks, there may be pressures on political 
leaders and law enforcement personnel to curtail freedoms, and members of the judiciary may 
feel pressure to allow those measures. Alex Schmid’s comments on the effect on censorship in 
the Latin American context show the importance of the media in preserving freedom: 
 
The freedom of the press…was one of the first things to go in the clash between the 
[terrorists] and the security forces. And with the arrival of censorship, the watchdog 
function of the media on governmental actions also ceased, allowing the power holders to 
engage in repressive crimes of a magnitude completely unexpected beforehand. Torture 
became the order of the day, and with the cell structure of the terrorist underground far 
from perfected, it was relatively easy to produce whole chain reactions of arrests following 
the capture of one terrorist. All those suspected as potential or actual sympathizers of the 
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The “effectiveness” of terrorism lies primarily in third-party responses. Governments, the 
public, and the media hold important keys to combating terrorism (along with the organizations 
that governments and members of the public form). 
Governments. Democratic governments can take many effective actions in responding to 
terrorist attacks. These actions involve a wide range of areas.  
Respond Carefully and Be Prepared. Prior preparation and plans, and comprehension of the 
risks and pressures involved with terrorist attacks, can help governments make effective 
immediate decisions and avoid mistakes. Before taking action after attacks, governments can 
analyze what responses terrorists are seeking from the range of their third-party targets 
(including the government itself), and then respond carefully.  
Attack Terrorist Groups. Governments can attack terrorist groups through many means. 
Governments can use the criminal justice system, policing, intelligence, and covert actions to 
attack, disrupt, and destroy terrorist groups. Such means as financial controls, public education, 
and media coordination can reduce the material and political support provided to terrorists, and 
diplomacy and economic measures can reduce state support of terrorism. Military force can have 
a significant role in counterterrorism, but can be difficult to use effectively against terrorists and 
must be used carefully to avoid potential pitfalls and negative consequences. In all responses, 
governments can be careful about measures that target specific communities—especially the 
communities perceived as “closest” to the terrorists. Bruce Hoffman noted, “The struggle 
[against terrorism] is not primarily military but political, social, economic, and ideological.”200 
Lead the Public. Governments can lead popular responses to attacks. Terrorist attacks are 
likely to arouse strong emotions in members of the public, who may feel counterproductive 
impulses such as the desire to attack other people. The government can help the public refrain 
from these kinds of responses, and channel efforts in effective ways. The danger of poor 
responses is particularly high when people feel threatened, at which times good leadership, and 
courage, are required. President Barak Obama expressed the need to maintain standards under 
difficult conditions when he said, “We are willing to uphold our values and our ideals even when 
it’s hard, not just when it’s easy; even when we are afraid and under threat.”201 
Governments can develop the public’s comprehension of terrorism and the dangers involved 
with responses, and this comprehension is needed before terrorist attacks occur. Government 
leaders can direct public impulses into productive channels, lead mourning, and support victims 
and their families. Governments can enlist the support of their populations in campaigns to 
eradicate terrorism, and foster courage and moral force. 
Avoid Pitfalls. Governments can be aware of the many potential pitfalls involved in 
responding to terrorist attacks. Excessive rhetoric and war terminology can elevate the 
importance of terrorists. Hasty legislation, spending, reorganization, and privatization may be 
counterproductive and waste resources. Governments may be tempted to use terrorist attacks for 
political purposes, such as to attack opponents or pursue other policy goals, and overreaching 
may be self-defeating. A poor leadership climate can result in compromising democratic values.  
Keep within Democratic Values. Governments can ensure that responses are in keeping with 
democratic values. Terrorist attacks create pressures to compromise values in the pursuit of 
security, but the consequences of not maintaining standards can also damage security, and 
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national honor.202 Regarding abuse and torture, the question is not whether or not they “work”—
the real question is what the consequences are. The use of torture corrodes values and degrades 
the heritage of democracies, and to legalize such action signals that it is legitimate, and thus 
encourages its use (and may become routine, as has happened in a number of countries).  
The argument that liberties can be traded for security is misleading, for liberties protect both 
freedom and security. Governments can evaluate counterterrorism measures and responses in 
terms of the short- and long-term impact on both terrorists and freedoms. The focus for 
democracies is the need to combat terrorism while preserving freedom, and maximize both 
liberty and security. “Any sacrifice of freedom or the rule of law within States—or any 
generation of new tensions between States in the name of anti-terrorism—is to hand the terrorists 
a victory that no act of theirs alone could possibly bring.”203 There can always be threats that 
may lead to calls to reduce freedoms, but as the Supreme Court noted, the “imperative necessity 
[for safeguarding rights to due process] under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout 
our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that there is the 
greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees.”204  
Support Research, Development, and Expertise. Governments can support the development 
of knowledge and expertise to control terrorism. Government-sponsored research and 
development can increase counterterrorism capabilities, and provide consistent funding. 
Governments can help develop a community of counterterrorism experts and use this expertise 
through such means as university consortia, advisory commissions, and national academies and 
laboratories. 
Reports can inform the public, provide a means for tracking terrorism, and pressure state 
sponsors. Research and reports can address the entire problem of terrorism, and not just the 
current types of terrorism perceived as most threatening to particular countries.  
Governments can encourage accuracy and objectivity in research and writing on terrorism. 
Such means as the consistent funding to support databases can increase data accuracy, and 
thereby increase the accuracy of conclusions and recommendations based on the data.  
Strengthen Diplomacy and International Cooperation. Governments can strengthen the 
international counterterrorism regime, foster international solidarity and determination to combat 
terrorism, and coordinate their actions in a comprehensive strategy through intergovernmental 
organizations. Bilateral as well as multilateral agreements can strengthen international 
cooperation and capabilities. Countries can support each other’s struggles against terrorism, and 
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avoid double standards. Patterns of cooperation can help develop consistent and effective 
responses to terrorism threats and security challenges.  
Governments can improve international law enforcement cooperation, reduce barriers between 
law enforcement officials, improve intelligence sharing and cooperation, and harmonize national 
laws. Governments can strengthen the international justice system and advance international law 
and the international system in general.  
Governments can provide assistance to other countries and thereby increase their ability to 
combat terrorism. Addressing issues such as poor governance and corruption can reduce the 
conditions in which terrorism may seem justified. Eliminating safe havens can deny terrorist 
organizations the ability to plan and execute attacks freely. 
Governments can share and draw on best practices and lessons learned. After a terrorist attack, 
governments can review incidents and provide lessons learned.  
Governments can ensure that they coordinate their counterterrorism strategies and responses, 
and execute the strategy efficiently and effectively. In executing strategy, governments can 
follow-up on plans and programs, and comply with their commitments.  
The Public. The public is an important key to controlling terrorism. The public can 
understand what terrorism is and what responses terrorists are seeking from them, and respond 
carefully to attacks. In particular, members of the public can ensure that their responses uphold 
democratic values, and refrain from illegal actions and violence such as assaulting others. The 
public can work to defeat terrorist groups by denying them legitimacy and support of all kinds, 
and by preventing them from progressing toward their political goals. The public can 
demonstrate against terrorism, and in many ways delegitimize terrorists.  
The public can view the terrorist threat and government options realistically, and avoid 
pressuring for unwise policies. The public can support the government, but also refrain from 
pressing the government to dampen dissent, and can avoid viewing those who criticize or debate 
government policies as persons who support terrorists. The public can keep respect for dissent, 
for criticism and debate is generally necessary to find good policies. Without open discussion, 
potential mistakes and pitfalls may not be identified, and there may be no check on those who try 
to use terrorist attacks for their own purposes. The public also needs courage and determination. 
The public can avoid falling into terrorist traps regarding the justifications that terrorists try to 
use. The public can reject the claim that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” 
and unequivocally condemn all terrorist attacks, regardless of the goal being pursued or who the 
attackers are. Members of the public can condemn all organizations that use terrorism in addition 
to other methods, and not make exceptions for organizations or goals they support.  
The public can assist national and local governments. The public also needs to keep a watch 
on government actions, and be alert for attempts to use terrorist attacks for other policy goals or 
personal gain. Yet the public needs to know what the government is planning and doing in order 
to assist, and to participate effectively in government. This requires transparency—without 
transparency in government, the public is hampered.  
The Media. The media can keep the public informed while at the same time avoid giving 
terrorists advantages. Terrorists try to manipulate the media, but the media control their own 
actions and can avoid being “used” by terrorists. The media can avoid increasing the danger to 
people during terrorist crises and help with their resolution. Media guidelines, and cooperation 
between the media and officials, can help resolve terrorist crises and reduce terrorism. The media 
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The prevention of terrorism lies primarily in the three steps of Phase I: measures pertaining to 
the attacker, the means of violence, and the targets of violence. To prevent terrorism, third-party 
actions can address each of the three areas. As can be seen in Phase I, third-parties can take 
actions to deter and dissuade potential attackers, control the means of violence, and protect 
potential targets of violence (Fig. 5–1). 
The prevention of terrorism involves 
both proactive and defensive measures. 
Protecting potential targets of violence, 
and controlling the means of violence, 
involve measures of a more defensive 
nature, whereas measures to deter, 
dissuade, and catch potential attackers are 
more proactive. The most defensive 
measures may be to protect the targets of 
violence, and control the means of 
violence. The most proactive preventive 
measures may be to deter and dissuade 
potential attackers. An analysis of the 







Note. Many counterterrorism tools can be used to both respond to attacks, and to prevent attacks. For 
example, intelligence can enable governments to take both proactive and defensive steps against 
terrorism, and track down terrorists. Research and development (R&D) can develop products to 
detect the presence of anthrax and thereby prevent attacks, but can also develop products to treat 
anthrax contamination and thereby 
aid in responding to an attack. For 
the purpose of this monograph, most 
tools are addressed as to whether 
they pertain predominately to 




Table 5–1. Examples of Counterterrorism Measures for 
Both Responses & Prevention 
 
Responding to Attacks 
 
  Intelligence                             
  Research & Development        
  Etc. 
 
The Prevention of Attacks 
 
Intelligence  
Research & Development 
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I. The Targets of Violence 
 
There are a number of ways to protect potential targets of violence. Measures such as physical 
security, surveillance, detection systems, access controls, and travel and movement security can 
reduce access to targets and prevent the movement of terrorists and weapons. 
Physical Security Measures. Physical security 
measures can prevent attacks, deter and deny access 
to targets, reduce vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage from attacks. Perimeter security 
and vehicle control can separate attackers from 
targets. Obstacles can slow attackers to the point at 
which a response force can stop an attack. Lighting 
and alarms can deter attacks. Detection systems can 
identify dangerous substances such as anthrax and 
explosives.1 Building construction can use materials 
that do not shatter and injure people inside rooms 
(window material is an example). Research and 
development can increase physical protection, such as from improved barrier technologies. 
Vulnerability assessments can identify weaknesses, such as accessibility by terrorists. 
Many physical security measures have the advantage of impacting civil liberties less than 
other counterterrorism methods. For example, the installation of sensors for weapons of mass 
destruction is not likely to decrease civil liberties. But physical security measures can have 
drawbacks. Well-protected targets can channel attacks to less-protected targets such as shopping 
centers where large numbers of people may be injured and killed. Physical security measures 
involve economic losses from the opportunity cost of the invested capital and reduced public 
access. Preventive measures may be recurring, and thus costs increase over time. There can be 
non-quantifiable costs of protective measures, such as the symbolism of fear and the dampening 
of a people’s spirit—students visiting the U.S. capital reported nervousness when passing police  
officers on Capitol Hill 
carrying assault rifles and 
wearing combat boots, 
fatigues, and flak jackets.2 
Protective measures can 
distract from the meaning 
of a memorial, but can be 
done with less negative 
appearances (see photos).3 
 
                                                 
1 For example, giant pouched rats, which have an extraordinarily acute of smell, have been trained to sniff out 
explosives by the organization APOPO (the organization has used the rats to help clear mines from former war 
zones—the rats smell the vapor from the explosives and scratch the dirt above the mine, but are too light to set the 
mine off). The rats have also been used to increase the detection of tuberculosis. See John Reed, “Rats that Go 
Where Man Fears to Tread,” Financial Times, July 25, 2006; Karin Brulliard, “Its Nose Knows Land Mines, and 
Now Pangolins,” Washington Post, Dec. 27, 2017. 
2 Will Cronin, “An Overly Forbidding Presence on the Hill,” Washington Post, March 16, 2005. 
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An important physical security issue is deciding which assets should be protected and to what 
level. There can be so many potential targets of violence that it is not feasible to try to protect all 
of them. In 2003, the United States had thousands of airports, stadiums, and power plants 
(including over 100 nuclear power plants); hundreds of 
skyscrapers; and millions of miles of interstate pipelines 
(Fig. 5–3).4 
However, critical infrastructure and key assets can be 
protected. In 2003, the U.S. government considered critical 
infrastructure and key assets to include those targets that if 
attacked could have significant consequences such as large-
scale casualties and property destruction; cascading 
disruption of key assets; or profound damage to national 
prestige, morale, and confidence.5 An attack on one or more 
pieces of critical infrastructure may disrupt entire systems 
and cause significant damage, and measures can protect the 
parts and systems that make up critical infrastructure. Key 
assets can include facilities, sites, structures, and national 
monuments and icons (damage to monuments and icons can 
negatively impact a population’s morale and a nation’s 
reputation). 
Defending against catastrophic threats involves deterring, 
protecting against, detecting, and mitigating terrorist use of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Protection 
requirements for low-probability scenarios with high 
consequences should be reviewed and factored into any 
program, but resource restrictions may preclude complete 
protection against worst-case scenarios. 
Criticality assessments can evaluate and prioritize which 
assets are relatively more important to protect from attack. 
In 2003 the United States focused on protecting key assets 
and critical infrastructure from acts of terrorism that would: 
 Impair the federal government’s ability to perform 
essential national security missions and ensure the 
general public’s health and safety; 
 Undermine state and local government capacities to 
maintain order and to deliver minimum essential 
public services; 
 Damage the private sector’s capability to ensure the 
orderly functioning of the economy and the delivery 
of essential services; and 
 Undermine the public’s morale and confidence in 
national economic and political institutions.6  
 
                                                 
4 White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 2003, 9. 
5 Ibid., viii. 
6 Ibid., 11. 
Fig. 5–3. The U.S. Protection 








   
Border, Transportation, and Movement Security. Border security and controls, visa and 
document security, and immigration and asylum policies can prevent the movement of terrorists 
and the transport of weapons and the materials for destruction. However, it can be difficult to 
facilitate the efficient flow of people, goods, and services across borders while preventing illegal 
movement, and making travel more difficult has drawbacks. For example, tourism; business; 
trade; and scientific, research, education, and cultural exchanges may be negatively affected. 
Tightened visa requirements after the 9/11 attacks dissuaded thousands of people from coming to 
the United States. The number of foreign students attending U.S. colleges fell; companies 
encountered production delays from slower shipments; and tourism decreased, generating 
protests from corporations, the travel industry, universities, and other organizations such as 
medical institutions.7  
Movement security measures can hinder the movement of terrorists, 
and prevent the means of destruction from being brought to the targets 
of violence. Note, however, that some measures involve personal 
privacy issues—see the images of actual scans of a man at an airport. 
Some privacy concerns can be mitigated through such means as 
obscuring an individual’s face (as shown), but other scans can be even 
more revealing. 
Lists, such as No Fly lists (lists that identified individuals prohibited 
from boarding an aircraft), can assist movement and border control; 
however, the accuracy of lists can be an issue, and erroneous data have 
negative consequences. For example, misidentifications at airports can 
cause delays and missed flights, but can also lead to intensive 
questioning, intrusive searches, denied border entry, and even 
wrongful incarceration.8 
Some names may be mistakenly included on watch lists, and misidentifications can occur 
when individuals have a name similar to one on a list. The wife of a U.S. senator was delayed 
repeatedly because a similarity of her name to a name on the watchlist.9 
Mistakes in processing procedures can have negative consequences. On some occasions, 
aircraft on international flights have been diverted to new locations when individuals on the U.S. 
government’s No Fly list passed undetected through prescreening.10 Airplanes that are diverted 
cause delays and inconvenience for all passengers on these flights.  
Response and Recovery. Emergency preparedness and response programs can help deter 
terrorist attacks, and protect potential targets of violence. Training and exercises can help deter 
attacks by showing that communities are protected and prepared. Local communities can be 
involved in the efforts to help protect homes, schools, and neighborhoods from terrorist attacks 
and their consequences—President George W. Bush established a Presidential Task Force to 




                                                 
7 Edward Alden, “Visa Delays Have Cost US $30 Billion in Two Years,” Financial Times, June 2, 2004; Lee 
Hockstader, “Post-9/11 Visa Rules Keep Thousands from Coming to U.S.,” Washington Post, Nov. 11, 2003. 
8 See GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening, GAO-06-1031, 2006, summary, 14, 15; Ellen Nakashima, “Ordinary 
Customers Flagged as Terrorists,” Washington Post, March 27, 2007. 
9 Karen DeYoung, “Terror Database Has Quadrupled in Four Years,” Washington Post, March 25, 2007. 
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II. The Means of Violence 
 
 
Governments can control access to the means of violence, and deny groups and individuals 
the means to carry out acts of terrorism. Terrorists can only select from the means of violence  
that are available to them, and governments can control 
these means, especially those that can cause mass 
casualties and catastrophic destruction. Controls on the 
means of violence have the advantage of impacting civil 
liberties less than many other counterterrorism measures.  
The materials and weapons used in “conventional” 
terrorism, such as guns and explosives, are difficult to 
control—small arms and many bomb-making materials 
are readily available.11 Yet the control of materials and 
weapons for conventional terrorism is an important 
counterterrorism tool—the vast majority of terrorist 
attacks have used weapons that are readily accessible.12  
The accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has many negative 
security effects including destabilized situations, exacerbated conflicts, and increased criminal 
violence. But States can combat the spread and illicit trafficking of SALW—the OSCE 
Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons compiled and shared ways that 
governments could control SALW. 
Governments can control the means to develop and use weapons of mass destruction. In the 
early 21st century, only two technologies could produce truly catastrophic terrorism: nuclear 
explosives and advanced pathogens (germs that have been made very deadly). A nuclear bomb 
made with 5 kg of plutonium or 20 kg of highly enriched uranium could kill many thousands of 







                                                 
11 Brian Jenkins called the wide-spread availability of weapons and explosives a “dangerous form of political 
pollution.” See Brian Michael Jenkins, “Terrorism: A Contemporary Problem with Age-old Dilemmas,” in Howard, 
ed., Terrorism: Roots, Impact, and Responses, 1992, 15. The FLN used urban bombings only after they were able to 
acquire plastic explosives. See Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Explaining Terrorism, 2011, 36. 
12 LaFree, “Using Open Source Data to Counter Common Myths about Terrorism,” in Criminologists on Terrorism 
and Homeland Security, 2011, 426–428. The use of sophisticated weapons has also been rare. 
13 “Advanced pathogens are created and used in biomedical science and research, and are much more virulent and 
infectious than naturally-selected pathogens. The natural selection process favors milder pathogens that do not kill 
their hosts, for a pathogen that kills its host may also die and therefore not reproduce. The research on these 
pathogens is useful, but the knowledge is available in medical research literature.” John Steinbruner, course 
discussion, “Problems of Global Security,” Maryland School of Public Policy, 2001, author’s files. 
Fig. 5–4. Prevention:  
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“Weapon of Mass Destruction” (WMD) and “Mass Casualty” 
     
The term “WMD” has often been used to refer to any weapon that uses chemical, biological, radiological, 
or nuclear means (CBRN). Some U.S. government agencies such as DOD included as weapons of mass 
destruction those weapons that could cause mass casualties, such as from large conventional explosives. 
No specific number of casualties makes a terrorist attack a “mass casualty.” One threshold can be a 
specific number, such as 100 deaths. The DOD standard was “any large number of casualties produced in 
a relatively short period of time, usually as the result of a single incident such as a military aircraft 
accident, hurricane, flood, earthquake, or armed attack that exceeds local logistic support capabilities.” 
 – JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2005 
 




   
Governments can maintain controls over the materials needed to make chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. For example, controls on fissile material limit 
terrorists’ ability to develop nuclear weapons.  
Governments can use constructive regulation and protective oversight/inspection mechanisms 
for biotechnology. Biotechnology can eradicate diseases; however, the same knowledge can be 
used for devastating destruction, and governments can devise and agree on independent 
oversight procedures of the biological research process.14 
By strengthening the arms control regime 
governments can reduce the risk of terrorists 
gaining access to weapons and materials of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery. 
The arms control regime can provide the 
means to control the diffusion of weapons 
technology while facilitating desired 
scientific information exchange. Through 
disarmament and non-proliferation measures, 
governments can strengthen international 
efforts to prevent nonstate actors and any 
additional States from acquiring WMD and 
the means to deliver them.  
Controlling access to the materials needed 
to make weapons of mass destruction is 
feasible, especially the materials needed for  
CBRN attacks. All fissionable material can be inventoried, tracked, and monitored, and it is 
technically feasible to devise an accounting and physical security system for all nuclear weapons 
and materials. The diffusion of technology and expertise can make CBRN weapons and materials 
more difficult to control; however, the arms control regime provides a framework for controlling 
these weapons and materials.15 
Government-sponsored research and development (R&D) can increase the capabilities to 
combat WMD terrorism. For example, the U.S. government funded research to detect weapons 
of mass destruction, chemical detectors, and filtration systems for buildings, and the National 
Institutes of Health conducted research on vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals. Government 
involvement is required for most research and development related to WMD because the risks, 




                                                 
14 See, for example, John Steinbruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy M. Okutani, Controlling 
Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System, Center for International and Security Studies at 
Maryland (CISSM), Maryland School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 2007. 
15 See, for example, Jonas Siegel, John Steinbruner, and Nancy Gallagher, Comprehensive Nuclear Material 
Accounting, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), Maryland School of Public Policy, 
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 2014. 
The Arms Control Regime 
 
 
The arms control regime is an interlocking 
network of formal treaties and agreements 
between and among nations that regulate the 
size, composition, and operational practices of 
national military forces, including weapons of 
mass destruction and conventional forces. Arms 
control arrangements include such means as 
treaties, agreements, protocols, declarations, 
memoranda of understanding, resolutions, 
statements, charters, and conventions. The arms 
control regime is of particular importance in 
counterterrorism because of its potential to 
control the development and use of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). 
 




   
 
III. The Attacker 
 
Attacks can be prevented by actions directed at attackers and potential attackers. Two of the 
primary ways to prevent attacks are first, to identify and interrupt attacks in the planning or 
execution process, and second, to affect the decision to use terrorism—that is, to dissuade or 
deter the selection of terrorism as a method.  
Identify Potential Terrorist Threats. Potential 
terrorist threats can be detected and interdicted. Law 
enforcement and investigation, surveillance, and 
intelligence are three important ways. 
Law enforcement can investigate criminal activity 
to prevent and interdict terrorist activity. Proactive 
policing can identify and interrupt attacks being 
planned. The police, with their permanent presence 
in communities, have an understanding of the threats 
in their areas, and can gather significant intelligence. 
Police presence alone may thwart terrorist attacks— 
terrorists fear being caught, and even being asked questions by the police can cause terrorists to 
stop their plans.  
Intelligence can detect terrorist activity before an attack, and thus enable preemptive, 
preventive, and protective action. Measures such as surveillance, informants, entrapment, and 
infiltration can prevent terrorist attacks. Monitoring can determine the intentions, capabilities, and 
vulnerabilities of terrorist groups, and intrusive techniques such as wire-tapping can be used to 
collect and analyze information on the planning of criminal activity. Infiltrators can prevent 
planned attacks by such means as sabotaging weapons.  
All intelligence methods are needed to deal with terrorism. After an egregious attack, there 
may be calls for more human intelligence, but an overemphasis on human intelligence can lead 
to the neglect of other intelligence systems: “The real secret of intelligence is to meld all of the 
collection techniques with as much cooperation as you can so as to play to the strengths that are 
most appropriate for a particular problem. The clues that one system obtains may be just what is 
needed to zero in on another.”16 
Efforts to identify, collect, analyze, and distribute intelligence can be effective, but it may be 
difficult to obtain and disseminate enough specific intelligence to thwart terrorist plots. The 1986  
bombing attack on the La Belle disco, a West Berlin club popular 
with U.S. military personnel, can illustrate. The U.S. National 
Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a message that directed 
Libyan embassies in Europe to develop plans for terrorist attacks 
on Americans; another message pointed to West Berlin as the 
first target.17 After receiving this information, the U.S. Army 
provost marshal in Berlin, Lieutenant Colonel Richard 
Yamamoto, sent patrols to the places soldiers frequented, but the 
attack occurred as the military police were nearing the club. 
 
                                                 
16 Stansfield Turner, course discussion, “Terrorism & Democracy,” Maryland School of Public Policy, 2004, 
author’s files; “For Smarter Intelligence: Separate Spies from Analysts,” Washington Post, July 24, 1994. 
17 David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans (New York: Harper, 1988), 284, 285. 


















La Belle disco bombing, 1986 




   
Governments can document and track people and their communications, movements, financial 
transactions, and product use. Data mining can enable the analysis of large amounts of data, and  
thereby allow searches for 
patterns in data, extract 
useful information, and 
possibly allow prediction 
(Fig. 5–6).18 However, 
there are concerns involved 
with gathering large 
amounts of data. Data 
accuracy, privacy issues, 
potential misuse, and 
security issues are four 
major concerns. If data are 
inaccurate, terrorist activity 
may be overlooked (false  
negatives) and thus threats may not be identified, but misidentifying people (false positives) can 
negatively affect individuals who have no association with terrorists. Data analysis may 
mistakenly identify individuals as terrorist supporters because of their behavior pattern or an 
unsuspecting connection to a terrorist group. There is the potential for erroneous association of 
individuals with terrorism or crime, and the misidentification of individuals with similar names. 
The Department of Justice inspector general repeatedly found many errors in the government’s 
central database for terrorism suspects.19 Correcting data may be difficult, and the problem is 
exacerbated if data have been disseminated to other databases—in 2003, many federal, state, and 
local government agencies had access to one or more of twelve federal watch lists.20  
Information on individuals can 
diminish privacy, especially as 
databases grow—in three years the 
number of records in the U.S. Terrorist 
Screening Center’s watch list more than 
quadrupled (Fig. 5–7).21 Data can be 
misused for other purposes, such as for 
political purposes. There are security 
issues involved with collecting data; for 
example, if a hacker or terrorist 
sympathizer gained access to a 
database, terrorists might be able to 
obtain useful information such as how 
to evade detection or sabotage the 
system.  
 
                                                 
18 GAO, Data Mining, GAO-07-293, 2007, 4, 5. 
19 U.S. Dept. of Justice, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices, Audit 
Report 09-25, 2009; Statement of Glenn A. Fine, U.S. Dept. of Justice Inspector General, to the Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Oct. 24, 2007. 
20 GAO, Information Technology, GAO-03-322, 2003, 2. 
21 GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening, GAO-08-110, 2007, 24.  









Fig. 5–7. Increase in Terrorist Watch List Records,  













   
Deter and Dissuade the Decision to Select Terrorism as a Method of Struggle. Third-
parties can take actions to dissuade and deter the selection of terrorism as a method (Fig. 5–8).  
The decision to use terrorism can be stopped at any 
point from the discussion of terrorism as a possible 
method, the initial decision to use terrorism, and the 
actual decision at the point of imminent attack (for 
the decisionmaker may not be the actual attacker).  
Ameliorate Conditions. Governments can 
ameliorate conditions, and thus can affect the 
decision to adopt terrorism by reducing the number 
of situations that may appear to make terrorism 
justified. Conditions such as unemployment and 
economic disparities can create tensions and 
instability that can lead to political violence, 
including terrorism. Such conditions also create  
situations that extremists and terrorists can exploit, and ameliorating these conditions can prevent 
this kind of exploitation.  
Reform. Governments can make reforms that resolve problems, or satisfy perceived injustices. 
Redressing grievances can defuse tensions, and thus reduce the chances that terrorism will be 
used. In the early 1970s, the Italian government reduced tensions by granting considerable 
autonomy to the German-speaking province of South Tyrol. Redressing grievances can isolate 
extremists from the general population—in the late 1970s, the Spanish government granted a 
degree of autonomy to the Basque region, an act that gained the allegiance of the vast majority of 
Basques and helped to marginalize ETA.22 However, making reforms is problematic when 
terrorism has been used. As the result of reform, a group may stop using terrorism, but 
acknowledging the justice of a goal may be seen as justifying the use of terrorism, and 
governments (and many members of the public) strongly oppose any action that appears to 
legitimize terrorism. Making reforms is also likely to anger those who think that terrorism is 
being “rewarded.” And even when grievances or issues are resolved, terrorism may not stop. 
Reforms may disadvantage others, and thus create a new aggrieved group, and if one group is 
able to gain by terrorism, others may adopt the same tactic.  
Development and education. Governments can encourage private investment, economic 
reform, sustainable development, and increased economic opportunities. Research has shown 
that raising the standard of education can reduce the risk of radicalization and the resort to 
violence.23 Reducing unemployment can be more important than reducing poverty—nearly 25 
percent of recruits for Kashmiri insurgent groups cited joblessness as a motive for joining.24  
 
                                                 
22 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, 2006, 84, 202. The average number of people killed yearly by ETA was 
81 between 1978 and 1980, and dropped to 16 between 1991 and 2000. See Rogelio Alonso and Fernardo Reinares, 
“Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain,” Terrorism & Political Violence 17 (2005): 266. 
23 See, for example, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf Ekeus, Statement to the 518th Plenary 
Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, July 22, 2004. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out that “study 
after study” showed that “there is no tool for development more effective than the education of girls and the 
empowerment of women.” See UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, address to the International Women’s Health 
Coalition, Jan. 15, 2004. And as Ralph Peters wrote, “No society that torments women will succeed in the 21st 
century.” See Ralph Peters, “Global War on Women,” USA Today, Sept. 27, 2005.  
24 Schmid, “Prevention of Terrorism,” in Bjorgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism, 2005, 228. 
Fig. 5–8. Deter & Dissuade the Decision 



















   
Conflict Resolution. Through conflict resolution, governments, organizations, and 
populations can reduce the number and intensity of conflicts in the world. Reducing the number 
of conflicts and the general level of violence can in turn reduce the likelihood that terrorism will 
be used, for many terrorist attacks take place during civil violence. A high level of violence also 
increases the likelihood that terrorism will be seen as acceptable. Governments can promote the 
peaceful settlement of disputes using conflict resolution methods such as peace processes, 
mediation, and compromises, and post–conflict measures can prevent tensions from recurring 
and causing conflict again. Governments can freeze conflicts—that is, not let existing conflicts 
get any worse—and then try to make an opening to solving the problem.  
Ending ideologically based conflicts 
can reduce terrorism perpetrated on 
behalf of those goals. The Cold War and 
post–Cold War period can illustrate. The 
number of conflicts in the world rose 
during the Cold War from the 1950s to 
the early 1990s, peaked shortly after the 
end of the Cold War, and then began to 
decline (Fig. 5–9).25 Many of those 
conflicts were ideologically based, and 
with the discrediting of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, the number of leftwing 
terrorist groups decreased, as did state-
sponsored terrorism for leftwing goals.  
Governments can work to break cycles of violence. Once a spiral of violence is initiated, both 
sides may claim to be reacting to others’ actions, and that the other side only understands force. 
A French officer expressed this view to American officials visiting Lebanon as follows: “In this 
part of the world, if you don’t strike back, you are despised.”26 Sometimes both sides believe that 
not acting forcefully sends a message of weakness that will only invite more attacks, and 
governments, organizations, and populations can work to counter these kinds of beliefs. In 
leading his civil rights movement, Martin Luther King repeatedly emphasized that nonviolent 
resistance was “not a method for cowards,” but instead the way of the strong.27 
Preventive Diplomacy (Preventive Action). Governments can 
use preventive diplomacy to defuse crises, prevent disputes from 
escalating into violence or armed conflict, and limit the spread of 
conflicts if they occur. Early preventive diplomacy can encourage  
and support efforts by contenders to seek compromise, whereas late preventive diplomacy can 
persuade parties to abstain from violence when an outbreak of conflict seems imminent.  
Intergovernmental organizations can develop a rapid deployment capability for crisis 
situations. Targeted funds can help provide a flexible response to crises, such as the funds the 
OSCE established for rapid reaction (REACT) to crisis situations in the OSCE region.  
 
                                                 
25 Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 23. Note that 
conflicts increased during the 1990–1992 period at the end of the Cold War, as a number of conflicts broke out in 
Eastern Europe and the territory of the former Soviet Union.  
26 Brian M. Jenkins, “Defense Against Terrorism,” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 5 (1986): 782. 
27 King, Stride Toward Freedom, 1958, 102. 
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Conflict Prevention. Governments can use conflict prevention techniques to promote 
stability, conserve resources, and reduce the tensions that can lead to conflict, for if tensions 
erupt into violence, parties on any side of a conflict may 
turn to terrorism among other methods. There are many 
conflict prevention techniques including early warning; 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement; 
fact-finding and rapporteur missions; advice and counsel from experts, institutions, and 
international organizations; peacekeeping; and “internal self-determination.”28 Effective conflict 
prevention examines all of the tension-generating factors in a situation, develops an integrated 
strategy to deal with all aspects of the problem, and involves all phases of a conflict cycle from 
early warning to post–conflict rehabilitation. Fighting terrorism cannot be separated from the 
task of conflict prevention—many terrorist attacks have occurred during civil conflicts.29  
Governments can recognize the cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention measures. 
Governments can be so occupied with current problems that they have difficulty finding the time 
to focus on conflicts that are brewing. By the time a crisis occurs, it can be very difficult to 
avert—at a late stage there are fewer means available for peaceful resolution, but without a crisis 
it can be hard to gain attention. It can be difficult to justify spending on conflict prevention when 
the need is not obvious, yet it is usually easier and more cost-effective to address tensions early 
before a conflict erupts. Once the threshold of violence has been crossed, a conflict can be very 
difficult and costly to bring to an end. In the meantime lives are lost, waves of hatred have been 
created, and enormous damage has been done. Instead of spending billions of dollars to rebuild 
after a conflict, governments can invest a fraction of those resources into preventing conflicts.  
The experience of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der 
Stoel, illustrates the cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention.30 Van der Stoel reduced interethnic 
tensions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the 1990s after a number of ethnic conflicts had 
broken out at the end of the Cold War, and other interethnic tensions threatened to erupt. He 
found that the earlier a problem was identified and an appropriate response applied, the more 
likely it was that the problem could be solved effectively and at minimal cost. Early on there 
were usually a number of possible ways to resolve differences and create the processes and 
mechanisms for managing interethnic relations peacefully. Bargaining positions had not 
hardened, the cycle of violence and revenge had not taken hold, and the parties usually wanted 
peaceful solutions. He was repeatedly struck by the amount of harmony he found at the local 
level among people of different ethnicity—despite animosities, stereotypes, and even atrocities—
but found that once violence broke out, this harmony not infrequently turned to hatred.31  
 
                                                 
28 “Internal self-determination” measures can help keep States from breaking up as the result of interethnic tensions 
that create pressures for secession. An example is increased minority control over particular cultural affairs. See, for 
example, Max van der Stoel, in Preventing Ethnic Violence and Building Cohesive States, 2016, 13–15. 
29 START research found that “terrorism trends do not occur in a political vacuum, [but] interact with, affect, and 
respond to larger global conflicts and struggles,” and that “the rapid increase in terrorist attacks in the Middle 
East/North Africa, and South Asia since 9/11” coincided with more general increases in civil conflict in these 
regions. See LaFree and Dugan, “Trends in Global Terrorism, 1970–2008,” in Peace and Conflict 2012, 52. 
30 The HCNM was a conflict prevention instrument established by the OSCE States to prevent interethnic tensions 
from developing into security threats that would endanger the peace, stability, or relations between OSCE States. 
HCNM Max Van der Stoel’s work was widely recognized as having been very effective in preventing conflict, and 
his eight-year tenure cost less than $1 million per year—see Yamamoto, OSCE Principles in Practice, 2015, 25. 
31 Personal communication from Max van der Stoel to author, Oct. 25, 2006. See also Max van der Stoel addresses 
in Zellner and Lange, eds., Peace and Stability through Human and Minority Rights, 2001, 40, 54. 
 
Conflict prevention: Actions to 
reduce tensions (and thereby 
prevent new conflicts from starting). 




   
Use dialogue and processes. Governments can use dialogue to reach understanding and 
remove threats to peace. There is a risk in any country that differences among communities can 
trigger conflict, and built-in political mechanisms for dialogue can reduce this risk and help 
resolve disputes. Dialogue needs to focus on specific concerns and avoid generalities; for 
example, issues labeled “ethnic” often have very little to do with ethnicity. Focusing on specific 
issues can facilitate discussion of solutions, whereas generalities can become contentious and 
exacerbate tensions. The long-term goal is for parties to develop a pattern of cooperative 
interaction––for governments and groups to develop processes and institutions to the point that 
they deal with contentious issues in a constructive way.  
Apply targeted resources. Targeted resources—that is, resources allocated for specific 
purposes—can have a significant impact on preventing conflict by ameliorating conditions that 
can contribute to conflict and terrorism. Tension-reducing projects can lessen the likelihood of 
disaffection—examples are funds for a census, or language classes for integrating a minority. 
Relatively minor problems can, if not addressed, develop into major sources of tension, and very 
modest expenditures can remove the causes of tensions and promote stability—for example, the 
cost of many OSCE small-scale projects was extremely low, often less than $5,000.32 
Use contacts, education, and public diplomacy. Contacts can promote peace and cooperation 
among people, and reduce terrorism. Increased contacts and information flows helped to end the 
Cold War, which in turn reduced terrorism in the pursuit of leftwing goals.33 Such means as 
cultural and educational exchange activities, libraries, and tours by performing artists can 
increase understanding, appreciation, and international security—Senator J. William Fulbright, 
who introduced legislation to establish the Fulbright Program, called education across 
international boundaries “the vital mortar to seal the bricks of world order.”34  
Provide disaster/humanitarian assistance. Disaster assistance can help victims, and prevent 
terrorist groups from gaining support. In the aftermath of an earthquake in Cairo in 1992, the 
Muslim Brotherhood gained popular support by providing aid faster and more efficiently than 
the government.35 After devastating flooding in Pakistan in 2010, concern was expressed that the 
Taliban would use the flood to increase its influence.36 Humanitarian assistance can include such 
activities as food distribution, and engineering projects such as building roads.  
Assist weak or failing States. Governments can assist failing or failed States, and thus reduce 
areas of chaos, violence, and safe haven for terrorists—research has shown a relationship 
between failed states and terrorism.37 Assistance to failing or failed States can be challenging, 
but disorder in any State can cause many serious security problems including civil conflicts, 
regional tensions, and wider conflicts. 
 
                                                 
32 OSCE ODIHR, “Democratization,” www.osce.org/odihr/?page=democratization (Feb. 1, 2004); see also OSCE, 
Democracy and Human Rights Assistance, OSCE ODIHR Programmes and Project Outlines 2004–2005, 2003.  
33 Measures agreed to through the OSCE during the Cold War in the 1980s increased economic, business, and 
cultural contacts; journalist travel; and information flows across the Iron Curtain. These measures helped increase 
the determination of Eastern European populations to replace their governments with democracies. See Evers et al, 
The Culture of Dialogue: The OSCE Acquis 30 Years after Helsinki, 2005, 26–27. 
34 J. William Fulbright with Seth P. Tillman, The Price of Empire (New York: Pantheon, 1989), 199.  
35 James Piscatori, “Religious Fundamentalism,” in Michael Foley, ed., Ideas that Shape Politics (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1994), 98. 
36 Griff Witte, “Flooding’s Devastation in Pakistan Is Seen as Opportunity for Taliban,” Washington Post, Aug. 9, 2010. 
37 LaFree et al., “Global Terrorism and Failed States,” in Peace and Conflict 2008, 53–54. 




   
Emphasize respect and appreciation. Governments can emphasize the importance of respect 
in all relations, and among all groups. Respect denies terrorists a pretext for violence—the UN 
Security Council passed a resolution that included the need for respect in combating terrorism: 
“Since terrorists and their supporters exploit instability and intolerance to justify their criminal 
acts, the Security Council is determined to counter this by contributing to peaceful resolution of 
disputes and by working to create a climate of mutual tolerance and respect.”38  
Respect is a basic tool, for attitude is a basis on which leaders make decisions. An attitude of 
respect can decrease tensions among individuals, groups, communities, and countries, and lack 
of respect for the inherent dignity and worth of every human being has been a major contributor 
to tensions and conflict. People hunger for the conviction of human equality, and to be treated 
with respect, and the perception of lack of respect has a “sting” that can be long remembered, 
and add to poor relations between countries. President George H. W. Bush wrote that he believed 
strongly in showing respect for other countries and their leaders, regardless of the size of the 
country and importance to U.S. policy: “Every chief of state and head of government has pride in 
his country and should be treated with dignity and respect, and that must include consulting with 
them. While most countries already respect the United States, they want to know and trust that 
the United States also has great respect for them, for their ways, and for their sovereignty. It is 
important to make gestures that signal we value their point of view. The more contact you make 
the better, particularly if there are common problems you have to work out together. If you have 
the confidence of someone, confidence built through personal contacts, you can get a lot more 
done.”39 He believed that showing respect was in the United States’ best interest, and had paid 
off during his administration such as by the support the United States had received during the 
Persian Gulf War.40 
International organizations have 
perceived and expressed the importance of 
respect. In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 
OSCE States formulated ten principles 
guiding international relations (the Helsinki 
Decalogue) and two of the ten principles 
included the necessity for respect.  
An attitude of appreciation goes beyond 
tolerance for (or “putting up” with) others, 
in that trying to appreciate others and their 
contributions can strengthen community 
cohesion. George Washington addressed 
toleration thus: “It is now no more that 
toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the 
indulgence of one class of people, that 
another enjoyed the exercise of their 
inherent natural rights.”41  
 
                                                 
38 UNSCR 1456, 2003. All parties, including political and religious leaders, organizations, the public, and the media, 
can play positive roles in promoting respect among religions, beliefs, cultures, and peoples. 
39 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 61. 
40 Ibid., 61, 339. 
41 George Washington, letter to the Hebrew congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, Aug. 17, 1790. 
The 1975 Helsinki Decalogue:  
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations 
Between OSCE States 
 
I.   Sovereign equality, respect for the rights            
    inherent in sovereignty 
II.  Refraining from threat or use of force 
III. Inviolability of frontiers 
IV. Territorial integrity of States 
V.   Peaceful settlement of disputes 
VI.  Non-intervention in internal affairs 
VII. Respect for human rights, and fundamental      
      freedoms, including the freedom of thought, 
      conscience, religion or belief 
VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
IX.   Co-operation among States 
X.     Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under 
       international law 




   
Promote the use of nonviolent methods. Governments, organizations, and individuals can 
encourage the use of nonviolent methods to pursue objectives. Methods of nonviolent struggle 
can provide political, moral, and economic means to pressure for peaceful change. Methods such 
as peaceful protest, pressure groups, media contacts, and boycotts can provide ways to struggle 
without violating others’ rights. 
Major change can be achieved through nonviolent means. Groups 
in Eastern Europe pressed for peaceful change through methods that 
included mass demonstrations. In early November 1989, huge 
demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of people took 
place daily in East Berlin and every major city in East Germany, 
demanding political and civil liberties, especially free elections. 
Slogans shouted included, “The Wall must go,” and “No one can 
hinder the people’s will for democracy anymore.” The government 
ground to a halt, and on November 8 the entire East German Cabinet 
of Ministers and Politburo resigned.42 On the following day, 
November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, a watershed event that came 
to symbolize the end of the Cold War. The next day the Bulgarian 
regime fell, a week later the “Velvet Revolution” began in 
Czechoslovakia, and then regime after regime crumbled.  
One objective of many terrorist attacks is to call attention to a cause; however, there are many 
nonviolent ways to draw attention to a problem or struggle. An example is a human chain, in 
which people demonstrate solidarity by linking arms or hands. On 
August 23, 1989, about 2 million people formed a nearly 400-mile 
human chain across Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to draw attention 
to the Soviet Union’s occupation of the three countries.  
Nonviolent methods can be powerful. The methods Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King used had a moral power that was essential to the 
effectiveness of their campaigns. King’s civil rights movement had no 
advertising, yet received extensive press coverage and contributions 
flowed in, even from other countries.43 And as Paul Wilkinson noted, 
“Consider the much more effective and positive propaganda value of 
Martin Luther King’s civil rights movement marches—peaceful, yet 
morally and politically infinitely more powerful than terrorism.”44 
Promote the nonuse of force. Governments, organizations, and 
populations can promote the nonuse of force. After World War II,  
governments placed stronger controls on the use of international force, and in general, the non-
acceptance of the use of force increased. Efforts began primarily in the UN in response to the 
unparalleled devastation of World War II, and these efforts were given additional impetus by 
other international organizations such as the EU and OSCE.  
 
                                                 
42 Other factors contributed to the resignation of the East German government. For example, in September 1989 the 
Hungarian government began allowing tens of thousands of East Germans to cross the border into Austria, and the loss 
of these individuals weakened the East German economy. Another important factor was the Soviet announcement of 
non-intent to support the East German regime militarily. 
43 King, Stride Toward Freedom, 1958, 80–81. 
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Use the conflict prevention capability of democracy. The expansion of the liberal democratic 
State can prevent conflict and reduce tensions. The democratic form of government provides 
conflict-reducing mechanisms that lessen any perceived 
need for political violence in response to problems, or 
to try to bring about change. Because every society is 
composed of individuals who have different needs and 
interests, differences will always arise, but through  
democratic processes these issues can be resolved peacefully, and even in ways that strengthen 
society. Democratic institutions provide mechanisms for the fair and peaceful resolution of 
differences, and through these institutions, the tensions that occur in all societies can be 
channeled and resolved.  
Democracies are resilient and adaptable, and 
able to respond to popular needs. The political 
process is open and available, and democratic 
institutions allow citizens to participate in  
decisionmaking. Public discussion enables citizens to express their aspirations and needs, and to 
exchange information. Democratic institutions increase popular trust in government, trust that 
can help prevent extremists from exacerbating or exploiting tensions among different groups. 
Democracy requires that all persons have equality of rights and freedoms, including individuals 
who belong to minorities. Tensions are reduced by ensuring that persons belonging to minorities 
can freely express, preserve, and develop their identity without discriminating against the 
majority. The market economy allows people the opportunity to pursue their economic interests. 
Democracies are able to respond to popular discontent. Political leaders can be criticized 
openly, protest can take the form of demonstrations, and leaders can be removed by elections. In 
contrast, when governance is poor and government leaders cannot be voted out, advocates of 
violence may find support. If nonviolent means of protest are not available, opposition 
movements may move underground and resort to violence. Without democratic mechanisms that 
people can use to express discontent and work peacefully for change, a government may increase 
repression to suppress protests—repression that increases popular disaffection. 
The rule of law gives citizens confidence that they will be treated fairly and that injustices will 
be corrected through an independent and impartial judiciary. The perception of justice aids 
stability, and many injustices have been corrected over time as societies progress—though it has 
been said that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice,” this progress 
has required the sustained efforts of many people.45  
Democracy is essential to conflict prevention. OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities Max van der Stoel  addressed conflict prevention and democracy as follows:  
 
Long-term conflict prevention is really about building a viable democracy and its 
institutions, about creating confidence between the government and the population and 
groups within the population, about structuring the protection and promotion of human 
rights, and about fostering tolerance, understanding, and mutual acceptance in society.46  
 
                                                 
45 See, for example, the writings of Theodore Parker, and the addresses of Martin Luther King.  
46 Max van der Stoel, in Preventing Ethnic Violence and Building Cohesive States, 2016, 20. 
More than an end to war, we want an 
end to the beginnings of all war.  
– Franklin Roosevelt, undelivered 
address scheduled for April 13, 1945 
The core of democratic principles in terms of 
security is that respect for individual rights is 
inherently stabilizing, and thereby contributes 
to both national and international security. 
 




   
Promote Democracy and Individual Rights. Two important measures to control terrorism are 
first, respect for individual rights, and second, the form of government required to protect and 
promote individual rights—that is, democracy. The promotion of individual rights is an essential 
solution to the problem of terrorism because people who respect the rights of others do not use 
terrorism, but instead select other methods of struggle. During the Cold War, groups such as 
Solidarity in Poland, and Helsinki Watch groups in Eastern Europe eschewed terrorism (and all 
violence) in their efforts to achieve peaceful change for democracy.47 Even when a situation is 
deemed to call for the use of arms, people who believe in individual rights will follow the laws 
of armed conflict—which prohibit making noncombatants the deliberate object of attack.  
As the form of government designed to protect and promote the rights of the individual, 
democracy is a second important means of controlling terrorism. Many tensions and conflicts in 
countries are caused by human rights violations, and the first responsibility of the democratic 
State is to protect and promote the individual rights of all members of the State.48 The protection 
of rights decreases human rights abuses, and the tensions and insecurity that abuse engenders. 
Alex Schmid found a strong correlation between lack of respect for rights and terrorism, and 
HCNM Max van der Stoel found that ethnic tensions often had their origin in rights violations.49 
Promote respect for individual rights. Governments, organizations, groups, and individuals 
can promote respect for individual rights. The protection and promotion of respect for rights can 
help delegitimize terrorists and extremists, and reduce the willingness to use terrorism. 
Government agencies can promote respect for individual rights—during the Cold War the 
Helsinki Commission increased U.S. efforts to promote human rights and democratic change by 
providing individuals, groups, and governments a way to participate in achieving the purposes of 
the OSCE (then the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)).50  
There are many ways to project ideas, including such measures as public diplomacy, personal 
contacts, speakers, visits, exhibits, material distribution, press briefings, official statements, 
publications, conferences, and broadcasts. The projection of ideas can be effective—during the 
Cold War, millions of people behind the Iron Curtain listened to Radio Free Europe and Voice of 
America broadcasts, and the ideas in the broadcasts helped promote democratic change. 
 
                                                 
47 These groups avoided terrorism on both practical and moral grounds. Any use of terrorism would have given the 
totalitarian regimes an excuse for massive government repression, and avoiding terrorism increased the groups’ 
legitimacy, power, and influence among their populations, and internationally. See, for example, Wilkinson, 
Terrorism Versus Democracy, 2001, 42. 
48 Charter of Paris, 1990, 3. A major purpose of the liberal democratic State is to create and maintain the conditions 
in which all members of the State are able to fully exercise their individual rights and freedoms, limited only by the 
rights of others and the general welfare. In 1990 the OSCE States, which comprised nearly all of the world’s 
democracies, identified three means required to protect and promote individual rights: a democratic political 
framework, a rule of law based on human rights, and a market economy (economic freedom). The OSCE States 
declared this political framework to be the only system able to effectively guarantee full respect for individual rights 
and freedoms, equal rights and status for all citizens, the free pursuit of legitimate interests and aspirations, political 
pluralism, and restraints on the abuse of governmental power—and therefore democracy would be the only system 
of government for their nations. See the 1990 Charter of Paris and the 1990 Copenhagen Document. 
49 Schmid, “Prevention of Terrorism,” in Bjorgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism, 2005, 227–228; HCNM Max van 
der Stoel addresses in Zellner and Lange, eds., Peace and Stability through Human and Minority Rights, 2001. 
50 The Helsinki Commission (the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) was an independent 
government agency that monitored and encouraged compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE/CSCE 
commitments, contributed to the formulation of U.S. OSCE policy, took a leading role in the planning and conduct 
of U.S. participation in the OSCE, held public hearings, and published research and reports. Through its activities, 
the Commission enabled organizations and individuals to increase their leverage in pressing for human rights.  




   
Governments can set standards regarding individual rights through such means as documents, 
declarations, agreements, and processes. Standards and documents can exert pressure to promote 
respect for rights, and thus reduce support for terrorism. During the 1975 to 1989 period, the 
OSCE exerted a steady pressure for individual rights and reform, a pressure that made a major 
contribution to the end of the Cold War.51 Through the 
OSCE “Helsinki process,” States negotiated values and 
commitments, and reviewed compliance through follow-up 
conferences.52 Through this process, the States developed, 
interpreted, and revised commitments over time, but overall 
toward the justice and fairness inherent in the individual  
rights contained in Helsinki Decalogue Principle VII: “Respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.” The end 
of the Cold War in turn reduced terrorism for leftwing goals. The OSCE also helped to reduce 
terrorism during the post–Cold War period by actions to consolidate democracy in Eastern 
Europe and the territory of the former Soviet Union, and through the work of the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, whose conflict prevention efforts 
helped prevent interethnic tensions in the OSCE area from erupting into conflicts.  
Governments can assist States to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights. The OSCE, for example, established an Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) to advance democracy and human rights in the OSCE area. The ODIHR 
helped States to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; abide by the rule of 
law; promote the principles of democracy; and build, strengthen, and protect democratic 
institutions. The ODIHR promoted democratic elections through a cycle of in-depth observations 
of national elections—operations included sending out teams to observe the entire electoral 
process before, during, and after election day. (The ODIHR was the organization that declared 
elections as “free and fair.”) The ODIHR conducted practical assistance projects to assist in 
consolidating democratic institutions—projects that helped turn principles into practice.53 For 
example, rule of law projects included training judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and police, as well 
as legal reform and legislative review projects to bring domestic laws in line with OSCE 
commitments and other international standards.  
Advance the forces of democracy and respect for individual rights. The most effective 
counterterrorism policy is to strengthen the forces of democracy and human rights in the world, 
and encourage the trend toward the democratic State. The movement toward individual rights 
and the acceptance of democratic values were reflected in Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
remarks at the 1990 OSCE Paris Summit: “We are entering into a world of new dimensions, in 
which universal human values are acquiring the same meaning for all and in which human 
freedom and well-being and the unique value of human life must become both the foundation 
and basis for universal security and the supreme criterion by which we measure progress.”54  
 
                                                 
51 NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), 57.  
52 The “Helsinki process” was a series of meetings during which the OSCE States met to review the implementation 
of commitments made through the OSCE, and to set new standards and commitments. 
53 See, for example, OSCE, Democracy and Human Rights Assistance, OSCE ODIHR Programmes and Project 
Outlines 2004–2005, 2003. Note that the OSCE called the protection and promotion of human rights the “human 
dimension” of security.  
54 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, “Speech by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to the Second Summit of 
CSCE Heads of State or Government,” Nov. 19, 1990. 
NATO identified the adoption of the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act as one of 
the three most significant events to 
which the end of the Cold War can 
be traced. – NATO Handbook, 1992 




   
Promote democratic change in authoritarian regimes. Governments, organizations, and 
individuals can promote democratic change in authoritarian States. The European and U.S. State 
Department program for regime change and stability in post–Milosevic Serbia was an example 
of effective democracy promotion.55 However, democratic promotion efforts need to be done 
carefully, and focus on the liberal democratic form of government, not just “voting,” and 
majority rule without respect for individual rights.56 A leader of a Central Asian fundamentalist 
movement showed his misunderstanding of what democracy means when he said, “I want to 
have democracy in my country. I want to apply human rights…. In my country, the majority of 
people are believers in God; they think as I do. So we are a majority. When we take power, we 
will install good order and the truth. There will be no place for others.”57 Elections held without 
respect for political and civil rights can result in governments that have little interest in 
democratic principles—cited examples include elections involving Hamas and Hezbollah.58 
Types of governments affect security. Autocratic governments are more likely than 
democracies to take actions that violate the rights of their populations, including actions that may  
give rise to the belief that terrorist violence is justified. Authoritarian regimes threaten peace and 
security: the way that a State acts toward its own people is an indication of how it will act toward 
other States. Governments that violate the rights of their own people are not likely to respect the 
rights of other countries, and are more likely to seek their international objectives by force, and  
to sponsor terrorism. Democracies, however, are more likely to look for peaceful ways of solving  
problems; cooperate on security, economic, and environmental 
concerns; uphold the rule of law; and respect citizens’ rights, 
and thus contribute to peace and security.  
The differences between democratic and authoritarian 
States are profound and arise primarily from conflicting views  
regarding the rights of individuals and the purpose of society. The core of the democratic State is 
the value and importance of the individual and the individual’s rights, in particular the 
inalienable rights that are “the birthright of all human beings,” and are essential for their “free 
and full development.”59 In contrast, many authoritarian governments have tried to deny that 
individuals have inalienable rights. Authoritarian governments rule their populations, whereas 
democratic governments are formed to serve all members of the State. Human rights must be 
respected because of the inherent worth and dignity of every person, and because peace and 
security depend upon it—violations of rights cause tensions that can lead to instability and 
conflicts within a State that can, in turn, threaten other States.60 
 
                                                 
55 Thomas Carothers, “Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, May 2001; Michael Dobbs, “U.S. Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition,” Washington Post, Dec. 11, 2000.  
56 For problems in promoting democracy, see the writings of Thomas Carothers, such as “The Rule of Law Revival,” 
Foreign Affairs (March–April 1998); “Messy Democracy,” Washington Post, April 8, 2003; Aiding Democracy 
Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999). 
57 Quoted in Bronislaw Geremek, “Building Cooperation Among Democracies,” in U.S. State Dept., Issues of 
Democracy, May 2000, 13. 
58 Raphael F. Perl, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, CRS RL34230, Nov. 1, 2007, 7; Steven A. Cook, 
“Don’t Blame Democracy Promotion,” Washington Post, July 29, 2006. 
59 Charter of Paris, 1990, 3; Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 6. The OSCE States recognize and fully accept “the supreme 
value of the human personality”—see the Copenhagen Document, 1990, 3. 
60 “Full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies based on pluralistic 
democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for a lasting order of peace, security, justice and cooperation.” See 
the Moscow Document, 1991, 28. 
The systematic and deliberate 
denials of basic human rights lie at 
the root of most of our troubles.   
– Secretary of State George Marshall, 
UN address, Sept. 23, 1948 




   
There have been many peaceful transitions to democracy. As the Cold War ended, the peoples 
in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Russia chose new governments that were primarily  
democracies, and the year 1990 marked the first time in 
history when the majority of governments in the world 
were democracies (Fig. 5–10).61 In 1993 the number of 
armed conflicts began to decline (see earlier Fig. 5–9), 
a decline attributed to the expansion of democracy, 
conflict management practices, and more active 
international mediation in the wake of the Cold War. 
The democratic revolutions that brought freedom to 
millions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
inspired other democratic changes, such as in Africa. 
Democracy promotion is aided by the desire for 
freedom, an aspiration shared by the vast majority of 
the world’s people. Many polls have shown that most 
people admire and aspire to political freedom—a slogan 
that Iranian demonstrators chanted during anti-
government protests in Tehran was “Freedom of 
Thought Forever.”62 The desire for the freedoms and rights declared in the U.S. Constitution and 
Declaration of Independence was a driving force behind the American civil rights movement—as 
Martin Luther King wrote, “The goal of America is freedom.”63 The desire for freedom was a 
powerful force during the Cold War: “Despite decades of state repression and terror the desire 
for democratic freedoms and human rights could not be extinguished. The ‘Velvet Revolution’ 
revealed that even powerful modern States using the full repertoire of techniques of totalitarian 
control and backed up by terror are not invincible. George Orwell’s nightmare vision of Nineteen 
Eighty-Four has shown that totalitarian control cannot succeed over the determined will of the 
people seeking democratic change.”64 
By the 21st century, democracy was the only political ideology that commanded widespread 
legitimacy, as UN resolutions can show. In 1999 the UN Commission on Human Rights passed a 
resolution that confirmed that democracy is a human right, and in 2000 passed a resolution 
calling on States to promote democracy.65 In 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution that called on States to promote and consolidate democracy, and to promote, protect, 
and respect all human rights, including “fundamental freedoms, in particular the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion, belief, peaceful assembly and association, as well as freedom of 




                                                 
61 Ted Robert Gurr et al., Peace and Conflict 2001, 1, 19, 23.  
62 “The West’s Role in Islam’s War of Ideas,” Financial Times, July 9, 2005; “Students Protest in Iran,” Washington 
Post, Nov. 10, 2002. Regarding the desire for freedom, see also John Waterbury, “Hate Your Policies, Love Your 
Institutions,” Foreign Affairs (Jan.–Feb. 2003).  
63 Martin Luther King, “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” 1963. 
64 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, 2001, 42. 
65 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/57, “Promotion of the Right to Democracy,” 1999; Commission 
on Human Rights Resolution 2000/47, “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy,” 2000. 
66 UNGA Res. 55/96, “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy,” 2001. 
Fig. 5–10. The Growth of Democracy 
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The prevention of terrorism focuses primarily on the three steps of Phase I: measures 
pertaining to the attacker, the means of violence, and the targets of violence. To prevent 
terrorism, third-parties can take actions to deter and dissuade potential attackers, control the 
means of violence, and protect potential targets of violence. 
The Targets of Violence. Potential targets of violence can be protected through physical 
security measures. Such means as surveillance, access controls, and detections systems can 
prevent terrorists from reaching targets. The way buildings are constructed can reduce injuries 
and damage if an attack occurs. Border, transportation, and movement security can prevent 
terrorists, weapons, and the materials for the means of violence from entering target countries, 
and prevent terrorist movement within countries. Research and development can increase 
capabilities in all areas to protect targets of violence. 
It is not feasible to protect all potential targets of violence—there are so many that the cost 
may be prohibitive, and attempting total protection may reduce freedoms. But critical potential 
targets can be protected, including those targets that could trigger a catastrophic cascade, and are 
symbolically important. 
The Means of Violence. Controls on means of violence can prevent terrorists from obtaining 
the means of destruction, particularly those that can cause large numbers of casualties. The arms 
control regime provides a primary tool for controlling access to weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and the materials to make WMD. Research and development can increase the capability 
to control the means of violence.  
The Attackers. Attacks in the planning or execution process can be identified and stopped. 
Measures such as intelligence, policing, and covert action can prevent terrorist attacks. 
Measures to deter and dissuade attackers can prevent individuals and groups from adopting 
terrorism as a method, and convince organizations that use terrorism to use nonviolent methods 
instead. Addressing conditions, resolving conflicts, and using conflict prevention measures can 
reduce the number of situations in which terrorism may appear justified. Many terrorist attacks 
and campaigns are connected to civil conflicts, and therefore preventing and resolving conflicts, 
and reducing tensions, can in turn reduce terrorism. 
Continuing the movement toward democracy and respect for individual rights can help 
prevent the selection of terrorism as a method of struggle. The liberal democratic State provides 
nonviolent ways for tensions and conflicts to be resolved, and by protecting and promoting the 
rights of the population reduces the violations of rights that may lead to conflict. The liberal 
democratic State as exemplified by democracy, individual rights, the rule of law, and economic 
freedom has been identified as the most effective way to achieve both security and freedom. 
Identifying planned and imminent attacks can have immediate effects, whereas impacting the 
decision to adopt terrorism can require broad, continued efforts. Promoting the liberal democratic 
State requires a sustained effort, but is the most effective way to reduce terrorism in the long 
term because people who respect the rights of others do not use terrorism to pursue their goals, 





   
 
Chapter 6. A Comprehensive Counterterrorism Strategy 
 
Chapter Outline 




I. A Comprehensive, Sustained Strategy 
 
The control and prevention of terrorism lies primarily in the actions of governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, the public, and the media. 
Governments and intergovernmental organizations in particular can develop and then execute a 
comprehensive, sustained counterterrorism strategy.  
 
The Development of Counterterrorism Strategy: Policy & Strategy. Four steps can help 
governments and intergovernmental organizations develop a comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy. These steps are to comprehend terrorism, conduct threat assessments, develop policy on 
how to counter the threat, and develop a counterterrorism strategy to execute the policy. 
Comprehend Terrorism. The first step in developing a strategy to control terrorism is to 
comprehend the phenomenon—to understand what terrorism is, how it operates, and the threats 
involved. This step is critical to all other steps, for if terrorism is not understood, then a 
counterterrorism strategy may not address all of the threats that terrorism poses, and thus make 
counterterrorism efforts less effective. Figures 6–1 and 6–2 can aid in comprehending terrorism. 
Figure 6–1 shows the steps of the terrorist attack, and though there have been disagreements 
about particular aspects of terrorism, the basic strategy that terrorism follows does not change.1 
Regardless of any disagreements about terrorism, it is important to comprehend the terrorist 
intent to involve third-parties (victim-target differentiation). Understanding that last “twist” of 
the attack—that terrorists want the entire range of their third-party targets (opponents and 
supporters) to take actions that aid the attackers’ political goal—is crucial to fighting terrorism 













                                                 
1 Many disagreements about terrorism have pertained to the first three steps of the attack: the attacker, the violence, 
and the targets of violence. Examples are disagreements about whether the attacker should include governments and 
state actors; which qualities of violence should be included; and which kinds of targets of violence that should be 
included or excluded, such as when soldiers should be considered noncombatants. There have also been 
disagreements regarding the political goal, and sometimes the victim-target differentiation characteristic (the 
involvement of third-parties) has not been understood or included.  
























Fig. 6–2. Victim-Target Differentiation: 

























   
Conduct Threat Assessments. The second step in developing a strategy to control terrorism is 
to assess the threats involved from terrorist attacks themselves, and from third-party responses. 
This assessment needs to be objective and comprehensive, and take into account the full range of 
current and potential threats, and the likelihood that each will occur. These assessments need to 
be done periodically. 
Develop Policy. The third step is to develop policy in light of the threats from terrorism. 
Governments and intergovernmental organizations can consider the process of the terrorist attack 
(Fig. 6–3) in deciding their policy, and this analysis involves answering many questions. What  
areas are most important to a government? To prevent attacks? Prevent terrorists from using 
nuclear weapons? Protect critical potential 
targets of violence? Does a government 
want an emphasis on Phase II of an 
attack—that is, to ensure that responses to 
attacks are effective, and to avoid the 
negative consequences of poor third-party 
responses to attacks? (The consequences 
of poor responses can exceed the physical 
damage done by an attack.) Where would 
resources and efforts be applied most 
effectively? Which areas would provide 
the best protection? Does a government 
want to concentrate more resources on 
catching attackers after they conduct 
attacks, or to prevent groups from forming? Effective counterterrorism depends on both 
preventing attacks and responding effectively to them (Figures 6–4 and 6–5). To prevent attacks, 
third-parties can dissuade the selection of terrorism as a method of struggle, limit the means of 
violence that terrorists can use, and protect potential targets of violence. To respond to attacks, 

















This kind of analysis can help governments and intergovernmental organizations decide where 
to concentrate their resources to combat and prevent terrorism, and help form policy. After 
determining their policy, governments can develop their strategy. 






















Fig. 6–5. Responding to Attacks 














    















    




   
Develop Strategy. The fourth step is to develop a counterterrorism strategy. A comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy prevents attacks, responds effectively if they occur, interrupts every 
step of the process of a terrorist attack, and counters every tool that terrorists use. As examples, 
terrorist violence can be met with force, the funding sources of terrorist groups can be stopped, 
terrorist communications can be denied, the means required for destructive weapons can be 
controlled, and the ideological aspects of terrorism can be exposed and discredited.  
The effective prevention of attacks involves a focus on Phase I of an attack, and a government 
concerned about preventing attacks would apply resources in this area. For example, a 
government that placed a high priority on preventing terrorist groups from forming might 
develop a public information campaign to dissuade groups from adopting terrorism as a method 
of struggle, and to dissuade potential recruits from joining terrorist groups. A government that 
placed a high priority on preventing terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons may focus 
on controlling the means of violence through such methods as radiation detection and the arms 
control regime. A government that wanted to protect important potential targets of violence 
could strengthen physical security measures.  
Responding effectively to attacks involves a focus on Phase II of a terrorist attack. A 
government concerned about responses to attacks would have effective plans prepared in the 
event of different kinds of attacks, and a public education program to ensure that the general 
public comprehends the kinds of responses terrorists are seeking.  
Governments need to be concerned about the 
potential negative consequences of third-party 
responses to attacks. In 1996 President Bill Clinton 
called terrorism “the enemy of our generation,” and 
five years later when the 9/11 attacks occurred, 
terrorism became the primary security focus of 
many countries.2 But one reason that terrorism is a 
serious threat is because of the damage that third-
parties can do to themselves in responding to 
attacks. Ten years after the 9/11 attacks, a Financial 
Times article pointed out some of the effects of U.S. 
responses in the following summarized excerpts:  
 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, the price 
of Brent crude oil was $28 a barrel, and the U.S. 
government was running a budget surplus. Ten 
years later, the price of oil was around $115 a 
barrel; the United States was projected to run a 
budget deficit for 2011 of $1.6 trillion, the largest 
in its history; America’s military forces were 
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the inflation-
adjusted cost of the “global war on terror” was 
estimated to be more than $2 trillion, twice the cost 
of the Vietnam conflict.3 
 
                                                 
2 President Bill Clinton, “Remarks on International Security Issues at George Washington University,” Aug. 5, 1996. 








   
The most comprehensive counterterrorism strategy uses a broad approach to security to ensure 
that all of the tools of national strategy are engaged. There are few, if any, tools specifically 
designed to fight terrorism—there are only the tools of national strategy, which can be used to 
counter any security threat including terrorism. As shown, the tools of national strategy can be  
divided into ten categories—political, 
legal, military & security, economic, 
environmental, knowledge & technology, 
intelligence, communications & media, 
ideological & moral, and organization & 
implementation (see Appendix E).4 
Every tool of strategy can contribute  
in the fight against terrorism. Political tools such as diplomacy can negotiate counterterrorism 
conventions and coordinate international responses to attacks. Legal methods can enforce 
national and international laws, and arrest terrorists. Military force can rescue hostages. 
Economic measures can pressure governments to stop supporting terrorist groups. Scientific 
research can develop ways to identify radioactive materials in transit. Intelligence measures can 
identify terrorist groups. Communication technology can monitor terrorist phone calls. 
Ideological tools can delegitimize terrorism and thereby reduce the number of attacks. 
Government organizational structures and processes can be made more efficient.  
Many tools are directly related to counterterrorism, but even tools that appear to be indirectly 
related to counterterrorism can contribute. For example, environmental measures can reduce 
tensions between countries over resources, and thus lessen the potential for conflicts in which 
terrorism may appear to be justified.5 
The tools of strategy can reinforce each other. To illustrate, advances in communications can 
increase the effectiveness of public diplomacy efforts, which in turn can reduce support for 
terrorist groups by discrediting terrorist propaganda.  
The tools of strategy need to be viewed objectively in terms of their capabilities and potential 
consequences. Leaders can avoid the discussion of what “paradigm” should govern 
counterterrorism, such as whether these efforts should be primarily a legal or a military matter.6 
This kind of discussion can be counterproductive by causing confusion and distorting strategy by 
ideology (and as a note that some who have promoted counterterrorism as a “war paradigm” also 
advocated invading other countries for reasons other than counterterrorism).  
A comprehensive counterterrorism strategy uses the capabilities of all tools and incorporates 
perspectives such as crime-fighting, war-fighting, and conflict prevention. The struggle against 
communism was a comprehensive campaign that used all national strategy tools, and capitalized 
on their capacity to influence, attract, induce, pressure, and coerce. An effective strategy makes 
the best use of all tools, and brings efforts together into a coherent, synergistic whole.
 
                                                 
4 The tools of national strategy can be organized in a number of ways, such as by whether or not they are proactive 
or defensive, or by their timeframe such as short- or long-term. The constructs used in this monograph for the tools 
of strategy were developed from the OSCE’s comprehensive security concept. 
5 Even modesty in consumption can contribute to the environment, and thereby contribute to security. See David A. 
Crocker, “Consumption, Well-Being, and Capability,” in Crocker and Linden, eds., Ethics of Consumption, 1998 (an 
article that includes a discussion of the personal benefits of reducing consumption). 
6 For example, President George W. Bush said, “I know that some people question if America is really in a war at 
all. They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments.” 
See President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Jan. 20, 2004. 
The Tools of National Strategy 
 
I. Political      VI. Knowledge & Technology 
II. Legal      VII. Intelligence 
III. Military & Security   VIII. Communications & Media  
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The Tools of National Strategy for the Democratic State 
 
 
I. Political Tools 
 1. International political tools 
1-1. Core values and assumptions regarding 
international security 
1-2. The structure of the international system 
1-3. International relations and security principles 
1-4. International organizations, alliances, and 
coalitions 
1-5. Diplomacy, including diplomatic pressure, public 
diplomacy, cultural and educational activities 
1-6. Conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, conflict 
resolution (including post–conflict measures) 
1-7. Governance assistance to States 
1-8. Peaceful regime change/democracy promotion 
1-9. International leadership and cooperation, and honor 
1-10. Moral force/force of example/ethical pressure  
 2. National political tools 
2-1. Core values and assumptions (attitude toward 
others/respect) 
2-2. Leadership vision (the goal or policy) 
2-3. Policy setting/reform 
2-4. Leadership, including character, competence, 
and honor 
2-5. Moral force/force of example/ethical pressure 
 
II. Legal Tools 
1. National and international laws, conventions, regimes, 
standards, and agreements (legally-binding and 
politically-binding) 
2. Law enforcement/legal cooperation/judicial actions 
3. Actions to enforce laws, conventions, standards 
 
III. Military & Security Tools  
 1. Military force actions  
1-1. Offensive and defensive combat operations 
1-2. Operations that may or may not involve the use of 
military force 
1-3. Deterrence/threat of force 
 2. Preventive defense (i.e., defensive postures, 
confidence- and security-building measures, military 
engagement activities) 
 3. Security relationships (i.e., alliances, coalitions, 
security assistance, joint training) 
 4. International security regimes (i.e., arms control 
regime/nonproliferation regime) 
 5. Organization and training of military forces 
 6. Physical security  




IV. Economic Tools 
  1. International economic tools 
     1-1. Leadership/teamwork in economic organizations 
     1-2. Economic policy coordination 
     1-3. Trade/trade regimes 
     1-4. Financial controls 
     1-5. Development assistance/foreign aid; 
             disaster/humanitarian assistance 
     1-6. Economic leverage—incentives, coercive  
             economic measures (i.e., sanctions) 
  2. National economic tools 
     2-1. Economic strength/financial (budget) security     
     2-2. Economic policy setting/reform 
     2-3. Resource development, use, and security 
     2-4. Mobilization base—human and industrial  
 
V. Environmental Tools 
  1. Actions to ensure an environment that protects 
human, animal, agricultural, and physical resources  
  2. Protection against transnational hazards 
  3. Prevention/resolution of disputes over resources 
 
VI. Knowledge & Technology Tools 
  1. Knowledge, information, technology, and R&D 
    1-1. Education and training (development of human 
resources and the research base) 
    1-2. Information & technology development and 
control (share and deny) 
  2. Training/equipment assistance 
  3. Tracking and movement control of materials/people 
 
VII. Intelligence Tools  
  1. Intelligence collection, analysis, control, and    
        dissemination 
  2. Covert action 
 
VIII. Communications & Media Tools  
  1. Communications technology 
  2. Communications security 
  3. The media 
  4. Social media 
 
IX. Ideological & Moral Tools 
  1. Core values (individual rights and freedoms) 
  2. The protection of individual rights and freedoms 
     2-1. Democracy, rule of law, and market economy 
     2-2. Democratic institutions, civil society, and 
individual action 
  3. The strengthening and advancement of values 
  4. The projection of values 
 
 
X. Organization & Implementation Tools 
(The Means to Coordinate and Control the Tools of Strategy in Implementing Policy) 
 
             1. Policy & Strategy        2. Organizational Structures & Processes        3. Leadership & Management 
 
 
(See Appendix E for further discussion of the tools of national strategy for the democratic State.) 




   
The Execution of Counterterrorism Strategy. Strategy needs to be well-executed to be 
effective, and good execution involves many aspects. The most critical aspect of the execution of 
strategy is leadership, supported by effective management.  
Leadership and Management. Leadership is essential for the effective execution of national 
and international counterterrorism strategies. Those responsible for policy and execution at all 
levels use leadership and management to execute strategy, and adjust it as needed. A U.S. Army 
handbook expressed the combination of leadership and management as follows: 
 
Leadership and management are two separate systems of action that work together to get a 
mission done. Leadership determines where to go and what to do both now and in the 
future, and then steers to get there. Management determines how to get there; creates the 
techniques, systems, and processes needed to accomplish the goals; and then executes…. 
Leadership is an art and focuses the organization on accomplishing the present mission, 
and at the same time develops the organization to meet future requirements…. 
Management is the science of controlling how to get a job or mission done—the step by 
step processes.7 
 
Leadership envisions, directs, and guides. Leaders set policy and direction; create the climate 
in which the tools of strategy will be used; select and direct the use of tools of strategy; and are 
responsible for the quality of organizational structures, processes, and execution. Management 
executes, monitors, and supports, and to achieve goals, leaders must be supported by effective 
management. Yet all jobs require leadership and management: leaders must manage and 
managers must lead—both activities are essential to success. “We lead people, and, at the same 
time, we manage resources, milestones, and programs.”8 
Leadership Goal for Counterterrorism Strategy: The Protection and Promotion of 
Democratic Values. In terms of a democratic counterterrorism strategy, the overarching goal that 
democracies seek—individual freedom—needs to guide the development and execution of 
strategy. President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1959 national security strategy expressed this vision in 
terms of the purpose of the U.S. government as dedicated to the rights of the individual:  
 
The genius, strength, and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people 
and government to the dignity, equality and freedom of the human being under God. These 
concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark 
of our free society, and are the basis of the respect and leadership which have been 
accorded our nation by the peoples of the world.9 
 
As governments dedicated to the rights of the individual, democratic countries need to 
maintain respect for democratic values in responding to and preventing terrorist attacks. 
Eisenhower’s 1959 national security strategy expressed the requirement that responses to 
challenges be based on core democratic values: “[Our] principles and fundamental values must 
continue to inspire and guide our policies and actions at home and abroad. When they are 
challenged, our response must be resolute and worthy of our heritage.”10  
 
                                                 
7 Command, Leadership, and Effective Staff Support, 2016, 194. 
8 General John Wickham, in The Chiefs of Staff, United States Army: On Leadership and The Profession of Arms, 
2016, 32.  
9 National Security Council Report, NSC 5906/1, Aug. 5, 1959. 
10 Ibid.  




   
Keeping responses worthy of the heritage of democracies can be valuable in the struggle 
against terrorism. A government reputation for honesty and fair play can illustrate. If a 
community is angered by an attack, terrorists may be able to cast the blame on the government if 
it not trusted. During the Algerian struggle for independence, the FLN murdered approximately 
300 males in Melouza village, and when the action was widely condemned, the FLN blamed the 
French, and the Algerian population apparently believed the accusation because of the 
government’s lack of credibility.11 
Example. Leadership involves setting the example, and conduct consistent with values can 
win respect and garner support and thereby cut off support for terrorism. Stansfield Turner 
addressed leadership by example as follows: “Moral leadership can prevail in human relations 
and even in affairs of the world. Such leadership, though, must be by example, not 
exhortation.”12 Respecting human rights at home, and promoting them consistently elsewhere, 
retains the moral high ground, and thus the ability to address human rights problems elsewhere. 
Not maintaining democratic standards causes loss of respect from other countries, and at home.  
Management in Counterterrorism Strategy. Good management is also necessary for an 
effective counterterrorism strategy. Effective management affects every area of counterterrorism 
strategy, including organization and processes, and follow-up to ensure strategy implementation. 
Organization & processes. Governments can ensure that counterterrorism strategy execution 
is efficient and well coordinated. As one example, the U.S. government established fusion 
centers to improve intelligence analysis and dissemination regarding criminal activity including 
terrorism, but obstacles to effective cooperation included incompatible computer systems, 
multiple databases, and the lack of consistent standards and policies.13 As an example of 
streamlining processes, three different U.S. federal agencies had programs to train and equip 
state and local officials to respond to terrorist WMD incidents, and when this caused confusion, 
officials asked the federal government to establish a single federal liaison.14  
Governments can establish organizational processes 
to support strategy execution. To illustrate, in 2002, the 
OSCE established an Annual Security Review 
Conference to provide a framework for improving 
security work undertaken by the OSCE States, and to 
implement and review the strategy to address threats to 
security and stability.15 
Follow-up. Good management requires follow-up on plans and programs, and governments 
can comply with their commitments. After the 9/11 attacks, the UN established new measures 
and rules to combat terrorism, and countries agreed to report on their actions every 90 days; 
however, by January 2003, 13 States had not submitted their first report, and 56 were late in 
submitting further reports.16 
 
                                                 
11 Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism, 1978, 30. 
12 Stansfield Turner, in Stansfield Turner: In His Own Words, 2016, 19. 
13 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines, 2005, 16, 9. 
14 GAO, Combating Terrorism, GAO-01-822, 2001, 90.  
15 OSCE, Tenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 2002. See also OSCE, First Annual Security Review Conference, 
2003, and Review of the Implementation of OSCE Commitments to Prevent and Combat Terrorism, 2003.  
16 U.S. State Dept., “Fact Sheet: New UN Rules Requiring States to Target Terrorism,” Dec. 19, 2001; UNSCR 
1456, 2003. 
Peace is a process requiring mutual 
restraint and practical arrangements.  
– Gerald Ford, address at the signing of 
the Helsinki Final Act, Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), Aug. 1, 1975 




   
Sustained Leadership and Management. After a strategy has been developed and adopted, 
governments can sustain counterterrorism efforts. Crises engage governments, and a government 
may respond to a terrorist “spectacular” with a spike of activity, but terrorism’s characteristics  
can make it difficult to maintain sustained 
attention. Terrorist attacks are usually 
sporadic, and the passage of time between 
them may reduce attention, particularly after 
the shock of an attack fades and day-to-day 
problems press. After the 9/11 attacks in 
September 2001, 46 percent of Americans 
identified terrorism as the nation’s most 
pressing problem, but twelve years later, in 
April 2013 (before the Boston Marathon 
bombing), that percentage had decreased to 
less than 1 percent (Fig. 6–6).17 But a form 
of political violence to which governments 
may respond with war, such as after the 9/11 attacks, demands a comprehensive and sustained 
counterterrorism strategy.  
Conclusion. A comprehensive strategy involves selecting the tools that will prevent attacks, 
and respond effectively to them. An effective counterterrorism strategy requires coordinated and 
sustained strategies at all levels, and cooperation among nations since many aspects of terrorism 
cross international borders. Good strategy, leadership, and management combine to create the 








Democracies can control terrorism, limit the destructive effects of terrorist attacks, and defeat 
terrorists. To do so requires understanding what terrorism really is; the development of a 
counterterrorism policy in keeping with the overall goals of the democratic State; and a 
comprehensive, sustained strategy to execute the policy. A statement by Admiral Stansfield 
Turner can summarize the issue of terrorism and democracy: 
 
Terrorists are not invincible—in time, all terrorist groups have been suppressed. One flaw in 
terrorism is that it is an inhumane, uncivilized practice—indiscriminate killing is basically 
unacceptable to all societies, and in time they will close in. The secret of dealing with terrorism 
lies in selecting the mixture of options that will have the greatest impact on terrorists while 
minimizing intrusions into democratic values. Many countervailing strengths come from the very 
fact that we have democratic systems. But that means we need public understanding of our 
options for curtailing terrorism, and the wisdom to avoid actions that might undermine the 




                                                 
17 Juliet Eilperin and Aaron C. Davis, “Worry About Attacks Has Faded Since 9/11,” Washington Post, April 17, 2013. 
18 Stansfield Turner: In His Own Words, 2016; course discussion, “Terrorism & Democracy,” Maryland School of 
Public Policy, 2004, author’s files. 
Fig. 6–6. U.S. Public Perception of Terrorism as a 












Appendix A. Terrorism and Political Violence Models 
 
 
Appendix A contains the primary models used in the monograph, and models relating to 
terrorism and other forms of violence.1 
 
1. Terrorism as a Form of Political Violence. Terrorism 
is a form of political violence; that is, violence used for a 
political purpose. “Political” can be described as “concerned 
with government, the State, or politics,” and political violence 
is used to try to obtain some kind of political change, or to 
prevent political change. Political violence is a large category 
that includes such actions as war, civil war, military strikes, 
insurrection, ethnic conflict, genocide, state terror, and 
terrorism (Fig. A–1). All forms of political violence are 
methods of struggle that can be used alone or with other 
methods to pursue political goals.  
 
 
2. The Terrorist Attack 
 
In a terrorist attack: A nonstate attacker uses violence and the threat of 
violence against noncombatants/property to affect third-parties, and elicit 
responses from them to advance political goals. 
 
The Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model 
illustrates the terrorist attack. The model: 
  specifies that the attackers are nonstate 
actors, 
  includes the actual use of violence, and the 
threat of violence, 
  limits the targets of violence to 
noncombatants and property,  
  illustrates the involvement of third-parties 
(victim-target differentiation), and 




Disagreements regarding terrorism. There have been many disagreements about terrorism. A 
major area of disagreement regarding the attacker has been whether governments and state 
actors should be included. At the UN, the effort to combined nonstate terrorism and state terror 
into one definition hampered agreement on a definition of terrorism for decades.  
 
                                                 
1 Note that in some terrorism models, certain steps of the terrorist attack have been simplified, such as by using the 
terms “targets of violence” or “people/property” instead of “noncombatants/property.” 



















































   
An area of disagreement regarding violence has been whether the threat of violence should be 
included, and which qualities of violence should be included or excluded. There have been 
disagreements regarding the targets of violence (the people/property attacked). One example is 
when and if members of military forces may be considered to be victims and/or noncombatants. 
(The issue of military force can affect the definition of terrorism in a number of ways, such as 
when the laws of war apply to nonstate actors, and who may be considered a noncombatant.) 
Sometimes the victim-target differentiation characteristic (the involvement of third-parties) 
has not been understood or included in a definition. In terms of the political goal, there have 
been disagreements regarding whether acts committed in pursuit of certain goals, such as 
national liberation, should be excluded from being considered as acts of terrorism. But regardless 
of any disagreements about particular aspects of terrorism, the basic strategy that terrorism 
follows does not change. 
 
 
3. The Two Phases of a Terrorist Attack 
 
A terrorist attack can be divided 
into two phases. Phase I is the 
actual violent attack on the targets 
of violence (the people/property 
attacked). Phase II is the 
involvement of third-parties 
through their responses to the 
violent attack. Phase II consists of 
the transmission of the news of the 
attack to third-parties, how the 
news affects them, and the actions 
third-parties take in response to the 




























































































   
4. Victim-Target Differentiation 
 
Victim-target differentiation is a distinctive strategy, and is a key to comprehending terrorism. 
In victim-target differentiation, an attacker uses or threatens violence against one set of targets 
(the people or property attacked) in order to affect third-parties and elicit responses from them 
that advance the attacker’s goals (Fig. A–6). The attackers physically attack or threaten the 
targets of violence (the victims), but are actually aiming at third-parties (Fig. A–7). The attack on 
















Very few forms of violence use the strategy of victim-target differentiation as the primary 
strategy. Terrorism, for example, always uses victim-target differentiation; state terror and some 
common crimes can use victim-target differentiation.  
State Terror. State terror can be described as 
the violence that governments use to 
intimidate, subjugate, and control their own 
populations (or the populations of occupied 
countries/territories), and suppress opposition 
and resistance. The government generally 
perpetrates the violence using state actors and 
official institutions such as the police and 
judiciary. During Stalin’s Great Terror, the 
Soviet government used such means as extra-
judicial killings by the police, rigged show 
trials, and deportations to gulags to frighten the 
general population, and thereby suppress 
opposition to the government and coerce  
compliance. Note that using the apparatus of government can enable state terror to be carried out 
on a massive scale. During World War II, the Soviet Union used mass deportations in occupied 
countries to suppress resistance.  
A primary difference between state terror and terrorism is that in state terror, the government 
is the attacker. Another difference is that government may not use victim-target differentiation in 
state terror—the government may be aiming directly at the victims. 


















































Fig. A–7. Victim-Target Differentiation: 

























   
Common Crimes That Use Victim-Target Differentiation. 
 
Some common crimes use victim-target differentiation. A common crime may involve the 
intent to affect third-parties and elicit responses from them, but these kinds of crimes are not 
terrorism—the primary purpose of the attack is for monetary gain, not for a political goal. 
Several examples follow. 
 
An organized crime group that damages one 
shop as a warning to other shopkeepers to pay 
“protection money” is using victim-target 
differentiation. The violence is directed 
against one target, but is actually aimed at 
other targets, and is intended to elicit 
responses from them. These kinds of acts are 
common crimes, not terrorism. As can be seen 
in Fig. A–9, the purpose of the attack is 





A drug cartel attack on a political leader in 
order to preserve an environment in which the 
cartel can conduct illicit activities involves 
victim-target differentiation, but is not 
terrorism. The attack is aimed at third-parties 
and is intended to affect the political system, 







Street gangs sometimes use victim-target 
differentiation in attacks. Violence to 
intimidate a neighborhood is an example. 
These attacks are not terrorism even though 
they are meant to terrorize (elicit fear). The 
attacks are intended to further non-political 
goals, such as maintaining an environment in 
which drugs can be sold freely and without 
competition, and the primary purpose of these 
attacks is monetary gain. (Gangs may use 
violence for emotional reasons, such as for the 
feeling of being powerful, but these attacks 
would not be terrorism either.) 
Fig. A–10. Drug Cartel Attack to 






































6. and elicit 












Fig. A–9. Organized Crime Group Attack 
to Intimidate Shop Owners 
 










6. and elicit 
















   
Common Crimes That Do Not Use Victim-Target Differentiation. 
 
 
Most common crimes do not involve victim-
target differentiation—note the absence of 
victim-target differentiation in a mugging. In 
this kind of ordinary robbery, the objective is 
monetary gain, not responses from third-








An area that has sometimes caused confusion is the 
perpetration of common crimes by terrorist groups 
in order to gain resources with which to conduct 
attacks (see example of a robbery to gain the funds 
needed to perpetrate terrorist attacks). These kinds 
of crimes—sometimes called “precursor crimes” or 
“auxiliary criminal activity”—are not acts of 
terrorism. Though the crimes, such as bank 
robbery, may be perpetrated for a political goal, 
there is no victim-target differentiation. Victim-
target differentiation must be present for an 
incident to be an act of terrorism.  
 
 
Thuggee cult murders were not terrorism. Thuggee 
killings were not used for a political goal, but for 
religious or other non-political purposes, and the 
murders were not generally intended to elicit 
responses from third-parties. 
Fig. A–13. Robbery for Funds to 




































































   
Forms of Political Violence That Do Not Use Victim-Target Differentiation. 
 
Most forms of political violence do not use victim-target differentiation as their primary 
strategy. War, military strikes, and sabotage are examples. War and military strikes use a 
 direct strategy to try to achieve a political goal 
(Figures A–15 and A–16), and do not involve 
victim-target differentiation. Unlike terrorism, 
in war, the attackers are state actors, and 
military force is legal when used in accordance 
with the laws of war. (See Appendix D for other 
differences between war and terrorism.)  
Sabotage does not usually involve victim-
target differentiation (Fig. A–17). In sabotage, 
the attackers do not generally use violence to 
elicit third-party responses—the property 















Victim-Target Differentiation as Compared to a Direct Political Violence Strategy. 
Victim-target differentiation uses an indirect strategy. Fig. A–18 compares the direct strategy 
used in a military strike with the indirect victim-target differentiation strategy used in terrorism. 
 
 
Fig. A–18. Direct Use of Violence Compared to Victim-Target Differentiation 
 
1. Direct Strategy:          X                                           X                                                    X                   
Example:                     Attacker           Uses               Targets                                    To Achieve the 
Military Strike                                Military Force                                                 Attacker’s Political Goal  
                                                            Against 
                                                                                                                                                                   
2. Victim-Target            X                                            X                                                     X  
Differentiation           Attacker           Uses               Targets                                            Attacker’s 
(Indirect Strategy)                          Violence         of Violence                                     Political Goal 
Example:                                            Against            (victims)                   X 
Terrorism                                                                                To Affect Third-Party Targets,  
                                                                                                   Who Are Intended to Take 
                                                                                                   Actions That Advance the   
























































   
5. Third-Party Targets 
 
In attacks, terrorists aim at a number of 
third-parties at the same time (Fig. A–
19). Categories of third-party targets 
can include governments, groups, 
organizations, the media, and members 
of the public (domestic and 
international). 
  Terrorists may view their third-party 
targets in terms of whether those targets 
are “supporters,” “neutrals,” and 
“opponents” of the terrorists’ political 
goal. Terrorists can classify the media 
in those terms as well. Third-party 
targets can be shown in a range of how 




Fig. A–20. The Range of Third-Party Targets 
 
 
     <------ Supporters  <------------->   Neutrals  <-------------->  Opponents -------> 
 
<----------|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------|----------> 
        Supporters       Potential             Uncommitted/          Potential       Opponents 
                               Supporters            Unconcerned          Opponents 
 
 
The media has a unique role in the process of a terrorist attack because it is involved in two 
ways. First, the media is the primary means by which the news of an attack is transmitted to 
third-parties (Fig. A–21). Second, the media is itself an important third-party target because 













































Supporters ↔ Neutrals ↔ Opponents 
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Supporters ↔ Neutrals  ↔  Opponents
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6. The Process of Eliciting Responses 
 
Terrorists use a number of “mechanisms” to try 
to elicit desired responses from third-party 
targets (Fig. A–23). Some mechanisms involve 
pressure, such as attempts to coerce third-parties 
into responding as terrorists intend; other 
mechanisms are intended to elicit voluntary 
responses, such as actions that may be inspired 
by attacks. Terrorists may use these mechanisms 
against any kind of third-party target, such as to 
intimidate opponents and supporters. But 
terrorists cannot force responses—they can only 
try to set the desired train of events in motion, 
and manipulate third-party responses toward a 




Fig. A–24. Selected Emotions and Responses That Terrorists Seek to Elicit 
                 
          <--------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|---------> 
                Supporters              Potential          Uncommitted/         Potential       Opponents 
                                              Supporters         Unconcerned        Opponents   
   
             Satisfaction;              Desire to          Interest; Fear;         Shock; Horror; Anxiety; Fear; 
      Glee; Greater fervor    support or join        Sympathy           Anger; Outrage; Vengefulness 
     
        More donations;         Become active       Choose sides;            Overreact; Retaliate in kind; 
           New Recruits            supporters       Give political support        Give in to demands 
 
Contribute to Advancing a Political Goal 
 
  
There can be interactions among third-party responses (Fig. A–25). For example, glee 
expressed by supporters after an attack can contribute to the rage of opponents, and thus 
strengthen their impulse to overreact. (And an overreaction can benefit terrorists.) 
 
 
Fig. A–25. Example of Interplay of Responses to Terrorist Attacks 
                 
 <-------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------> 
      Supporters         Potential         Uncommitted/        Potential       Opponents 
                                Supporters         Unconcerned        Opponents   
 
 
                   Glee                                                                        Shock; Horror; Anxiety; Fear; 
                                                                                                   Anger; Outrage; Vengefulness 
     
 
                                                                                                       Overreact; Retaliate in kind 
           
 
Contribute to Advancing a Political Goal 
 


























   
7. The “Effectiveness” and Leverage of Terrorism 
 
 



















From the terrorist perspective, the effectiveness of terrorist attacks lies primarily in 
whether or not third-party responses advance the attacker’s political goal, and how much 
those responses move the terrorists closer to their goal (Fig. A–26). The actual physical 
damage caused in Phase I, such as the destruction of a building, may contribute to the 
attackers’ political goal, but in the main, third-party responses can advance terrorist goals 
much more than the actual physical destruction. 
 
Terrorists and third-parties “control” 
different parts of the terrorist attack. 
Terrorists control most aspects of Phase 
I, the violent attack on the targets of 
violence (the people/property attacked). 
Third-parties control most aspects of 
Phase II, in particular their responses to 
an attack (and note that many third-
party responses are focused on the need 
to prevent future attacks). Terrorists 
cannot control who hears about an 
attack, how the news affects them, or 
how these third-parties respond. 
Terrorists try to manipulate these 
responses, but third-parties can refuse 
to be manipulated. Third-parties may  
think that they must take certain responses, and there may be strong pressures to respond in 
certain ways, but third-parties have control of their responses—what they do is their decision. 
Fig. A–26. The “Effectiveness” of Terrorism 
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The Leverage of Terrorism 
 
The “leverage of terrorism” is the tendency for 
third-party responses to be greater than the damage 
done to the targets of violence (the people/property 
attacked). From the terrorist point of view, the 
leverage of terrorism can increase the 
“effectiveness” of terrorist attacks. For example, if 
third-parties make mistakes in their responses, 
overreact, or overspend, terrorists can benefit. 
   The leverage of terrorism can be seen in the ratio 
between terrorist expenses to perpetrate attacks, 
the cost of the physical damage from the attack, 
and the cost of third-party responses. The 9/11 
attacks can illustrate. Al Qaeda spent an estimated 
$400,000–$500,000 to perpetrate the 9/11 attacks, 
which killed nearly 3,000 people and caused an 
estimated $34 billion in immediate damage.2 But 
in responding to the attacks, the U.S. government 
spent more than $1 trillion over the rest of the 
decade, according to some estimates.3 Based on 
$34 billion as the cost of the immediate damage, 
and $1 trillion as the cost of U.S. government 
responses, every dollar that al Qaeda spent to 
perpetrate the attack caused $68,000 in damage, 
and the U.S. government spent $2 billion in 
responding.  
   The major sources of the leverage of terrorism 
come from who the attacker is, the kind of violence 
used, and who the victims are. There are a number 
of reasons for strong third-party responses. To 
illustrate, the fact that the attackers have arrogated 
to themselves the “right” to use violence can 
infuriate people. An attack using indiscriminate 
violence may injure children, and thereby provoke 
intense emotions in third-parties. The 
deliberateness of the intent to injure can shock and 
enrage third-parties.  
 
                                                 
2 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 169. The $34 billion estimate was for the 
immediate damage as measured by destroyed property, and victim compensation. The indirect costs were much 
higher. See Dick K. Nanto, 9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs, CRS RS21937, Oct. 5, 2004, 2.  
3 See, for example, Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 
9/11, CRS RL33110, Sept. 28, 2009, summary; Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Iraq War Will Cost Us 
$3 Trillion, and Much More,” Washington Post, March 9, 2008.  


































Fig. A–29. The Economic Leverage of 
Terrorism: U.S. Government Responses 
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8. The Threat from Terrorism 
 
The major threat from terrorism 
lies in two areas. The first area is 
the damage that may be done to the 
targets of violence. This damage 
may be considerable, such as 
injuries and loss of life, and the 
destruction of property. The second 
area is the damage that third-
parties may do in their responses to 
attacks. Of the two areas, the 
greater potential for damage 
generally lies in the responses of 
third-parties. Several factors 
contribute to this greater potential. 
Third-party targets that terrorists  
aim at may include governments, organizations, populations, and groups, and thus can involve 
large numbers of people. These third-party targets—governments in particular—are able to 
respond in considerable ways, and if these responses are poor, the damaging effects (including 
self-damaging effects) can be magnified.  
The tendency for third-party responses to be disproportional when compared to the damage 
done in an attack also contributes to the threat involved with third-party responses. For example, 
the qualities of terrorist violence, and the selection of the targets of violence, can contribute to 
the intensity of responses. To illustrate, if children are attacked, third-party responses are likely 
to be intense.  
 
Terrorists generally have the 
initiative in such areas as when, 
where, and how attacks occur, and 
who or what is attacked. Terrorists 
decide which targets they will 
attack, what means they will use to 
perpetrate attacks, and how much 
damage they intend to do. (Note 
that potential third-party targets can, 
to some degree, affect terrorist 
decisions regarding which targets to 
attack—for example, physical 
security measures can deter 
terrorists from selecting protected 
targets to attack. But the choice still 
belongs to the terrorists.) Therefore, 
terrorists generally control most  
aspects of the damage done to the targets of violence. Third-parties, however, control most of 
any damage that may result from responses to attacks (third-parties choose whether or not to 
respond, and how to respond). 
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9. The Cause of Terrorism: The Decision to Use Terrorism 
 
 
The cause of terrorism is the decision to use 
terrorism as a method to pursue a goal. 
Decisionmakers consider what tools to use 
to pursue their political goal, and decide to 
use terrorism—for whatever reason—and 
either perpetrate the attack themselves or 
direct others to conduct the attack. (The use 
of terrorism is a choice, and there are 
always alternatives to terrorism.) 
As can be seen in Figures A–33, 34, and 
35, terrorism uses an indirect strategy to 
pursue a political goal. Instead of pursuing 
their goal directly, terrorists choose the 
asymmetrical and complex strategy of 
attacking targets of violence in order to 
“get” third-parties to take actions that will 
advance the attackers’ political goal.  
 
Groups can choose a direct strategy to pursue their political goals, such as voting, or an 













Voting illustrates a direct strategy to  
pursue a political goal: voters go to  
polls and vote, and thus try to achieve  






Fig. A–35. Direct & Indirect Methods 
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Fig. A–34. The Decision to Pursue 
Political Change Through Voting 













Fig. A–33. The Decision to Pursue Political 
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10. Responding to Terrorist Attacks 
 
 
Third-party actions to respond to attacks 
primarily involve measures that focus on 
the attackers, and responses that affect the 
political goal. Primary third-parties 
include governments, organizations, 









Media actions can affect how third-party 
targets respond to attacks, and help third-
parties take effective actions—actions 
that are detrimental to terrorists, and are 
not self-damaging. Many third-party 
responses harm the third-parties 
themselves, and terrorists often intend for 
these responses to harm and weaken their 
opponent-third-parties.  
Note that the media affects many 
aspects of the terrorist attack, in both 
response and prevention. As can be seen 
in Fig. A–37, the media is an actual third-
party target and the medium by which 
news of attacks is usually transmitted to  
other third-party targets. The actions of the media can affect the attackers, and affect third-
parties. The media have a unique involvement in the process of a terrorist attack, and in 
responding to, and the prevention of terrorist attacks. 





Supporters ↔ Neutrals ↔ Opponents 
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Fig. A–36. Responding to Terrorist Attacks 














    




   
11. Preventing Terrorist Attacks 
 
 
The prevention of terrorist attacks 
primarily involves measures that 
focus on the attacker, the violence 
used, and the targets of violence. 
These are the three areas of Phase I of 
a terrorist attack. Examples are 
measures to prevent potential recruits 
from joining terrorist groups; 
controlling the means of violence, 
such as through the arms control 
regime; and using physical security 
measures to protect potential targets 
of violence. 
 
The prevention of terrorist attacks 
includes measures to deter and 
dissuade potential attackers and 
decisionmakers who may decide to 
select terrorism as a method of 
struggle. Third-party responses that 
do not advance the attackers’ goals 
can affect groups’ future decisions to 
adopt, or continue to use, terrorism as 






Media actions can affect the attackers 
themselves. For example, media 
criticism of terrorist attacks can affect 
terrorist groups’ future choices 
regarding the methods they will select 
to pursue their goals. Terrorists seek 
legitimacy, and media criticism can 
help dissuade groups from choosing 
to use terrorism.  
 
Fig. A–39. Deter & Dissuade the Decision 
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Appendix B. Construction of the Definition of Terrorism 
 
Appendix Outline 
I. The Characteristics of Terrorism 
II. The Characteristics of Terrorism and Its Definition 
 
 
I. The Characteristics of Terrorism 
 
In their definitions, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and scholars have 
identified many characteristics that can apply to terrorism and the qualities of terrorist violence. 
To illustrate, in the early 1980s, Alex Schmid analyzed 109 definitions of terrorism, and 
identified twenty-two definitional elements as shown in Table B–1.1 Other definitions have  
included additional characteristics. 
Many of the characteristics identified 
apply to all terrorist attacks; others 
apply only to some attacks; and a few 
are not characteristics, but 
descriptions of terrorism.*  
The Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism 
Model can aid in analyzing these 
characteristics of terrorism, and 
identifying which must be included in 
a definition, which are optional, and 
which must not be included. Accurate 
and useful definitions of terrorism can 








* A number of the definitions 
quoted in this appendix contain 
characteristics that should not be 
included in an accurate definition 
of terrorism, but the definitions 
have provided important 
perspectives that contribute to the 
overall understanding of terrorism. 
 
                                                 
1 Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 76–77. 
Table B–1. Frequencies of Definitional Elements 









   
Phase I Characteristics 
 
Nonstate Perpetrator of the Violence. The characteristic that the attacker is a nonstate actor is 
essential to an accurate definition of terrorism, and a definition that does not specify the nonstate 
perpetrator of the violence is inaccurate. The 
nonstate characteristic excludes actions by States 
and official state actors. The definition of terrorism 
must be limited to the acts of private individuals 
and groups, and certain acts of unofficial state 
actors such as clandestine state agents. The use of 
force and political violence by States and official 
state actors are not acts of terrorism but other 
forms of political violence such as war, war 
crimes, and state terror.  
Some definitions use such terms as “substate,” 
“subnational,” or “nongovernmental” to express 
the nonstate characteristic of the attacker.2 These  
terms are accurate and exclude the official actions of States; however, “nonstate” may be the 
clearest. People may see “substate” and “subnational” as implying that a terrorist group is 
confined to one country, when in fact some groups have been transnational with cells in a 
number of countries.  
If a definition uses general terms such as “individuals” or “groups” without specifying 
“nonstate,” the definition might be interpreted as including the actions of state actors. For 
example, if a soldier deliberately attacks noncombatants, that is a war crime, not terrorism 
(soldiers are state actors).  
The designation of groups that use terrorism along with other major methods can be 
problematic, for some political groups may work to build political parties and create a support 
base by providing health and educational services, but also conduct terrorist attacks. Defining a 
“terrorist group” as any group “practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice” 
international terrorism, requires that these kinds of groups be identified as terrorist groups.3 
Individuals vs. groups. Some 
definitions specify that the attackers 
must be part of a group, and not an 
individual operating alone (see 
example in box).4 These definitions 
may include the point that there must 
be some kind of organizational  
structure. However, the definition must not exclude individuals, for people have perpetrated 
terrorist attacks while working alone. Eric Rudolph, who bombed the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta 
and perpetrated other terrorist attacks, was not part of a group.  
 
                                                 
2 For example, the U.S. State Department used “subnational”—see Patterns of Global Terrorism reports.  
3 22 USCS § 2656f(d) (1987), and numerous U.S. State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism reports.  
4 G. Bouthoul, quoted in Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 128, 129 (italics added).  
























Inaccurate exclusion of individuals: [Terrorism has a] 
clandestine nature: terrorist actions are the work of small 
and very secret groups…. Terrorism attempts to act in 
secrecy: the anonymous, unidentifiable threat creates huge 
anxiety, and the terrorist tries to spread fear by contagion, to 
immobilize and subjugate those living under this threat. 
 





   
Qualifiers pertaining to groups. The definition of terrorism must not qualify groups in terms 
such as “small,” “secret,” “clandestine” or “conspiratorial” (see example in box).5 Most terrorist 
attacks have, in fact, been perpetrated by 
small, secret, clandestine, and conspiratorial 
groups, but not all. For example, some 
groups have been large, with several 
thousand members. Similarly, groups may 
not be clandestine—even though attacks are  
usually performed in a clandestine way, the groups themselves may not be secret. Hamas, for 
example, conducted both political activity and terrorist attacks.  
In addition, qualifiers regarding types or subsets of terrorism cannot be included. For 
example, international terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism are types (that is, sub-types) of 
terrorism. The basic definition of terrorism should be determined first—then other types of 
terrorism can be defined. 
Clandestine state agents. A definition that excludes clandestine state agents would be 
incorrect; however, the term does not need to be specifically stated in the definition as long as 
the category is included as nonstate actors. The omission of clandestine state agents excludes 
acts that should be considered terrorist attacks. States that use clandestine state agents are trying 
to hide the government’s involvement, and when an attack occurs it is seldom known whether or 
not the perpetrator is a state or nonstate actor.  
Some attacks perpetrated by clandestine state agents have been 
widely considered to be terrorist attacks. As one example, in 1989 
a bomb planted by alleged Libyan state agents on board UTA 
Flight 772 exploded as the plane was in flight, killing everyone on 
board. In a letter to the UN, France called the attack a “terrorist 
act.”6 The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 is another 
example. Even after Libyan state agents were directly implicated 
in the bombing, the attack was still seen as an act of terrorism. 
Note that violence perpetrated by clandestine state agents may or may not be terrorism 
depending on the circumstances. For example, a government sending clandestine agents to 
assassinate political leaders of another country may not be an act of terrorism. A 1983 North 
Korean attack on South Korean officials visiting Rangoon can illustrate. In that attack, North 
Korean agents killed a number of senior South Korean officials, and though the goal was 
political, the attack was not aimed at third-party targets. The primary purpose of the attack was to 
weaken the South Korean government, not to provoke third-party responses. The attack did not 
involve victim-target differentiation—the targets of the violence were the target.  
As another example, the Libyan government conducted assassination campaigns against 
dissidents abroad, and in 1980 alone murdered eleven Libyan exiles.7 These murders can be 
considered to be state terror: the attacker was the State. The attacks involved victim-target 
differentiation in that the primary intent was to suppress domestic opposition to the regime (the 
primary third-party targets were other dissidents and the Libyan population).  
 
                                                 
5 D. Della Porta, in Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988, 37 (italics added). 
6 Letter dated 20 December 1991 from France to the UN Secretary-General, S/23306, Dec. 31, 1991.  
7 CIA, Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, 9. 
Inaccurate focus on group qualifiers: Terrorism 
is the action of clandestine political organizations, 
of small dimensions, which try to reach political 
aims through a continuous and almost exclusive 





UTA Flight 772, 1989 
 
 





   
State actors (state terror) and nonstate actors (terrorism) in one definition. An accurate 
definition of terrorism cannot include state terror (see a proposed definition of international 
terrorism by a group of nonaligned nations at the UN), for state terror and nonstate terrorism are  
two separate forms of political violence.8 Bruce 
Hoffman described the difference between state terror 
and terrorism thus: “State-sanctioned or explicitly 
ordered acts of internal political violence directed 
mostly against domestic populations—that is, rule by 
violence and intimidation by those already in power 
against their own citizenry—are generally termed 
‘terror’ in order to distinguish that phenomenon from 
‘terrorism,’ which is understood to be violence  
committed by nonstate entities.”9 The word “terrorism” has had different meanings in history; 
however, by 1972 a UN report noted that most people associated the term with certain kinds of 
violent actions carried out by individuals and groups, not States: “While at first it applied mainly 
to those acts and policies of Governments which were designed to spread terror among a 
population for the purpose of ensuring its submission to and conformity with the will of those 
Governments, it now seems to be mainly applied to actions by individuals, or groups of 
individuals.”10  
There have been efforts to combine state terror and terrorism into one definition, for a number 
of reasons. One reason was to keep a focus on state terror, which during the 20th century caused 
far more deaths and destruction than terrorism.11 
But the differences between state terror and nonstate terrorism are very large. Terrorist groups 
and governments differ greatly in the threats they can pose, the level and kinds of resources that 
they have access to, methods of operation, and goals.  
States can pose much greater threats than nonstate actors (which terrorist groups are) because 
of the power and resources that States control. States can marshal the resources of a country to 
conduct political violence on a scale that few nonstate groups can match, particularly terrorist 
groups, which are usually small, secretive groups capable of only sporadic action. For example, 
though terrorist groups may “declare war” as al Qaeda did in 1996, they cannot prosecute a war 
as a government can. Al Qaeda’s violence consisted of intermittent attacks that killed many 
people, but wars have killed millions. 
States have tools and methods that are not available to nonstate actors. States control the 
apparatus of government to include the military and security forces, and therefore, to execute a 
policy of state terror, governments can use such means as the intelligence services and secret 
police, mass arrests, deportations, and imprisonment in labor camps—methods not available to 
 
                                                 
8 Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/9028, Supp. (18 Dec. 1973), Annex, in Bassiouni, 
International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 138 (italics added). 
9 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2006, 15–16. 
10 Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/C.6/418 (2 Nov. 1972), para. 7, in Bassiouni, 
International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 94. Note that the word 
“terrorism” (terrorisme) originally referred to state terror during the Reign of Terror in France.  
11 Walter Laqueur pointed out that “acts of terror carried out by police states and tyrannical governments, in general, 
have been responsible for a thousand times more victims and more misery than all actions of individual terrorism 
taken together.” Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 146. Pakistan called state 
terror “the most ignoble form of terrorism”—see Report of the Secretary-General, Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/55/179 (2000), para. 56. 
Inaccurate combination of state and 
nonstate attackers: [Terrorism includes] 
acts of violence and other repressive acts 
by colonial, racist and alien regimes against 
peoples struggling for their liberation [and] 
acts of violence committed by individuals 
or groups of individuals which endanger or 
take innocent human lives or jeopardize 
fundamental freedoms. 
 





   
terrorists. Governments can “legalize” state terror by passing laws or declaring a state of 
emergency, whereas terrorists deliberately break laws. (Note too that terrorist groups generally 
work in secret, whereas state terror may be overt in order to intimidate a population.) 
There is a significant difference between the political responsibilities of governments and 
nonstate actors. Governments have responsibilities regarding their populations that nonstate 
groups do not have, even when groups aspire to become the government. 
States interact with each other through the structure and process of the international system, in 
which terrorist groups are not primary participants.12 States generally conduct their relations 
through such means as diplomatic representatives, which nonstate actors do not have, and 
through intergovernmental organizations, in which terrorist groups are not members. Thus when 
dealing with nonstate groups, States cannot use many of the methods of international relations.  
The differences between state terror and nonstate terrorism are so significant that it is 
counterproductive to try to combine them. To illustrate, the effort to combine nonstate terrorism 
and state terror into one definition was an obstacle that prevented agreement on a definition at 
the UN for decades, and thereby hampered international counterterrorism efforts. Even after the 
9/11 attacks, the issue of including state terror was a major obstacle at the UN to obtaining 
agreement on a definition. The majority of States that supported a common definition of 
terrorism wanted the definition to apply only to individuals and groups, but other States wanted 
to include state terror, and exclude actions by national liberation movements.13 
There are practical reasons to keep state terror and nonstate terrorism separate. Officials 
responsible for managing security problems and protecting people need to have separate 
categories of security threats to do their jobs effectively. It would not be effective, for example, 
for counterterrorism specialists to monitor terrorism and state terror, or for law enforcement 
officers to focus on terrorist cells and government actions against their own populations. 
Counterterrorism expert Paul Pillar addressed this issue as follows: “Security issues…have their 
own communities to deal with them, both inside and outside government. The relationships 
between different security issues must be noted and analyzed, but that does not mean expanding 
the concept of an issue beyond workable limits. Counterterrorist specialists have enough on their 
plates without, say, weighing into debates on ballistic missile defense.”14  
As two different forms of political violence, state terror and nonstate terrorism need to be kept 
separate to reduce confusion about terrorism, and thereby deprive terrorists of the confusion that 
helps them to deceive people. If the term “terrorism” is applied to such actions as state terror, 
nuclear war, conventional war, guerilla attacks, insurrection, and nonstate terrorism, then the 
term means little more than violence in a political context and therefore refers to nothing 
specific. It is vital that political violence in general is not labeled as terrorism—this may 
exaggerate the threat and result in overreaction and unwise countermeasures. 
Not maintaining the distinction between state and nonstate actors provides the opportunity to 
try to label countries as “terrorist” for international actions. An example is calling the United 
States a “terrorist State,” as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez did.15 This kind of statement can 
 
                                                 
12 In the international legal system, States are usually considered to be the only holders of full legal personality, and 
therefore formally entitled to participate fully and equally with other holders of full legal personality in the processes 
of customary international law.  
13 Schmid, “Terrorism—The Definitional Problem,” 2004, 388.  
14 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, 15. 
15 “Press Conference by President of Venezuela,” UN, Sept. 15, 2005.  





   
aid terrorists by increasing confusion regarding what terrorism is and is not. States can break 
international law, such as by interstate aggression, but those acts are not terrorism. UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that it was “time to set aside debates” in this area because 
“the use of force by States is already thoroughly regulated under international law.”16  
To try to combine state terror and nonstate terrorism into one definition (and one form of 
political violence) results in analytic inaccuracy, and what can be more serious, inaccurate 
countermeasures. Including state terror in the definition of terrorism distracts from what 
policymakers most need to know, which is how to combat the threats that nonstate terrorist 
groups pose—threats that are different from those that state terror poses. The definition of 
terrorism needs to be limited to nonstate actors. 
“Container terms.” Sometimes when parties could not agree on a definition, ambiguous 
definitions of terrorism have been used to allow for discussion, counterterrorism efforts, and  
different interpretations (see example in 
box).17 The phrase “terrorism in all its forms 
and manifestations” was sometimes used at 
the UN as a “container term” when member 
States could not agree on whether or not the 
definition of terrorism should include certain 
aspects, such as the inclusion of both 
nonstate terrorism and state terror in one 
definition.18 These kinds of terms and  
phrases cannot be used in an accurate definition because they are vague and refer to no specific 
form of political violence.  
No attacker specified. Some definitions of terrorism do not specify the attackers and omit this 
characteristic (see example in box).19 A definition that omits the attacker is inaccurate because 
the definition is then open to the interpretation that 
the actions of States and state actors may be 
included. A definition that does not specify the 
attackers is also ambiguous, and would need further 
clarification when creating a record or database of 
terrorist attacks.  
Omitting the attacker may be seen as providing 
political flexibility; for example, by giving a  
government leeway regarding whether or not to list a country as a state sponsor of terrorism. 
However, this kind of flexibility has drawbacks. One is that a government may be open to 
charges of hypocrisy if standards are not applied consistently, such as if one act is called 
terrorism and a similar act is not, or one group is called a terrorist group and a similar group is 
not. Another drawback is that the omission of the attacker opens the way to blurring what 
terrorism is.  
 
                                                 
16 UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, In Larger Freedom, 2005, para. 91. 
17 UNSCR 1456, 2003 (italics added).  
18 Schmid, “Prevention of Terrorism,” in Bjorgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism, 2005, 224. 
19 28 CFR 0.85 (2005), Title 28--Judicial Administration (italics added). This particular definition could include a 
number of other forms of political violence, such as ethnic conflict, genocide, and some acts during war. 
Inaccurate omission of attacker: 
Terrorism includes the unlawful use of 
force and violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or 
any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives.  
Inaccurate “container term”: [The UN Security 
Council reaffirms] that terrorism in all its forms 
and manifestations constitutes one of the most 
serious threats to peace and security; any acts of 
terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless 
of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever 
committed and are to be unequivocally 
condemned, especially when they indiscriminately 
target or injure civilians. 
 





   
Violence. The term “violence” must be included in a definition of terrorism. Terrorism is a 
form of political violence, and if the characteristic of violence is omitted, the act is not terrorism 
but a different method of struggle. In addition, the 
word “violence” must refer to the use of physical 
power to injure or abuse. For example, physical 
violence by strikers cannot be equated with the 
“violence of unemployment,” as has been argued.20 
The definition must use the word “violence” rather 
than “force” because of the different meanings of the 
two words. Violence can be described as the use of 
physical power to injure or abuse, and force as the use 
of physical power to overcome, restrain, or physically 
coerce. Violence is usually lawful only in specific and 
limited circumstances, but the use of force and 
violence can be legitimate when used properly by authorized individuals. For example, the State 
can legitimately use force to preserve order, enforce the law, and defend against threats. In these 
areas, the State has a presumed monopoly on the use of force, the purpose of which is to contain 
violence and control the use of force by restricting its use to legitimate instances regulated by 
law. (The fact that not all government use of force is legitimate does not negate the principle that the 
use of force should be confined to the State. It does mean, however, that with very few exceptions, 
such as defending from a murder attempt, only States can legitimately use force.) 
The Threat of Violence. A definition of terrorism that does not include the threat of violence 
would be understandable, but not accurate. It might be argued that the threat of violence does not 
need to be included because terrorist attacks by their nature contain an implicit threat of further 
violence. But the threat of further violence is an intrinsic part of the process of a terrorist attack, 
and increases the effect on third-parties. In addition, if the threat of violence is omitted, certain 
acts that should be considered to be terrorist acts would not be included, such as a terrorist group 
credibly threatening to detonate a bomb unless a political demand is met. 
The Qualities of Terrorist Violence. The omission of the qualities of terrorist violence would 
not necessarily make a definition incorrect; however, most of the qualities should not be 
included, and some must not be included. The qualities of terrorist violence are crucial in 
explaining why terrorism has such a strong effect on many third-parties, but the inclusion or 
omission of each quality has effects. Discussion follows regarding a number of qualities of 
terrorist violence. 
Premeditated violence. The omission of the premeditated quality of terrorist violence would 
not necessarily make a definition incorrect because the meaning of the word “violence” involves 
the deliberate intent to injure or abuse, and the political goal implies premeditation. However, 
including “premeditated” has the advantage of clearly excluding certain kinds of actions such as 
accidents, the unintentional collateral damage that may occur during military operations, or a 
momentary impulse of fury. If accidents are not excluded, they may be mislabeled as terrorism, 
 
                                                 
20 Secretary of State George Shultz said that those who would argue that “physical violence by strikers can be 
equated with ‘the violence of unemployment,’ are, in the words of the Economist, ‘a menace to democracy 
everywhere.’” See address, “Terrorism and the Modern World,” U.S. State Department Bulletin, Dec. 1984.  






























   
inadvertently or deliberately. For example, sometimes accidents are deliberately called terrorism 
for political purposes, such as to try to foment dissension within a community.  
Terms such as “deliberate,” “intentional,” “planned,” “calculated,” and “purposeful” all 
express the “premeditated” quality of terrorist violence. However, the term “premeditated” may 
convey most strongly the callousness of terrorist attacks in which people are knowingly and 
indiscriminately injured and killed.  
Unlawful/illegal/illegitimate violence. The omission of the unlawful quality of terrorist 
violence would not necessarily make a definition incorrect, because violence itself is unlawful 
except in certain circumstances. However, including “unlawful” has the advantage of specifically 
excluding legal actions such as the proper use of force and violence by the police. 
“Unlawful” is a more appropriate term than “illegal.” The difference between “legal” and 
“lawful” can be summarized as the “letter of the law” vs. the “spirit of the law.” “Legal” means 
based on or authorized by law, and implies a literal connection or conformity with statute law or 
its administration. “Lawful” is a more general word that suggests conformity to the principle 
rather than the letter of the law.21  
A major drawback of the term “illegal” is the potential for the abuse of the “letter of the law.” 
Governments have passed egregious laws, such as those allowing slavery, and laws passed based 
on some definitions of terrorism could appear to make terrorist attacks legal under domestic law. 
The definition used in the 1999 Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 
Combating International Terrorism can illustrate (see box).22 The inclusion of “all means,” and 
“self-determination and independence 
in compliance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter and resolutions 
of the United Nations” adds a great deal 
of ambiguity. “All means” could be 
interpreted as including terrorism, and it 
is not clear whether “in compliance 
with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and resolutions of the United  
Nations” applies to “all means,”  
“self-determination and independence,” 
or both. International law does not 
permit many of the acts that terrorists 
perpetrate, but if a domestic law was 
passed based on this definition, terrorist 
attacks could be perceived as legal 
during a liberation struggle. 
The terms “criminal” and “extralegal” should not be used. “Criminal” can be subjective, 
both terms would need clarification, and neither term is as accurate and clear as “unlawful.” 
A definition must not characterize the violence as illegitimate. It can be a fact that an act is 
illegal, but calling an act legitimate or illegitimate can be an opinion.  
 
                                                 
21 Note that the term “unlawful” can also mean “shady but within the law.” 
22 Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1999 (italics, 
bold, and underlining added). Regarding this particular definition, how would “imperiling honor” be defined?  
Ambiguous legality: Confirming the legitimacy of the 
right of peoples to struggle against foreign occupation 
and colonialist and racist regimes by all means, 
including armed struggle to liberate their territories and 
attain their rights to self-determination and 
independence in compliance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter and resolutions of the United 
Nations.... “Terrorism” means any act of violence or 
threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions 
perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective 
criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or 
threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, 
freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment 
or any facility or public or private property to hazards or 
occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national 
resource, or international facilities, or threatening the 
stability, territorial integrity, political unity or 
sovereignty of independent States. 
 





   
Random violence. The random quality of terrorist violence cannot be included in a definition 
of terrorism because not all terrorist attacks are random. The random quality of terrorist attacks 
can apply in two areas: the selection of the target of violence, and the effects of the violence, and 
an attack may not be random in either area. For example, a terrorist assassination may not be 
random in the selection of the target of violence, or in the effect of the weapon used: a particular 
individual may be the intended victim, and the weapon used may target only that person. 
“Arbitrary” is similar in meaning to “random,” but may not be easy to understand. The term 
“arbitrary” may convey more of the “whim” by which some targets are selected, such as which 
building from among similar buildings terrorists may attack. However, as with “random,” 
“arbitrary” cannot be used because the selection of the targets of violence, or the effects of the 
violence, may be focused, not arbitrary. 
 “Indiscriminate” must not be used because terrorist attacks may be highly discriminate. Many 
terrorist attacks are indiscriminate, such as the effects from a bomb, but not all. For example, in 
a terrorist assassination, the violence may not be indiscriminate. 
Symbolic violence. The symbolic quality of terrorist violence does not apply to all attacks and 
therefore must be omitted. Though the quality is helpful in clarifying how terrorist violence 
affects third-parties, a definition can be both accurate and clear without the term, and its 
inclusion could lengthen the definition unnecessarily and make it more difficult to understand.  
The terms “demonstration” and “demonstration effect” have sometimes been used in lieu of 
“symbolic,” but can limit a definition unacceptably. Not all terrorist attacks are intended as a 
demonstration—many attacks are used for other purposes such as coercion and provocation.  
Unpredictable violence. The unpredictable, erratic, or sporadic qualities of terrorist violence 
must not be included in a definition. Terrorism often relies for its effect on unpredictability, for if 
attacks are systematic, they may become expected and have less effect on people (who may 
become fatalistic or inured to violence). However, the quality of unpredictability must not be 
included in a definition because not all attacks are unexpected. For example, the selection of 
targets may be somewhat predictable during a spiral of terrorist attacks between two 
communities. In other instances, there may be warnings, such as bomb threats.  
Extranormal violence. Some definitions include that the violence is “extranormal,” “ruthless,” 
“unacceptable,” “abnormal,” or “amoral,” and these qualities must not be included in any 
definition of terrorism (see example in box).23 First, the 
kinds of violence that are considered extranormal, immoral, 
or unacceptable varies with different societies, and has 
changed over time, even within the same societies. At one 
time some U.S. communities considered lynchings to be 
acceptable, and what is regarded as extranormal violence 
in one society may be considered normal in another. Second, “extranormal” can apply to several 
aspects of terrorist violence, such as using an unusual weapon or attacking a location that is 
usually peaceful. Third, the State has a presumed monopoly on the use of force and violence, and 
this presumption implies that no private violence is “normal.”  
A definition must not specify that the attacks occur in environments that are normally 
peaceful, because it is not always the case. Many terrorist attacks have occurred in conditions of 
general violence, especially civil violence such as ethnic conflict.  
 
                                                 
23 Thomas P. Thorton, quoted in CIA, Research Study, 1976, 9 (italics added). 
Inaccurate focus on extranormal 
violence: [Terrorism is] a symbolic 
act designed to influence political 
behavior by extranormal means, 
entailing the use or threat of violence.  
 





   
Serial violence. Some definitions include the need for terrorist acts to be serial or repetitive, 
and this serial quality of terrorist violence must not be included (see example in box).24 First, 
perpetrators sometimes commit only one attack; for  
example, Timothy McVeigh was caught after 
perpetrating one attack (the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing). Second, groups do not always claim 
responsibility for their attacks, so it might not be 
known if a particular act was part of a series. Third, 
an act would not be classified as terrorism until it 
was seen whether or not the attack was part of a  
series. Thus, a bombing might be initially classified as a common crime, but reclassified to a 
terrorist attack later when further bombings established a pattern. Grant Wardlaw noted:  
 
Imagine that a political group possesses a nuclear device and threatens to detonate it unless 
certain demands are acceded to by the government. Imagine further that this is the first act 
on the part of the group. Surely one would not have to wait until the group perpetrated 
another act for the first to be an instance of terrorism.25 
 
Furthermore, waiting for attacks to be part of a series has practical implications in making it 
difficult for security officials to respond effectively. 
Systematic violence. Some definitions use the 
term “systematic” (see example in box), but this 
term must not be used.26 Terrorist attacks are 
systematic in that they are deliberately planned, 
but the term can have other implications such as 
that attacks are methodical, repetitive, or serial, 
which not all terrorist attacks are. An attack may 
not be methodical, but somewhat haphazardly planned, and sometimes the means of violence 
misfire, blow up the attacker, or hit the wrong targets. In addition, a terrorist group may perpetrate 
only one attack, and therefore the attack is not systematic in the sense of a “process” (except in 
the sense that “systematic” implies premeditation).  
Secretive/clandestine/surreptitious violence. Some definitions specify that the means used 
must be secretive, clandestine, or surreptitious (see example in box using “surreptitious”  
means).27These qualities of terrorist 
violence must not be included because even 
though most terrorist attacks involve 
clandestine violence, this is not always the 
case. Sometimes a bomb threat warns that a 
particular building is going to be attacked,  
and even though the location of the bomb may be concealed, the attack is not. At other times, the 
violence may be overt, and not secretive, such as a threat to harm hostages.  
 
                                                 
24 Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 1998, 2 (italics added). 
25 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 1989, 13. 
26 H. W. Tromp, quoted in Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 146 (italics added). 
27 J. Mallin, quoted in Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 136 (italics added). 
Inaccurate focus on the recurrent use of 
violence: [Terrorism is] the recurrent use 
or threatened use of politically-motivated 
and clandestinely organized violence, by a 
group whose aim is to influence a 
psychological target in order to make it 
behave in a way which the group desires.  
Inaccurate focus on secretive violence: Terrorism 
is the threat of violence or an act or series of acts of 
violence effected through surreptitious means by an 
individual, an organization, or a people to further his 
or their political goals.  
 
 
Inaccurate focus on “systematic”: Political 
terrorism [is] the systematic use of violence 
for political ends, directed principally against 
outsiders in a political conflict, with the goal 
of bringing round the actual opponent in that 
conflict to desirable political behavior. 





   
Noncombatants/Property as the Targets of Violence. An accurate designation for the targets 
of violence (the people physically harmed or killed, and the material damaged or destroyed), 
must be included in a definition. The term chosen may 
address people and property separately, or combine 
people and property in one term.  
People and property as the targets of violence. Terms 
that combine both people and property as the targets of 
violence can be accurate. The term “noncombatant 
targets” is accurate because it restricts the targets of 
violence to individuals considered to be in noncombatant 
status, and to noncombatant property. “Noncombatant 
property” is the most precise term to describe property 
as the target of violence because the term includes both 
civilian property and military property during conditions of peace—an example is a military 
installation when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site. However, the term 
“noncombatant property” may not be readily understood, especially by the public.  
Terms such as “property of a civilian nature” or “civilian targets” cannot be used alone 
because military property can be the target of terrorist violence. For example, during peacetime, 
attacks on military installations can be terrorist attacks.  
The term “targets of violence” includes both people and property, but is too general and could 
include targets that must be excluded, such as combatants. In addition, the phrase may not be 
easily understood by the public, and would need explanation and interpretation.  
A definition that does not include property as a target of violence would be understandable 
but not accurate. Therefore the term “property”—or an accurate term that includes both people 
and property such as “noncombatant targets”—must be included. The omission of this 
characteristic would exclude those attacks in which only property was damaged and no people 
were physically harmed, such as the 1998 Vail ski resort attack. Attacks that target only property 
operate in the same way as attacks on people, and are seen as terrorist attacks. 
“People” or “victims” as the targets of violence. Some 
definitions use “people” or “victims” for the individuals who 
are the targets of violence. These terms are more 
understandable than “noncombatants,” but cannot be used 
because they are too general and would need further 
interpretation, such as the status of soldiers off duty. 
“Noncombatant” is the most accurate term for “people” as the 
targets of violence. The term “noncombatant” excludes military 
personnel as targets of violence when they are acting as 
combatants, and includes them as victims in situations in which 
they are considered noncombatants.28 Military personnel can 
be the victims of terrorist attacks, such as the airmen sleeping 
in their quarters in Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, in June 1996.  
 
                                                 
28 A soldier killed or wounded in battle is a casualty, not a victim—DOD defined a casualty as “any person who is 
lost to the organization by having been declared dead, duty status–whereabouts unknown, missing, ill, or injured.” 
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Terrorism cannot be accurately defined by specifying “civilians” as the targets of violence 
(see example in box).29 The term “civilians” has the advantage of being understandable, but is  
problematic in that the term may exclude military 
personnel. For example, members of Queen Elizabeth’s 
Household Cavalry were attacked in July 1982 while 
riding to the Changing of the Guard at Buckingham 
Palace. These soldiers were not acting as combatants in 
this ceremonial situation. 
Some definitions of terrorism use the term “innocents” in lieu of “noncombatants,” but the 
term is misleading and counterproductive, and therefore must not be used (see example in box).30 
The term “innocents” can help terrorists in their deception 
efforts by giving them an opening to argue that certain 
groups or entire populations are “guilty.” But there is no 
legal basis for “group guilt,” and terrorists must not be 
allowed to deceive people by blurring this area. The legal 
concept of “innocence” means the absence of guilt for a specific act, and is a matter to be 
determined through due process, and not by private individuals or groups. But many terrorists 
ascribe “guilt” in any way they choose, including ways so broad as to include almost everyone. 
Terrorists may claim entire populations are “guilty” because they have not acknowledged the 
“justice” of the terrorists’ cause, or that tourists are “guilty” for visiting a certain country. 
Using the term “noncombatant” removes subjectivity regarding “guilt” and “innocence,” and 
deprives terrorists of one means of deception. Using “noncombatant” also removes subjectivity 
regarding any connection between victims and the terrorists’ cause. In some instances terrorists 
may victimize people who are involved in the issues at stake, but at other times attack people 
who are not involved in any way. Victims have rights regardless of whether or not they are 
involved in an issue, rights that terrorists violate.  
Qualifiers regarding property. The targets of 
violence must not be qualified in ways that include 
only certain categories of property (see a U.S. 
Homeland Security definition in box).31 This 
definition excludes all attacks that may injure but 
are not dangerous to human life, and all property 
not classified as “critical infrastructure.” However, 
attacks that injure people without risking their 
lives, and attacks on noncritical infrastructure, can 
be terrorism. Homeland Security may need to 
focus on particular targets, but can use a common,  
basic definition, and then use more specific criteria regarding attacks for agency purposes. 
 
                                                 
29 Boaz Ganor, “Defining Terrorism—Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” www.ict.org (Dec. 
22, 2009) (italics added). 
30 Definition referenced in Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Avon, 1987), 9 
(italics added). P. C. Sederberg noted that the term noncombatants was not “an especially felicitous term,” but was 
nevertheless less loaded than the more common innocents, since “innocence, like beauty, is often in the eye of the 
observer.” See Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 152. 
31 6 USCS § 101 (2005), Title 6. Domestic Security. Chapter 1. Homeland Security Organization (italics added).  
Inaccurate focus on specific property:  
The term “terrorism” means any activity that 
involves an act that is dangerous to human life or 
potentially destructive of critical infrastructure 
or key resources; and is a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State 
or other subdivision of the United States; and 
appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or to 
affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.   
Inaccurate focus on “innocence”: 
Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic 
murder, maiming, and menacing of the 
innocent to inspire fear for political ends. 
 
Inaccurate focus on civilians as the 
targets of violence: Terrorism is the 
intentional use of, or threat to use violence 
against civilians or against civilian targets, 
in order to attain political aims. 
 





   
Definitions That Include Only Phase I of an Attack. Some definitions address only Phase I 
of a terrorist attack, and omit both the involvement of third-parties and the political goal. But 
terrorism cannot be effectively defined only by the act (Fig. B–4). The international community 
used this approach when efforts to agree on a 
definition of terrorism were not successful, and 
prepared conventions that outlawed specific acts such 
as airline hijacking and attacks on diplomats. 
However, this approach cannot be used to define 
terrorism because specific acts of violence can be 
terrorism, another form of political violence, or 
common crime depending on the factors involved. 
Alex Schmid addressed the pitfalls of focusing on 
specific acts of violence as follows: 
 
The drafters of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism…opted for a 
definitional approach which simply enumerated certain specific threatening or violent acts 
which in turn were considered to fall under the mandate of the convention. These acts included 
the unlawful seizure of aircrafts (hijackings), serious offences against diplomatic agents, acts 
of kidnapping and hostage taking and offences involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, 
automatic firearm, or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons. In our view this…is a 
misleading approach. The nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and 
the same act—e.g. a bombing—can be terroristic or not, depending on intention and 
circumstances.32 
 
To illustrate, hijacking an airplane to escape prosecution for a crime is not an act of terrorism, 
whereas hijacking an airplane and demanding a political concession may be terrorism. In 
addition, to list violent acts or threats that constitute terrorist attacks misses the terrorist’s true 
objective, which is to elicit responses that further a political goal. 
For the same reasons, terrorism cannot be accurately 
defined using the laws-of-war/war crime approach (see 
example in box).33 Brian Jenkins described this view as 
follows: “Under the laws-of-war approach, terrorism  
would comprise all acts committed in peacetime that, if committed during war, would constitute 
war crimes.”34 A UN website included the following perspective on the laws-of-war approach:  
 
Terrorism expert A. Schmid [suggested in a 1992 report] that it might be a good idea to take 
the existing consensus on what constitutes a “war crime” as a point of departure. If the core 
of war crimes––deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking, and the killing of prisoners––
is extended to peacetime, we could simply define acts of terrorism as “peacetime equivalents 
of war crimes.”35  
 
                                                 
32 Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 101. 
33 UN, “Definitions of Terrorism,” www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html (Aug. 16, 2005) (italics 
added). (Note: To be an act of terrorism, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by the laws of war (jus in 
bello) as in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and elsewhere. But being outside of the laws of war does not necessarily 
make an incident a terrorist attack.)  
34 Brian M. Jenkins, “Defense Against Terrorism,” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 5 (1986): 779. 
35 UN, “Definitions of Terrorism,” www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html (Aug. 16, 2005).  
Inaccurate definition of terrorism 
as a war crime: Act of Terrorism = 
Peacetime Equivalent of War Crime. 
 
 























   
Schmid noted that there is broad international agreement about what actions are considered to 
be war crimes, and that this agreement could be a basis for defining terrorism.36 However, the 
laws-of-war approach cannot be used to define terrorism. The laws of war address specific acts, 
and these acts can be terrorism or not depending on what factors are involved.37 For example, 
there is no victim-target differentiation in many war crimes, and the deliberate intent to involve 
third-parties is the primary characteristic that makes terrorism a distinct form of political 
violence.  
There are other problems involved in trying to apply the laws of war (which were designed for 
governments) to nonstate actors. Many acts committed by terrorists would, in fact, be war crimes 
if perpetrated by soldiers during armed conflicts. However, when these acts occur during 
peacetime, the illegality of these acts has to be established “first and foremost by reference to the 
national law of States; international treaties on terrorism and related matters; and other relevant 
parts of international law (including parts of the laws of war) that apply in peacetime as well as 
wartime, for example the rules relating to genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain rules 
relating to human rights.”38 In addition, if the laws-of-war approach is used to define terrorism, 
the approach may be seen as accepting the moral right of a group to resort to violence. 
Note that in a definition of terrorism, it would be better not to use phrasing such as that the act 
is “outside of the parameters of the laws of war.” Such statements can be accurate, but do not add 
to the clarity of a definition, for an act can be outside of the laws of war in a number of areas 
such as the attacker, the means of violence, and the targets attacked.  
Definitions That Include Only Phase I of an Attack for a Political Goal. Some definitions 
address only Phase I of an attack and the political goal, and leave out the intent to target third-
parties (Fig. B–5). The 2004 State Department definition can illustrate:  
 
[Terrorism is] premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents.39 
  
The State Department’s definition does not include 
any third-party targets, or the process of impacting 
these targets and getting responses from them. The 
definition could, therefore, include other forms of 
political violence. An example is ethnic conflict, in 
which subnational (nonstate) groups may directly attack 
civilians and property such as houses with the intent to 
destroy rather than to elicit responses from third-parties. 
A definition that does not include victim-target differentiation omits the most distinctive 
terrorism characteristic, which is that the attack is aimed at third-parties in order to obtain 
responses from them. Definitions that leave out this characteristic are likely to include other 
forms of political violence, and therefore cannot effectively define terrorism.  
 
                                                 
36 Alex P. Schmid, “The Problems of Defining Terrorism,” in Crenshaw and Pimlott, eds., International 
Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 1997, 20–21. 
37 For example, war crimes include the murder of civilians and the killing of hostages. See the “Principles of 
International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal,” 1950. 
38 Roberts, “Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War,” Survival (Spring 2002): 8. 
39 U.S. State Dept., Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, 1; 22 USCS § 2656f(d) (2004). 























   
Phase II Characteristics 
 
Affect Third-Parties. A number of definitions include terms that express the ways that an 
attack may affect or impact third-parties, such as “shock,” “stun,” and “create fear.” A definition  
of terrorism that does not include any impact on third-
parties would not necessarily be incorrect, but if this step 
of the terrorist attack is included, it would be better to use 
summarizing terms such as “affect” or “impact.” Listing 
all of the ways that terrorists try to affect third-parties 
would make a definition very long, for the emotions that 
terrorists try to elicit can include fear, shock, outrage, 
rage, vengefulness, interest, elation, excitement, and 
satisfaction. Another drawback to listing many ways is 
that any omission may mislead potential third-party 
targets, and impair their ability to understand how 
terrorists are seeking to elicit responses from them (and also try to trick them). 
Fear. Some definitions over-emphasize one particular effect that attacks can have on third-
parties, especially the intent to arouse fear. These kinds of definitions can be misleading if they  
give the impression that the effect on third-parties is the 
purpose of the attack. An example is a 1974 definition 
of terrorism (see box).40 This particular definition 
includes the political goal, and identifies the public as 
the third-party target, but nearly half of the definition 
focuses on the creation of fear. Any definition that  
focuses primarily on the creation of fear misses two important points. The first is that terrorists 
intend to arouse different feelings in a wide range of third-party targets, such as glee on the part 
of supporters, interest in those who are neutral, and fury on the part of opponents. For example, 
an attack may be intended primarily to enrage opponents in order to provoke them into 
committing an outrage that would take the focus off the terrorists. The opponents may also feel 
fear, but the primary emotion the attackers intend to provoke is anger. And at the same time, the 
attacks are usually intended to elicit enthusiasm in supporters.  
The second point is that the creation of fear—or any emotion—is not the purpose of terrorism. 
The purpose of terrorism is to advance a political goal, and the creation of emotional reactions 
such as fear is a method to elicit responses from third-parties, who are intended to then act in 
ways that advance the terrorists’ political goal.  
The role of fear in terrorism has been often misperceived, and too much emphasis on fear can 
tend to expand the acts that are called terrorism, such as the ordinary crimes street gangs 
perpetrate that cause fear in a community. As Susan Pinto and Grant Wardlaw pointed out, if all 
violent acts that cause fear (terror) are terrorist acts, “the concept of terrorism becomes so 
inflated as to have no analytical or explanatory use at all.”41 
 
                                                 
40 UK definition, quoted in Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988, 34 (italics added). The definition is 
particularly problematic in that it could include a number of forms of political violence such as state terror and some 
acts of war.  
41 Susan Pinto and Grant Wardlaw, Australian Institute of Criminology, Political Violence (Dec. 1989). 
Inaccurate focus on fear: [Terrorism is] 
the use of violence for political ends, and 
includes any use of violence for the 
purpose of putting the public or any 
section of the public in fear. 





























   
Method of communication to third-parties. A definition of terrorism must not overemphasize 
the communication function of terrorism. Examples are statements such as “terrorist acts are  
means of communication” and “[terrorism is] a 
strategy of political communication.”42 These kinds 
of statements are misleading because they express 
only part of what terrorism is. As shown in Fig. B–
7, the communication function is an essential part of 
a terrorist attack, but cannot be used in a definition 
because it overemphasizes one element of an attack. 
An example is the statement, “The immediate 
human victims of violence…serve as message 
generators.”43 This statement is misleading: victims 
can “serve” several functions, including that of a 
“message generator,” but their primary function is 
to serve as a “response-generator.” Terrorism is  
intended to elicit responses, and the communication aspect serves this purpose. 
Some definitions use variations of “to send a 
message” as the purpose of attacks (see example in 
box).44 However, the phrase “to send a message” 
does not express that terrorists want action as a 
result of third-parties having received a message. In 
addition, terrorists are not trying to send “a” 
message, but different messages to different groups at the same time, such as the public, 
governments, opponents, and supporters. For example, terrorists try to “send the message” that 
they are powerful to governments and opponents, as in “our cause is inexorable,” but to 
supporters the message may be, “We fight for you—support us!” (Fig. B–8). 
 
 
Fig. B–8. Different Terrorist “Messages” 
 
                        Supporters                      Neutrals                      Opponents 




       <-------|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------> 
             Active             Potential          Uncommitted/         Potential          Active 
           Supporters       Supporters        Unconcerned/        Opponents      Opponents 
 
                    “Our cause is              “Our cause is noble,     “Our cause is inevitable, so you 
                      your cause.”                admit its justice            might as well give in because 
                                                           and support us.”           we will continue to attack  
                                                                                                until we get what we want.” 
 
 
                                                 
42 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988, 21; R. Crelinsten, quoted in Schmid and Jongman, Political 
Terrorism, 1988, 21. 
43 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988, 28. 
44 Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2002), 
3 (italics added). 





















Inaccurate focus on “sending a message”: 
Terrorism…is a form of “armed propaganda,” 
a potent way not only to communicate but 
also to send a message in an age dominated 
by the mass media.  
 





   
Third-Party Targets. A definition of terrorism must include the characteristic of third-party 
involvement (victim-target differentiation), and a definition that does not express that third-
parties are the true targets of the attack is incorrect. 
The intent to elicit responses from third-parties is the 
most distinctive characteristic of terrorism, and if the 
violence directed against the victims is not aimed primarily 
at third-parties, the act is not terrorism but another form of 
violence. Most forms of violence are used to achieve goals 
directly through the use of violence. To illustrate, the goal 
of some wars may be achieved by seizing and controlling 
the territory of another country. Terrorism, however, does 
not use violence to seize territory, but to advance political 
goals through the responses of third-parties to the use of 
violence. To further illustrate, a military attack can be used to seize the capital of another 
country, and through that means directly achieve the goal of overthrowing that government. But 
terrorists who seek to overthrow a government are not using violence to achieve their goal 
directly, but to try to induce third-parties to help overthrow the government. 
A definition may use the term “victim-target differentiation” to describe third-party 
involvement. This term is accurate, but may not be readily understood, and does not specifically 
express that terrorists are seeking third-party responses that will advance the attackers’ goals.  
General terms such as “third-parties” and “groups, organizations, and governments” may be 
accurate as long as the term used recognizes that terrorist attacks are aimed at multiple third-
parties at the same time, and as long as the term is inclusive enough to cover all third-party 
targets. Other general terms such as “society” and “population” are too broad because terrorists 
may aim primarily at a particular segment of a society such as a religious group, and not the 
entire society. The phrase, “governments and societies, or any part of a society,” is not accurate 
because attacks can be aimed at other third-party targets such as international organizations. An 
FBI definition that identified “a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof” as 
the third-party targets, is not accurate because an attack can be aimed at multiple governments 
and populations, and at international organizations. If the definition uses specific terms, then 
“governments” should be included, since they are usually important third-party targets.  
Some definitions have indicated that a third-party target is “wider” or “broader” than the 
victims. An example is an early State Department definition (see box).45 Such terms cannot be 
used because they do not accurately describe third-
party targets, and may be inaccurate or misleading. 
For example, an attack may be aimed at the same 
ethnic group as the victims, and therefore it could 
be misleading to consider the primary third-party 
target as wider or broader than the victims.  
Phrases such as “other than” and “not the direct 
object of attack” can be accurate, but are not the  
best choice. Terms that identify third-party targets more explicitly would be easier to understand.  
 
                                                 
45 U.S. State Dept., Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, inside front cover (italics added). 
























Inaccurate focus on third-party targets 
“wider than” the victims: [Terrorism is] the 
threat or use of violence for political purposes 
by individuals or groups, whether acting for, 
or in opposition to, established governmental 
authority, when such actions are intended to 
shock, stun, or intimidate a target group 
wider than the immediate victims. 





   
Selected third-party targets. A definition that identifies only a selected third-party target is 
inaccurate (see example in box).46 This particular definition identified a government as a third- 
party target. However, there are many third-
party targets other than governments such as 
international organizations, an ethnic group, or 
a specific group such as journalists. This 
particular definition would exclude many 
instances that are terrorist attacks. 
“Third-party targets as the “target of...” Some definitions classify third-party targets by the 
type of responses that terrorists are seeking from them, such as “target of provocation,” “target 
of coercion,” “target of demands,” and 
“target of attention” (see example in 
box).47 This concept illustrates the 
important point that terrorists are 
seeking different responses from 
different third-party targets, and a 
definition that includes these kinds of 
terms could be accurate. However, the 
phrases should not be used because there 
are so many “targets of” that listing them 
would make a definition very long, and 
even then some “targets of” may not be 
included. A phrase such as “targets of 
response” could summarize the concept, 
but may not be very clear.  
Terrorism as “drama/theater.” It is 
important that a definition of terrorism not use 
the image of drama or the theater (see example 
in box).48 The statement, “Terrorism is theater, 
and the American press guarantees a stage,” is 
another example.49 Terrorism is, in fact, often 
designed to have “dramatic” aspects, and it is  
important to understand the publicity aspects for which terrorists are aiming, but it is 
misleading—and dangerous—to think of terrorism as drama. Even though terrorism can have 
“theatrical” aspects, terrorism is not theater but a deadly means to an end. Furthermore, linking 
the word “terrorism” with an experience that many people enjoy (going to see a play) may 
distract from the heinousness of terrorist methods.  
 
                                                 
46 Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11: A Report to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives and the Minority Leader, 2002, summary (italics added). 
47 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988, 28 (italics added). 
48 Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 
10 (italics added). 
49 James M. Smith and William C. Thomas, “The Real Threat from Oklahoma City,” Journal of Conflict Studies 
(Spring 1998): 129. Brian Jenkins perceived the “dramatic” quality of terrorist violence: “Terrorism is aimed at the 
people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is theater.” See Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A 
New Kind of Warfare, RAND, 1974, 4. 
Unnecessary focus on “targets of…”: Terrorism is an 
anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or 
state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political 
reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the 
direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The 
immediate human victims of violence are generally 
chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively 
(representative or symbolic targets) from a target 
population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and 
violence-based communication processes between 
terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main 
targets are used to manipulate the main target 
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of 
demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. 
 
Inaccurate focus on terrorism as “drama”: 
Terrorism [is] a synthesis of war and theater, a 
dramatization of the most proscribed kind of 
violence—that which is perpetrated on innocent 
victims—played before an audience in the hope 
of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes. 
  
 
Inaccurate focus on selected third-party targets: 
Terrorism is the illegitimate, premeditated use of 
politically motivated violence or the threat of 
violence by a subnational group against persons or 
property with the intent to coerce a government by 
instilling fear amongst the populace.   





   
“Audience” as the third-party target. A definition that identifies only an “audience” as the 
third-party target is inaccurate and misleading, and therefore must not be used. An example is the  
definition that the State Department used (see box).50 
There are several problems with using the word 
“audience” for third-party targets.  
First, every person who hears about an attack is a 
target—a “target of response” in that terrorists intend 
for every person who hears about an attack to take some 
kind of action that will advance the terrorists’ goals. (The intended actions can be very large, or 
as small as simply being aware of the terrorists’ goal—but an action or response of some sort.) 
Second, the word “audience” implies a group that is not directly participating in a 
performance, but is primarily observing—an audience watching a play is an example. This image 
is misleading. Terrorists are indeed trying to get third-parties to watch what is happening, but as 
a means of trying to get them to take some kind of action as a result. Plays in a theater are not 
usually designed to try to get the audience to take some kind of political action in response, but 
terrorists are trying to get their third-party targets to take actions in response to attacks.  
Third, “audience” is an inaccurate term to use to describe all third-party targets. For example, 
a government involved in a hostage situation is not an audience but a “target of coercion.” 
Terrorists are trying to coerce the government, and not trying to induce it to watch the terrorist 
situation as an audience—the government is directly involved.  
The third-party targets that are closest to being an “audience” are neutrals and some potential 
supporters (Fig. B–10) from whom terrorists primarily seek interest and attention (at least 
initially), and such groups can be called the “targets of attention.” These individuals are likely to 
feel more freedom as to whether or not they will pay attention to the attacks, or interest 
themselves in the goals the terrorists are pursuing. But those who fear that they may become 




Fig. B–10. Third-Party Targets Closest to Being an “Audience” 
 
    <------ Supporters  <------------->   Neutrals  <-------------->  Opponents -------> 
 
<---------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------|----------> 
       Supporters       Potential          Uncommitted/         Potential        Opponents 
                              Supporters        Unconcerned         Opponents 
 
 
           Most Likely to Be Potential “Audiences”  
                       (Targets of Attention) 
 
 
Fourth, the word “audience” has a connotation that the audience is voluntary. Some people, 
such as supporters, may be willing observers of the terrorist scene, but attacks force many people 
into involuntary—and extremely unwilling—participation. The families of those harmed in 
attacks did not volunteer to be in an “audience,” and many others do not wish to be.  
 
                                                 
50 See numerous U.S. State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism reports (italics added). (The reports also 
included minor changes in the definition of terrorism.) 
Inaccurate focus on “audience”: 
[Terrorism is] premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience.  
 





   
Eliciting Responses from Third-Parties. The intent to elicit responses from third-parties is an 
essential element of a terrorist attack, and therefore needs to be included in the definition. A 
definition needs to convey that terrorists are seeking particular responses from third-parties (and 
if individuals, groups, organizations, and governments can 
see this clearly in the definition, they can be better prepared 
to resist attempts to manipulate them). The term “victim-
target differentiation” may not be incorrect, but should not 
be used because the term addresses only part of the process 
of a terrorist attack, and does not fully convey that terrorists 
are trying to “use” third-parties to advance goals. 
Take or refrain from actions. Some definitions  
include that the attacks are intended to induce third-parties 
to either take or refrain from taking particular actions (see 
example in box).51 This point is accurate, and important  
because inducing third-parties to take particular actions can help terrorists, as can refraining 
from taking actions. For example, inspiring supporters to donate money helps terrorists, as does 
coercing opponents into giving ransom 
money. In contrast, intimidating 
supporters and opponents into refraining 
from actions such as cooperating with 
the police can help terrorists. R. A. 
Fearey pointed out that attacks may 
advance political goals by mobilizing 
supporters and by immobilizing 
opponents: “Through brutality and fear 
[the terrorist] seeks to impress his 
existence and his cause on the minds of 
those who can, through action or terror-
induced inaction, help him to achieve 
that cause.”52 However, a definition of 
terrorism can be accurate without the 
phrase, “take or refrain from actions,” and therefore is best omitted in the interest of conciseness.  
“Cause” vs. “elicit.” Some definitions may include that the intent of terrorist attacks is to 
cause third-parties to act in certain ways (see example in box).53 This perception is insightful,  
but not accurate. Terrorism does not cause people to 
act in certain ways, but sets up situations that induce 
people to choose to act in certain ways. The 
difference is crucial, in that people always have the 
option of not doing what terrorists want.  
 
                                                 
51 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999 (italics added). 
52 R. A. Fearey, quoted in Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 131 (italics added). 
53 H. H. A. Cooper, Evaluating the Terrorist Threat: Principles of Applied Risk Assessment, 1974, quoted in Sean K. 
Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2002), 479 
(italics added). 
Unnecessary inclusion of “take” or “refrain” from 
acts: Any person commits an offence within the meaning 
of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or 
indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects 
funds with the intention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in 
order to carry out: (a) An act which constitutes an offence 
within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties 
listed in the annex; or (b) Any other act intended to cause 
death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a 
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, 
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to 
do or to abstain from doing any act. 
Inaccurate focus on “causing” responses: 
Terrorism is the use of violence to create 
terror in others who are not the direct object 
of violence in order to cause them to act in 
certain ways.   





























   
Change behavior. Some definitions bring out that terrorists seek for third-party targets to 
change their behavior (see example in box).54 This aspect of terrorism is perceptive, but is not  
always accurate and therefore cannot be included in 
a definition. For example, terrorists may try to 
maintain certain behavior or policies, and not change 
the behavior. As one example, terrorists may use 
“potboiler” attacks (attacks at a low level of 
destruction) to keep up a certain level of attention 
from the media. As another example, terrorists may  
use attacks to maintain support from a community on whose behalf the attacks are being 
perpetrated, and dissuade other groups that may want to compete to represent the community. 
The definition in the box focuses on intimidation and coercion, and therefore implies that the 
action is one that the third-party targets would not ordinarily choose to take. However, this is not 
always the case. In the context of intimidation and coercion, it is usually true that the attack is 
intended to elicit responses that many third-parties would not ordinarily take, and do not want to 
take. But it may not be true for supporters and potential supporters—these third-party targets are 
often willing to modify their behavior, such as by increasing their donations. 
A related “change in behavior” aspect addresses the idea that people cannot escape becoming 
victims regardless of how they act (see example in box).55 A terrorism definition must not 
include whether or not people can avoid 
becoming victims because this inclusion 
would exclude many attacks. Sometimes 
there may, in fact, be little that people can 
do to avoid becoming victims. But in other 
attacks—even those completely random—
people can take defensive actions that 
reduce their chances of becoming a victim. 
The leverage of terrorism.56 Some definitions include references to the “leverage of 
terrorism.” An example is a definition used in 1988 (see box).57 The leverage of terrorism is an 
extremely important aspect of terrorism, and 
helps to explain why terrorist attacks can have 
such an intense effect on many third-parties, 
and why these third-parties may respond so 
strongly. Understanding the potential leverage 
of terrorism is also essential for effective 
counterterrorism efforts. However, the  
leverage of terrorism must not be included in a definition, for third-party targets can control their 
responses, and may choose not to respond in ways that surpass or exceed the physical results of 
an attack. Furthermore, not all terrorist attacks may be intended to elicit a greater response than 
the damage done by the actual attack. It is likely that the intent is to do so, but may not be so.  
 
 
                                                 
54 Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 1986, 1 (italics added). 
55 A. Schmid and J. de Graf, quoted in Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988, 36 (italics added). 
56 See also the section on the leverage of terrorism in Chapter 2. 
57 A. Merari, quoted in Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988, 38 (italics added). 
Unnecessary inclusion of the “leverage of 
terrorism”: [Terrorism is] the systematic use of 
violence by substate groups or individuals in the 
service of political, social, or religious objectives, 
whose intended psychological impact 
considerably surpasses the physical results. 
Inaccurate focus on the ability to avoid becoming 
a victim: Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic 
use or threat of violence against instrumental 
(human) targets (C) in a conflict between two (A, B) 
or more parties, whereby the immediate victims C—
who might not even be part of the conflicting 
parties—cannot, through a change of attitude or 
behavior, dissociate themselves from the conflict.   
 
 
Inaccurate focus on changing behavior: 
[Terrorism is] the unlawful use or threat of 
violence against persons or property to 
further political or social objectives [and 
is] generally intended to intimidate or 
coerce a government, individuals, or 
groups to modify their behavior or policies. 





   
Mechanisms to Elicit Responses. Omitting the mechanisms that terrorists use to elicit 
responses from third-parties would not make a definition incorrect, but including this element of 
a terrorist attack could help people understand the kinds of responses terrorists are seeking. 
Terrorists use a number of mechanisms to try to elicit responses, and including all of them would 
make a definition very long, and even then some mechanisms may be omitted. Therefore, only a 
summary such as “elicit responses,” “induce responses,” or “obtain responses” would be useful.  
Definitions that include one or two mechanisms to elicit responses from third-parties.  
Definitions that include only one or two of the mechanisms by which terrorists seek to elicit 
responses are incomplete and therefore inaccurate. These definitions also may leave third-party 
targets ill-prepared to resist being manipulated if they are the targets of mechanisms not listed. 
An FBI definition is an example that 
addressed only the intimidation and 
coercive mechanisms (see box).58 These 
two mechanisms are very important; 
however, others are also important, such 
as “influence” and “provoke.” 
A U.S. State Department definition included only the “influence” mechanism, a limitation that 
is problematic (see box).59 First, the term does not accurately describe a number of terrorist  
situations. For example, if a terrorist group takes 
hostages and demands a political concession as 
the condition for their release, the terrorists are 
trying to coerce the government, not influence it. 
Second, the term “influence” does not convey the 
danger to third-parties involved with mechanisms  
such as provocation, in which terrorists seek to trick third-parties into harming themselves 
through their responses. For example, terrorists may seek to provoke third-parties to respond to 
attacks by committing counter-atrocities, and thus lose the moral high ground.  
Inaccurate inclusion of mechanism “qualifiers.” A definition should not include qualifiers 
regarding the mechanisms used to elicit responses (see definition excerpt in box).60 Qualifiers  
can make a definition very imprecise and 
subject to a great deal of interpretation. 
Regarding this definition, it would be 
very difficult to have a consistent 
database. What measures would be used 
to decide when terrorists aim to 
“seriously” intimidate, or “unduly” 
compel? Governments may need to be 
concerned with a particular level of 
terrorism, but one common definition is  
needed, and once adopted, modified definitions can be used for specific purposes.  
 
                                                 
58 28 CFR 0.85 (2005), Title 28--Judicial Administration (italics added). 
59 See numerous U.S. State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism reports, such as the 1985 report (italics added).  
60 Summarized excerpt, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, Official Journal of 
the European Communities, 2002, Article 1 (italics and underlining added). 
Inaccurate focus on “influence”: [Terrorism 
is] premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine state agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience.  
Incomplete limit to two mechanisms: Terrorism 
includes the unlawful use of force and violence against 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. 
Inaccurate inclusion of qualifiers: Terrorism is an 
intentional act which may seriously damage a country 
or an international organization, with the aim of 
seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling 
a Government or international organization to perform 
or abstain from performing any act, or seriously 
destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic, or social structures of a 
country or an international organization by means of 
attacks upon a person’s life [and other acts]. 





   
Political Goals. The political characteristic must be included in a definition of terrorism. If 
an incident does not have a political goal, it is not an act of terrorism. The political characteristic  
excludes all incidents of a nonpolitical nature, such as 
organized crime assassinations and kidnappings for 
ransom. The political characteristic excludes the 
common crimes that terrorists commit to support their 
political goal such as robberies to obtain resources to 
conduct terrorist attacks. In these kinds of instances, 
the acts themselves are not intended to involve third-
parties and elicit responses from them. 
The political characteristic excludes violent acts 
perpetrated to elicit responses from third-parties for 
monetary gain. For example, if an organized crime 
group damages one shop as a warning to other  
shopkeepers to pay “protection money,” this action would not be an act of terrorism. Even 
though the violence is aimed at third-parties and intended to elicit responses from them, the goal 
is financial, not political.  
The political goal excludes individuals who are not sane. As Brian Jenkins noted: “We are not 
talking about the actions of a lunatic who hears God whispering in his ear that the world is a 
wicked place and must be destroyed, who walks in a former place of employment or onto a school 
campus and begins shooting people. We mean actions carried out by groups for political ends.”61  
The political characteristic of terrorism can be expressed in concise ways such as “political 
violence” and “politically motivated.” These two terms may be technically accurate, but are not 
the best choice—they do not specifically convey that terrorists are pursuing a political goal, and 
do not express that terrorists are seeking to advance political goals through the use of terrorism. 
Phrases such as “to further a political goal” and “to advance a political goal” do express this 
aspect of terrorism. (Few terrorists expect to achieve their goal through the exclusive use of 
terrorism, but do intend for responses to attacks to aid their political goal, and understanding this 
expectation is essential for effective counterterrorism efforts.) 
Some definitions include terms beyond “political,” such as “social,” “religious,” and 
“ideological,” and these terms are not likely to make a definition incorrect as long as the political 
goal is clear. Examples are the 2005 FBI definition, which stated, “in furtherance of political or 
social objectives, and the 2005 DOD (Department of Defense) definition that stated, “in the 
pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”62 “Social,” “religious,” 
and “ideological” can be political in nature. However, some terms may be questionable as to 
whether or not they express a political goal; for example, the 2005 NCTC criteria included the 
phrase “potentially including religious, philosophical, or culturally symbolic motivations.”63 
“Culturally symbolic” can be political, or the connection between “culturally symbolic” and 
political may be slight. 
 
                                                 
61 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Terrorism: A Contemporary Problem with Age-old Dilemmas,” in Howard, ed., 
Terrorism: Roots, Impact, and Responses, 1992, 14. 
62 28 CFR 0.85 (2005), Title 28--Judicial Administration (italics added); JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 2005 (italics added). 
63 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), A Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004, vii 
(italics added). 





























   
Particular attackers/goals. A definition cannot specify the attackers in a way that includes 
only particular political goals. An example is a definition that the U.S. Department of Defense 
used in 1983 (see box).64 This definition 
limits terrorism to acts committed by groups 
with a revolutionary goal, and thereby 
excludes groups with other goals, such as 
rightwing and single-issue terrorists. 
Rightwing terrorist groups have aimed at 
preserving or strengthening a political  
system, not overthrowing it, and under this definition would be excluded. Single-issue groups 
such as those pursuing environmental goals are seldom revolutionary organizations.  
The political goal of power. A definition of terrorism must not overemphasize the role of 
“power,” such as stating that the purpose of terrorism is to achieve power (see discussion in  
box).65 First, it is not always true. Some groups 
may be seeking power, but other groups seek 
change, not power. Single-issue terrorists, for 
example, usually seek policy changes, not power, 
and often intend for other people, such as 
political leaders and voters, to make the changes.  
Second, the statement puts the focus on the 
acquisition of power, rather than on what the 
attackers want power to accomplish. For example,  
terrorists who seek to overthrow a government may not be seeking power for its own sake, but to 
implement their own preferred form of government (and may not want to run the new 
government). The strategy of terrorism is not to achieve a goal directly through power, but 
through the actions of third-parties.  
Political goals that are “otherwise unattainable.” The qualification that the political goal 
being sought must be “otherwise unattainable” must not be included (see example in box).66 The 
inclusion of that term would mean that few acts would be terrorism because anyone could 
“decide” that there is no other way to achieve a 
goal. But there are alternatives to terrorism, and 
terrorist attempts to justify their attacks are not 
valid (see Appendix D). Even when groups 
think they have tried “all” other methods, trying 
methods once, twice, or even a number of times 
does not justify turning to terrorism—many 
groups used the same nonviolent methods repeatedly, as Martin Luther King’s civil rights 
campaign illustrates. A second reason to exclude the “otherwise unattainable” term is that its use 
may aid the idea that the attackers were “forced” to use terrorism. The “forced to use terrorism” 
ploy is a deception technique that terrorists use to try to get people to see attacks as legitimate. 
 
                                                 
64 DOD Directive 2000.12, Feb. 12, 1982, quoted in Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport 
Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, 1983, 122 (italics added).  
65 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2006, 2–3 (italics added).  
66 Student memo to Stansfield Turner, Dec. 7, 2005, author’s files (italics added). 
Inaccurate restriction on goal: [Terrorism is] the 
unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence 
by a revolutionary organization against individuals 
or property with the intention of coercing or 
intimidating governments or societies, often for 
political or ideological purposes. 
Inaccurate focus on power: Terrorism…is 
fundamentally and inherently political. It is also 
ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, 
the acquisition of power, and the use of power 
to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus 
violence—or equally important, the threat of 
violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in 
service of, a political aim. [Terrorism] is a 
planned, calculated, and, indeed, systematic act. 
 
Inaccurate focus on “otherwise unattainable” 
goals: Terrorism is the unlawful, premeditated 
use or threat of use of force against persons or 
property with the intent to coerce or influence by 
instilling fear in order to meet an otherwise 
unattainable political or ideological objective.  





   
Making exceptions for particular political goals. A definition of terrorism cannot make an 
exception for any political goal or cause, or for any goals that may be seen as legitimate. For 
example, the 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism used a definition that could 
be interpreted as allowing the use of 
terrorism for self-determination 
struggles, or for liberation from 
foreign occupation (see box).67 In this 
definition, “whatever means” could be 
seen as including terrorism. The 
definition is unclear as to whether the 
“principles of international law” refer 
to the means used in armed struggle, 
the principles of self-determination 
and liberation, or both. In all armed 
conflicts, the principles of international 
law prohibit many of the acts that 
terrorists perpetrate, such as taking 
hostages and murdering civilians.  
The legitimacy of a political goal cannot be included in a definition of terrorism for a number 
of reasons. One reason is that though people have an inalienable right to complete freedom of 
thought and belief, they do not have complete freedom in how they act. All people have the right 
to think and believe anything they want—including the right to believe in any political system, 
ideology, philosophy, or religion—and parties on all sides of an issue have an equal right to their 
beliefs. Because the right to freedom of thought and belief is absolute, there can be no restriction 
on the belief that any particular political goal is desirable or undesirable, legitimate or 
illegitimate. But though the right to freedom of thought and belief is absolute, the right to act on 
beliefs is limited—acts that give expression to thoughts must not infringe on others’ rights, and 
everyone has the same rights. To illustrate, people have the right to think that totalitarianism is 
the best form of government, but they do not have the right to use any means they choose to try 
to implement that government. The methods used must not violate the rights of others.  
A second reason is that terrorist attacks for any goal violate the rights of the victims to due 
process. To illustrate, many terrorist attacks deprive victims of their right to be free from injury.  
A third reason is that forms of political violence are generally defined by acts and do not 
include value judgments. As an example, the definition of “war” does not include the legitimacy 
of the goal being pursued. World War II was a war regardless of the justice of the goals of the 
countries involved. (The legitimacy of a war is addressed by qualifiers such as “just war.”) 
Therefore, a definition of terrorism cannot include any subjectivity regarding the political 
goal. Thoughts and beliefs are free from regulation: only actions can be regulated. 
There are practical reasons for excluding the legitimacy of a political goal from any definition 
of terrorism. One reason is that it can lead to continuing violence. If it is “acceptable” for one 
group to use terrorism in the pursuit of a particular political goal, why would it not be 
“acceptable” for other groups to use the same method to pursue the same kind of goal? If it is 
 
                                                 
67 The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998 (italics, bold, and underlining added). Note that 
groups within Arab States are denied self-determination.  
Inaccurate focus on the legitimacy of a political goal: 
Terrorism [is] any act or threat of violence, whatever its 
motives or purposes, that occurs for the advancement of an 
individual or collective criminal agenda, causing terror 
among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing 
their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to cause 
damage to the environment or to public or private 
installations or property or to occupy or seize them, or 
aiming to jeopardize a national resource…. All cases of 
struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, 
against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation 
and self-determination, in accordance with the principles 
of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence. 
This provision shall not apply to any act prejudicing the 
territorial integrity of any Arab State. 
 





   
considered legitimate for one group to use terrorism in the pursuit of self-determination, why 
wouldn’t other groups also have the right to use terrorism in their pursuit of self-determination? 
And if a group using terrorism does achieve self-determination and establishes a new State, other 
groups within that new State may think that they are justified in using terrorism against the new 
government to pursue their own State. Thus violence can spread.  
A second reason is that including a goal’s legitimacy can hamper agreement on a definition of 
terrorism. Disagreement on including the legitimacy of goals was an area that prevented 
agreement on a definition of terrorism at the UN for decades. As an example, a number of 
delegations sought to exclude national liberation movements from any definition of terrorism.68 
(In addition, if a political goal’s legitimacy is a criterion, then agreement as to whether an act is 
or is not terrorism depends on agreement regarding the justice of a particular goal—and it is not 
likely that parties on opposite sides of an issue will agree on the justice of the other side’s goal.) 
Maximum publicity. A definition cannot specify that the purpose of the attack is to achieve 
“maximum publicity” (see example in box) because this is not always the case.69 Terrorist  
attacks are not necessarily conducted for 
maximum publicity, but for the desired level 
and kind of publicity. If terrorists desired 
maximum publicity, they would be likely to 
try to cause massive destruction. But terrorists 
generally constrain themselves because of 
their intent to elicit particular responses from 
different third-parties. Therefore terrorists  
usually calculate what level and type of destruction they think will elicit the desired responses, 
and at the same time not elicit responses that they want to avoid. For example, through an attack, 
terrorists may want to elicit donations from supporters, but at the same time avoid sparking an 
intense counterterrorism effort from the government, and this is likely if an attack is egregious. 
Against, or in support of, a government. Some definitions include that the purpose of terrorism 
must be for or against a government, such as attacks used for revolutionary or reactionary goals 
(see definition excerpt in box).70 This 
limitation must not be included because it is 
not always true—many terrorist attacks are 
for or against a government, but not all. As 
one example, terrorist attacks often occur 
during conditions of general violence, such as 
in a failed state with no functioning 
government. As another example, during  
ethnic conflict, groups may use terrorist attacks against each other, and not for or against a 
government.  
 
                                                 
68 Even after the 9/11 attacks, the Organization of the Islamic Conference rejected a proposed compromise definition 
at the UN because it did not exclude national liberation movements fighting foreign occupation. See Associated 
Press, Edith M. Lederer, “Annan Hopes U.N. Will OK Terror Treaty,” Jan. 24, 2002.  
69 Student memo to Stansfield Turner, Sept. 9, 2003, author’s files (italics added). 
70 ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) database definition of international terrorism, 
in Edward F. Mickolus, “How Do We Know We’re Winning the War Against Terrorists? Issues in Measurement,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (May 2002): 151–152 (italics added). 
Inaccurate focus on “maximum publicity”:  
Terrorism is the illegitimate, premeditated use of 
violence or the threat of violence by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents against noncombatant 
targets chosen for maximum publicity, with the 
intent to coerce, shock, or intimidate governments 
or societies or to achieve other political, social, 
religious, or ideological objectives. 
 
Inaccurate focus on “for or against” a 
government: [Terrorism is] the use, or threat of 
use, of anxiety-inducing extranormal violence for 
political purposes by any individual or group, 
whether acting for or in opposition to established 
governmental authority, when such action is 
intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of 
a target group wider than the immediate victims.  
 





   
The type of government. A definition cannot make exceptions regarding the type of 
government involved. This argument has taken at least two forms.  
One form of this argument excludes acts that would normally be identified as terrorism if the 
act was perpetrated in a democracy in which groups have been denied basic rights (see example 
in box).71 An example was the claim that  
bombing a police station in South Africa 
during the apartheid period was not 
terrorism, but a similar bombing in 
Northern Ireland would be terrorism. The 
rationale for this claim was that particular 
groups in South Africa were denied  
participation in the political process, but in Northern Ireland all could participate.72 
A second form of this argument  
excludes acts that would normally be 
identified as terrorism if the act was 
perpetrated in a country with an 
authoritarian government (see example in 
box).73 An example would be the claim 
that bombing a police station in the Soviet  
Union was justified because the attacker was trying to overthrow an oppressive government.  
These kinds of arguments are not valid. Terrorism cannot be justified based on the type of 
government, or on the related grounds of oppression, denial of rights, or lack of the ability to 
participate in the political process. Injustice and oppression can certainly be opposed, but not 
with terrorism. Taking up arms to resist oppression may or may not be justified, but the 
legitimate use of arms does not include terrorist attacks.74 Human beings have rights regardless 
of the kind of government in their country. Noncombatants in nondemocratic States have the 
right of their person to be free of the injuries and indiscriminate killings that so often result from 
terrorist attacks. For example, bombing a police station anywhere may injure or kill passers-by 
and thereby dispossess these individuals of their rights. Terrorism violates the rights to life and 
property, and bypasses due process of law: “[The act of terrorism,] whoever performs it, in some 
sense violates civil liberties. All the cries about redressing injustices cannot disguise this fact.”75 
Guerillas, resistance groups, and freedom fighters have opposed oppressive regimes without 
perpetrating terrorism, or attacking noncombatants. In democratic States, groups have been 
oppressed and denied basic rights, but did not turn to terrorism as Martin Luther King’s civil 
rights movement demonstrated. In nondemocratic States, groups have been oppressed and denied 
basic rights, but did not turn to terrorism, as the actions of the Helsinki Watch Groups in Eastern 
Europe during the Cold War demonstrated.76 
 
                                                 
71 Student memo to Stansfield Turner, Dec. 6, 1993, author’s files (italics added). 
72 For example, see Conor Cruise O’Brien, “Terrorism Under Democratic Conditions: The Case of the IRA,” in 
Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 1983, 94–95. 
73 H. D. Schwind, quoted in Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 144 (italics added). 
74 As a minimum, all individuals who take up arms are bound by those parts of the laws of war that are customary 
international law.  
75 I. L. Horowitz, quoted in Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 135. 
76 See, for example, Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, 2001, 42. 
Inaccurate focus on democratic governments: 
Terrorism is the use of premeditated violence by 
individuals or groups desiring to bring about changes in 
society, government, or the bases of law and authority 
in which the violence is directed at a state that permits 
effective, realistic, and peaceful forms of opposition.  
 
Inaccurate focus on nondemocratic governments: 
[Terrorism is] a primarily politically motivated 
behavior of a nonstate group without electoral 
prospects in a democratic context which aims by means 
of violent acts against persons and/or property to coerce 
people (especially the political leadership of democratic 
states) in order to obtain its will thereby.  
 





   
Other Definition Aspects 
 
Characteristics Describing Terrorism as a Method. Some definitions identify terrorism as a 
method, a strategy, war, or combat. These terms are either unnecessary or inaccurate.  
Terrorism as a method. A definition may 
identify terrorism as a “method” (see example in 
box), but this term should not be included 
because it is unnecessary.77 Terrorism is, in fact, 
a method, but all forms of political violence are 
methods, and a definition should be succinct. 
Terrorism as a strategy or tactic. Some definitions identify terrorism as a “tactic” or 
“strategy” (see example in box).78 These terms can help in understanding how terrorism can be  
used, but are unnecessary and 
misleading, and therefore inappropriate 
in a definition. Terrorist attacks can be 
used as a tactic, a strategy, or both. For 
example, a particular attack usually has 
specific (or “tactical”) objectives, but is 
also intended to serve a strategic 
objective—the political goal or cause.  
A terrorist campaign to overthrow a government can illustrate. A group trying to overthrow a 
government may use one attack to alarm members of the public so that they will respond with 
less confidence in political leaders, a second attack to disrupt the government’s relations with 
allies, and a third to affect an election by intimidating voters. Each specific attack may be 
“tactical,” but all are part of the campaign for the strategic goal of overthrowing the government. 
Terrorism as a method of psychological struggle/psychological warfare. Some definitions 
describe terrorism as a method of psychological struggle or warfare. Examples are statements 
such as, “The fundamental aim of terrorism is psychological”; “Essentially, terrorism is a 
strategy based on psychological impact”; and the example given, which describes terrorism as a 
form of psychological warfare (see box).79 These kinds of 
statements cannot be used in a definition. Terrorism has a very 
important psychological element in that it “operates” through 
responses and the manipulation of third-parties rather than the 
direct physical effects of violence. But terrorism cannot be  
placed only in the psychological realm. Terrorism uses actual physical violence, and terrorists 
are seeking tangible results from actions taken in response to attacks. The psychological effects 
are intended to elicit responses—the psychological effects are a means, not an end. The term 
“psychological warfare” is particularly misleading because the intended psychological effects are 
aimed at both opponents and supporters, and “warfare” is an inaccurate way to describe the 
feelings and responses sought from supporters and potential supporters. Terrorists want these 
groups to respond positively to the attacks—to be enthusiastic and energized.  
 
                                                 
77 F. M. Watson, quoted in Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 133 (italics added). 
78 A. H. Miller, quoted in Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1983, 149 (italics added). 
79 Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 25 
(2002): 313 (italics added). 
Unnecessary inclusion of terrorism as a 
“method”: Political terrorism can be defined as a 
strategy, a method by which an organized group 
or party tries to get attention for its aims, or force 
concessions toward its goals, through the 




Inaccurate focus on terrorism 
as psychological warfare: 
Terrorism is fundamentally a 
form of psychological warfare. 
 
Unnecessary inclusion of “tactic/strategy”: [Terrorism] 
is not a tactic but a strategic mode of political violence. It 
is generally but not exclusively, directed at targets which 
have symbolic value in addition to or independent of any 
tactical or strategic value. It is the symbolic value which 
usually transcends the direct significance of any specific 
target, and is aimed at influencing political decisionmaking 
through fear and intimidation.  





   
Terrorism as a method of combat, war, or surrogate warfare. Some definitions describe 
terrorism as a method of combat, war, or surrogate war (see example in box).80 These kinds of 
terms cannot be used for this reason: all attacks 
are a method of struggle, but not all attacks are a 
method of combat, war, or surrogate war. For 
example, a nonstate group that uses terrorist 
attacks alone or with guerilla-like attacks against a 
government may be using terrorism as a method  
of combat, but an environmental group that perpetrates a symbolic attack to advertise its cause is 
not using terrorism as a method of combat (a method of struggle, certainly, but not “combat”). 
Terrorism cannot be defined as “surrogate war.” A government can use state-sponsored 
terrorism as a method of covert war against another country and thereby avoid the risks involved 
with open belligerency.81 But not all terrorist attacks are surrogate war, and therefore the 
definition cannot use the term. (State-sponsored terrorism can be defined, but as a type of 
terrorism.) 
Defining terrorism as a method of combat, war, or surrogate war is also problematic in that 
the definition may then imply particular policy responses such as the use of military force. A 
number of factors are involved if terrorism is viewed as part of war, such as the laws that apply 
during wartime, and the additional powers that governments may have. Military force may be an 
appropriate response to terrorism, but it is counterproductive for a definition to impede the 
selection of the best responses by any implied “preselection” of counterterrorism tools. 
The Term “Usually.” The term “usually” 
should not be included in a definition of 
terrorism because the term adds imprecision and 
ambiguity (see example in box).82 Definitions of 
most forms of political violence do not include 
such terms; for example, the definition of “war” 
is not likely to include the term “usually.” 
Agency Perspectives. Agency considerations, perspectives, or responsibilities must not affect 
the definition of terrorism.83 A definition of terrorism must be objective; however, once an 
accurate definition has been constructed and adopted, agencies can focus on the particular 
aspects relevant to their mission and responsibilities in combating terrorism (and perhaps prepare 
their own working definitions in addition to the basic, common definition).  
 
                                                 
80 J. B. S. Hardman, “Terrorism: A Summing Up in the 1930s,” in Walter Laqueur and Yonah Alexander, eds., The 
Terrorism Reader (New York: Meridian, 1987), 224 (italics added). 
81 In the 1960s, terrorism was generally placed in the context of internal war, but in the 1980s many saw terrorism as 
a form of international war, or its substitute. See Schmid, Political Terrorism, 1988, 98. State sponsorship of 
terrorism was frequently connected to the idea of “surrogate warfare,” especially in the United States during the 
1980s because policymakers did not believe that the “label of terrorism alone conveyed a sufficient sense of danger 
or prescribed an appropriate response.” See Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, 1995, 10–11.  
82 See numerous U.S. State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism reports (italics added).  
83 In the United States, for example, a 1985 study concluded that government agencies or offices had approached the 
definition of terrorism from their own point of view and responsibilities. See State-Sponsored Terrorism, report 
prepared for the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, U.S. Senate, 1985, 25. In 2003, a GAO report concluded 
that U.S. federal agencies’ definitions of terrorism varied somewhat based on their functional roles and missions. 
See GAO, Combating Terrorism, GAO-03-165, 2003, 12.  
Inaccurate focus on terrorism as a method 
of war/combat: Terrorism is a method of 
combat in the struggle between social groups 
and forces rather than individuals, and it may 
take place in any social order. 
Inaccurate focus on “influence”: 
[Terrorism is] premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups 
or clandestine state agents, usually intended 
to influence an audience.  





   
 
II. The Characteristics of Terrorism and Its Definition 
 
Terrorism’s characteristics and qualities can be summarized as to which are essential in a 
definition of terrorism, which are optional, and which should not be included (Table B–2). From 
this determination, the conditions that an incident must meet to be an attack can be identified 
(Table B–3) and used to compare incidents (Table B–4). Accurate definitions of terrorism can 
then be constructed (Table B–5). 
 
 
Table B–2. The Inclusion of Terrorism Characteristics in a Definition 









I. The Violent Act 
 
 
X    
   Nonstate attacker X   
   Violence X   
      Threat of violence             X*   
        -Premeditated  X  
        -Unlawful  X  
        -Random   X 
        -Symbolic   X 
        -Unpredictable   X 
        -Serial   X 
        -Systematic   X 
        -Secretive   X 
        -Extranormal   X 
        -Illegitimate   X 
   Noncombatants X   
   Property             X*   
    
 
II. 3rd-Party Involvement 
 
 
X   
    3rd-party targets X   
       -Affect  X  
       -Elicit responses             X**   
       -Mechanisms  X  
    
 
III. Political Goals  
 
 
X   
   Particular political goals   X 
   Legitimacy of political goal   X 





   
   Method of communication   X 
   Method of struggle   X 
   Method of combat/warfare   X 
   “Usually”   X 
  “Outside of the laws of war”   X 
 
* A definition is understandable without the inclusion of the “threat of violence” and “property,” but 
without those two characteristics, a definition would not be accurate. 
 
** A definition could be technically accurate without the inclusion of “elicit responses,” but the intent to 
obtain responses from third-party targets is essential to understand how terrorism is intended to operate, 
and therefore should be included in a definition.





   
     From analysis of the characteristics of terrorism, the conditions that an incident must meet to 











1. The attack was done by a nonstate actor—that is, a 
private individual or group, or a clandestine state 
agent—not a person or group officially acting for a 
government. 
 
2. The attack aimed or threatened physical violence at 
noncombatant targets—that is, civilians (in general), 
military personnel in noncombatant status, or property. 
 
3. The attack was intended to elicit responses from 
third-party targets—that is, people, governments, 
organizations, and groups other than the 
victims/property attacked. 
 
4. The attack had a political purpose—that is, the attack 





Conditions Restated as Questions: 
 





2. Was the violence aimed at physically 
harming or threatening noncombatant 
targets?  
 
3. Was the attack intended to elicit 











Comparison of Incidents. The required conditions can be used to evaluate incidents. For an 









Required Conditions to Be 
a Terrorist Attack 














































2. Was the violence aimed at 

















3. Was the attack intended to 

































Was the incident a terrorist 





















   
Tables B–2 through B–4 show that the characteristics required in a definition of terrorism 
include the violent act (the use/threat of violence in Phase I of a terrorist attack), third-party 
involvement (victim-target differentiation), and the political goal. The definition must 
specifically include that the attackers are nonstate actors who use or threaten violence against 
noncombatants and/or property, and intend to elicit responses for political purposes. The 
qualities of violence are not essential to a definition, and some qualities must not be included.  
From this analysis, accurate definitions of terrorism can be constructed. A definition of 
terrorism must contain nothing that is misleading, and little that is extraneous (if anything extra 
at all). Judgment should be used regarding the optional characteristics as to whether they add to 
the clarity of a definition or make it more difficult to understand and use. Terrorism can be 
defined accurately in more than one way as shown in Table B–5, and analyzed in Table B–6). 
 
 









1. The use and/or threat of violence by nonstate actors against noncombatants 
and/or property to elicit responses from third-parties to advance political goals. 
 
2. Violence, or the threat thereof, that is perpetrated by nonstate actors, 
victimizes noncombatants/property, and is aimed at obtaining desired 
responses from third-parties for political purposes. 
 
3. Nonstate political violence and/or threat against noncombatant targets 
aimed at third-party responses. 
 
4. Premeditated, unlawful violence or threat of violence against noncombatant 
targets by nonstate actors (individuals or subnational groups, or clandestine 
state agents), to coerce, provoke, intimidate, influence, and inspire responses 












not very clear 
 



















I. The Violent Act X X X X 
  Nonstate attacker X X X X 
  Violence X X X X 
     Threat of violence X X X X 
        -Premeditated    X 
        -Unlawful    X 
        -Random/symbolic     
  Noncombatants X X X X 
  Property X X X X 
   3  
 
II. 3rd-Party Involvement X X X X 
   3rd-party targets X X X X 
      -Affect     
      -Elicit responses X X X X 
      -Mechanisms    X 
     
 
III. Political Goals 
 





   
 





I. Arguments Against Defining Terrorism 




Can terrorism be defined? Should terrorism be defined? Can general agreement on a definition 
of terrorism be obtained? In answer, terrorism can be defined accurately, terrorism should be 
defined, and general agreement on a definition can be obtained. None of the objections to an 
agreed-upon definition are valid, the advantages to a single, accurate definition outweigh any 
disadvantages, and any obstacles to national and international agreement on a definition can be 
overcome. An analysis of arguments regarding the definition of terrorism follows. 
 
 
I. Arguments Against Defining Terrorism 
 
Several arguments have been made as to why terrorism should not be defined, but none are 
valid. An analysis of several major arguments follows.  
Argument 1: “Terrorism Cannot Be Defined.” Some experts and writers have argued that 
terrorism cannot be defined, but this is not so—everything can be defined. The hundreds of 
definitions of terrorism show that the phenomenon has been defined (many times and in many 
ways), and it may be assumed that the authors of thousands of books and articles on terrorism 
thought that they were writing about something specific. It is true that some aspects of 
terrorism—victim-target differentiation in particular—add complexity to the definition of 
terrorism, but terrorism is no more difficult to define than many other concepts:  
 
Many political and strategic concepts are difficult to define in a few sentences. Concepts such 
as democracy, imperialism, and revolution, for example, have been used in many different 
ways. But does this mean we can simply dispense with them? Of course not, because there is a 
sufficient common understanding of the meanings of these terms to make them useful, indeed 
essential, in scholarly discourse and political debate.1 
 
Terrorism is more complex than most other forms 
of political violence because of the victim-target 
differentiation characteristic, but that complexity does 
not prevent devising an accurate definition. Terrorism 
shares characteristics with other forms of political 
violence and common crime, but also has differences. 
The complexity of terrorism, and the similarities with 
other forms of violence, require analysis before 
constructing a definition. The Turner-Yamamoto 
Terrorism Model can help identify the elements of a 
terrorist attack, and from these elements an accurate 
definition can be determined (see Appendix B). 
 
                                                 
1 Wilkinson, “Ethical Defences of Terrorism—Defending the Indefensible,” Terrorism & Political Violence (Jan. 1989): 8. 






























   
Argument 2: “A Definition Would Be Too Limiting.” The argument has been made that 
any definition risks being too narrow or too broad. For example, proponents have argued that if 
terrorism is defined too narrowly, attacks may fall outside the scope of the definition, especially 
if the attacks are designed to do so. However, the Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model shows 
that there are few areas of ambiguity, and accurate definitions derived from the model are not 
likely to be either too narrow or too broad. If an act falls outside of the model, it is a different 
form of political violence. War, for example, is distinct from terrorism, as can be seen by 
comparing Figures C–2 and C–3. War is a direct strategy—the use of military force itself can 
achieve the political goal being pursued, whereas terrorism uses the indirect strategy of victim-

















A related argument is that having one definition may not capture terrorism’s “evolving 
nature.” The following statement expresses this idea: “To manage the task of comprehending  
terrorism in its diverse manifestations by 
reducing it to a single definition would 
mask complexities and thereby conceal its 
diverse and changing nature.”2 Proponents 
of this argument may point to changes 
such as the methods of violence used, 
links between terrorist groups, or 
technological developments. However, 
though some aspects of terrorism evolve, 
such as the method of attack, the basic 
process of a terrorist attack does not 
change (see the Turner-Yamamoto 




                                                 
2 Charles W. Kegley, “The Characteristics, Causes, and Controls of International Terrorism: An Introduction,” in 
Kegley, ed., International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 4. 







































































   
Argument 3: “There Is No Need for a Definition of Terrorism: ‘I Know It When I See 
It.’” An argument is that there is no need for a definition of terrorism because people “know it 
when they see it.” This argument is not valid. Even though people grasp various aspects of 
terrorism, they often have not comprehended the phenomenon of terrorism as a whole and how it 
operates. Many people have recognized terrorist attacks, but have also misidentified such acts as 
killing sprees, street gang attacks, hate crimes, and even boycotts as terrorism. For example, in 
most street gang attacks, the victims are the target—the attacks are not intended to induce third-
parties to take actions that advance a political goal. The characteristics of victim-target 
differentiation and a political goal must be present for an incident to be an act of terrorism.  
Sometimes even senior officials have made statements that show that they do not understand 
what terrorism is and is not. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld showed that he did not fully 
comprehend terrorism when he said, “The purpose of terrorism is not to kill people. The purpose 
of terrorism is to terrorize. It’s to alter people’s behavior.”3 Rumsfeld’s statement includes a 
partial understanding of certain aspects of terrorism, such as victim-target differentiation, but he 
was mistaken when he said that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize. The purpose of terrorism 
is to advance a political goal, and the creation of fear (terrorizing) is intended to elicit responses 
that contribute to the attacker’s political goal. Rumsfeld’s partial understanding of terrorism is 
also evident in his statement that the purpose of terrorism is to alter people’s behavior. Terrorist 
attacks are, in fact, often intended to alter the behavior of many third-party targets, but the 
altered behavior is not the purpose of attacks—again, behavior that advances the terrorists’ goals 
is the purpose.4 The purpose of the attack is what the altered behavior accomplishes for the 
terrorists. Terrorism must be understood in terms of the political goals that the terrorists are 
seeking, and how the responses of third-parties are intended to move the terrorists closer to those 
political goals.  
Another example of misidentifying terrorism can 
be illustrated by Thuggee murders.5 The Thuggee 
cult has sometimes been included in terrorism 
histories as an example of terrorism in ancient times; 
however, the religious murders that members of this 
cult perpetrated were not acts of terrorism—there 
was no political motive, and no victim-target 
differentiation (Fig. C–5).  
It is essential that acts that are not terrorism, such 
as killing sprees and hate crimes, not be labeled 
terrorism. Distinguishing among such acts as killing 
sprees, hate crimes, and terrorism is essential to 
combat these kinds of acts—the differences in  
motives and methods of operation require different methods to counter. To combat terrorism, 
third-party responses are key, and the methods used to combat the actions of a cult such as the 
Thuggee are different from the methods used to combat terrorism. An accurate, understandable 
definition can reduce misstatements and misunderstandings regarding terrorism.  
 
                                                 
3 “Radio Interview with Secretary Rumsfeld with Scott Hennen, WDAY Radio, Fargo, N.D,” April 4, 2006. 
4 “Altered behavior” can also be against what terrorists want. For example, a government’s “altered behavior” may 
be taking effective counterterrorism measures—which is not what terrorists intend.  
5 For a discussion of the Thugs, see David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious 
Traditions,” American Political Science Review (Sept. 1984). 



























   
Argument 4: “It Is Useless to Try to Get Agreement on a Definition of Terrorism.” The 
argument has been made that it is useless to try to get agreement on a definition because not 
everyone will agree. The following statement expresses this idea: “Attempts to define terrorism 
are futile, and only add to the sense of confusion that people have about what really is 
terrorism.”6 Proponents of this argument have pointed to the many definitions that scholars, 
governments, and organizations have developed, and to the fact that efforts to reach agreement at 
the UN were not successful for decades. But as Stansfield Turner pointed out: “Is a definition 
worthless because not everyone agrees with it? Simply because everyone might not agree with a 
definition of robbery, should we not define it? Because a criminal might claim that what he was 
doing was playing Robin Hood, should we not define crime?”7  
There have been obstacles to gaining general agreement on definition of terrorism. Efforts to 
define terrorism at the UN during the 20th century were hampered by several issues. Two 
particularly difficult issues were that some governments wanted to exclude goals that they 
supported such as national liberation movements, or believed that state terror and nonstate 
terrorism should be combined into one definition. 
Some governments may want no definition, or one that is ambiguous, often in order to have 
flexibility in deciding whether or not to call an incident terrorism. An agreed-upon definition 
would require an act of terrorism to be identified as such even if a government supports the 
political goal or the actors involved. This requirement for governments to apply the term 
evenhandedly, regardless of political preference, may demand action at an inopportune time. 
Some governments may resist a definition that would identify previous acts as terrorism. In 
some instances, governments have been led by individuals who perpetrated or directed terrorist 
attacks—before or even after obtaining their political positions—and governments may try to 
exclude from any definition the means of struggle that these individuals employed or directed.8 
Any definition adopted will be examined for its applicability to previous actions, and if the 
definition applies, the question may be raised as to why others may not use the same method of 
struggle. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that in some of these cases, terrorism has, in 
turn, been used against the governments led by former terrorists. 
State sponsors of terrorism prefer no definition, or one that excludes their actions. Terrorists 
and their supporters want no definition so that they can call their attacks something other than 
terrorism, and so try to deceive and confuse the public and other groups and organizations.  
Agencies may resist a single definition because of organizational perspectives. However, 
agencies can use one common definition, and then develop different definitions for different 
needs, or for different types of terrorism such as domestic terrorism, international terrorism, and 
state-sponsored terrorism. This approach can be practical: the U.S. State Department at one time 
used one basic definition of terrorism, and another for international terrorism.9  
In summary, obstacles for agreement on a basic, accurate definition of terrorism can be 
overcome. Governments can agree on an accurate and understandable terrorism definition.  
 
                                                 
6 Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 383. 
7 Memo from Stansfield Turner, 2002, author’s files. 
8 See, for example, Brian M. Jenkins, “Defense Against Terrorism,” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 5 (1986): 
781. Examples are Menachem Begin, Yasser Arafat, and Yitzhak Shamir. 
9 See, for example, U.S. State Dept., Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, inside front cover. To illustrate 
further, though the FBI had the lead responsibility for domestic terrorism, and the State Department for international 
terrorism, both agencies could use the same basic definition of terrorism, and then adopt working definitions for 
domestic and international terrorism. 





   
 
II. Arguments for Defining Terrorism 
 
There are a number of reasons to define terrorism and obtain agreement on an accurate 
definition. Several advantages follow.  
Make Counterterrorism Efforts More Effective. The effective control of any kind of 
political violence, including terrorism, requires that the phenomenon be described—it is difficult 
to find solutions for a problem without knowing what is being addressed. An accurate definition 
establishes a common framework for action in which to address the threat, and helps identify the 
means of countering that threat.10 An accurate definition can provide insight into the dynamics of 
incidents that happen, and thus allow policymakers to take the most effective responses.  
National Counterterrorism Efforts. A single, accurate definition of terrorism is needed for 
the most effective national counterterrorism efforts. Effective counterterrorism requires extensive 
coordination among government agencies, and to work together each needs to understand the 
problem being addressed. A single definition is essential to coordinate agencies’ efforts, focus 
their capabilities, prioritize issues and actions, and unify their strategies. Raymond Decker 
pointed out as follows: 
 
Commonly accepted definitions of such terms as terrorism and homeland security help 
provide assurance that organizational, management, and budgetary decisions are made 
consistently across the organizations involved in a crosscutting effort. For example, they 
help guide agencies in organizing and allocating resources and can help promote more 
effective agency and intergovernmental operations by facilitating communication. A 
common definition also can help to enforce budget discipline and support more accurate 
monitoring of expenditures. Without commonly accepted definitions, the potential exists 
for an uncoordinated approach to combating terrorism caused by duplication of efforts or 
gaps in coverage, misallocation of resources, and inadequate monitoring of expenditures.11 
 
The guidelines for U.S. fusion centers addressed the same point, and stated that the effective 
fusion of intelligence and information needed common terminology and definitions.12  
The individuals responsible for analyzing problems, finding solutions, and developing policies 
regarding terrorism need an accurate definition of terrorism to know what problem they are 
addressing. Security officials responsible for public safety must deter threats to their populations 
and respond to attacks that occur, and an inaccurately defined threat hampers effective responses. 
Furthermore, security forces and soldiers who risk their lives in combating terrorism are entitled 
to understand what they are fighting. They are also entitled to effective counterterrorism efforts 
from the countries that they are defending, and this support includes the better coordination that 
an agreed-upon definition can provide.  
 
                                                 
10 Not only can effective counterterrorism efforts flow from an accurate definition of terrorism, but governments and 
populations should not allow terrorists and supporters to define the word “terrorism,” and abuse its meaning for their 
own purposes. Lack of precision allows the term to expand and become a catchall for criminal activity, or for such 
actions as political opposition. Members of the public need to know that terrorists are trying to force their issues 
onto others—that the public is, in essence, being blackmailed into listening to someone else’s agenda. 
11 Raymond J. Decker, Combating Terrorism, GAO, GAO-03-519T, 2003, 7. 
12 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines, 2005, 3, 14. A fusion center was “a collaborative effort of two or 
more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and/or information to the center with the goal of maximizing the 
ability to detect, prevent, apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.” 





   
International Counterterrorism Efforts. A single, accurate definition of terrorism is needed 
for the most effective international counterterrorism efforts. An effective international strategy 
requires agreement on what is being dealt with—without general agreement on a subject, 
discussions on how to solve a problem are not likely to be as productive as is needed.  
To deal with terrorism that has international aspects, countries must have the cooperation of 
other countries, and a definition can strengthen international cooperation and unity to combat 
terrorism. A definition is needed to coordinate countries’ efforts and provide a focused and 
consistent strategy for fighting terrorism. Defining terrorism can aid in mobilizing and fostering 
international support against terrorism, and add to the legitimacy and moral authority of 
responses. A definition can reduce the time spent debating about who is a terrorist and who is a 
freedom fighter, and about organizations that use terrorism along with other methods of struggle.  
The problem of agreeing on a definition of terrorism at the UN obstructed international 
cooperation against terrorism for decades. A 2004 UN report stated that the inability of member 
States to agree on an anti-terrorism convention that included a definition had hampered the UN’s 
ability to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, and had prevented the UN “from 
exerting its moral authority and from sending an unequivocal message that terrorism is never an 
acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes.”13 The report also stated that lack of 
agreement on a clear and well-known definition undermines the normative and moral stance 
against terrorism.14  
Without a definition, countries can change the meaning of terrorism as desired. Having no 
accepted definition can allow countries to try to evade responsibility for terrorist groups 
operating on their territory. If States disagree about whether or not an incident is an act of 
terrorism, countries can avoid responding to terrorist attacks in other countries. 
A definition can help pressure state sponsors of terrorism. This is especially needed because 
state support can increase terrorist groups’ capabilities. The provision of safe haven may enable a 
terrorist group to conduct more frequent attacks because group members do not need to hide, and 
can plan their attacks with less secrecy. State sponsors may provide more powerful weapons than 
nonstate groups normally have access to, and thus enable a terrorist group to make more 
destructive attacks.  
State involvement with nonstate terrorism can be divided into different levels, such as 
inability to act, unawareness, inaction, permissive neglect, and support/sponsorship (Fig. C–6). 
States can be involved in terrorism in a number of ways, and to varying degrees, and an agreed-
upon definition can aid in combating terrorism at each level.  
 
 
      Fig. C–6. Levels of State Involvement with Terrorist Groups 
 
                  Inability            Unawareness                 Inaction/                    Support/          
                    to Act               of Terrorists           Permissive Neglect       Sponsorship 
   <-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------> 
                          Less Involvement                                         More Involvement 
                            (More Passive)                                               (More Active) 
 
 
                                                 
13 A More Secure World (New York: UN, 2004), para. 157.  
14 Ibid., para. 159.  





   
Make Counterterrorism Policies and Research More Accurate and Productive. To find 
the most effective policies to deal with threats, the different forms of political violence must be 
studied effectively, and categories are necessary for this purpose. To use a category for analysis, 
the category needs to be limited to a specific type of phenomenon, distinguishable from other 
phenomena. There is a need to classify the different forms of political violence into categories 
such as war, civil war, ethnic conflict, state terror, and terrorism. Security officials, experts, and 
scholars need to be able to distinguish between the various types of violence in order to find 
ways to cope with them. Different kinds of political violence operate in different ways and 
present different threats, and there are major policy differences in combating different forms of 
violence such as terrorism, organized crime extortions, hostage-taking for ransom, and bombings 
committed by mentally unstable individuals. The inducing of emotions and responses from third-
parties for political purposes is a distinct method of operation, and one that sets terrorism apart 
from most other forms of political violence—and presents particular challenges to combat. 
Accurate research requires consistent criteria regarding the data to be used, and a definition 
guides the criteria. There is a need for specific criteria that can be used to classify events as 
terrorism. These criteria must be agreed upon and applied objectively by those studying 
terrorism—when different criteria are used, the statistics and conclusions must be evaluated in 
light of the criteria for the data on which conclusions are based.15 And researchers create 
confusion when one classifies an event as terrorism, and another does not.  
A single definition of terrorism would require organizations and agencies to revise their 
criteria and databases, but this has been done many times. The U.S. government, for example, 
has changed its criteria and database several times.16 
Reduce Terrorism and the Costs of Terrorism. An accurate and clear definition can help 
reduce the use of terrorism. Very few people have actually been willing to use terrorism, and if it 
was clearly understood what terrorism is, even fewer people might adopt it as a method. 
Similarly, if the public understands what terrorism is and emphatically voices opposition to its 
use, political groups may be deterred from making the initial decision to adopt terrorism. (Before 
selecting any method of struggle, groups are likely to discuss what tools they will use to pursue 
their goals, and if these groups believe that using terrorism will not get them the support they 
want, they are likely to choose other tools. Lack of popular support has helped to end many 
terrorist groups and campaigns.) Public opposition to terrorism may also affect subsequent 
decisions to use terrorism. Fewer attacks would likely result in fewer deaths and injuries; less 
damage and destruction; and reduced costs of responses, which often involve significant 
expenses. Defining terrorism can help third-parties make more effective responses to attacks and 
avoid counterproductive measures, and thereby reduce the costs involved with self-damaging 
responses. A form of political violence to which governments, companies, and people respond by 
spending large sums requires that the measures taken against terrorism be effective and efficient. 
 
                                                 
15 For example, the data used in the ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) database 
were not comparable with the data used in the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism reports. See Edward 
F. Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism 2002–2004: A Chronology, vol. 1 (Westport: Praeger, 2006), ix. 
16 During the first years of the Patterns of Global Terrorism reports, the U.S State Department changed the coding 
criteria several times, and updated the database accordingly. See Dennis Pluchinsky, “The Evolution of the U.S. 
Government’s Annual Report on Terrorism: A Personal Commentary,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006). 
As a note, incidents in the START database were coded in a way that allowed users to identify only those incidents 
that met their definition of terrorism. In this way, researchers could use the same data, though their conclusions 
might differ because of the different definitions being used. See START, “Data Collection Methodology,” Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/ (Jan. 17, 2012). 





   
Reduce Misuse of the Term. A definition can reduce the misuse of the term “terrorism.” 
Terrorism is an attention-getting and negative word, and its misuse has many detrimental effects.  
The term “terrorism” has been misused as a pejorative applied to any action a person opposes. 
Some governments have labeled any opposition, even peaceful opposition, as terrorism, and this 
kind of misuse adds to the confusion about terrorism. “If ‘terrorist’ is what one calls one’s 
opponent…then the word is more of an epithet or a debating stratagem than a label that enables 
all who read it, whatever their ideological affiliation, to know what terrorism is and what it is 
not,” Martha Crenshaw noted.17 If the term “terrorism” simply describes a position disagreed 
with, the term is being used primarily for political or propaganda purposes. 
The term “terrorist” can be used as a political 
weapon. The term is very stigmatizing, and 
therefore, getting the label applied to opponents 
can be politically advantageous (see example in 
box).18 If the label sticks, opponents have been 
branded as criminal and even evil, and the  
opponent’s goal may appear evil by association. “If you can brand your foes as terrorists, that’s 
an important moral and political victory,” Brian Jenkins pointed out.19 In contrast, the labelers 
may appear righteous, and thereby win public support and promote solidarity within a group. 
Calling adversaries “terrorists” can also be a way of trying to avoid negotiation or compromise, 
since one should not enter into discussions with criminals.  
A definition would counter the tendency to apply the term “terrorism” to a widening range of 
acts that are not terrorism. “Water terrorism” has been used to describe the diversion of water, 
“paper terrorism” to describe bogus legal actions filed to clog courts or protest taxation, and 
“cultural terrorism” to describe boycotts by artists and musicians to protest a country’s policies.20 
The term “political terrorists” was used by a columnist to describe politicians who opposed 
healthcare reform.21 But these kinds of actions are not terrorism: “terrorism” must involve 
violence (and/or the threat of violence), and cannot include such nonviolent forms of protest as 
peaceful protest, boycotts, and walkouts. William Arkin noted that pasting the terrorist label on 
everything from nonviolent civil disobedience to environmental activism had allowed “some to 
argue that even George Washington was a terrorist.”22 
An accurate definition would prevent the insertion of political preferences into a definition to 
reflect preferred counterterrorism methods. For example, those who want a military response may 
try to define terrorism as “combat” or “war.” The “political preference” approach is likely to 
distort any definition, and a definition needs to be free of bias. This approach is also impractical: 
as Paul Pillar pointed out, “arguing semantics as a surrogate for arguing about policy is a 
confusing, cumbersome, and ultimately poor way to arrive at a policy.”23 
 
                                                 
17 Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, 1983, 2. 
18 Amy Goldstein, “Paige Calls NEA a ‘Terrorist’ Group,” Washington Post, Feb. 24, 2004.  
19 Brian Jenkins, quoted in Mary H. Cooper, “Definitions of Terrorism Often Vary,” CQ Researcher, July 21, 1995. 
20 Karin Brulliard, “Rhetoric Grows Heated in Water Dispute Between India, Pakistan,” Washington Post, May 28, 
2010; Tobias Buck, “Band Boycott Has Israelis Fearing Cultural Divide,” Financial Times, June 12, 2010.  
21 Steven Pearlstein, “Republicans Propagating Falsehoods in Attacks on Health-Care Reform,” Washington Post, 
Aug. 7, 2009.  
22 William M. Arkin, “‘War’ Plays into Terrorists’ Hands,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 29, 2002. 
23 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, 13. 
Political use of the term “terrorism”: In 
2004, U.S. Education Secretary Roderick Paige 
called the National Education Association 
(NEA), the largest teacher’s union in the United 
States, a “terrorist organization.” 
 





   
Reduce Confusion. Terrorism needs to be defined to preclude the confusion that results from 
having many definitions. Governments, international organizations, scholars, and databases have 
used different definitions, many of which are inaccurate, conflicting, complicated, confusing, or 
misleading. Confusion about terrorism has many negative consequences, such as enabling 
terrorists to try to blur the meaning of terrorism. An example is calling terrorist attacks “acts of 
resistance.” To illustrate, in 1997, Lebanon maintained that its resistance to Israeli occupation of 
Lebanese territory was not terrorism.24 However, “resistance” may or may not be terrorism: if no 
terrorist attacks are perpetrated, then resistance to occupation is, in fact, not terrorism.  
A definition would help reduce public confusion. Confusion can result when newspapers use 
different terms such as militants, gunmen, guerillas, raiders, and commandos to describe the 
same group members. Public confusion can increase even more if political leaders and law 
enforcement officers misuse terms. For example, when a street gang member was charged under 
New York’s state terrorism laws, a district attorney said that street gangs had been  
perpetrating “terror,” and the police commissioner said 
the gang had “terrorized” the community.25 However, 
there was no political purpose for the gang’s criminal 
acts, and it is important to distinguish between political 
violence and common crime. In this instance, 
prosecutors did not allege that the gang was connected to 
any terrorist group or network, and the case shows how 
misuse of the term “terrorism” can contribute to an 
expanding definition (see an illustration of street gang 
attacks in Fig. C–7). (In addition to reducing public 
confusion, an accepted definition would reduce the time 
spent discussing what terrorism is: after the 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombing, newspaper articles repeated the same kind of discussion regarding the 
definition of terrorism that had been going on for decades.26) 
An accepted and accurate definition would help people identify and resist terrorist attempts at 
manipulation. For example, agreement on a definition of terrorism would make it more difficult 
for terrorists to play on sympathy by portraying their attacks as something other than terrorism.  
An accepted and accurate definition would reduce confusion among and within government 
agencies. Different agencies within the U.S. government have used different definitions—in 
2005, for example, the State Department, DOD, FBI, and Homeland Security used different 
definitions (Tables C–1 and C–2, note, too, that none accurately define terrorism). In 2001, 
hundreds of federal statutes and regulations referenced “terrorism,” and included a number of 
different definitions.27 Counterterrorism efforts would be more effective with consistent 
definitions, and increased cooperation among agencies would inspire more public trust. Reduced 
confusion among government agencies would also help the public understand terrorism better, 
and be better prepared to respond effectively to attacks. 
 
                                                 
24 UNGA press release, “General Assembly, with No Dissent, Adopts International Convention for Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings,” Dec. 15, 1997. 
25 Michelle Garcia, “N.Y. Using Terrorism Law to Prosecute Street Gang,” Washington Post, Feb. 1, 2005. 
26 See, for example, Juan C. Zarate, “When Do We Call It ‘Terrorism’?” Washington Post, April 21, 2013.  
27 See Elizabeth Martin, “Terrorism” and Related Terms in Statute and Regulation: Selected Language, CRS 
RS21021, Oct. 2, 2003. 
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State (2005). [Terrorism is] premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.28 
 
DOD (2005). [Terrorism is] the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful 
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the 
pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.29  
 
FBI (2005). Terrorism includes the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.30 
 
Homeland Security (2005). The term “terrorism” means any activity that involves an act that 
is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; 
and is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision 
of the United States; and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct 




Table C–2. U.S. Government Definitions of Terrorism, 2005 
(Required Characteristics in Italics) 
 
Characteristics 








I. The Violent Act X X X X 
  Nonstate attacker X    
  Violence X X X some acts 
    Threat of violence  X   
      -Premeditated X X   
      -Unlawful  X X X 
      -Random/symbolic     
  Noncombatants/ X  “persons” “human life” 
  Property X  X some 
   3  
II. 3rd-Party Involvement  X X X 
   3rd-party targets  some some some 
       -Affect  some   
       -Elicit responses    some 
       -Mechanisms  some some some 
     
III. Political Goals 
 






                                                 
28 U.S. State Dept., Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 9. During earlier years, the State Department’s definition 
included victim-target differentiation: “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience.” See numerous State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism reports (italics added). 
29 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2005. 
30 28 CFR 0.85 (2005), Title 28--Judicial Administration. 
31 6 USCS § 101 (2005), Title 6. Domestic Security. Chapter 1. Homeland Security Organization. 
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I. Claims That “Others” Are Responsible for Attacks 
II. Claims That Terrorist Violence Is Justified 





Terrorists use a number of arguments to try to justify their attacks, and though none of the 
arguments are valid, they need to be examined because they can deceive people and thereby 
undermine counterterrorism efforts. Deceptive attempts at justifications can make terrorism 
difficult to counter because of the perception of the legitimacy of the goals terrorists are 
pursuing, and by the fact that terrorists try to make themselves appear altruistic in the pursuit of 
these goals. Many attempts to justify terrorism fall into three categories: to claim that others, not 
the terrorists, are responsible for the attacks; to claim that the violence is justified; and to try to 
place the attacks under the umbrella of war and military conflict (and are therefore legitimate).  
 
 
I. Claims That “Others” Are Responsible for Attacks 
 
Introduction. Terrorists have claimed that others—not themselves—are to blame for terrorist 
attacks. Two of these arguments follow. 
Claim #1: “Someone Else Is Responsible.” Terrorists often claim that they are not 
responsible for the violence they perpetrate, or for the effects of their violence. Alex Schmid and 
Albert Jongman addressed this argument as follows: 
 
Leila Khaled, the notorious Arab skyjacker [said], “If we throw bombs, it is not our responsibility. 
You may care for the death of a child, but the whole world ignored the death of Palestinian 
children for twenty-two years. We are not responsible.” The implication is that the apathy of the 
whole world is to blame for the terrorists’ violent actions and that if the world redresses the just 
grievances of the terrorists it will no longer be subjected to attacks of this nature.1 
 
 However, by this logic all groups with any grievance can claim that they are justified in using 
terrorism because of the “unconcern” of others regarding a particular goal or grievance—and that 
the group is entitled to decide what level of unconcern justifies the terrorist attacks. This logic 
could be used by groups on any and all sides of an issue.  
There are many examples of attempts to shift responsibility. After a terrorist group hijacked a 
Lufthansa airplane in October 1977, the group’s leader claimed that whatever the group did next 
would be entirely the fault of the German government. The IRA claimed that their attacks were 
the responsibility of the British for not having left Northern Ireland. Abu Iyad tried to shift the 
blame for the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre to the International Olympic Committee and the 
international community for not having properly recognized the Palestinians, and claimed that 
the German rescue attempt was responsible for the murder of the Israeli athletes.2 
 
                                                 
1 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1988, 86.  
2 Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 1998, 28. 




   
Claim #2: “The Victims Are ‘Guilty’ or ‘Worthless.’” Terrorists and their supporters have 
tried to blame their victims and show that they deserved the harm done to them. Even when the 
victims have little or no connection to the terrorists’ goals, terrorists may still try to attribute 
blame to them. In 1972, the PFLP attempted to justify the murders of travelers in Lod Airport, 
including many Christian Puerto Ricans on a pilgrimage, by saying that by being in Israel, the 
victims in essence had recognized the Israeli State.3 
Terrorists may ascribe “guilt” to everyone in a particular group because of what their 
governments are doing, or simply because of their nationality, ethnicity, or religion. Osama bin 
Laden expressed this attitude when he said, “We do not have to differentiate between military or 
civilian. As far as we are concerned, [Americans] are all targets.”4  
Terrorists have often broadened their targets of violence. In 1968, Palestinian groups first 
attacked the Israeli airline El Al, and then expanded to European airlines. At first the Basque 
group ETA primarily attacked police officers and alleged informers, but over time broadened its 
targets to include civil servants and military officers; civilians; and finally journalists, judges, 
businessmen, professors, Basque politicians, and others who did not support nationalist goals. 
Supporters may claim that the victims of terrorist attacks were guilty. Steve Bruce outlined a 
number of arguments that Loyalist journals in Northern Ireland used to try to justify the murder 
of Catholics, such as the 1971 bombing of McGurk’s Bar, in which fifteen people were killed, 
including two children: 
 
The victims were IRA men. Some of them were IRA men. 
If they were not active members, then they were 
supporters of the IRA. If they were not supporters of the 
IRA, then at the very least they had silently acquiesced in 
IRA atrocities in that they did nothing to root the IRA out 
of their areas. And, even if they were not guilty of that 
crime, they were nationalists who were willing to benefit 
politically from the actions of the IRA and were thus 
almost as responsible as the IRA.5 
 
Thus all of the victims were painted as “guilty.” (Note that 
this “logic” could be used to apply to all future victims as well.) 
In some instances, terrorists may assert that by not actively supporting them, people forfeit all 
rights. Paul Wilkinson summarized this terrorist attitude as follows: “You must be either with us 
or against us. If you are with us, join our cause and fight against the enemy. If you are not 
actively with us, we will assume you are a traitor, and therefore we are entitled to kill you.”6 
Stigmatizing victims as “guilty” has the additional benefit of helping to legitimize the terrorists’ 
actions in their own eyes, and the eyes of their supporters. (Note that neutralizing guilt is 
important to many terrorists, who may feel remorse over their attacks.)  
 
                                                 
3 Brian M. Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., 
International Terrorism and World Security (New York: John Wiley, 1975), 18. 
4 John Miller, “Interview with Osama bin Laden,” Frontline, PBS, May 1998. 
5 Steve Bruce, The Edge of the Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 45. See also Steve Bruce, “Protestantism 
and Terrorism in Northern Ireland,” in Yonah Alexander and Alan O’Day, eds., Ireland’s Terrorist Trauma (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1989) 18–33. 
6 Wilkinson, “Ethical Defences of Terrorism—Defending the Indefensible,” Terrorism & Political Violence (Jan. 1989): 11. 
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Many terrorists place no limits on their assumed “right” to place blame. In this view, women 
may be attacked because they provide support, and children because they will become the next 
generation of opponents. As an IRA member said, “We regard all people who support the armed 
forces of the British Government in any way as legitimate targets.”7  
However, all “victims are guilty” arguments are invalid for a number of reasons. First, there is 
no legal basis for “guilt by association.” A basic principle of law is that crimes are individual 
acts—there must be no collective punishment of a group for the acts of individuals.8 To 
illustrate, at the Nuremberg trials after World War II, people were prosecuted for specific acts, 
and not for reasons such as having been members of a particular political party. In terms of 
international law, the principle of individual responsibility for specific criminal acts is customary 
international law, and therefore binding on States, groups, and individuals. 
Another basic principle of law is that minimum force should be used to stop lawbreakers. 
Terrorists violate this principle by the unlimited injuries that many of their attacks cause (and 
because their victims are usually not lawbreakers). 
A third basic principle is that all persons are protected by law. Terrorists take the law in their 
own hands, and thus violate due process. People have the right to a fair trial—Common Article 3 
of each of the four Geneva Conventions prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out 
of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording 
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”9 If an 
international crime is alleged, Principle V of the Nuremberg Tribunal applies, which states that 
“any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts 
and law.”10 Terrorist attacks deprive people of their legal rights. 
Terrorists and their supporters may claim that terrorist attacks are justified because their 
victims have little or no “worth,” or are not “worth” as much as other people. A reported 
statement by Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad can illustrate: “We don’t make a distinction 
between civilians and non-civilians, innocents and non-innocents. Only between Muslims and 
unbelievers. And the life of an unbeliever has no value. It has no sanctity.”11 A rabbi expressed a 
similar attitude at the funeral of the perpetrator of the Hebron massacre: “The life of a Jew is 
worth much more than the lives of many gentiles.”12 These kinds of expressions try to negate the 
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II. Claims That Terrorist Violence Is Justified 
 
Introduction. Many terrorists and supporters claim that attacks are justified. These claims 
have taken several forms, a number of which follow. 
Claim #1: “Last Resort/Forced to Use Terrorism.” Terrorists have claimed that they were 
“forced” to use terrorism as their “only means” or “last resort.” The statement that “terrorism is 
morally justified whenever there is no other remedy for an intolerable situation,” illustrates this 
kind of claim.13 This deception technique comes in different forms.  
In one technique, terrorists try to convey an image of an oppressed people who have 
exhausted all options, and turned to terrorism from desperation. This technique tries to use the 
moral appeal of the oppressed. George Shultz described this position as follows: “Terrorists say 
to us, ‘Look, it’s very simple. Change your policy, and no more planes are hijacked. Figure out a 
way to give us what we want, and no more children will be killed. We’ll release your hostages if 
you free our brothers or pay us a ransom. After all, injustice has made us desperate.’”14 
In another technique, terrorists claim that terrorism is their only means of struggle because of 
the disparity of power and resources between themselves and their opponents. For example, 
terrorists may argue that they are justified in using attacks because they are trying to remove a 
tyrannical regime that is much stronger than the terrorist group. In a third technique, terrorists 
have tried to justify attacks because there were no democratic institutions they could use to 
pursue their goals, or that they were denied access to these democratic institutions.  
All of these kinds of claims are false. No one is forced to use terrorism. Terrorism is a 
choice—people select their methods of struggle and there are alternatives to terrorism. 
Nonviolent tools include demonstrations, marches, human chains, public meetings, speeches, 
writings, mass organization, strikes, civil disobedience, hunger strikes, boycotts, contacts with 
the media, and competition in elections (if available).  
There are many examples of nonviolent struggles that succeeded in achieving major political 
change in democratic and nondemocratic countries. Martin Luther King’s civil rights campaign 
achieved major political change in the United States without using any violent methods. There 
was continual pressure within his organization to adopt a more militant approach, but King 
consistently responded with the absolute need to adhere to nonviolent methods.15 
Terrorism played no role in the peaceful overthrow of many totalitarian governments during 
the “great change” (the “Wende”) that ended the Cold War and brought freedom to people in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The methods these groups used to press for peaceful change 
included mass demonstrations, speeches, writings, and escape.  
Trying and not succeeding with nonviolent methods does not justify turning to terrorism. 
Many groups seeking political change have had to make repeated efforts before they were 
successful. If Martin Luther King had turned to terrorism it is not likely that his campaign would 
have succeeded—the use of terrorism would likely have resulted in more repressive methods 
being used, and the general public might have accepted these methods as justified. 
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15 See King, Stride Toward Freedom, 1958, 87–89. During the U.S. civil rights movement, Martin Luther King 
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Claim #2: “Only Responding to Injustices or Violence by Others.” Terrorists have claimed 
that their violence is justified because they are only responding to injustice, terrorism, or 
violence by others such as the State, opponents, or a rival movement.16 George Habash described 
the forced expulsion of all Arabs (including himself and his 
family) from Lydda as an action that justified his adoption of 
terrorism, saying that the Israelis “came to Lydda [and] forced 
us to flee…. It was terrible. One thinks: this isn’t life, this isn’t 
human. Once you have seen this, your heart and your brain are 
transformed…. We want to remind the world that a catastrophe 
has taken place here, and that justice must be done…. After 
what has happened to us we have the right to do anything, 
including what you call acts of terrorism.”17  
In other instances, terrorists have claimed that attacks are justified because opponents have 
used terrorism against them or that others have achieved a similar goal through the use of 
terrorism. Palestinian leaders, for example, reportedly said that terrorism “has been used by other 
patriotic movements which lacked other effective means, including the Israelis before 1947.”18  
Terrorists have claimed that the State or someone else is the real terrorist. After the 1998 Vail 
attack, the comment was made, “To me, Vail expanding into lynx habitat is ecoterrorism.”19 
All of these kinds of justification attempts are false. Those who have suffered great injustices 
can choose how to respond. Many people who have been treated with extreme cruelty have put 
the experience in the past, or worked to ensure that others did not suffer as they had. Thomas 
Buergenthal said that he and other Holocaust survivors had the obligation to try “to ensure that 
those who come after us—whether they are Jewish, Haitians, Muslims, Rwandans, or human 
beings anywhere…are not subjected to what was done to us.”20 
It is both immoral and impractical to seek justice through terrorism even if a person or group 
has been wronged. Responding to an alleged crime with a terrorist attack uses one crime to 
answer another, and detracts from the morality of those who choose that response. In response to 
the Pan Am 103 bombing, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said, “I do not think an eye 
for an eye or a tooth for a tooth is ever valid,” and added that revenge could affect innocent 
people.21 “I can understand the anger,” she said. “We feel the anger very deeply. The most 
important thing to do is to try to get the cooperation of all nations to track down these people so 
that they are brought to justice.”22 It is also impractical to seek justice through terrorism. 
Responding to one “wrong” with another seldom solves problems and usually makes them 
worse. Vengeance can lead to ever-increasing violence: “An eye for an eye, and soon the whole 
world is blind.” Cycles of violence need to be broken, not escalated—if violence could end 
violence, the world might have become peaceful long ago.  
 
                                                 
16 For example, several UN representatives said that in their opinion, violent action by a State provoked terrorist 
attacks against it. Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/9028, Supp. (18 Dec. 1973), para. 49, 
in Bassiouni, International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 134. 
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19 Robert Sullivan, “The Face of Eco-Terrorism,” New York Times, Dec. 20, 1998. 
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Claim #3: “Terrorism Is ‘Self-Defense.’” Terrorists have claimed that their violence is 
“self-defense.” Osama bin Laden made this claim when he said, “America and Western leaders 
often say that Hamas, the [Islamic] Jihad in Palestine and other militant organizations are 
terrorist groups. If self-defense is terrorism, what then is legitimate?”23 Self-defense can be 
legitimate, but it does not follow that all means are, therefore, justified to use in self-defense. 
People have the right to defend themselves when under unlawful attack, but not at the expense of 
other people’s rights, and there are means that must not be used. The use of force is not 
unlimited, and those who take up arms are prohibited from making noncombatants the direct 
object of attack—and many terrorists do deliberately attack noncombatants. Regardless of who 
or what are the targets of violence, terrorism is a means that violates the rights of others.  
There is a presumption against the use of private judgment regarding force: the use of force is 
to be confined to the government, with exceptions for individual use in certain situations such as 
self-defense from attempted murder. However, there is a significant difference between state and 
nonstate actors regarding the use of force and violence. The police have the responsibility to act 
within the law, and thereby uphold the law and promote the general welfare. Terrorists have no 
such responsibilities and usurp the authority to use violence without bearing the corresponding 
responsibilities of governments, military forces, and the police. Even when terrorists are working 
for goals that others support, terrorists answer to no one, and thus endanger everyone. 
Claim #4: “Terrorism Is No Worse Than What Others Do.” Terrorists and their supporters 
have tried to justify their attacks by comparing their violence to that of others. Sheikh Omar 
Bakri Muhammad expressed this attitude when he said, “The British also are terrorists, in Iraq…. 
Terrorism is the law of the 21st century. It’s legitimate.”24 In another example, an individual 
condemned bombings and violence, but said that Muslims were angry because of daily 
oppression in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and being killed in Iraq, and were asking why no 
one was doing anything about Muslims getting killed.25 But terrorism is not the law of the 21st 
century, and legitimate ways to resist oppression do not include terrorism.  
Terrorists have argued that democratic governments have used violence on their own citizens. 
It is true that a government’s legitimate use of force can spill over into excess; however, in a 
democracy, state violence can be corrected through the rule of law through such means as 
investigation and prosecution. In contrast, by not having the legitimation of law, terrorist 
violence is essentially arbitrary in that the terrorists decide on the violence, and not the people 
through democratically-enacted laws. In addition, democratic States must answer to their 
populations, whereas terrorists arrogate to themselves the right to be above the law. 
 Terrorists have pointed out that Western democracies have supported nonstate groups that 
used terrorism, and regimes that used state terror against their own citizens. Paul Wilkinson 
noted that the during the Cold War, the U.S. government assisted military dictatorships in Latin 
America, and turned a blind eye to their human rights violations because they believed that 
supporting these regimes was vital to preventing these countries from “following the Cuban path 
and going over to the communist camp.”26 Nevertheless, totalitarian and authoritative regimes 
perpetrated the overwhelming majority of 20th century acts of state terror and violence, not 
democracies. 
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Claim #5: “The Political Goal Justifies the Attacks.” Terrorists use several false arguments 
to try to show that the goal they are seeking justifies their attacks. The “hallowed cause” and 
“greater good” are two arguments. At other times terrorists claim that they are justified in using 
any and all means. 
“Legitimate or ‘Hallowed’ Cause.” Terrorists have claimed that their goal is “so hallowed” 
that they are justified to use terrorism (or any means they choose). In the “hallowed cause” view, 
everyone—men, women, children, and infants—may be considered potential victims for the sake 
of the goal, even if they have no connection with the terrorists’ goal. The claim has been made 
that terrorist attacks in pursuit of certain goals are acceptable, or even “worthy.” In 1972 a 
Madagascar UN representative said that acts of terrorism “undertaken to vindicate hallowed 
rights recognized by the United Nations were praiseworthy,” though the effects on innocent 
persons were, “of course, regrettable.”27 Some UN delegations argued that international 
terrorism practiced in a “just cause” such as self-determination could not be considered 
criminal.28 
The attempt to justify terrorism through religion is a variation of the “hallowed cause.” Omar 
Malik pointed out that it was “not difficult for those who are so minded to find a diktat of the 
‘smite thine enemies’ variety in the Old Testament, the Torah, or the Koran [and that] such 
diktats can then be reinterpreted (or spun) for believers into a sacred call to terrorism.”29 But as 
Martha Crenshaw pointed out: “The specific doctrines that extremists espouse are typically 
narrow, inconsistent, and selective interpretations of wider bodies of thought. Furthermore, the 
decision to use violence may come first, at least on the part of the leadership, which then crafts a 
borrowed doctrine out of bits and pieces of established ideology or religion in order to support 
what is in essence a political goal.”30  
No major religion permits the kinds of attacks that terrorists perpetrate. After the 9/11 attacks, 
the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference  said, “Our tolerant Islamic 
religion highly prizes the sanctity of human life and considers the willful killing of a single soul 
as tantamount to killing humanity at large.”31 Muslim scholars of the Fiqh Council of North 
America issued a ruling that condemned terrorism, and declared that those who committed 
suicide bombings were not martyrs but criminals, and that it is forbidden in Islam to target 
civilians in terrorist acts or to cooperate with any individual or group involved in any act of 
terrorism or violence.32  
Pope John Paul II wrote that terrorists “gravely offend God and man” and that “No religious 
leader can condone terrorism, and much less preach it. It is a profanation of religion to declare 
oneself a terrorist in the name of God, to do violence to others in his name. Terrorist violence is a 
contradiction of faith in God…. Terrorism exploits not just people, it exploits God: it ends by 
making him an idol to be used for one’s own purposes…. You shall not kill in God’s name!”33  
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“The Greater Good (For All or Some)/Lesser Evil.” Terrorists have argued that the overall 
benefit of their political goals outweighs the harm done to the victims of terrorist attacks. As one 
example, terrorists have claimed that their political goals will bring about a better society for 
everyone, and therefore terrorist attacks are on behalf of the “greater good.” Another example is 
the argument that attacks to overthrow a dictator could result in a net gain for human rights.  
In the related “lesser evil” ploy, terrorists and their supporters have tried to justify terrorist 
attacks by saying that their violence is less damaging than the situation they are trying to correct. 
An example is the following statement regarding the bombing of family planning clinics: 
“Perhaps it is terrorism to use violence to intimidate. But which is the greater terror: the 
destruction of two dozen buildings without loss of life in 1984, or the destruction of 1.5 million 
human beings because they were inconvenient to the mothers who carried them?”34 
Other terrorists see themselves as the “enlightened” who know what is best for the masses. A 
1999 FBI report noted that leftwing groups generally viewed themselves as “protectors of the 
people against the dehumanizing effects of capitalism and imperialism.”35 Members of the Red 
Army Faction were described as seeing themselves as “the most advanced consciousness of 
humanity,” with a mission to lead people to Marxist revolution.36 In other cases, terrorists 
believed that attacks would lead others to fulfill the goal—the Weather Underground claimed, 
“We create the seeds of the new society in the struggle for the destruction of the empire.”37  
Some terrorists have claimed that they are acting on the behalf of a particular group, or have 
viewed themselves as an “elite” (though self-appointed), acting on behalf of the oppressed, 
marginalized, or dispossessed. But as Pope John Paul II wrote: “The terrorist claim to be acting 
on behalf of the poor is a patent falsehood…. The injustices existing in the world can never be 
used to excuse acts of terrorism, and it should be noted that the victims of the radical breakdown 
of order which terrorism seeks to achieve include above all the countless millions of men and 
women who are least well-positioned to withstand a collapse of international solidarity—namely, 
the people of the developing world, who already live on a thin margin of survival.”38 
Terrorists may act without asking whether members of a claimed constituent community 
desire attacks on their behalf, or whether terrorism is in the best interest of that community. The 
people on whose behalf terrorists claim to be acting may not approve of the goal the self-
proclaimed elite is pursuing, in which case the terrorists may think that the claimed community 
must be “led” or even forced. During the 19th century, one purpose of terrorist attacks was to try 
to communicate with the masses—to stir them and draw them from their “torpor,” but many 
terrorist groups have tried to coerce the public or claimed constituent community. 
But regarding these kinds of arguments, terrorists have no right to decide for others what is 
best, no right to use violence to try to impose what they think, and no right to violate the rights of 
others. All individuals have the right to think what they like, but respect for the equal rights of 
others limits the actions people have the right to take to implement their thoughts. 
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“All Means Are Justified.” Terrorists have claimed that they are justified in using any and all 
means. A statement by Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah is an example: “There is no 
difference between dying with a gun in your hand or exploding yourself. In a situation of 
struggle or holy war you have to find the best means to achieve your goals.”39  
However, the right to adopt the means of injuring an opponent or enemy is not unlimited. This 
long-recognized principle is customary international law, binding on all States, groups, and 
individuals. The UN General Assembly has repeatedly recognized the requirement to apply this 
principle in all armed struggles. As one such example, in 1968 the UN General Assembly 
affirmed that the right of parties in a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited, and that it is prohibited to launch attacks against civilian populations.40 
There is a long history of restraints on the means used in armed conflicts. The idea that war 
and armed hostilities are subject to rules dates back to ancient civilizations on many continents. 
Ancient India, China, Greece, and Rome customarily observed particular humanitarian 
principles, as did societies in Africa, and religions such as Islam.41 Some laws prescribed when 
nations could or should go to war (jus ad bellum); others dealt with conduct in war (jus in bello). 
India’s ancient Book of Manu contained the instructions below:  
 
When [the king] fights with his foes in battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed (in 
wood), nor with [such as are] barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazing with fire. 
Let him not strike one who…joins the palms of his hands (in supplication), nor one who (flees) 
with flying hair, nor one who sits down, nor one who says “I am thine.” Nor one who 
sleeps…nor one who is disarmed [or] grievously wounded; (but in all these cases let him) 
remember the duty (of honorable warriors).42 
 
During the American Civil War, the U.S. government issued General Orders No. 100, which 
expressed the idea of restrictions on armed conflict as follows: “Men who take up arms against 
one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one 
another and to God.”43 During a meeting on terrorism at the UN, several representatives pointed 
out that if States fighting for their very existence were legally precluded from using all means, 
that there were also constraints on individuals and groups:  
 
In the opinion of some representatives, the examination of the question of causes of 
international violence could not imply seeing in those causes justification of any sort for the 
violence experienced. There were limits to what was permissible and acceptable to the 
international community. If the fundamental right of the State to self-defense could be limited 
by the laws of war in that there were acts so brutal that no State might undertake them even if 
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III. War and Military “Justifications” 
 
Introduction. Many terrorists and their supporters are well aware that the terms “terrorist” 
and “terrorism” are very stigmatizing, and therefore have gone to great lengths to try to get 
people to see attacks as something other than terrorism. To illustrate, after the 1998 Vail ski 
resort attack, an ELF spokesman stated that the attack was not an act of terrorism, but an “act of 
love.”45 But attempts to disguise and justify terrorism have frequently involved efforts to place 
terrorist attacks and terrorists in the context of war and military conflict. In these justification 
attempts, terrorists often call terrorism “war”; adopt military designations for their groups and 
organizations; and describe themselves in such terms as soldiers, guerillas, and freedom fighters. 
Terrorists use this deception technique to try to achieve a number of benefits for themselves and 
their goals, as addressed below: 
—Terrorists use war and military terminology in the pursuit of legitimacy. Terrorists are 
trying to get people to see terrorist attacks as included in the legal and moral structure that 
governs war and armed conflict. If terrorists can successfully elicit this response, terrorist attacks 
may seem legitimate, and the acts of terrorists and military forces may be seen as morally 
equivalent (which they are not). Terrorists are trying to get others to see them as one of the 
groups that are authorized to use force and/or violence, and therefore claim the same legitimacy. 
Military force can have legitimacy because of its legality and its function as a state instrument, 
and terrorists are trying to be seen as being on this same level.  
The issue of legitimacy is crucial. The more legitimacy a terrorist group can obtain, the more 
support it can garner to pursue its goals. If terrorists can get themselves and their acts to be seen 
as within the law, they have been given a great deal of legitimacy, recognition, and status—and 
in some cases may be seen as more on a par with a government.  
—Terrorists are trying to avoid being seen as common criminals. Under the laws of almost all 
countries, terrorist acts such as murder are the acts of common criminals. However, a lethal act 
by a soldier is not murder when that act is within the laws of war. Alex Schmid addressed the 
issues of terrorist legitimacy and crime as follows: 
 
Generally, terrorists try to avoid a discussion of their tactics because this would help label 
them as criminals; they much prefer a discussion that places their struggle in a framework 
of a war for political ends. When the language describing terrorism concentrates on crime, 
it raises questions of legitimacy very different from when the terminology of war is used to 
describe terrorism.46 
 
—Terrorists try to call terrorism “war,” and themselves soldiers, to be seen as powerful. 
Military forces have strength, and the state of being “at war” can be seen as a powerful status. 
Therefore, if terrorists are successful in being seen in this way, they have increased their stature 
in some people’s eyes.  
In summary, the military context is a prevalent deception technique that has taken several 
forms. In seeking to place themselves and their actions in the military and war context, terrorists 
make a number of claims that need to be examined, especially in light of the laws of war. 
 
                                                 
45 Mike Soraghan, “‘Eco-Terror’ Spokesman Takes Fifth,” Denver Post, Feb. 13, 2002.  
46 Alex P. Schmid, “The Problems of Defining Terrorism,” in Crenshaw and Pimlott, eds., International 
Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 1997, 20. 




   
Claim #1: Terrorists Are Soldiers. Terrorists often call themselves soldiers, and use military 
imagery to try to cloak themselves with the legitimacy of soldiers who fight in accordance with 
the laws of war. However, the image of terrorists as soldiers is an illusion—an insidious illusion. 
There are significant differences between soldiers and terrorists. A number of these differences 
can be seen by comparing soldiers assaulting a machine gun nest with terrorists planting 
grenades in a crowded marketplace: 
—Soldiers are state actors, acting on behalf of a government. The government has given 
soldiers responsibilities that include defending the country, and therefore has given them the 
means to fulfill their responsibilities—means such as training, weapons, and the authority to use 
the weapons in accordance with the laws of war. Terrorists, in contrast, are private individuals 
acting on their own. They have no responsibility for which they need a weapon, and have not 
been authorized to use force or violence. Instead, terrorists arrogate to themselves the “right” to 
use violence, and any weapons and means of destruction, no matter how barbaric.  
—Soldiers are required to use discrimination regarding their targets.47 In using grenades to 
attack a machine gun nest, soldiers can aim and throw, and therefore have some control over 
what targets they are aiming at, and over the lethality of the attack. The laws of war prohibit 
soldiers from making noncombatants the deliberate object of attack, and soldiers can avoid 
throwing grenades at civilians.48 In contrast, terrorists attacking a marketplace with grenades 
fully intend to cause indiscriminate civilian injuries and deaths. 
—Soldiers carry their weapons openly, and wear uniforms and insignia that clearly identify 
them as combatants. In contrast, terrorists attacking a marketplace with grenades are likely to 
wear civilian clothes and carry their grenades in secret. 
—The laws of war involve humanitarian considerations, honor, and chivalry. For example, 
after a battle, the laws of war require parties on both sides to search for and care for the 
wounded.49 Terrorists, however, are likely to depart as quickly as possible after an attack (or 
after planting bombs or other explosive devices), leaving the victims to their fate. Furthermore, 
many terrorists deliberately seek outrage by violating humanitarian considerations, and honor. 
—To be a soldier requires courage because opponents are usually armed and can return fire. 
Terrorists, however, seldom risk return fire because they attack unarmed people who have no 
means of fighting back. Being a soldier also requires courage because military forces assume 
additional risk to minimize potential harm to noncombatants and civilian property. General 
Norman Schwarzkopf said that never before in the history of warfare had pilots endangered their 
lives more than in Operation Desert Storm in order to prevent civilian casualties.50 
Terrorists have claimed that they are “waging war,” and therefore they should be considered 
soldiers. If this assertion (which is false) is accepted, then terrorists who perpetrate acts 
prohibited by the laws of war are war criminals.  
 
                                                 
47 Attacks can be considered “indiscriminate” when their effects are not or cannot be limited to military targets, and 
so harm military targets, civilians, or targets of a civilian nature without distinction. Under the laws of war, 
combatants are required to differentiate between combatant and noncombatant targets, and must actively seek to 
minimize the harm to noncombatants. 
48 “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.” See, for 
example, the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Article 51. 
49 Geneva Conventions, 1949, Common Article 3. 
50 See Norma Romano-Benner, “Allied Air Campaign Forcing Iraqi Planes to Iran,” USIA, Jan. 27, 1991. 




   
Claim #2: Terrorists Are Guerillas or Freedom Fighters. A frequent terrorist deception 
technique is to claim to be guerillas or “freedom fighters.”51 An example is calling terrorist 
attacks “a special kind of guerilla warfare.”52 These types of claims are false. 
Guerilla Warfare and Freedom Fighting. Under the laws of war, all irregular military forces, 
including guerillas and freedom fighters, are bound by the laws of war. For example, the laws of 
war prohibit killing and injuring people taking no active part in the hostilities, and prohibit 
murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, and the taking of hostages. Guerillas generally attack 
other armed combatants and military objectives, whereas terrorists generally attack civilians and 
civilian objects. The terrorist claim to be a type of urban guerilla “has to be recognized as a 
semantic trick aimed not only at being recognized as a belligerent party but also at masking the 
essentially criminal nature of their methods,” Fritz Allemann wrote.53 
“Freedom Fighting” and the False Claim That “One Man’s Terrorist Is Another Man’s 
Freedom Fighter.” The “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” claim is a 
deception technique that tries to gain legitimacy for terrorist attacks by blurring the distinction 
between an aspiration that many consider legitimate, such as the goal of freedom, and the means 
(terrorism) used to try to achieve that goal. The laws of war—which include “freedom 
fighting”—are clear, and prohibit many of the actions that terrorists perpetrate such as taking 
hostages and intentionally attacking noncombatants. Terrorists generally do not discriminate 
between combatants and noncombatants, or define “noncombatants” as they choose, often 
including all members of a particular group—the elderly as well as infants. 
The “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” ploy assists terrorists and 
therefore needs to be guarded against. “The difference between the terrorists and the freedom 
fighters is as profound as it is obvious. To permit this distinction to become blurred is to play 
into terrorists’ hands,” noted George [H. W.] Bush.54 Nothing can disguise the fact that most 
terrorists pursue “freedom” by abrogating the freedoms and rights of others—often dispossessing 
victims of their most basic rights to the physical integrity of their bodies (to be free from injury), 
and to life itself. The goal of freedom for one group does not justify violating the rights of others. 
Terrorist supporters may think that terrorists are pursuing freedom for them; however, groups 
that are willing to use terrorism against opponents have also been willing to use violence against 
supporters, claimed constituent communities, and even group members. During the Algerian 
struggle for independence, the FLN murdered an estimated 16,000 Muslim Algerian civilians, 
committed atrocities against Algerians to coerce compliance, and “purged” an estimated 12,000 
FLN members.55  
 
                                                 
51 David Rapoport explained that the term freedom fighters originated after the end of World War II, by which time 
the term terrorist had “accumulated so many negative connotations that those who identified themselves as terrorists 
incurred enormous political liabilities,” and organizations understood that they needed a new language to describe 
themselves. Menachem Begin, leader of the Irgun, described the members of his group as “freedom fighters,” a self-
description that was “so appealing that all subsequent terrorist groups followed suit.” See David C. Rapoport, “The 
Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements 
of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 54.  
52 George Habash, quoted in Oriana Fallaci, “A Leader of the Fedayeen,” LIFE, June 12, 1970, 34. 
53 Fritz Rene Allemann, “Terrorism: Definitional Aspects,” Terrorism: An International Journal 3, no. 3 (1980): 185.  
54 Vice President George Bush, introductory memo, Terrorist Group Profiles (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988). 
55 Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 2006, 538. Some groups have felt entitled to try to coerce the claimed constituent 
community. The FLN proclaimed that it was the duty of Algerian people to associate themselves with the FLN, and 
used violence to coerce the Algerian population. See Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 2006, 95. 




   
Claim #3: Captured Terrorists Are POWs. Terrorists have sometimes demanded that if 
they are caught, they should be treated as prisoners of war (POW). Terrorists try to obtain POW 
status for a number of reasons, such as to gain publicity and legitimacy, and to receive treatment 
as captured soldiers rather than as criminals. Lawful combatants who are captured, such as the 
soldiers in a country’s armed forces, may not be tried for hostile acts directed against opposing 
forces before capture, unless those acts constituted violations of the laws of war. 
 Terrorists are not entitled to treatment as POWs. Only lawful combatants are entitled to POW 
status upon capture, and terrorists do not meet the legal conditions for lawful combatant status. 




The terrorist intent to attack civilians is a direct violation of both the letter and spirit of the 
laws of war. Terrorists cannot claim the rights involved in the laws of war without also assuming 
the corresponding responsibilities, which include fighting according to the laws of war. 
 
                                                 









(Entitled to POW Status) 
 
 
Unlawful Combatants  
(Not Entitled to POW Status) 
 
1. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, as well 
as members of militias or volunteer corps that are part of the 
armed forces.  
 
2. Members of other militias, volunteer corps, and organized 
resistance movements, provided that they fulfill all four of the 
following conditions:* 
  1) commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;  
  2) have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;  
  3) carry their arms openly;  
  4) conduct operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 
 
 
All others who use arms, 
including terrorists.  
 




*To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates means that the commander of the 
group is a commissioned officer of the armed forces or is a person of position and authority. 
Members of a militia or volunteer corps must be provided with documents, badges, or other means 
of identification to show that they are officers, noncommissioned officers, or soldiers so that there is 
no doubt that they are not persons acting on their own responsibility. Those engaging in use of force 
entitled to the protections of the laws of war must belong to organizations that act on behalf of an 
entity subject to international law.  
   The purpose of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, and of carrying arms 
openly, is that combatants must be readily distinguishable from ordinary civilians (noncombatants). 
   To conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war means that most of 
members of the unit comply with the laws and customs of war. This requirement applies to militias, 
guerillas, freedom fighters, and others who may not have had time to organize themselves, such as 
the spontaneous taking up of arms to repel an invader. 
 




   
Claim #4: “Terrorism Is War.” Terrorists have claimed that terrorism is a form of war. But 
terrorism is not war. “War” generally means the use of force between States; a certain threshold 
of violence between a State and an armed group such as a revolutionary army; or the use of force 
between contending armed groups within a State, such as in a civil war. Terrorism does not meet 
the threshold required to declare the existence of a state of war between belligerents. Some key 
differences between war and terrorism are shown in Table D–2. 
 
 





Targets of violence: Combatant targets: military forces, 
military/industrial infrastructure  
 
Generally noncombatant targets: 
civilians, and objects of a civilian 
character 
Method of operation: The physical seizing/defending/ 
control of territory for political 
objectives 
 
Actions to elicit third-party 
responses for political objectives 
(victim-target differentiation) 
 
Wear uniform (fixed 
distinctive sign) and 






Legality: Yes, if conducted in accordance 
with the laws of war 
 
No—terrorist acts are crimes 
 
What Laws Govern War? Two legal regimes govern war and armed conflict. Each regime 
consists of a body of laws, conventions, treaties, agreements, and customs.  
The first legal regime, jus ad bellum (justice toward war), governs the decision to resort to 
armed conflict. This regime addresses whether the resort to armed force is legal or justified.  
The second legal regime, jus in bello (justice in war), governs the actual conduct of armed 
conflict. This regime addresses how the conflict is conducted, such as prohibited weapons and 
the treatment of prisoners of war. The term “laws of war” refers primarily to this regime, and not 
to the rules governing the resort to armed conflict (jus ad bellum)—see Table D–3.  
 
 
Table D–3. Differences Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello 
 
The Resort to War: 
Jus ad Bellum (Just War) 
Conduct in War: 
Jus in Bello (The Laws of War) 
 
 
Governs the legality and 
justification for the resort to 
war and armed conflict. 
 
Governs the actual conduct of hostilities. Some laws of war are 
customary international law and therefore binding on all countries, 
groups, and individuals: examples are the four Geneva Conventions, 
the 1907 Hague Convention IV, and the Nuremberg Judgment. Jus in 




The two regimes are separate so that all parties can be held to the same rules of conduct in a 
conflict, regardless of the goal any side is pursuing. According to the jus in bello regime, even if 
one party breaks the laws of war, all other parties are still bound: “A derogation from the rules 
by one party does not excuse breaches by another…. Were this not the case, any deviation from 




   
the letter of the law could be invoked to justify wholesale abandonment of the law of war, 
causing the conflict to degenerate into the kind of barbarity the law of war aims to mitigate.”57 
For example, even when Iraqi forces violated the laws of war during the Persian Gulf War by 
abusing captured pilots, U.S. coalition forces were still bound by the laws of war.  
Jus in bello applies to the conduct of the conflict by all parties, and applies the same standards 
to all. These standards apply under all conditions, regardless of factors such as how the conflict 
started, who attacked first, whether or not the goal being pursued is considered legitimate, and 
whether or not the decision to resort to armed force was legal or justifiable. Under the laws of 
war, all parties to an armed conflict have the same rights and duties. When Iraq invaded Kuwait 
in 1990, an act that the UN Security Council considered to be unjustified aggression, the laws of 
war applied equally to all Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and U.S. coalition forces.  
What Are the Laws of War? (The “International Law of Armed Conflict”).58 The laws of 
war consist of principles that distinguish permissible violent conduct from war crimes and 
common crimes. The most basic principle is that not all means may be used in conflicts: there are 
limits placed on the exercise of a belligerent’s power. This principle was expressed explicitly in 
the 1907 Hague Convention IV: “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy 
is not unlimited.”59 (Much terrorist violence violates this basic principle by recognizing no limits 
on the means used, or the destruction intended.) 
The laws of war permit only the degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited, that is 
required for the submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical 
resources. The law of armed conflict is not intended to impede the waging of hostilities, but to 
ensure that the violence is directed toward military targets (that is, combatant forces and military 
objectives), and not to cause unnecessary human misery and physical destruction.60 Laws 
regulating the use of military force are needed because war can lead to extremes of barbarity, 
cruelty, and destruction beyond what may be necessary to achieve military objectives. 
The laws of war prohibit making noncombatants the direct object of intentional attack.61 The 
laws of war recognize that in armed conflict, incidental damage or injury to civilians may occur, 
but the actions that are permissible in war and armed conflict are controlled and limited by the 
principles of military necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and chivalry.62 The principle of 
military necessity allows those measures, not prohibited by international law, that are required 
 
                                                 
57 Jennifer Elsea, Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, CRS RL31367, April 11, 2002, 6–7. 
58 The most accurate term for the laws of war is the “international law of armed conflict”; however, the older term, 
“laws of war,” has been widely used. Another term, “international humanitarian law” has been used, but has 
drawbacks. Roberts and Guelff explained that the term “focuses attention on the central issue of the treatment of the 
individual, whether civilian or military [and] can also encompass relevant parts of the international law of human 
rights. A possible disadvantage of the term is that it could be thought to exclude some parts of the laws of war (such 
as the law on neutrality) whose primary purpose is not humanitarian. Indeed, the term ‘international humanitarian 
law’ could be seen as implying that the laws of war have an exclusively humanitarian purpose, when their evolution 
has in fact reflected various practical concerns of States and their armed forces on grounds other than those which 
may be considered humanitarian.” See Roberts and Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 2007, 2. 
59 Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, Article 22. The 1907 Hague Convention IV is customary international 
law, and therefore binding on all people who take up arms. 
60 U.S. Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 1987, para. 5.2. 
61 The distinction shall be made at all times between combatants and noncombatants—the civilian population and 
objects of civilian character shall not be made the object of deliberate attacks.  
62 Roberts and Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 2007, 9–10.  




   
for securing the partial or complete submission of the enemy.63 The principle of proportionality 
requires that the anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. The 
principle of discrimination requires combatants to differentiate between combatant and 
noncombatant targets, and actively seek to minimize the harm to noncombatants.64 The principle 
of chivalry requires combat to be conducted with honor and minimum standards of humanity, 
particularly regarding the means used. 
What Are the Purposes of the Laws of War? The laws of war were designed to diminish the 
evils of war, until the time when all armed conflict is abolished. The law of armed conflict seeks 
to mitigate the harmful effects of hostilities in four ways:65  
1. Prevent unnecessary suffering and destruction. Unnecessary suffering and destruction must 
be prevented, and devastation as an end in itself is prohibited. Certain weapons, material, 
and methods of warfare are prohibited; examples are weapons that cause unnecessary 
suffering such as dumdum bullets, poisoned weapons, and biological weapons, or weapons 
that continue to cause damage after hostilities cease. 
2. Provide minimum standards of protection to both combatants and noncombatants. 
Combatants and noncombatants are entitled to certain protections, and the laws of war 
outline the minimum standards. Nations may provide higher standards of protections, but 
must meet the baseline.  
3. Safeguard certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the 
enemy. Persons who fall into the hands of the enemy have certain fundamental rights that 
must be safeguarded, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians.  
4. Facilitate the restoration of peace. Hostilities must be conducted in a way that does not 
inhibit the restoration of peace. (As a practical matter, one should not behave to one’s 
adversary in such a way as to make eventual reconciliation more difficult.) 
 
The “War is Hell” view holds that force cannot be regulated, and therefore, true humanity lies 
in increasing that Hell so that it is unendurable and thereby forces war to a speedy end. But one 
answer to this view follows: “[The cry that] war is Hell at best, then make it Hell indeed [has 
echoed] down the ages.... What was the result? Hell was indeed let loose; but so was Hate. Was 
the war made shorter? No! Not by an hour! It was simply made needlessly bitter, brutal, and 
barbarous.”66 And the seeds of further wars may thus be planted. 
 
                                                 
63 The deliberate use of noncombatants to shield military objectives from attack is prohibited; however, the presence 
of noncombatants within or adjacent to a legitimate target does not preclude its attack. See U.S. Navy, The 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 1987, para. 11.2; Roberts and Guelff, eds., Documents on 
the Laws of War, 2007, 9–10. “Military necessity” does not override the prohibition against acts forbidden by the 
laws of war (which were developed with consideration for the concept of military necessity). See U.S. Army, FM 
27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 1956, para. 3. The laws of war “were specifically designed to take account of both 
the legitimate security needs of States and the obligation to protect human life and basic rights. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross is convinced that it is possible to achieve a balance between the two.” See Jakob 
Kellenberger, “No War Is Above International Law,” Financial Times, May 19, 2004. 
64 U.S. Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2006, paras. 7-30 and 7-34. 
65 See U.S. Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 1956, para. 2; U.S. Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on 
the Law of Naval Operations, 1987, para. 5.2; Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, Article 23; and Roberts and 
Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 2007, 27–28. 
66 Charles Francis Adams, address, Jan. 26, 1903, quoted in Friedman, ed., The Law of War: A Documentary 
History, vol. 1, 1972, xx. General William Sherman’s “War is hell” statement was attributed to an 1879 address to 
the Michigan Military Academy, published in the National Tribune, Nov. 26, 1914, in which he said: “I am tired and 




   
To Whom Do the Laws of War Apply? The international law of armed conflict (jus in bello) 
applies to all combatants including members of the armed forces of a party in conflict; militias; 
volunteer corps; and irregular fighters such as guerillas, freedom fighters, insurgents, and 
resistance groups.  
In armed conflicts that do not have an international character—that is, armed conflicts within 
a country (jus in bello interno)—certain laws still apply. Common Article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions can illustrate: Common Article 3 outlines the minimum standards that are always in 
force in every type of conflict.67 Thus all combatants—lawful and unlawful, and whether called 
insurgents, guerillas, freedom fighters, or gunmen—within a country engaged in armed conflict 
are bound to the same provisions as governments. 
Those parts of the laws of war that are customary international law apply to all armed 
struggles, whether international or within a country.68 The 1907 Hague Convention IV, the 1945 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and the four 1949 Geneva 





















                                                                                                                                                             
sick of war. Its glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have neither fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans 
of the wounded who cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance, more desolation. War is hell.” See John Bartlett, 
Familiar Quotations, 13th ed., (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955). 
67 Each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions repeat certain articles, called “Common Articles.”  
68 Customary international law consists of those practices that have attained a degree of regularity, and are 
accompanied by the general conviction among nations that the practice is obligatory. Customary law can be 
described as a combination of “state practice” and “a sense of legal obligation.” A rule of customary international 
law is a “universal law,” and is binding on all States, groups, and individuals. Rules of law established through 
treaties are ordinarily binding only on those nations that are parties to them; however, if treaties and international 
agreements codify existing customary law or otherwise come over time to represent a general consensus among 
nations that observance is obligatory, the rules are binding upon party and nonparty nations alike.  
69 Roberts and Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 2007, 8. 
 
The 1907 Hague Convention IV 
 
Article 22. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is 
not unlimited.  
 
Article 23. It is especially forbidden…to employ arms, projectiles, or material 
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;… To destroy or seize the enemy’s 
property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war; To declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court 
of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.  
 
Article 25. The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, 
villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.  
 
Article 27. In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to 
spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or 
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick 
and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for 
military purposes.  
 


















The 1949 Geneva Conventions are particularly 
important in regard to terrorism. The 
requirements outlined in Common Article 3 
(repeated in each of the four Geneva 
Conventions) apply to all conflicts whether they 
are between or within States, and all 
combatants, whether lawful and unlawful, are 
























The 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
 
Article 6. The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:…  
 (b) “War Crimes:” namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such 
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder [of members of the civilian 
population], killing of hostages, [or] wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages…. 
 (c) “Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder…and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population…whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.  
 
Common Article 3 in the Four 1949 Geneva Conventions 
 
Article 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:  
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, 
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
     To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
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Claim #5: Terrorists Should Be Exempt from the Laws of War. Terrorists have used 
various arguments to try to claim that the laws of war should not apply to them. None of these 
arguments are valid. Several examples follow.  
Exemption for Certain Goals. One argument is to claim an exemption for certain political 
goals or causes such as “fighting for freedom from occupation.” An example of this argument is 
the statement, “The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for 
which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation 
of his land from the invaders, the settlers, and the colonists, cannot possibly be called terrorist.”70 
Another example was a claim made during discussions at the UN that the acts of those fighting 
for their national liberation could not be considered as acts of international terrorism.71 However, 
whether “resistance” is terrorism or not depends on the specific act. For example, nonviolent acts 
of resistance are not acts of terrorism. As another example, fighting for freedom from occupation 
by developing a guerilla army and following the laws of war is not terrorism. UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan addressed the issue of fighting for freedom from occupation as follows: 
“The right to resist occupation must be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the right 
to deliberately kill or maim civilians.”72 Regardless of whether or not the goal of fighting for 
freedom from occupation is legitimate, there is still “nothing in the fact of occupation that 
justifies the targeting and killing of civilians.” 73 And as a number of UN delegations pointed out, 
oppression can be resisted by violent means without resorting to terrorism.74 
“Denial of the Right to Take Up Arms.” A terrorist argument is that the laws of war deprive 
groups from exercising their “right” to resort to violence. This is not true—“just war” doctrine 
(jus ad bellum) allows the taking up of arms for certain purposes. As an example, regarding 
national liberation, the UN Secretary-General “has already emphasized [that international 
terrorism has] nothing to do with the question of when the use of force is legitimate in 
international life. On that question the provisions of the [UN] Charter, general international law, 
and the declarations and resolutions of United Nations organs, in particular those of the General 
Assembly relating to national liberation movements, are not and cannot be affected.”75 All 
combatants in all armed conflicts are bound by the laws of war, which prohibit many or even 
most of the violent acts that terrorists commit.76 In addition, almost all religions have moral 
standards that allow the use of force and violence only under certain conditions, standards that 
terrorist attacks violate. Many religions also address the legitimacy of the decision to resort to 
war (and the methods of waging war).77 
 
                                                 
70 Yasser Arafat, address, UN General Assembly, Nov. 13, 1974. 
71 Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/9028, Supp. (18 Dec. 1973), para. 37, in Bassiouni, 
International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 131. (These representatives 
also said that “peoples struggling to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and exploitation had the right to use 
all methods at their disposal.”) 
72 UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, In Larger Freedom, 2005, para. 91. 
73 A More Secure World (New York: UN, 2004), para. 160. 
74 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/34/37 (17 April 1979), para. 29, in 
Bassiouni, International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 307. 
75 Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/C.6/418 (2 Nov. 1972), para. 10, in Bassiouni, 
International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 94.  
76 Note too that all individuals who take up arms are bound, as a minimum, by those parts of the laws of war that are 
customary international law. 
77 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 3–6. Audrey 
Cronin noted that though the Christian “just war” tradition and the Islamic tradition were distinct, they were largely 




   
“Forced to Use Illegal Tactics.” Terrorists have claimed that they are “forced” to use 
“different” tactics than armies use. However, insurrection, war, and resistance to occupation may 
be conducted without targeting noncombatants. Under severe repression or actions such as 
attempted genocide, there may be nothing illegitimate about fighting—but in ways that do not 
include terrorism. Even the most repressive States have been successfully resisted through 
popular movements and guerilla warfare that did not include terrorist attacks. States have won 
independence without resorting to terrorism: the American revolutionaries never adopted a 
policy of terrorism. Even when the use of force may be justified, there are some means which 
must not be used, especially when directed against noncombatants.78 The UN General Assembly 
has repeatedly affirmed that it is prohibited to direct attacks against civilian populations.79 
Nonviolent means succeeded in a number of anti-colonial struggles, and there have been 
many peaceful transitions to democracy. Examples are the transitions to democracy in Portugal 
and Spain in the 1970s, a number of South American countries and the Philippines in the 1980s, 
and many regimes in Eastern Europe during the end of the Cold War period.  
“Fight by Their Rules.” Terrorists have claimed that the laws of war should not apply to them 
because the laws were allegedly “contrived by a small group of primarily western nations for 
their own advantage.”80 This is not true—the laws of war have been developed by countries 
worldwide, and evolved over centuries of efforts to control war and conflict, and mitigate their 
harmful effects. Pope John Paul II wrote that from the earliest times, “human communities 
sought to establish agreements and pacts which would avoid the arbitrary use of force and enable 
them to seek a peaceful solution of any controversies which might arise. Alongside the legal 
systems of the individual peoples there progressively grew up another set of norms which came 
to be known as jus gentium (the law of the nations). With the passage of time, this body of law 
gradually expanded and was refined in the light of the historical experiences of the different 
peoples.”81 In essence, until warfare is eliminated completely, the world’s nations agreed to rules 
limiting their conduct in war. 
Countries that are not parties to all of the laws of war are nevertheless bound by customary 
international law such as the four Geneva Conventions, the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, 
and the 1907 Hague Convention IV. These customary international laws have worldwide 
agreement: the UN General Assembly has passed several resolutions in their support.82 (These 
customary international laws are also binding on individuals, and many terrorist actions violate 
these laws.83)  
                                                                                                                                                             
in agreement, and that “Islamic states have had no difficulty reconciling the Islamic concept of ‘humanitarian law’ 
with the laws of war represented, for example, in the Geneva and Hague Conventions.” See Audrey Kurth Cronin, 
“Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism,” Survival (Summer 2002): 125.  
78 Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/C.6/418 (2 Nov. 1972), para. 10, in Bassiouni, 
International Terrorism: A Compilation of U.N. Documents (1972–2001), vol. 1, 2002, 94.  
79 See, for example, UNGA Res. 2444, “Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts,” 1968. 
80 Brian M. Jenkins, “Defense Against Terrorism,” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 5 (1986): 780. 
81 Pope John Paul II, World Day of Peace Message, “An Ever Timely Commitment: Teaching Peace,” Jan. 1, 2004. 
82 See, for example, UNGA Res. 95, “Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal,” 1946, which affirmed the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment and the principles of 
international law contained therein. Note that UN resolutions that express the will of the international community 
can contribute to the establishment of international customary law. 
83 All individuals who take up arms are bound by those parts of the laws of war that are customary international law.  




   
“The Laws of War Are Worthless.” The claim has been made that terrorists do not need to 
follow the laws of war because international laws, including the laws of armed conflict, are 
“worthless.” This is not true. The laws of war were prepared by States and reflect their interests 
and the interests of military forces, and most States abide by the laws of war, and international 
law in general. Hans Morgenthau, a principal theorist of realism in international relations, noted 
that nations do try to live up to their international agreements, at least to a certain degree.84  
Another claim is that international laws are worthless because there is no “higher authority” to 
enforce them, or that States decide for themselves whether or not to follow international law. 
This is not a valid argument. The lack of a higher authority does not mean that laws are 
unenforceable—coercive mechanisms exist regarding non-compliance, and there are incentives 
for States to follow international law, and adverse consequences if they do not. These 
consequences can be in a number of economic, military, legal, and political areas, such as 
military reprisals or military action, sanctions, trials, compensation demands, and the loss of 
allies. International embarrassment can also result, and most countries care about their 
reputation. Regardless of any negative consequences, international law provides standards that 
States consider in forming and implementing their policies, a fact which affects their decisions. 
Michael Kinsley addressed the value of international law as below: 
 
Even though there are no police to enforce it, international law can also create a fairly 
powerful incentive to obey the rules it lays down. How does it do that? By creating a web 
of rules, each of which is stronger for being part of the web than if it were a single thread 
dangling alone. Every nation will have rules it cares more about and rules it cares less 
about. But a vested interest in being seen as obeying rules—and in seeing others obey most 
of the rules most of the time—can overcome the temptation to break any individual rule 
when it suits your purposes.85 
 
There are factors that lead States and armed forces involved in armed conflict to comply with 
the laws of war. States need to be seen as acting in accordance with international law, and the 
ethical beliefs widely held by their populations. Governments need the support of citizens, and 
following the laws of war can avoid one potential source of domestic opposition. States usually 
need international support as well, and following the laws of war assists in garnering this 
support. Following the laws of war denies opponents the propaganda value of accusing States of 
non-compliance. States also desire reciprocity, such as that captured soldiers will be treated in 
accordance with the laws of war.  
The laws-of-war regime has also had positive effects. The laws of war have significantly 
affected the policies, practices, and conduct of States and armed forces, and have aided progress 
toward the abolition of war. The international organizations and agreements established after 
World Wars I and II had the avoidance of war itself as an ultimate objective. The devastation of 
World War I spurred efforts to control and end war, and these efforts intensified after World War 
II in reaction to the “abyss of violence, destruction and death unlike anything previously known,” 
resulting in the establishment of the UN to prevent the scourge of war.86  
 
                                                 
84 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1967), 231. Even though it is not as well 
developed as domestic law, international law has prevented a state of complete world anarchy. 
85 Michael Kinsley, “Our Kind of Law,” Washington Post, March 28, 2003. 
86 Pope John Paul II, World Day of Peace Message, “An Ever Timely Commitment: Teaching Peace,” Jan. 1, 2004. 




   
The laws of war have promoted the idea of the nonuse of force, and a major trend of the 20th 
century was increasing constraints on the use of force between States. As a UN report noted, 
“Since 1945, an ever-stronger set of norms and laws—including the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Geneva Conventions, and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court—
has regulated and constrained States’ decisions to use force and their conduct in war.”87 
“States and State Actors Break the Laws of War.” Terrorists and their supporters have 
pointed out that military forces have broken the laws of war and committed war crimes. 
Instances of soldiers intentionally breaking the laws of war have occurred, and these acts are 
illegal and prosecutable offenses. However, violations of the laws of war do not invalidate those 
laws any more than the perpetration of murder invalidates laws against murder. The value of a 
law does not depend on perfect compliance, and soldiers breaking the laws of war are not the 
norm. In contrast, terrorists deliberately and systematically break national and international laws. 
The laws of war apply to all combatants, whether they are lawful or unlawful combatants, and 
many terrorists have completely disregarded these laws, such as by deliberately attacking 
civilians. The prohibition against the intentional targeting of civilians is customary law, and has 
worldwide support—for example, in 1970 the UN General Assembly affirmed that “in the 
conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all times 
between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations.”88 
Sometimes efforts have been made to equate revolutions and rebellions with terrorism and the 
illegal use of force, including attempts to connect terrorism to the American Revolution and even 
George Washington. During one such discussion at the UN, the chief U.S. delegate replied to 
comments about this issue by saying that “while it was true that George Washington had been a 
rebel…he had not hijacked the boat in which he had crossed the Delaware and had not 
endangered innocent lives.”89 
Some States have, in fact, intentionally broken the laws of war through official policies. In 
many armed conflicts there have been deliberate attacks on civilians, houses, and religious 
buildings, and lawlessness by military forces. However, these violations are generally 
condemned, and have resulted in intensified efforts to suppress such actions. The unanimous 
ratification of the Nuremberg Judgment after World War II is an example of the response to 
egregious actions by States during war.  
Even when engaged with adversaries who are not following the laws of war, armed forces are 
required to continue to comply with the laws of war. During the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi 
government abused U.S. military personnel taken prisoner; however, the US-led coalition did not 
set aside the laws of war, and continued to treat prisoners in accordance with the Geneva 
Conventions. Doing so was important because of the requirement to follow international laws 
and treaties, maintain military discipline, keep domestic and international support, and strengthen 
the rule of law. 
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Claim #6: “War and Terrorism Are Morally Equivalent.” Terrorists have argued that 
there is no moral difference between war and terrorism because people, including 
noncombatants, have been killed in both. An example is the claim that bombs placed in a 
restaurant and bombs from a jet are morally equivalent—a claim sometimes expressed by such 
statements as, “The bomb-placer is the poor man’s air force,” and “If you will let us lease one of 
your B-52s, we will use that instead of a truck bomb.” But if terrorists were to use B-52s to drop 
bombs, it is not likely that they would follow the laws of war and try to avoid causing civilian 
deaths—many terrorists have deliberately sought to cause civilian deaths. Soldiers are required 
by the laws of war to accept additional risks to avoid injuring and killing noncombatants—in 
contrast, many terrorists have tried to reduce the risk to themselves by attacking noncombatants 
who have no means of defense, and also by attacking using stealth and with nothing to identify 
themselves as armed. Many acts that terrorists perpetrate would be war crimes if committed by 
soldiers during war. 
None of the moral equivalency arguments are valid. There are significant differences between 
unintentional collateral damage in war, and intentional attacks on noncombatants. Under the laws 
of war, there are controls on the use of military force, whereas terrorists recognize no limits on 
what they might do. In all armed conflicts, combatants are prohibited from making 
noncombatants the deliberate object of attack. In contrast, many terrorist attacks are designed to 
injure and kill civilians. In war, the injury and deaths of noncombatants may occur from mistakes 
or as an unsought side effect, but a bomb that goes astray in war and kills civilians is not the 
same as a bomb that is intended to explode in a crowded marketplace. If military forces 
deliberately tried to kill civilians, the carnage would be horrific given the extreme lethality of 
weapons that States control, and the power of the State to wage war on a massive scale.  
Terrorists have argued that all forms of political violence are equally bad, and therefore 
terrorism is justified. This is not true. Even if a person declares that all forms of violence are bad, 
until the time that all differences are settled using only nonviolent methods, there is still a need 
for self-defense, and the question of how to deal with violence of all kinds remains. In particular 
there is still the question of how to deal with aggression at all levels, from the international to the 
individual. There must be some legally sanctioned use of force for defensive purposes and in the 
collective interest. Without some authorization to use force on the international level, there 
would be no check on international aggression. Governments have the responsibility to protect 
their populations, and in the face of aggression need to be able to take measures to protect them, 
at least until any international assistance or organization comes into operation (such as action by 
alliances or the UN Security Council). When under unlawful attack, individuals need to be able 
to defend themselves, at least until the police arrive. In these areas, the legal maxim applies: “It 
is lawful to repel force by force, provided it be done with the moderation of blameless defense, 
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None of the arguments that terrorists and their supporters use to try to justify terrorism are 
valid. Terrorists are responsible for their actions and no goal or cause justifies terrorism, 
regardless of the possible legitimacy of the political goal being pursued. Some delegations at the 
UN expressed this view as follows: “Commitment to the principles embodied in the [UN] 
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international instruments meant 
that acts of terrorism which were in direct contravention of those principles had to be condemned 
without exceptions.”91 The 2004 UN Secretary-General’s high-level panel report concluded that 
terrorism was never an acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes.92 An earlier UN 
study pointed out that terrorism, along with certain forms of violence, must not be used: 
 
The legitimacy of a cause does not in itself legitimize the use of certain forms of violence…. 
Terrorism threatens, endangers, or destroys the lives and fundamental freedoms of the innocent, 
and it would not be just to leave them to wait for protection until the causes have been remedied 
and the purposes and principles of the [UN] Charter have been given full effect…. At all times 
in history, mankind has recognized the unavoidable necessity of repressing some forms of 
violence…. There are some means of using force, as in every form of human conflict, which 
must not be used, even when the use of force is legally and morally justified.93 
 
Beliefs cannot justify terrorism, for terrorists have no right to injure or kill their victims, or to 
try to force their beliefs on others. Pope John Paul II addressed this issue as follows:  
 
Terrorism is often the outcome of that fanatic fundamentalism which springs from the 
conviction that one’s own vision of the truth must be forced upon everyone else. Instead, even 
when the truth has been reached—and this can happen only in a limited and imperfect way—it 
can never be imposed…. To try to impose on others by violent means what we consider to be 
the truth is an offence against human dignity, and ultimately an offence against God whose 
image that person bears. [This] is an attitude radically opposed to belief in God.94 
 
The methods used in war and armed conflict are legally constrained even when conducted 
against the worst of governments. If States fighting for their very survival are legally prohibited 
from using all means, groups seeking to advance a goal also have no right to struggle without 
any restraints. 
The goals that terrorists are pursuing, or the alleged grievances that terrorists seek to redress, 
may or may not be legitimate. But terrorist acts themselves are not legitimate, and legitimate 
goals or causes cannot justify or excuse terrorism. In conclusion, none of the arguments to try to 
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I. The Tools of National Strategy for the Democratic State 





This appendix outlines the tools of national strategy, using the construct applied in Part II of 
this monograph. Governments of all kinds use these tools; however, this appendix addresses the 
tools of national strategy from the perspective of the democratic State. The appendix is not 
intended to be a comprehensive discussion, but does expand on tools that are integral to 
democracy, and tools that may be less well understood. A summary is at the end of the appendix. 
 
I. The Tools of National Strategy for the Democratic State 
 
The tools of national strategy can be  
divided into ten categories—political, 
legal, military & security, economic, 
environmental, knowledge & technology, 
intelligence, communications & media, 
ideological & moral, and organization & 
implementation. This construct builds on  
the “dimensions” of security used in the OSCE’s comprehensive security concept.1 
 
I. Political Tools. Political tools can be divided into those used primarily in the international 
arena, and those used primarily at the national level.  
 
I-1. International Political Tools. International 
political tools are the instruments that 
governments use in the international arena. These 
tools include core values and assumptions 
regarding international security; how the 
international system is structured; principles of 
international relations and principles of 
international security; international organizations, 
alliances, and coalitions; diplomacy and 
diplomatic tools; conflict prevention, preventive 
diplomacy, and conflict resolution (including 
post–conflict measures); governance assistance to 
States; peaceful regime change and democracy  
promotion; international leadership and cooperation, and honor; and international moral force, 
example, and ethical pressure. 
 
                                                 
1 The OSCE generally used three categories or “dimensions” to express their comprehensive security approach: the 
political-military; economic, scientific/technological, and environmental; and human rights aspects. “Process” was a 
fourth original category, and can be considered a fourth dimension of the OSCE’s comprehensive security concept. 
(Note that the OSCE called the human rights aspects of security the “human dimension.”)  
I-1. International Political Tools 
 
1. Core values and assumptions regarding 
international security 
2. The structure of the international system 
3. International relations and security principles 
4. International organizations, alliances, and coalitions 
5. Diplomacy, including diplomatic pressure, public 
diplomacy, cultural and educational activities 
6. Conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, conflict 
resolution (including post–conflict measures) 
7. Governance assistance to States 
8. Peaceful regime change/democracy promotion 
9. International leadership and cooperation, and honor  




The Tools of National Strategy 
 
I. Political      VI. Knowledge & Technology 
II. Legal      VII. Intelligence 
III. Military & Security   VIII. Communications & Media  
IV. Economic     IX. Ideological & Moral 










   
I-1-1. Core Values and Assumptions Regarding International Security. Core values and 
assumptions are the basic international security beliefs of governments. These values differ 
based on the type of government, and the values and assumptions of democratic States regarding 
international security differ profoundly from those of non-democratic States, and the actions that 
result from these beliefs also vary widely. Two important beliefs of democratic States follow. 
Respect for Individual Rights Increases Security. A core belief of democratic States is that 
respect for individual rights is inherently stabilizing, and thereby contributes to security. The 
belief of these States is that democratic principles increase security by providing the conditions 
in which all members of the State can exercise their rights and freedoms, and thus reduce or 
prevent the tensions and conflicts that can result from the nonrespect of rights. The violation of 
rights within a State causes tensions that can lead to instability and conflict, which in turn can 
cause instability in other States, and threaten international security. Conflict within a State 
threatens international security in many ways, including regional wars and refugee flows. 
Democratic States believe that individual rights must be respected not only because they are the 
birthright of every person, but because security and peace depend upon it. “Only a just peace 
based on the inherent rights and dignity of every individual can truly be lasting.”2  
A Democratic World Is More Stable, Secure, and Free. A second core belief of democratic 
States is that the democratic form of government increases stability, security, and freedom, and 
that the well-being and security of democracies are strengthened in an increasingly democratic 
world. Democracies believe that their national interests are best served in a world in which 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and economic freedom are widespread and secure. 
Democracies seek to meet threats without undermining fundamental values and institutions, and 
to create and maintain an international order in which they can sustain and advance democratic 
values. “America’s ideals and interests coincide, for the United States has a stake in the stability 
that comes when people can express their hopes and build their futures freely. In the long run, no 
system is as solid as that built on the rock of freedom.”3   
 
I-1-2. The Structure of the International System. The international system can be described as a 
“plane” on which States and other participants in the international arena meet and interact, and in 
which governments conduct their international relations. The international system is a structure 
with rules that in general control how the participants interact—the patterns and types of 
interaction. These rules include who is considered a member of the system, what rights and 
responsibilities members have, and what kinds of actions and responses normally occur. The 
international system’s basic units are States, and the primary participants are State governments. 
Other participants in the international environment include intergovernmental organizations, 
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations.  
The structure of the international system is a tool because the way that the architecture of the 
international system is constructed affects how States interact. States have tried different 
international systems in history, and the system in place in the early 21st century was largely 
established after World War II. This system includes multilateral institutions such as the UN 
Security Council, structures that, among other purposes, were intended to prevent the repeat of 
the devastation caused by two World Wars. 
 
                                                 
2 President Barak Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize,” Dec. 10, 2009. 
3 Cyrus R. Vance, “The Human Rights Imperative,” Foreign Policy (Summer 1986).   





   
An important goal that States seek in the international system is security. National security 
can be considered the protection of a country from major threats to territorial, political, and 
economic well-being. National security involves security of many kinds—political security, 
including political independence and territorial integrity; military security, including freedom 
from attack and the loss of territory from military attack; economic security, including 
employment and access to resources; environmental security, including protection from such 
dangers as pollution from other countries; information security, including the protection of 
information; and individual rights security—the protection of individual rights and liberties.  
National security policy goals include national survival; the defense of territory; a favorable 
world order; national well-being and economic prosperity; the preservation of political 
institutions; and the strengthening of national values, and their projection abroad. National 
security requires an international environment supportive of a country’s interests. “The policies 
of the United States do more than any other country to set the basic conditions of international 
security. It is in the United States’ interest to use this strength to work out policies that increase 
international security.”4   
 
I-1-3. International Relations and Security Principles. International relations principles guide 
how States deal with each other; international security principles guide how States can achieve 
security. Principles developed by the OSCE States can serve as a model for the views of 
democratic States regarding international relations and security. In 1975, with the signing of the 
Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE States adopted 
their first principles, the Helsinki Decalogue. 
In the following years, the OSCE States—
which then included both democratic and 
communist States—continued to develop 
their principles.5 The States increased their 
areas of agreement, and at the end of the 
Cold War, all of the States committed 
themselves to democratic values, and to 
democracy as the only system of government 
for their nations.6 The Charter of Paris was 
followed by other landmark documents such 
as the 1990 Copenhagen Document, the 1991 
Moscow Document, and the 1992 Helsinki 
Document, all of which outlined further 
democratic commitments and values.  
  
 
                                                 
4 John Steinbruner, course discussion, “Problems of Global Security,” Maryland School of Public Policy, 2001, 
author’s files. 
5 The OSCE States used the “Helsinki process” to expand their agreements and commitments. The Helsinki process 
was a process in which the States would meet periodically to evaluate their implementation of commitments, and to 
negotiate new ones, which would then be expressed in OSCE documents adopted by consensus. Each new document 
built on all previous documents, creating a significant body of work (the OSCE acquis). 
6 Charter of Paris, 1990, 3. At the 1990 Paris Summit, the Heads of State and Governments of the OSCE countries 
signed the historic Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The document, described as Europe’s Magna Carta, called for 
a Europe “whole and free.”  
The 1975 Helsinki Decalogue:  
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations 
Between OSCE States 
 
I.   Sovereign equality, respect for the rights 
inherent in sovereignty 
II.  Refraining from threat or use of force 
III. Inviolability of frontiers 
IV. Territorial integrity of States 
V.   Peaceful settlement of disputes 
VI.  Non-intervention in internal affairs 
VII. Respect for human rights, and fundamental   
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion or belief 
VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
IX.   Co-operation among States 
X.     Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under 
international law 
 





   
During the 1990s, the OSCE States advanced and consolidated their principles, which can be 




The OSCE Security Concept Principles, 2001 Summary  
 
 
I. Principles Guiding Relations  
Between OSCE States 
 
1. Respect for the sovereign rights of States, 
with agreed-upon limits on sovereign rights. 
2. Mutual State involvement, accountability, and 
assistance regarding OSCE commitments. 
3. A comprehensive, cooperative, and common 
security approach. 
4. The prevention of security threats, and the use 
of peaceful means to reduce tensions and 
resolve disputes and conflicts. 
 
 
II. Principles Guiding the Protection and 
Promotion of Individual Rights within States 
 
 
5. State responsibility to ensure respect for 
individual rights through democracy, the 
rule of law, and the market economy. 
6. Rights and responsibilities pertaining to 
national minorities. 
7. Respect for the equal rights of all, and a 
climate of respect. 
 
 
III. Principles Guiding Implementation, Review, 
and Development Processes 
 
8. Good faith, full, equal, and continuous efforts to 
implement OSCE principles and commitments. 
9. The development and advancement of shared values. 
10. Processes and mechanisms. 
 
 
Of particular note in the OSCE principles is the emphasis on the relationship between security 
and respect for individual rights. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act was the first international 
agreement that addressed the connection between security and respect for rights. “The 
realization that the security of States also depends on the security of the individuals within them 
was an innovation in European security thinking and one of the great achievements of the East-
West dialogue of the 1970s. As a result, the [OSCE] participating States recognized that there is 
no security without respect for basic political and civil rights.”8  
The Helsinki Final Act made major advances in the conduct of international relations. One 
advance was through Principle VII, “Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.” Through Principle VII, the 
States placed respect for rights on the same level as the other principles of international relations 
such as respect for the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States. “The Helsinki Final 
Act, for the first time in the history of international agreements, accorded human rights the 
status of a fundamental principle in regulating international relations.”9  
Furthermore, no previous international agreement had ever considered that sovereign States 
were accountable to other sovereign States for the treatment of their own citizens. “The Helsinki 
 
                                                 
7 This OSCE security concept summarizes the efforts of more than fifty democratic States to identify and implement 
the standards and principles needed to achieve security, peace, and freedom.  
8 Evers et al, The Culture of Dialogue: The OSCE Acquis 30 Years after Helsinki, 2005, 30 (underlining added).  
9 Joint Resolution 48, Sept. 6, 2000. John Lewis Gaddis wrote that the Helsinki Final Act was the “turning point” in 
the balance between order and justice (that is, freedom). See Gaddis, “Order versus Justice: An American Foreign 
Policy Dilemma,” in Order and Justice in International Relations, 2003, 162, 163. 





   
Accords established for the first time a procedure by which the human rights records of each 
participating government would be subjected to systematic review, criticism, pressure, and 
negotiation by the others. This process is conducted at lengthy periodic review meetings which 
have emphasized human rights issues.”10 
Max van der Stoel pointed out the realpolitik nature of the need to find common agreement on 
principles of international security and relations. “We are all aware of the historical experience of 
the very bloody 20th century. Whatever the motivations for the extreme violence which has 
shattered so many societies, destroyed so much of what careful and creative work has built, and 
literally brought mankind to the brink of annihilation, we have been forced to react in order to 
protect and maintain civilized life. It is our self-interest as individuals and as a species which 
drives us to find solutions to the perils which we face. In my opinion, this self-interest informs 
and drives international relations. The great projects of the United Nations, the Council of 
Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and 
similar (if weaker) organizations and regimes in other regions of the world are the product of 
combined interests. In this regard, international commitments to human rights, based on liberal 
philosophy, should be viewed through the prism of realpolitik. If it was not sufficiently evident, 
or popularly believed, after the Second World War that mankind inhabits a common planet with 
limited resources and interrelated interests, then surely the contemporary perils of regional or 
global environmental decay, economic decline, social unrest or, still, military threat should be 
enough to lead us to the conclusion that our security and prosperity are indivisible.”11 
 
“The [Helsinki] Final Act’s central insight—that the protection of human rights and 
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OSCE Countries (Areas in Light and Dark Green), 2004 
 
  
In 2004, the OSCE consisted of over fifty participating States in Europe, 
Central Asia, and North America as shown on the NATO-OSCE map. 
(The OSCE countries are in dark and light green, and the countries in 
both the OSCE and NATO are in dark green.)  
 





   
1-1-4. International Organizations, Alliances, and Coalitions. International organizations, 
alliances, and coalitions are among the ways that governments use to organize relations, 
cooperate, and work together. Other important ways include institutional and legal relationships.  
The effectiveness of international organizations depends on its members. “An organization’s 
weight and its ability to act always depend on the will of its member States. An organization can 
be no better than its members wish it to be.”13 “We should properly assess the role of 
international organizations and realize what they can do but also what they cannot do. If they 
are found unable to fulfill assigned tasks they have to be strengthened. Just repeating how 
imperfect they are will not add strength. Political and material investment by their member 
States is needed. International organizations are as strong as the support offered to them by 
member States. They are nothing more than a channel for expressing a collective will of States 
and a framework for their concerted action.”14  
International organizations can serve as a pole of attraction—at the end of the Cold War, the 
desire of many former Soviet bloc countries to join NATO and the EU provided a strong 
incentive for countries to reform their governments towards democracy and the market economy. 
 
I-1-5. Diplomacy. Diplomacy includes bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, and diplomatic tools 
such as diplomatic pressure, public diplomacy, and actions to promote understanding (i.e., 
cultural and educational activities).  
 
“President [George H. W.] Bush invested an enormous amount of time in personal diplomacy, and, in my 
opinion, it was indispensable to the success of our foreign policy. His direct relationship with his 
counterparts had a tremendous effect upon them—most were immensely flattered. They would no longer 
be strangers, having only occasional formal contact. The President called his principal allies and friends 
often, frequently not with any particular issue in mind but just to chat and exchange views on how things 
were going in general…. The contact meant that foreign leaders knew him on a personal basis, knew 
what his basic values were, and, therefore, were predisposed to respond favorably when he called to ask 
for support. As a result, foreign leaders tended to be there when we needed them, often only because they 
knew, understood, and empathized from having spoken with him on so many occasions. Those leaders 
less crucial to US policy were also the object of the President’s attention…. Personal diplomacy 
paralleled traditional diplomatic processes and greatly reinforced them. Using the State and Defense 
Departments as the regular channels and augmenting them by presidential telephone calls made a 
powerful combination in rallying support for US policies.”15 
 
On the importance of education and international peace: “For the individual, education is the path to 
achievement and fulfillment; for the Nation, it is a path to a society that is not only free but civilized; 
and for the world, it is the path to peace—for it is education that places reason over force.”16 
 
I-1-6. Conflict Prevention, Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution (including Post–
Conflict Measures). Conflict prevention consists of actions to reduce tensions; preventive 
diplomacy prevents an outbreak of conflict; conflict resolution ends conflicts; and post–conflict  
action addresses the underlying tensions that contributed to the conflict.  
 
                                                 
13 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Is the OSCE Underestimated?” in Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, ed., 
OSCE Yearbook 2001 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002), 27.  
14 OSCE Secretary General Wilhelm Hoynck, in From CSCE to OSCE, 1996, 34. 
15 Brent Scowcroft, in George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 61, 62. 
16 President Lyndon Johnson, “Remarks at Southwest Texas State College Upon Signing the Higher Education Act 
of 1965,” November 8, 1965. 





   
Conflict prevention methods can increase security, and can be very cost-effective. The cost of 
conflict prevention can be compared to the cost of fire prevention versus a fire. “If a forest 
ranger goes through the forest and prevents fires, this is rather uninteresting. But if half of 
Florida or large swathes of Greek forest burn to the ground, this is news. Preventing crises may 
not make dramatic headlines—but that’s the point.”17 Beyond the loss of life and destruction, the 
costs of conflict can be very high even when measured in only monetary terms: the international  
community spent tens of billions on the conflict in Bosnia in the 1990s.18 In comparison, High 
Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel was credited 
with having prevented a number of conflicts in Europe from breaking 
out, and spent less than $1 million per year.19 “Capital invested in 
conflict prevention is capital well invested. In humanitarian, financial, 
and political terms, conflict prevention is much cheaper than peacekeeping or rebuilding 
societies after a violent conflict…. Timely and effective action can help to avert a costly crisis. 
Instead of hindsight that says that ‘we should have seen it coming’ and post–conflict 
rehabilitation that pours billions of dollars into reconstruction and rehabilitation, we should act 
with foresight and make the necessary investments when it comes to preventing conflicts. More 
often than not the warning signs are there. The problem is to act on them in time.”20 
International cooperation can prevent conflict, and the spreading of conflict. When the 
Bosnian conflict in the early 1990s threatened to spill over and embroil Macedonia in a broader 
Balkan war, the international community worked together to prevent wider conflict. The 
international community established the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force 
(UNPREDEP), which provided peacekeepers to Macedonia’s borders with Albania and Serbia—
the first time the UN had deployed forces to a region before the outbreak of any fighting. The 
OSCE established a Mission in Macedonia, and Max van der Stoel, the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, worked to help preserve peace in Macedonia, and help 
Macedonia become more cohesive. (Van der Stoel’s methods included promoting “internal self-
determination” measures as a way to meet the needs and interests of minorities, and thus keep 
States from breaking up. He pointed out that no matter where a border is drawn, there will almost 
always be different ethnic groups living together, and that the key is to learn to live 
harmoniously with one another. 21) 
It can be difficult to get political systems to allocate funds for conflict prevention, for if a 
conflict is averted, there may be the question whether the measures were necessary. “It is hard to 
quantify successful preventive diplomacy because if it works nothing happens. But it is certainly 
easy to spot failure. No News is Good News. Preventive diplomacy is seldom discussed in the 
popular press. If a crisis is averted—especially at an early stage—nothing ‘newsworthy’ has 
occurred. And yet, for the people involved this is the best possible outcome.”22  
 
                                                 
17 Walter A. Kemp, “Ever Heard of the OSCE?” Helsinki Monitor, no. 1 (1999). He also added that “If someone told 
Humpty Dumpty to get down off the wall at an early stage, nothing would have happened—no nursery rhyme, no 
work for ‘all the king’s horses and all the king’s men.’” 
18 Brown and Rosecrance, The Costs of Conflict, 1999.  
19 Kemp, Quiet Diplomacy in Action, 2001, 19–20; OSCE Handbook, 2000, 34; and OSCE budget figures.  
20 Max van der Stoel, in Preventing Ethnic Conflict and Building Cohesive States, 2016, 21, 22. 
21 Ibid., 13–15. See also Walter A. Kemp, “Between Assimilation and Secession: Integrating Diversity in 
Multi-Ethnic States,” 2002, and Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations (FIER), The Lund Recommendations 
on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, 1999. 
22 Max van der Stoel, in Preventing Ethnic Conflict and Building Cohesive States, 2016, 22.  
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The establishment of democratic governments can be an effective conflict prevention tool. But 
leadership may be needed to develop understanding for the sustained efforts required to 
implement democracy and the institutions required for its effective functioning: “Developing 
civil society is like pouring concrete; it is essential for building strong foundations, but it takes 
time and watching it solidify is rather uneventful.”23  
After the end of hostilities, post–conflict measures can help break cycles of violence, and 
compassion and assistance can prevent the seeds of future wars. “A war, fought for whatever 
reason, that does not aim at a solution which takes into account the fears, the interests and, not 
least, the honor of the defeated peoples is unlikely to decide anything for very long.”24 After 
World War II, the United States helped to establish a new post–war paradigm through programs 
to rebuild areas of conflict. “The Marshall Plan after World War II [was] an act of 
strengthening allies, of enlightened self-interest.”25 France and Germany went to war three times 
between 1870 and 1939, but after World War II, measures such as reconciliation, assistance, 
political ties, and economic cooperation ended that cycle. 
“Conscious of German history and the resultant moral 
and political responsibility, the united Germany will be 
the cornerstone of the peaceful European order. Our 
constitution imposes upon us the obligation to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner 
in a united Europe. Only peace will in future emanate from German soil.”26  
An increased focus on preventive measures can increase security. Rising tensions may require 
more conflict prevention efforts, particularly if an increasing population creates pressures that 
can exacerbate fissures among communities. During the 1990s, the OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities developed new conflict prevention methods that can be used and built 
upon, and help people live together in peace.27 It may true that “peace is a thousand times more 
difficult to make than war,” but peace can be achieved.28   
 
I-1-7. Governance Assistance to States. Governance assistance to States consists of actions to 
help governments to be more effective (good governance). Governance assistance to States can 
include such measures as assisting refugees. Assistance to other countries can increase the ability 
of governments to prevent serious international security problems including civil conflicts, 
regional tensions, and wider conflicts.  
 
I-1-8. Peaceful Regime Change/Democracy Promotion. Peaceful regime change and democracy 
promotion are actions to encourage democratic change in hostile or authoritarian regimes, and to 
promote democracy. Democracy promotion has a realpolitik basis—respect for human rights as 
protected by democracy is a foundation of international order, freedom, and peace, and is 
 
                                                 
23 Walter A. Kemp, “Ever Heard of the OSCE?” Helsinki Monitor, no. 1 (1999). 
24 Michael Howard, “When Are Wars Decisive?” Survival (Spring 1999): 135. 
25 President Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, 1988, 7. 
26 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in The 1990 Paris Summit: Words of Wisdom from CSCE Leaders, 2016, 9.  
27 During the early post–Cold War period, the establishment of the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM) was an initiative that reduced international tensions in Europe regarding ethnic issues. The first 
HCNM, Max van der Stoel, used preventive diplomacy to prevent immediate conflicts, and conflict prevention to 
address the underlying causes of interethnic frictions, and help build the processes, institutions, and legal 
frameworks needed to resolve issues democratically and peacefully. 
28 A Boer general, in Paul Wilkinson, “Temptation to Condone Terrorism,” Herald (Glasgow), Aug. 20, 1997.  
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required for lasting security: “Our own freedom, and that of our allies, could never be secure in 
a world where freedom was threatened everywhere else.”29  
Democracy promotion efforts require that the protection of individual rights be at the core, 
and these efforts need to focus on the liberal democratic form of government, and not only on 
majority rule without respect for individual rights. Elections are a necessary part of democracy, 
but to focus primarily on establishing democratic procedures such as voting does not in itself 
achieve the purpose of democracy, which is to protect rights. Voting without respect for rights 
can result in egregious violations of rights, such as voting in a state religion. Voting without 
respect for individual rights can have other serious consequences, such as the election of 
governments that do not respect the rights of their populations. Governments can use the 
democratic process to be elected, and then try to weaken democracy.   
 
“Freedom is a universal right of all human beings. America’s own national experience, as well as 
recent events in [countries that have moved to democracy,] attests to the power of the drive for 
freedom. [What has been shown] is that peaceful, democratic change is possible in today’s world, 
that such change carries with it great promise, and that there is much that American human rights 
policies can do to promote it.”30 “We are embarked on a long journey [towards human rights]. But 
our faith in the dignity of the individual encourages us to believe that people in every society, 
according to their own traditions, will in time give their own expression to this fundamental 
aspiration. Our belief is strengthened by the way [OCSE] principles and the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights have found resonance in the hearts of people of many countries. Our task is to sustain 
this faith by our example and our encouragement.”31  
 
“The idea of human rights has a life and force of its own which governments can nurture or oppose, 
but never extinguish.”32 “The basic proposition of the worth and dignity of man is not a sentimental 
aspiration or a vain hope or a piece of rhetoric. It is the strongest, the most creative force now 
present in this world.”33 
 
“Our idealism and our self-interest coincide. Widening the circle of countries which share our 
human rights values is at the very core of our security interests. Such nations make strong allies. 
Their commitment to human rights gives them an inner strength and stability which causes them to 
stand steadfastly with us on the most difficult issues of our time.”34 
 
I-1-9. International Leadership and Cooperation, and Honor. Countries exercise leadership 
bilaterally and multilaterally, and this leadership involves example, legitimacy, and honor. 
Foreign policies identify the objectives that government leaders decide to pursue in the 
international arena, and these policies can confer power and honor when they are seen as 
legitimate and as having moral authority. “Political and military struggles usually involve a 
battle for legitimacy, and sometimes legitimacy matters more than physical or military power.”35 
 
                                                 
29 President Ronald Reagan, message to Congress, March 14, 1986. 
30 Cyrus R. Vance, “The Human Rights Imperative,” Foreign Policy (Summer 1986).   
31 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, address, “The Pursuit of Human Rights,” April 30, 1977.  
32 Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, address, “Human Rights: Principle and Realism,” Aug. 9, 1977.  
33 President Harry Truman, “Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference,” Aug. 9, 1945. 
34 Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, address, “Human Rights: The Diplomacy of the First Year,” Feb. 
13, 1978.  
35 John Steinbruner, course discussion, “Problems of Global Security,” Maryland School of Public Policy, 2001, 
author’s files. 





   
Policies that are seen as being in the world’s best interest will tend to induce support, thereby 
increasing their effectiveness; whereas policies not seen this way may be resisted. Trying to 
overcome resistance uses up national energy and resources, and thus can reduce a nation’s 
power. “Getting others to want what you want can be much more efficient than getting others to 
do what you want.”36  
Many threats can only be met by cooperation among States. The cooperative security 
approach seeks to achieve security with other States and not against them, and recognizes that 
States have common interests and face common threats. The OSCE approach was that 
“cooperation is stronger than confrontation.”37 
Some countries have more political power than might be expected because of their efforts in 
areas that benefit others, such as the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands for their 
peacemaking and economic aid efforts. “I believe that national power is also derived from a 
nation’s moral legitimacy and leadership.”38 These kinds of actions involve honor. Living up to 
agreements builds legitimacy and has practical benefits—for example, a country has more 
options if it has honored its previous commitments.  
Honor matters, especially when built up over time. The shock of the 9/11 attacks brought out 
increased international appreciation for all that the United States had done to try to improve 
conditions in the world. The United States’ sustained efforts were honored by the offers of help 
from countries all over the world, and by responses from organizations such as NATO, declaring 
that the attacks had been an attack on all members—invoking Article V for the first time. “It was 
not simply international institutions—not just treaties and declarations—that brought stability to 
a post–World War II world. Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: The United 
States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the 
blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and 
women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled 
democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we 
seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest—because we seek a 
better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if 
others’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.”39  
 
“I was familiar with the widely-accepted arguments that we had to choose between idealism and 
realism, or between morality and the exertion of power; but I rejected those claims. To me, the 
demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and 
moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence.”40 “A 
foreign policy that ignored the fate of millions around the world who seek freedom would be a 
betrayal of our national heritage.”41  
 
I-1-10. Moral Force/Force of Example/Ethical Pressure. Values and example contain moral 
force and legitimacy that can be used in the international arena—the power of moral values can 
attract support, reduce support for adversaries, and weaken opponents’ will. Security comes from 
 
                                                 
36 EU High Representative Javier Solana, address, “Mars and Venus Reconciled,” April 7, 2003. 
37 OSCE video, For Human Dignity, Vienna, 2000.  
38 President Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, 1988, 7. 
39 President Barak Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize,” Dec. 10, 2009. 
40 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, 1982, 143. 
41 President Ronald Reagan, message to Congress, March 14, 1986. 





   
strength in many areas, but moral strength can guide all other sources of power. “We need many 
different kinds of strength—military, economic, political, and moral. And of all these, I am 
convinced that moral strength is the most vital.”42 
Example has practical effects. The precedents set by 
powerful countries may be used by others, and therefore it is  
in a country’s interest to be careful about the precedents it establishes. If a country is strong 
enough not to follow a rule and still does, the example encourages others to also follow the rule: 
“It is particularly important for the strongest community to uphold a rule—the core reason is a 
simple principle: it is necessary to accept restraint in order to induce it.”43  
The OSCE experience demonstrates that the application of principles widely seen as 
legitimate can increase security. To illustrate, during the Cold War, many people in Eastern 
Europe and elsewhere saw OSCE principles as legitimate for a number of reasons, including the 
careful process of their development, adoption by consensus, and their recognition of basic 
rights. This perception of legitimacy helped channel the energies of individuals, groups, 
organizations, and governments in support of OSCE principles and human rights, actions that 
contributed to ending the Cold War and the establishment of many democracies in Eastern 
Europe and the territory of the former Soviet Union.  
The great changes in Europe at the end of the Cold War provided opportunities to increase 
international security through leadership and example. There was unprecedented cooperation 
among many countries (including former adversaries such as the Western democracies and the 
Soviet Union) in responding to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. President George [H. W.] 
Bush wrote that while his administration was building the coalition to reverse the invasion, “We 
evaluated each action in terms of its suitability as a model for the future.”44 
 
I-2. National Political Tools. National political 
tools are the instruments that governments use in 
the domestic area. Key national political tools 
include core values and assumptions, which involve 
attitude toward others (respect); leadership vision 
(the goal or policy); policy setting and reform; 
leadership, including character, competence, and 
honor; and the moral force and force of example 
that leaders and the population exert. 
 
I-2-1. Core Values and Assumptions (Attitude Towards Others/Respect). National values, 
assumptions, and beliefs form an important foundation for policies, decisions, and actions. The 
core values of democracies are found in sources such as Constitutions, Declarations of 
Independence, UN documents, and OSCE documents (OSCE documents as a whole—the 
acquis—constitute a significant body of the thoughts and practices of nearly all of the world’s 
democracies on achieving security and respect for individual rights).  
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Respect and recognition for others and their innate dignity and rights are vital. Whether or not 
leaders have respect for others forms a foundation for their decisions—if people are considered 
to be “subjects,” different decisions result than if leaders believe that their job is to create the 
conditions in which all members of the State can exercise their freedoms.  
Respect for others affects dialogue—a key element of democracy and problem-solving. 
“Recognition is vital. People on all sides of an issue have to acknowledge each other, respect the 
opinion of their counterparts, and recognize the equal rights and value of all individuals.”45 
Columnist William Raspberry wrote about the effectiveness of respect, in that after a time he had 
tried “to write in such a way that people who didn’t agree with me might at least hear me. Then I 
found that they were talking back to me in similarly civil tones…. It reminded me of something a 
wise divinity professor once said. If you are having an argument with some ‘enemy,’ he advised, 
try to reword his position in a way that would make it at least palatable to you. Then invite him 
to do the same thing with your position. You won’t appreciate the dispute-melting magic in that 
until you try it a few times…. If you are convinced that your position is the correct one, why 
wouldn’t you want to examine it and explain it in a way that might win a convert or two?” 46 “If 
the other side has a point, learn from them. If they’re wrong, rebut them.”47 
Whether or not leaders have respect for others and their rights affects security. Lack of respect 
for the dignity and worth of every human being has many negative consequences including 
resentment, frustration, anger, and alienation, and has contributed to tensions and conflict—
including throughout history. More than two thousand years ago, Thucydides wrote that 
perceived lack of respect contributed to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.48 
Conversely, an attitude of respect can decrease tensions among individuals and communities, 
and can be long remembered. Though nearly fifty years had passed, editor Colbert King still 
remembered the respect President Dwight Eisenhower showed during his first Inaugural Parade. 
King wrote that the 1953 Inaugural Parade was one of the longest, and that he and his fellow Boy 
Scouts waited all day to march in the parade, and night fell before his troop reached the 
reviewing stand: “By luck, I was lined up on the left flank of the group, nearest the president’s 
reviewing stand. The streets were dark, the moon was out, the crowds had thinned. As we drew 
abreast of the giant wooden structure, I was surprised to see a half-empty reviewing stand 
bathed in bright lights. There, standing ramrod straight with his black homburg over his heart, 
was the president of the United States. Ike had waited for us.”49 
Judith Martin addressed the issue of respect, writing that sometimes the idea is expressed that 
people have to earn respect, but she disagreed with that view, in that “there is a basic respect we  
are all due as human beings, and beyond that, respect due 
to age, relationship, and position.”50 Another perspective 
is that the essence of religion is how a person treats others.  
Respect includes appreciating differences, and the contributions that differences can make: 
“The real wealth of the world is in its diversity, and the wealth of its component parts depends on  
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their capability to partake of that diversity, to embrace it 
without capturing it.”51 Leaders, the media, and educators 
can all contribute in these areas, and can either decrease 
or increase tensions among communities. Those who use 
their influence to exacerbate problems do a great deal of  
damage—and can make the achievement of goals more difficult. William Raspberry wrote that 
listening to polarizing extremists and other demagogues is “like being lost in the desert and 
choosing as your leader not the one with a workable plan for leading you to the Promised Land 
but the one who offers the most eloquent condemnation of Pharaoh.”52  
 
I-2-2. Leadership Vision (the Goal or Policy). Vision expresses the desired state of affairs—the 
goal or policy. Vision helps focus and direct efforts towards goals: leaders communicate vision, 
and then, using resources, steer towards the goal. “Vision…is not only the leader’s guidepost, but 
also is important in involving the spirit and will—it captures the imagination and provides the 
focus for the future.”53  
At the national level, vision can keep a nation on course, and provides a way to measure 
progress. A country needs a compelling vision towards which the government and the people can 
strive, goals that can engage all of the elements of power contained in the tools of strategy—to 
influence, attract, induce, pressure, and coerce, and over the short- and long-term. Leaders at all 
levels can have vision, and can rise above situations—even the world—to see what is needed.  
For democracies, the core vision is the protection and promotion of individual rights, within 
the country, and also in the world. This vision guides both policy and strategy.  
 
I-2-3. Policy Setting/Reform. Policies are tools, and the principles, values, and assumptions that 
form the basis of policies contain dynamic elements that can affect the results of their 
implementation. In particular the effectiveness of policies depends in part to the extent that they 
are based on democratic principles. Policies that are in keeping with respect for individual rights 
and freedoms are likely to be seen as legitimate and therefore draw on the power that legitimacy 
brings. Legitimacy may be intangible, but engages support and can have significant effects; for 
example, if a government is seen as legitimate, people are likely to cooperate with its policies 
more readily, thus reducing the time, effort, and resources required to enforce compliance.  
Policies that are not in keeping with democratic principles 
may not solve the problems that decisions were intended to 
solve, and are likely to create additional problems that will  
have to be dealt with. Choosing a “lesser evil” may be the best (or only) option in some 
situations, but in those instances governments, and people, need to be prepared to deal with the 
negative consequences of the new problems that result. “Fairness is essential to security because 
injustice will inevitably be challenged and is therefore inherently unstable. And as the forces of 
globalization continue to transform world relations, international standards of equity will 
become increasingly important as a means of inducing coordinated policies.”54 
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Policy has both practical and moral aspects, and can affect security. President of Estonia 
Lennart Meri noted that “if a situation seems wrong from a moral point of view, then it will 
probably turn out to be a problem from a political and security point of view as well.”55 His 
perspective applies not only at the international and national levels, but in organizations as well. 
A senior Army noncommissioned officer pointed out: “When soldiers believe their leaders will 
do what is right, it gives them the strength to do that little bit more.”56 
 
I-2-4. Leadership, Including Competence, Character, and Honor. Leadership is the art of 
taking a vision of what needs to be done, communicating it so that the intent is clearly 
understood, and then ensuring its execution. These requirements are the same at all levels.57 
Character. The ability and character of leaders makes achieving goals easier or harder, and 
character includes leaders’ attitude towards others (whether or not they have basic respect for  
other people), and how leaders think the world works (whether they believe in threats and 
coercion, or in leadership). These attitudes and beliefs matter because they are a basis on which  
leaders make decisions. “Values are intangible. While we 
cannot see or touch them, we can sense solid values in 
others. They, in turn, can sense them in us.”58 
“Character is the inner power source of leadership.”59 
People want leaders who are responsible, have a vision for 
what is right, and who can bring out their best: “Fear of a tyrannical leader does motivate 
people, but not as much as respect and admiration for an inspirational leader who brings forth 
the inner strength of men and women.”60 “We want to thrive, not just survive.”61  
Honor. Honor is a key part of character and leadership, with practical benefits. The Roman 
general Vegetius wrote that honor helps lead to success: “A sense of honor, by preventing them 
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from behaving ill, will make them victorious.”62 Many centuries later, a U.S. Secretary of War 
also expressed this idea: “No one who is thinking of himself can rise to true heights.”63  
Honor includes living up to responsibilities, and eschewing what is self-serving. “As a result 
of my experience during a somewhat long life, I have become accustomed to placing the various  
holders of public office with whom I come in 
contact in one or the other of two categories—first, 
those who are thinking primarily of what they can 
do for the job which they hold; and second, those  
who are thinking primarily of what the job can do for them.”64 Avoiding the misuse  
of authority matters. “He that does good, having the unlimited power to do evil, deserves praise 
not only for the good which he performs, but for the evil which he forbears.”65  
Everyone can have honor: “Your honor is an intangible possession.”66 What is the price of 
honor? “I have a lantern. You steal my lantern. What, then, [asked Epictetus,] is your honor 
worth no more to you than the price of my lantern?”  
 
I-2-5. Moral Force/Force of Example/Ethical Pressure. Moral force is a strength that can be 
developed and released in individuals, organizations, and nations. The sources of moral force  
are values, ideals, and principles, and from these moral force 
flows. Moral force can be developed by creating and sustaining a  
strong ethical environment, understanding why a nation’s values are worth defending, drawing 
on the strength of values, and abiding by democratic principles. Values and ideals give strength 
and hope, and can lead to increased success for a nation. Adherence to principle is a source of 
personal—and national—honor and strength: “In that inner power of courage and conviction 
which stems from the spiritual integrity of the individual, lies the strength of democracy.”67 
The example and moral tone that leaders set are tools. Living up to principles can set a strong 
example, especially when the decisions involve ethical dilemmas. Issues of right and wrong are 
clearest in situations in which only one ethical issue is involved, but in some situations two or 
more values conflict or collide, and there is no action that can be taken without violating one or 
more principle (an ethical dilemma). “Several years ago, I asked a veteran journalist for advice. 
‘I’m trying to figure out if I have an ethical conflict,’ I began. ‘If you have to ask, you do,’ he 
said.”68 An ethical decisionmaking process can help to think through an ethical dilemma, as the  
following steps can outline. Identify what values or principles 
are in conflict. Separate and examine each issue involved.  
Answer the question, “What is the right thing to do?” The key is to identify the right thing 
without regard to any other consideration, and that answer becomes the firm fixed reference 
point. After the right thing to do is identified, then consider other factors, including how to deal 
with other issues and possible perverse consequences. Decide how to best deal with these 
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potential consequences, keeping in mind that they must not affect the decision itself.69 “Ethical 
positions are a matter of judgment. You will not be able to avoid making ethical decisions. Issues 
are not black/white––you will have complex, ambiguous choices. This means you must think 
about ethics now, not when you are under pressure.”70 
“Making decisions based on what is right is effective because for the most part these 
decisions will stand because they are right, for right has a strength of its own…. Not making 
decisions based on what is right is ineffective because it does not solve the original problem and 
usually creates additional problems. When decisions are based on, or affected by, anything other 
than what is right, such as a ‘political’ or expedient decision, leaders must often deal with the 
same problem again because they did not solve it and have most likely compounded it. They then 
have to deal with the original problem and the consequences of more problems that occur 
because they did not make the right decision the first time.”71 When these kinds of decisions are 
made by supervisors, perverse consequences include that “every subordinate is spiritually 
wounded, [and] faith and trust in ‘the system’ is eroded,” and as one battalion commander 
noted, “The impact of unethical decisions and behavior is compounded at each level.”72 
 
“There is good and there is evil, and every man has to throw his weight on one side or the other. 
We don’t always recognize the moments when we have to choose. A good man would never 
choose the evil. He compromises. Or he does nothing. Sometimes he only says nothing. He could 
have put up a small barrier, but he leaves the way clear for the evil to move in.”73 
 
II. Legal Tools. Legal tools include national and 
international laws, conventions, regimes, standards, 
and agreements (legally-binding and politically-
binding); law enforcement, legal cooperation, and 
judicial actions; and actions to enforce laws, 
conventions, standards, and agreements. 
Actions to Enforce International Laws. There are fewer ways to enforce international laws 
and agreements than national laws, but ways do exist. Methods include the exercise of national 
power, the practice of reciprocity, and international coalitions. These and other ways can be 
strengthened. The US-led coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 reinforced the 
prohibition against international aggression, and was intended to set a pattern for international 
responses and cooperation. Former President George [H. W.] Bush wrote: “We sought to 
respond [to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait] in a manner which would win broad domestic support 
and which could, as far as possible, be applied universally to other crises. In international terms, 
we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost was the principle that 
aggression cannot pay. In this respect, our short- and long-term objectives were 
indistinguishable. If we dealt properly with Iraq, that in itself should go a long way toward 
dissuading future would-be aggressors. We also believed that the United States should not go it 
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alone, that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a practical matter. Mounting 
an effective military counter to Iraq’s invasion required the backing and bases of Saudi Arabia 
and other Arab states.”74  
Example can strengthen international law. “The test of a country’s commitment to 
international law—and the measure of its credibility when it accuses other countries of flouting 
international law—is whether that country obeys laws even when it has good reasons to prefer 
not to.”75 Even if laws and rules are not implemented perfectly, they affect outcomes, and 
engage the issue of legitimacy.76 “Security ultimately depends more on inducing adherence to 
consensual rules than on wielding coercive force.”77 
Politically-Binding Documents and Agreements. A politically-binding document creates the 
political and moral obligation for States to implement the commitments in the document. 
Politically-binding commitments cannot be enforced in a court of law, but the commitments still 
have binding force, as an OSCE document explained: “The distinction is between ‘legal’ and 
‘political’ and not between ‘binding’ and ‘non-binding.’”78 Politically-binding commitments are 
not only a declaration of intentions, but also a political promise to comply with standards. 
The Helsinki Final Act and OSCE documents can show the effectiveness of politically-
binding documents. The Helsinki Final Act was not a treaty but an agreement (or “Accord”), for 
the States’ intent was not to make law, but to find political means to strengthen security and 
cooperation in Europe. In the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, the 
commitments adopted were possible in great part because of the consensus manner in which the 
documents were drafted, and their character as political rather than legally-binding. “While it 
usually takes a considerable amount of time to reach an agreement on a final text in 
international legal documents, and the final documents are subject to ratification and 
reservations, this is not the case as far as OSCE documents are concerned. The political nature 
of OSCE documents means that once consensus among the States has been achieved, decisions 
enter into force immediately and, in principle, are binding for all OSCE States.”79 
The commitments made in OSCE politically-binding documents increased security in Europe 
and elsewhere, and resulted in great advances for individual rights in the world. “The flexibility 
the OSCE process enjoys because its rulemaking practice is not subject to domestic legal and 
constitutional constraints has enabled it to dramatically transform and expand the human 
dimension commitments, to do so in less than two decades, and thus to rapidly take advantage of 
the changing political climate in Europe [the end of the Cold War]. These achievements would, 
on the whole, have been impossible had the participating States been drafting and voting on 
treaty provisions…. The treaty-making process [is] very slow—it takes a long time for a treaty to 
be drafted and adopted, and longer yet to enter into force. [The OSCE] avoided the problems 
associated with the treaty-making process by promulgating legally nonbinding human dimension 
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[human rights] principles and by gradually expanding their meaning and scope through its 
interpretative rulemaking practice.”80 
 
III. Military and Security Tools. Military and 
security tools consist of a wide range of military 
force and security actions.  
Military tools include first, offensive and 
defensive combat operations, operations that may 
or may not involve the use of military force, and 
deterrence/threat of force; second, preventive 
defense measures such as defensive postures, 
confidence- and security-building measures, and 
military engagement activities; third, security 
relationships; fourth, international security 
regimes; and fifth, the organization and training 
of military forces.  
Security tools include physical security 
measures, and domestic preparedness and 
emergency response.  
 
III-1. Military Force Actions. Military force actions include military combat actions, operations 
that may or may not involve the use of force, and deterrence and threat of force measures. (The 
basic missions of military forces are land, sea, and air control, but as an instrument of national 
power, military force can be used for other purposes. For example, military forces can support 
and implement national policies and objectives, such as providing disaster relief.)  
 
III-1-1. Offensive and Defensive Combat Operations. Offensive military action includes such 
measures as military attack, strikes, interdiction, the enforcement of embargoes and no-fly zones, 
forceful regime change, and major war.  Defensive military actions include such measures as 
denying land to an aggressor. 
 
III-1-2. Operations That May or May Not Involve the Use of Military Force. Military forces 
can conduct operations that do not focus primarily on combat, but during which the military must 
be prepared to use force. Peacekeeping is an example—the primary mission is not to engage in 
combat, but situations may occur in which soldiers need to use force, such as to stop actions by 
others, or for self-defense.  
Military forces may conduct non-combat operations under peaceful conditions, or in which 
the military is not expected to need to use force. Military forces can respond to disasters, 
evacuate citizens, conduct emergency operations, provide humanitarian assistance and medical 
treatment, and improve a country’s infrastructure (examples are constructing roads and ports). At 
the end of hostilities, military forces can restore order, facilitate the transition from hostilities to 
peace, enable the establishment of legitimate authority to rebuild areas of conflict, and guarantee 
compliance with peace terms. 
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III-1-3. Deterrence/Threat of Force. Deterrence and threat-of-force operations are measures 
intended to dissuade potential aggressors or adversaries from taking actions. As the result of 
deterrence measures, another country may conclude that an action being considered will not 
succeed, or that the costs outweigh any potential gain. Threatening force, including such actions 
as show-of-force operations, can demonstrate the willingness to use force, emphasize policy 
commitments, and bolster friends and allies.   
 
“War includes not only a battle of force between the belligerents, but a more subtle, psychological 
battle of perception. Victory, if one can be found in such a setting, is not only dependent upon the 
capabilities of the actual forces deployed, but also on the ability to make the other actors perceive 
your level of commitment to specific goals. This can be perceived as the most ancient of strategic 
wisdom––to subdue the enemy without fighting.  
Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder. It must be our common purpose to create unacceptable 
risks for our opponents––to make the costs of aggression unacceptably high wherever our vital 
interests are involved. This is not to advocate universal intervention in troubled areas, but suggests 
selective involvement in areas of overriding concern.”81 
 
III-2. Preventive Defense. Preventive defense includes such actions as defensive postures, 
confidence- and security-building measures, and military engagement. These kinds of actions 
can decrease international tensions, and increase confidence.82 
Defensive Postures and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Defensive postures and 
confidence- and security-building measures are actions to reassure other countries regarding 
intentions, and reduce the danger of misinterpretation. Actions that increase openness and 
predictability regarding military activities can reduce international tensions and the risk of 
conflict. Such measures as transparency in military forces and defensive postures can mitigate 
the security dilemma. 
Military Engagement Actions. The military forces of democracies can promote freedom, 
democracy, and peace; keep day-to-day tensions below the threshold of conflict; assist in conflict 
resolution; and help prevent war. Military forces can impart democratic values by interacting 
with other nations’ armies and peoples—examples are military-to-military contacts and nation-
building. The army of a democracy can assist another country, and thereby contribute to 
economic and political progress, and the national capability to maintain order. “Building the 
peace is a tough business; for a host of reasons, it requires boots on the ground.”83 
An example of military engagement was the National Guard State Partnership Program, 
established in 1993 in response to the changes after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of 
communism, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The program paired State National 
Guards with partner countries, such as the state of Maryland with Estonia. Partners participated 
in a wide variety of engagement activities such as military-to-military exchanges and visits; 
training exercises; responding to nuclear, biological, or chemical disasters; civil/military 
relations; officer and noncommissioned officer professional development; interoperability 
between service components, and with NATO; airbase security and firefighting; combat service 
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support; and military medicine. The program built ties with the armies and governments of the 
former Warsaw Pact, and helped to shape the international environment in line with US interests. 
 
III-3. Security Relationships. Security relationships include such bilateral and multilateral 
relationships as alliances, coalitions, security assistance, and joint training with allies.  
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is an example of a security relationship. PfP was a NATO 
program introduced in 1994 to extend security in Europe during the post–Cold War period. 
Through bilateral relations between individual partner countries and NATO, the program was 
integral for countries of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union to build democracy,  
contribute to international security, 
develop NATO interoperability and, 
potentially gain NATO membership. 
PfP expanded political and military 
cooperation between NATO members 
and partner nations within the NATO 
framework. The program promoted 
democratic reform of the armed 
forces such as transparency in defense 
planning, ensuring civilian control of 
the military, and commitment to the 
democratic principles that underpin 
NATO. Other core objectives were to 
develop interoperable forces, and to 
prepare partner nations to contribute 
to NATO operations. PfP members 
made major contributions to NATO 
missions, such as peacekeeping in the 
Balkans, and many joined NATO.  
 
III-4. International Security Regimes. International security regimes are those regimes dealing 
with military force and security—examples are the arms control regime and the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. Arms control agreements can increase national security in such ways as  
preventing arms races, and increasing crisis stability through limits, freezes, restructuring, 
reductions, bans, and stabilizing measures. Arms control can reduce the risk of war, reduce the 
risk of misunderstanding of events or accidents, and limit the spread of nuclear weapons.  
Security regimes can be effective. Regarding the efforts to control nuclear weapons, Thomas 
Schelling spoke in his December 2005 Nobel Lecture, “An Astonishing Sixty Years,” of the 
effectiveness of the efforts to control the use and spread of nuclear weapons: “What’s so 
astonishing about the last sixty years? What’s the most important event that didn’t happen? Sixty 
years, four months, day before yesterday, Hiroshima was bombed. Sixty years, four months ago 
tomorrow, Nagasaki was bombed. There has been no use of nuclear weapons in anger in 
warfare in over sixty years.”84 
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III-5. Organization and Training of Military Forces. The organization and training of military 
forces are actions to develop and maintain forces with the desired capabilities. Congress, for 
example, intended for the U.S. Army to be capable of successfully conducting major war, and 
also to be able to conduct operations that support national policies and objectives.  
 
 
As an example of force structure design, William Perry, later Secretary of Defense, wrote 
after Operation DESERT STORM (the military operation that ejected Iraq from Kuwait during 
the Gulf War), that “no one should be deluded into believing that the military capability that can 
easily defeat an army with 4,000 tanks in a desert is going to be the decisive factor in a jungle or 
urban guerrilla war.”85 (His comments were notable in light of the difficulties experienced in 
the 2003 military invasion of Iraq.) Note that developing the forces with the required force 
structure, quantity, training, equipment, mobility, and readiness can require a long lead-time.  
 
III-6. Physical Security. Physical security measures are actions taken to protect people and 
structures.  
 
III-7. Domestic Preparedness/Emergency Response. Domestic preparedness and emergency 
response preparation are actions to be ready for and respond to emergencies. 
 
Comments on the Use of Force. The purpose, capabilities, and limitations of military force are 
not always well understood. Several perspectives follow.  
 
The Purpose of Military Force. The aim of military force is the political goal for which force is 
being used. “The deadliest illusion about warfare is that the aim of war is military victory. The 
true aim of war is to accomplish the political, economic, or security goals for which it was 
fought.”86 For example, military victory in terms of defeating opposing military forces may not 
achieve the political goal for which force is being used: “Mission success does not always take 
the conventional form of victory.”87 “Military victories do not themselves determine the outcome 
of wars; they only provide political opportunities for the victors.”88 “Every military strategy 
must be rooted in a political need.”89 
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“A nation has to first ask itself what it wants to accomplish by going to war. To consult 
Clausewitz, war must have a political objective, and it must not be waged in a way that defeats 
that political objective. 
The second step is to match the means to the end desired––in other words, match the strategy to 
the policy. One of the issues with which we must wrestle is the concept of victory in war. 
MacArthur’s famous statement, ‘There is no substitute for victory,’ epitomizes the traditional 
military outlook. This is tempered today in two respects: 
 ––Victory in its traditional military sense simply may not be achievable or recognizable, and,  
 ––Victory in its traditional military sense may not be politically desirable; for example, the 
costs and risks may outweigh the benefits in war. National objectives may be achieved by a stand-
off from which both sides can maneuver. 
Our measure of success [in war] should be the earliest termination on favorable terms. How we 
use force to bring that about is not a military matter but a political judgment. All across the 
spectrum, then, from very controlled to very wide responses, the desired effects are measured in 
political terms more than in military terms––not in how much is destroyed but in how quickly the 
opponent understands that policy objectives cannot be fulfilled by continuing to wage war.  
It is neither wise nor fair to charge military planners with drawing up plans tailored more to 
political concerns. The last thing we should want is to encourage the military to set the political 
objectives of war. And above all, any military decision with significant implications for policy must 
be based on significant guidance from political authorities.”90 
 
The Necessity for the Capability for Force, and to Defend Freedom. Until the time that there 
are no threats in the world, nations must be prepared to protect themselves with force if need be. 
Nations unable or unwilling to defend themselves can lose their territory, heritage, well-being, 
and national values. During US history, freedom could have been lost many times, but through 
sacrifice and service, each generation met the challenges to freedom in their time, and passed it on. 
“Freedom can be lost in a single generation. All any nation can give to each succeeding 
generation is the possibility of freedom.”91 “No doubt future generations will be asked to mount 
their own defense of American freedoms.”92 
Might and right are both needed: “Law and power are two sides of the same coin. Power is 
needed to establish law and law is the legitimate face of power. Sometimes…law and  
international norms have to be backed by force. [And] if it is to 
have lasting effect, force needs to be backed by legitimacy.”93 
Might can defend right, and the military strength of democracies 
can prevent a world in which “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must.”94 Might may be particularly needed in dealing with nations that respect primarily physical 
strength: “The less that a nation has regard for moral obligations the more it tends to respect 
physical strength—the deterrent power of a force too strong to be challenged with impunity.”95  
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Wars are ultimately fought to control land, resources, and people. “People will fight when they 
believe that they can accomplish their objectives by resorting to force, or when they think that 
they have no other alternative, or when pride, principles, or religious convictions demand it.”96  
There are times when the only way to stop improperly used force is with counterforce. Yet: 
“The instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace. And yet this truth must 
coexist with another—that no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy. The soldier’s 
courage and sacrifice is full of glory, expressing devotion to country, to cause, to comrades-in-
arms. But war itself is never glorious, and we must never trumpet it as such. So part of our 
challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths—that war is sometime 
necessary, and war at some level is an expression of human folly.”97 
 
A Realistic View of the Capabilities and Risks of Military Force. Military force can achieve 
certain goals, and can increase the effectiveness of other tools. For example, a history of the 
successful use of military force can increase the options available to a government and can “back 
up” other tools, such as economic or diplomatic initiatives. “A nation’s military is one means to 
execute a nation’s policy. If you don’t have the capability to use military force if necessary, you 
have fewer tools with which to handle a problem. And when our secretary of state visits Moscow, 
or shuttles between capitals in Africa or the Middle East, he doubtless does not dwell on specific 
comparisons of military forces in his political talks, but the armed strength of our nation resonates 
in his words.”98 
Military forces may be able to successfully invade another country and overthrow the 
government, but the force structure may not have the needed configuration to create security on 
the ground and maintain control of a country after regime change. The 2003 U.S.-led military 
invasion of Iraq can illustrate. Stated goals of the invasion included the overthrow of the Iraqi 
government and the establishment of democracy. But though military force successfully 
overturned the existing government, in the aftermath of the invasion, the coalition did not have 
the forces required to provide the security in which a stable democracy could be established.  
A realistic and objective view of the capabilities and risks of military force is needed. The use 
of military action can be satisfying: “I know the withering effect of limited commitments and I 
know the regenerative effect of full action.”99 But a bias toward military options can cause 
policymakers to overlook other ways to achieve goals, and in many situations military force 
needs to be combined with other tools in order to achieve policy goals. The military invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 achieved forceful regime change, but the establishment of democracy required other 
tools such as extensive State Department planning for after the invasion.  
War can erode values, especially the longer a conflict continues. Thucydides wrote that during 
the Peloponnesian War, “every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries,” and that the 
Athenians finally lost the war through their own internal disorders.100  
 
                                                 
96 General Gordon Sullivan, in The Chiefs of Staff, United States Army: On Leadership and The Profession of Arms, 
2016, 84. 
97 President Barak Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize,” Dec. 10, 2009. 
98 Stansfield Turner, in Stansfield Turner: In His Own Words, 2016, 15. 
99 Secretary of War Henry Stimson, in The Armed Forces Officer, Dept. of Defense (Washington, DC: GPO, 1950).  
100 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides also wrote, “The ancient simplicity into which 
honor so largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became divided into camps in which no 
man trusted his fellow.” 





   
Military/Civil Relations. In a democracy the responsibilities and risks of defense are shared by 
all citizens: “It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every 
Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a proportion of his  
property, but even his personal services to the 
defence of it.”101 President Franklin Roosevelt  
addressed the responsibility and right to fight for 
one’s country when he announced the formation 
of a primarily Japanese-American unit during 
World War II: “No loyal citizen of the United 
States should be denied the democratic right to 
exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, 
regardless of his ancestry. The principle on which 
this country was founded and by which it has 
always been governed is that Americanism is a 
matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, 
and never was, a matter of race or ancestry.”102  
The close involvement of the population of a 
democracy with its armed forces is essential for 
military effectiveness. “An Army does not fight a 
war, a nation does. Close bonds and a special 
relationship must endure between the military 
and society [for the Army] to be an effective 
instrument of national power. Our Army does not 
exist to serve itself, but to serve the American 
people. When the United States Army is 
committed, the American people themselves are 
committed. When the American people drop that 
commitment, then the Army cannot remain 
committed. Nothing so disturbs the Soldier’s 
dedication and service to the ideals of this nation  
than an insecurity in the domestic support extended to him.”103  
“Wars are won by the great strength of a nation—the soldier and 
the civilian working together.”104 “Eventually I believe that there 
can and will be developed a national army which will be far more 
than a body of trained specialists; an army which will be bone of 
the bone and flesh of the flesh of the American people…. I toast the 
Army of the United States; the imperishable traditions of its past; 
the promise of its equally useful and glorious future.”105 
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IV. Economic Tools. Economic tools relate to the 
development and use of resources. 
International economic tools include leadership, 
and teamwork in economic organizations, 
economic policy coordination, trade and trade 
regimes, and financial controls. Other international 
economic tools include development assistance, 
foreign aid, and disaster/humanitarian assistance. 
Economic leverage includes incentives as well as 
coercive economic measures such as sanctions.  
National economic tools include economic 
strength, budget security, and policy setting/ 
reform; resource development, use, and security; 
and the human/industrial mobilization base. 
 
V. Environmental Tools. Environmental tools are 
actions taken to ensure an environment that 
protects human, animal, agricultural, and physical 
resources; protects against transnational 
environmental hazards; and prevents and resolves 
disputes over resources. Environmental issues can  
raise tensions and threaten security, such as by disputes over water. These kinds of issues can 
have serious results—as examples, cross-border pollution can reduce economic production, and 
desertification decreases food production.  
The prevention of epidemics can help ensure an environment that 
protects humans against international hazards such as polio. “Polio has 
existed for a very long time, but in the late 1800s, major polio epidemics 
began to appear in Europe and then in the United States. By 1910 
epidemics occurred frequently, primarily in cities during the summer. 
Though adults contracted the disease, most of the victims were children, 
thousands of whom became crippled every year. No one knew what to do 
or how to avoid the disease, and during the first half of the 20th century 
polio became one of the most dreaded childhood diseases. 
A global effort to eradicate polio began in 1988, led by the World 
Health Organization, UNICEF, and the Rotary Foundation. These efforts 
reduced the number of annual diagnosed cases by 99 percent—from an 
estimated 350,000 cases in 1988 to 1,310 cases in 2007. By 2008, polio 
had been virtually eliminated from all but seven countries…. By the early 
21st century, no cure had been found for polio, or any way to reverse the 
paralysis, but polio can be prevented through immunization. The polio 
vaccine, given multiple times, can almost always protect a child for life.  
Thus, as the world eliminated smallpox—a disease officially declared eradicated in 1979—the 
scourge of polio, and other diseases, can be ended.”106 
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The kind of government that a country has can impact the environment: Federal Chancellor of 
Austria Franz Vranitzky pointed out that governments that despise human beings also despise 
the environment.107 Many countries taken over by the Soviet Union incurred massive 
environmental damage during the Soviet period—after regaining independence Estonia was left 
with an 80-acre pond containing about 8 million tons of radioactive waste, with some minor 
leaking into the Baltic Sea.108 An increasing world population emphasizes the need for 
environmental protection—and for conflict prevention measures and democracy.  
 
VI. Knowledge and Technology Tools. 
Knowledge and technology tools address the 
development, use, and control of knowledge, 
information, technology, and R&D (research 
& development). The growth of knowledge 
involves the development of human resources 
and the research base through education and 
training. Training and equipment assistance  
can assist other countries, and increase the effectiveness of 
coordination. Knowledge and technology tools include the ability 
to share and control information and technology, and the tracking 
and movement control of materials and people.  
Accurate information about other countries matters: “Great 
wasteful wars broke out in the 20th century partly because of 
misperceived comparisons of armed forces, and we continually 
observe unnecessary misunderstandings between nations. The 
United States needs a deeper understanding of what motivates those 
other nations with whom we must deal on important issues. We have 
to be more astute, more well-informed, better able to predict the 
trends of events, to understand the culture, the attitudes, the 
aspirations of peoples in foreign countries. We need to try to look at 
issues from the viewpoint of other people––not that we adopt their 
viewpoint but that we try to understand why they think the way they 
do. In light of U.S. global responsibilities, failure to understand the 
mores and attitudes of other nations could be serious.”109 
Openness as well as the control of information contribute to security. “The withholding of 
information from the public is a serious matter. Every time our government designates a piece of 
information secret, that diminishes our democracy. Every time someone leaks a true government 
secret, that weakens our ability to sustain our democracy.”110 Openness has strengths. “A society 
that not only permits but encourages the vigorous exchange of ideas, and does not believe that 
wisdom necessarily comes from the top, will always have a healthy edge on a society where ideas 
that do not conform to State wisdom are regarded as treasonous.”111 
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VII. Intelligence Tools. Intelligence tools include the 
collection, analysis, control, and dissemination of information, 
and also covert action. Intelligence is knowledge—a product 
resulting from the collection, collation, analysis, evaluation, 
integration, interpretation, and synthesis of information—that  
is, “distilled knowledge.” At the national level, intelligence includes foreknowledge about 
events, trends, and individuals that may affect the nation or national security. Intelligence can 
identify, describe, and define situations that require—or are likely to require—presidential 
decision.  
 
VII-1. Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Control, and Dissemination. Intelligence collection 
and analysis are intended to produce and disseminate clear and accurate assessments to 
decisionmakers in time for them to take action.  
 
“Our intelligence operation is the gathering of information on events, trends, and facts in foreign 
countries. The effort of the Intelligence Community is to provide a factual basis on which our 
policymakers in the executive branch and in the legislative branch may make educated decisions. It 
is our role to provide to those in policymaking positions objective information, as objective we can 
make it. We provide evaluation of the meaning of facts and trends and events that we perceive 
around the world, so that there is always available to Congress, to the President, and to the cabinet 
officers, somebody analyzing events of an international nature that affect the United States, and from 
an organization which has no ax to grind, no role to play in the policymaking function. It is that 
objectivity, that separation from the policy process, that is so important….  
Governments, no less than any of us as individuals, depend upon accurate and timely information to 
make decisions. The collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information to protect national 
security, and upon which to base foreign policy, is essential for any sovereign State. And in this day 
when our country has such international responsibilities, a good intelligence collection organization is 
absolutely vital.”112 
 
“The principal problem of the Intelligence Community is ensuring that all of the shreds of intelligence 
which are available, whether they are in Treasury, FBI, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], or 
anywhere else, are brought together and synthesized. The secret to collecting good intelligence is to 
meld the technical and human systems so as to play to the strengths that are most appropriate for a 
particular problem. The clues that one system obtains may be just what is needed to zero in on another. 
I am as concerned with gaps as I am with overlaps. The latter costs us money; the former may cost 
us our security. We have to be sure that all of our agencies are working together so that we have the 
right amount of overlap and no critical underlaps.”113 
 
VII-2. Covert Action. Covert action can be defined as “an operation designed to influence 
governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of foreign policy in a manner that is 
not necessarily attributable to the sponsoring power.”114 Covert action includes political, 
economic, propaganda, psychological, and paramilitary activities.  
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“Covert action is the term that describes our efforts to influence the course of events in a foreign 
country without our role being known. It is separate from intelligence––the collecting and evaluating of 
information about foreign countries––but has always been assigned to the CIA to perform. 
We must maintain a capable, viable, strong covert action capability. It is absolutely essential that 
we have that potential, ranging from the paramilitary right on down to some of the lesser dramatic 
types of covert action, in the kit of tools a President may have available to him. 
No covert operation should be undertaken until two standards have been met. The first would be 
that there was a thorough exploration of alternative ways to accomplish the objective in an overt 
manner. The second would be that there was a very careful weighing of the potential value to the 
country of what might develop from the operation versus the risks that have to be accepted. I would 
urge that we think of the risks in two categories: the risk of disclosure of the covert operation, and 
the risk of undermining our own respect for the fundamental laws and values of our country.  
One of the risks of any covert action is that it may get out of control. One reason is that the people 
the CIA enlists to do the covert work will not always have the same purpose as the United States. 
Generally, their aim is to obtain political power for themselves as soon as possible. As the price for 
getting the support that we offer them, they may well accept the somewhat different purpose and 
timetables that we establish. But as a covert action progresses, they may well start working for their 
own objective, not ours. A second reason covert actions can get out of control is that our own 
purposes change from those originally set. A third reason is that the CIA people operating them can 
get carried away with their dedication to getting the job done. 
President Ronald Reagan was burned four times by covert actions that the public rejected: the 
mining of Nicaragua’s harbors, publication of a manual for the contras that appeared to condone 
assassination, support of antiterrorist actions by Lebanese intelligence that got out of the CIA’s control 
and resulted in some 80 innocent deaths, and arms deliveries to Iran. None of these passed the verdict 
of ‘makes sense.’ It is contrary to the spirit of our constitutional process to carry out foreign policies in 
secret that the public and Congress would not accept if known. 
The overall test of human intelligence activities and covert actions is whether or not the 
decisionmakers believe that they could effectively defend their decisions if the actions became public. 
As DCI, I asked myself, ‘Would I be proud of what I have done?’ Would I be able to say, ‘Yes, I did 
that, and I did that for our country?’”115 
 
“Deception can backfire (‘blowback’), particularly with today’s instant global communications. For 
example, if we plant a story in another paper overseas, if it’s interesting, the New York Times may 
pick it up. That, in turn, may defeat the purpose of the story. It is also likely that some enterprising 
reporter will expose the story as false.” 116  
 
VIII. Communications and Media Tools. 
Communication and media tools are those areas relating 
to the means of communication. These tools include the 
technological aspects of communication, protecting 
communications, and the media in all its forms. 
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IX. Ideological and Moral Tools. Ideological 
and moral tools are beliefs and values, and the 
actions that result from these beliefs. Beliefs 
and values are tools because they are a basis 
for decisionmaking, and shape the use of all of 
the tools of strategy. Different types of 
governments are based on different beliefs and 
values, but will use the same tools to try to 
implement their ideology and moral values.  
Ideological and moral tools for the democratic State can be divided into four categories:  first, 
core values (individual rights and freedoms); second, the protection of individual rights and 
freedoms through democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy, and also through 
democratic institutions, civil society, and individual action; third, the strengthening and 
advancement of values; and fourth, the projection of values. 
 
IX-1. Core Values (Individual Rights and Freedoms). The core value of the democratic State 
is the belief that all people have individual rights and freedoms that are inalienable and derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person. These rights and freedoms are the birthright of all 
human beings, and are so intrinsic to being human that no government can legitimately take them 
away.117 Democratic States have many values, but the belief in inalienable rights and freedoms is 
the most basic value, and the value upon which all others rest.118 “Individuals, groups, peoples, 
and governments all claim rights…. It may be useful to think of rights as forming a kind of 
spectrum, running from individual rights through group rights to the rights of peoples and the 
ultimate right of an organized society to independent statehood and sovereignty.  
At one end of this spectrum are human rights, the rights of individuals. They are the most 
basic and unconditional because they are inherent in the human person…. The farther along this 
spectrum we move, the more qualified the rights become, because the rights of groups or of 
peoples or of the State in fact derive from the fundamental human rights of the individual human 
person. It is only when more than one person, by their naturally shared characteristics or by 
mutual consent, form a group that individual human rights are extended to represent the 
interests which the members of the group have in common.”119 However, no kind of “group 
right” trumps individual rights—a group cannot legitimately deny an individual member his or 
her basic rights.  
 
                                                 
117 The U.S. Declaration of Independence addresses inalienable rights, and then states that the purpose of 
government is to secure these rights. The Charter of Paris states that the “first responsibility of government” is to 
protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms—see the Charter of Paris, 1990, 3. These rights are 
essential for the free and full development of the human person—see the Helsinki Final Act, 1975, 6.  
118 The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution contains the rights to both liberty and security. “Security,” including the 
security of the person, is identified as a basic right. Freedom can mean the greatest amount of individual liberty 
consistent with the requirement that all people have the same rights, and that one person’s freedom does not infringe 
on another’s.  
119 John Maresca, “Making Sense of the Spectrum of Rights,” 1995, 41–42. Maresca continued: “Group 
rights…derive from individual rights, and are built on these rights. The group demands that it be allowed to practice 
its own religious beliefs; its right to do so is based on the fact that each individual in the group has the right to hold 
and practice his or her own religion or belief, and not have an alien religion forced upon them.” See Maresca, 
“Making Sense of the Spectrum of Rights,” 1995, 42. 
IX. Ideological & Moral Tools 
 
1. Core values (individual rights and freedoms) 
2. The protection of individual rights and freedoms 
   2-1. Democracy, rule of law, and market economy 
   2-2. Democratic institutions, civil society, and 
individual action 
3. The strengthening and advancement of values 










   
IX-2. The Protection of Individual Rights and Freedoms. The protection of individual rights 
and freedoms is done by governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. Governments 
protect rights through a democratic political framework, a rule of law based on human rights, and 
the market economy. Organizations, groups, and individuals protect rights through democratic, 
rule of law, and human rights institutions; civil society; and personal conduct and action.  
 
IX-2-1. The Protection of Individual Rights and Freedoms through Democracy, a Rule of Law 
Based on Human Rights, and the Market Economy. Democratic States are responsible for 
establishing and maintaining the conditions in which all members of the State are able to 
exercise their individual rights and freedoms. During the early 1990s, the OSCE States, which 
included almost all of the democracies in the world, identified three means required to protect 
and promote individual rights: a democratic political framework, a rule of law based on human 
rights, and a market economy (economic freedom). The OSCE States considered this framework 
as the only system able to effectively guarantee full respect for individual rights and freedoms, 
equal rights and status for all citizens, the free pursuit of legitimate interests and aspirations, 
political pluralism, and restraints on the abuse of government power.120 
A democratic form of government. A democratic political framework is the first means to 
protect and promote individual rights. The structures of governments are flexible in how they are 
organized in order to secure individual rights, but a democratic government includes a 
representative form of government with characteristics that included the following: 
—the executive is accountable to the elected legislature or the electorate;  
—a clear separation is maintained between the State and political parties—in particular, 
political parties are not merged with the State; and  
—periodic, free, and fair elections are held for which individuals and groups have the right to 
freely establish political parties, organizations can compete with each other on a basis of equal 
treatment before the law and the authorities, and governmental and nongovernmental observers 
are present for national elections. The will of the people, expressed through periodic free and fair 
elections, is the basis of government legitimacy and authority. 
The rule of law. The rule of law is the second means democratic governments use to protect 
and promote individual rights. The rule of law includes that judges are independent and the 
judicial services operate impartially; military forces and the police are under the control of, and 
accountable to, civil authorities; and government and public authorities comply with their 
constitutions and are not above the law. 
The rule of law is required to protect each person from the encroachments of others, and from 
the arbitrary exercise and rulings of government power, and thus ensure equal legal protection 
for all. The rule of law protects majorities as well as minorities: “The only safety for the many is 
safety for the few.”121 
 
The rule of law is required to control force and violence. The use of force between States, 
between the State and people, and between individuals must be regulated by the rule of law. In a 
democracy, the use of force within the State is to be restricted to legitimate authorities, and 
legitimacy, in turn, is to be determined by the will of the people through democratic means, and 
must meet basic human rights standards. The purpose of State control of force and violence is to 
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prevent the anarchy of private warfare. In the liberal democratic State, force is the legitimate use 
of state power by those properly authorized and for specific purposes such as to preserve internal 
order, enforce the law, and defend the State against external threats. 
The market economy. The market economy (economic liberty) is the third means governments 
use to protect and promote individual rights. All individuals have the right to exercise individual 
enterprise, and to own property alone or in association with others. Economic freedom is 
essential to the effective functioning of markets and economies.  
The primacy of individual rights. Democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy are not 
ends in themselves, but means to support and enforce respect for individual rights. The rule of 
law protects and enforces rights and freedoms, and democratic institutions support individual 
rights through such means as safeguarding freedom of expression, limiting governments, and 
providing equality of opportunity for each person.  
Individual rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy as interdependent, 
mutually reinforcing, and necessary. Human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the market 
economy are interrelated. Respect for rights is the foundation of democracy, and the rule of law 
is based on the recognition of the value of the individual and the individual’s rights. The market 
economy is necessary for freedom: democratic institutions foster economic progress, and the free 
will of the individual, exercised in democracy and protected by the rule of law, allows all 
individuals to pursue their economic interests and provides the basis for sustainable prosperity. 
“We have to look at the connection between political and civil rights, on the one hand, and the 
prevention of major economic disasters, on the other. Political and civil rights give people the 
opportunity to draw attention forcefully to general needs and to demand appropriate public 
action…. In the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred 
in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press.”122 
Democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual rights are all necessary for freedom and 
to protect rights. Democratic procedures by themselves are not sufficient to protect individual 
rights. Without respect for rights, a majority can vote for egregious laws, such as laws that allow 
slavery. The rule of law alone is not sufficient to protect individual rights, for “the rule of law 
can preserve repression.”123 Abraham Lincoln spoke of an example of extremely severe 
repression that was allowed by law, and the requirement for equal freedom for all: “We all 
declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing. With some the 
word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his 
labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with other 
men, and the product of other men’s labor. Here are two, not only different, but incompatible 
things, called by the same name—liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by the 
respective parties, called by two different and incompatible names—liberty and tyranny.”124 
Laws that violate basic rights cannot be legitimately enacted in a democratic State. In a 
democracy, the rule of law means that government authority can only be exercised in accordance 
with written laws that have been adopted through established democratic procedures, and meet 
the basic standards of individual rights.  
 
                                                 
122 Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (1999).  
123 John Steinbruner, course discussion, “Problems of Global Security,” Maryland School of Public Policy, 2001, 
author’s files. 
124 Abraham Lincoln, address, April 18, 1864. 





   
IX-2-2. The Protection of Rights and Freedoms through Democratic Institutions, Civil 
Society, and Individual Action. Democratic institutions, civil society, and personal action can 
protect individual rights. Press reporting and popular vigilance can help identify and correct 
encroachments on freedoms. Individuals can protect rights through daily actions—by treating 
others with respect, and by involvement with government at all levels. Individual actions to 
guard rights—whether the efforts are large or small—add to “the eternal code of justice.”125 
Such means as peaceful popular protest can help correct injustices and improve conditions. 
“Protest is more than simply a safety valve: it should be regarded as a valuable mode of 
political communication, criticism, and democratic consultation in its own right.”126 
Strengthening democracy includes 
keeping civility in public discourse. 
Responses to a tragedy such as a 
mass shooting may include calls for 
more respect in political discourse 
and less partisanship, but the respect 
may not last. After Americans were 
shocked by a June 2017 shooting 
attack on Congressional lawmakers 
and others, Tom Toles wrote, 
“Maybe this time all Americans will 
remember to think about violence, 
about hatred, about the precious and 
fragile nature of democracy and civil 
discourse more seriously after the 
pain of this tragedy fades. And take 
steps to work together to solve them, 
rather than just pay them pious lip 
service for the occasion.”127 
There are threats to democracies, internal and external, that need to be protected against. In 
May 2017, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told CNN anchor Jake Tapper 
that he thought “in many ways our institutions are under assault both externally—and the big 
news here is the Russian interference in our election system—and I think as well our institutions 
are under assault internally.”128 Asked if he meant US institutions were under assault internally 
from the President (of the United States), Clapper responded, “Exactly.”129  
A commitment to truth and facts defends democracy, externally and internally. Many 
democratic governments have had to defend against efforts by authoritarian and communist 
countries to undermine their societies, including by propaganda and efforts to affect elections. 
 
                                                 
125 Sinclair Lewis, Cass Timberlane (New York: Random House, 1945), 316.  
126 Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 1986, 29. 
127 Tom Toles, “The Gunman and My Cartoon,” Washington Post, June 16, 2017.  
128 James Clapper interview with Jake Tapper, “State of the Union,” May 14, 2017, www.cnn.com (June 6, 2017). 
129 Ibid. Authoritarian governments have tried to undermine democracies for decades, but can be countered—Dana 
Priest and Michael Birnbaum wrote about European efforts to counter Russian propaganda and election interference 
(see Dana Priest and Michael Birnbaum, “In Europe, Fake News from Russia Is Old News,” Washington Post, June 
26, 2017). Economic efforts also matter—Martin Wolf wrote about the relationship between economics and 




Tom Toles, Washington Post, June 16, 2017 





   
Internally, falsehoods by leaders and the media undermine democracy and can have very 
serious consequences, as seen throughout history. Thucydides wrote that as the Peloponnesian 
War dragged on, “words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now 
given them,” and that this weakness contributed to the defeat of the Athenians.130 During a 
period in U.S. history marked by a serious increase in falsehoods by senior officials and the 
dissemination of false news and so-called “alternative facts,” Tom Toles wrote, “The assault on 
reason and facts, by words, is one of the hallmarks of the distorted and dangerous political 
atmosphere we live in.”131 Toles’ responses included pointed and biting cartoons, for such means 
as criticism, ridicule, and humor can be used to defend democracy.  
Ridicule and humor can also be used as a tool against authoritarianism. President of Estonia 
Lennart Meri spoke of the power of ridicule to attack totalitarianism: “The Soviet totalitarian 
regime was doomed much faster than the Western democracies believed…. Estonians considered 
Soviet totalitarianism to be temporary. True, it was cruel and dangerous, we lost one quarter of our 
citizens; the regime was feared, but even more, it was ridiculed. At no other time in history has 
Estonia produced such a mass of beautiful sarcastic anecdotes—and the world’s greatest nuclear 
power was defenseless.”132 
An involved and educated population is needed to defend democracies. “Democracy cannot 
succeed unless those who express their choice are prepared to choose wisely. The real safeguard 
of democracy, therefore, is education.”133 In addition, a bone-deep belief in individual rights and 
fair play is needed.  
 
IX-3. The Strengthening and Advancement of Values. The strengthening of values are actions 
that governments, organizations, governments, and individuals take to deepen and extend values. 
For democratic States, these actions include the strengthening of civil society as well as 
democratic, human rights, and rule of law institutions; increasing the observation of respect for 
others; and promoting citizen involvement in government.  
The advancement of values includes the enlargement of freedom. 
The history of the United States can illustrate the long expansion of 
freedoms over time, and the continual efforts to try to bring actions 
and policy in line with declared principles of freedom.  
The advance of the values of democracy includes bringing actual practice closer to aspirations 
and professed ideals. Practice has not always lived up to ideals, and efforts to “close the gap” 
provided the impetus for much reform to correct injustices and advance freedom. The United 
States, for example, began with the aspirations for freedom stated in the Declaration of 
Independence, but freedom was denied to many millions of people. The disconnect between the 
stated ideals and actual practice contributed to the rise of the abolition movement, the civil war, 
and the end of slavery. “The American Revolution demonstrated our determination to be free, 
and the Civil War tested our will to extend that freedom to all.”134 These kinds of efforts have 
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resulted in greater freedom. “[We need] the continued expansion of our moral imagination; an 
insistence that there’s something irreducible that we all share.”135 Henry Stimson called this 
“something irreducible” the “eternal verities.”136  
 
IX-4. The Projection of Values. The projection of values are actions that governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals take to encourage the acceptance and implementation of 
values. The core of democracy is the value and importance of the individual and the individual’s 
rights. President Ronald Reagan expressed the foundation of individual rights, and the goal of 
advancing freedom: “The ultimate purpose of our National Security Strategy is to protect and 
advance…the values that we as a nation prize…values such as human dignity, personal freedom, 
individual rights, the pursuit of happiness, peace, and prosperity. [A major objective in support 
of U.S. interests is] to defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights 
throughout the world.”137 Democracies seek a world in which freedom is the common condition. 
Democratic values have strength, and command the moral authority that is inspired by the 
principles of freedom and respect for the individual. “President [Jimmy Carter placed] human  
rights firmly and irrevocably on the international political 
agenda. Human rights thus acquired political respectability as 
an important element in the contemporary realpolitik equation. 
By addressing an issue of genuine concern to peoples all over 
the world, the struggle for human rights had become a political 
force difficult for many governments to ignore. Ironically, the 
more each side to the ideological conflict and the nonaligned 
nations sought to exploit human rights for their own political and propagandistic ends, the more 
the idea of an effective international system for the protection of human rights captured the 
imagination of mankind. It made many institutional developments in this field possible.”138  
“It is our goal to promote greater observance by governments of all…fundamental human 
rights.”139 “We want our own world-wide influence to reduce human suffering and not to 
increase it.”140 Any progress means the relief of suffering.  
Democratic principles are a crucial component of power, and a weapon in the battle of ideas. 
“If we [the US government] have moved human rights to the front page, it is not because of us, 
but because of the power of the ideas we are espousing.”141  There are many ways to project 
values by governments, organizations, and individuals. Foreign policy and diplomacy are major 
ways for democracies to project and promote rights, including the integration of human rights in 
foreign policy. Individual rights must be central to the foreign policy of democracies because 
these rights are central to the countries. “Underlying principles and values must be reflected in 
American foreign policy if that policy is to have the support of our people and if it is to be 
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effective.”142 Supporting constructive change that enhances individual freedom is both morally 
right and in America’s national interest.”143  
Yet judgment is required. “Human rights policy…requires practical judgments. Americans 
must continually weigh how best to encourage progress while maintaining their ability to 
conduct necessary business with countries in which they have important security interests.”144  
Public diplomacy and the media can project rights. “One of [the major weapons Western 
democracies used during the Cold War] was the skillful use of radio. [Radio Free Europe] 
destroyed the monopoly of the Communist public media and frustrated the efforts of the Soviet 
Union to isolate the satellite countries from the outside world. Citizens of these countries had 
only to tune in to the RFE frequency to learn what their governments were attempting to hide 
from them. People were able to get the information they needed to form their own views, even if 
they could not speak them. Their minds remained free.”145 
Politically-binding agreements can project rights. Twenty years after he signed the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act, former President Gerald Ford said that the Act had been a “Trojan horse for 
liberty”: “In retrospect, it is fair to say that Leonid Brezhnev and other Eastern European  
leaders did not realize at the time that in endorsing the human 
rights basket of the Helsinki Accord they were planting, on 
their own soil, the seeds of freedom and democracy. In 
agreeing to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accord, 
the Soviets and the eastern bloc nations unwittingly dragged a 
Trojan horse for liberty behind the Iron Curtain.”146  
The soldiers of democracies can project rights through the beliefs for which they serve. An 
extensive study of why Civil War soldiers fought revealed many reasons, including the 
conviction on the part of many Union soldiers “that they fought to preserve the Union as a 
beacon of republican liberty throughout the world…. Northern soldiers also picked up Lincoln’s 
theme that the United States represented the last best hope for the survival of republican 
government in a world bestrode by kings, emperors, and despots of many stripes. If secession 
fragmented America into the dis-United States, European aristocrats and reactionaries would 
smile in smug satisfaction at the confirmation of their belief that this harebrained experiment in 
government of, by, and for the people would indeed perish from the earth. ‘I do feel that the 
liberty of the world is placed in our hands to defend,’ wrote a private in the 33rd Massachusetts 
in 1862, ‘and if we are overcome then farewell to freedom.’…  
A private in the 28th Massachusetts of the famous Irish Brigade [wrote in 1863]: ‘This is the 
first test of a modern free government in the act of sustaining itself against internal enemys…. If 
it fail all tyrants will succeed [and] the old cry will be sent forth from the aristocrats of europe 
that such is the common lot of all republics.’  
[In 1863] a thirty-three-year-old private in the 2nd Ohio Cavalry wrote that he had not 
expected the war to last so long, but no matter how much longer it took it must be prosecuted 
‘for the great principles of liberty and self government at stake, for should we fail, the onward 
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march of Liberty in the Old World will be retarded at least a century, and Monarchs, Kings and 
Aristocrats will be more powerful against their subjects than ever.’”147 
Union soldiers were accurate about the desire for freedom in Europe. The impetus for the 
Statue of Liberty was admiration for democratic principles, as well as sorrow over Lincoln’s 
assassination. Joseph Pulitzer wrote that the Statue’s cost was paid “by the masses of the French 
people—by the working men, the tradesmen, the shop girls, the artisans—by all, irrespective of 
class or condition. [It was] not a gift from the millionaires of France to the millionaires of 
America, but a gift of the whole people of France to the whole people of America.”148 
 
“At home and around the world America’s examples and America’s influence [must] be 
marshaled to advance the cause of human rights. To establish those values, two centuries ago a 
bold generation of Americans risked their property, their position, and life itself. We are their 
heirs, and they are sending us a message across the centuries.”149  
 
X. Organization and Implementation Tools  
(The Means to Coordinate and Control the Tools of 
Strategy in Implementing Policy). Organizational and 
implementation tools include policy and strategy, 
organizational structures and processes, and leadership 
and management. Leaders set policy, and strategy is the plan to achieve that policy; 
organizational structure and processes support the achievement of policy; and leadership and 
management guide the execution and implementation of policy (the goal).  
 
X-1. Policy & Strategy. Policy is a goal or objective, or a set of goals or objectives, and strategy 
is the plan to achieve a policy. Strategy is the process by which means—tools—are used to 
achieve ends—policy. Policy answers the question of what is the goal—what is to be done or 
what is the desired state of affairs; strategy answers the question of how to achieve a goal—the 
way something is to be accomplished. Admiral Stansfield Turner explains Policy & Strategy:  
 
“The concepts of policy and strategy provide an effective framework for achieving goals at 
all levels, from the national level to the individual level. 
Policy is a set of goals. At the national level, these goals come from national interests. 
National interests are the broad conditions or values a nation strives to achieve or maintain 
in the world. Examples are national survival, a favorable world order, and national prestige. 
Senior political leaders establish policy, in consultation with civilian and military advisers. 
 Strategy is a plan to achieve policy (the set of goals). At the national level, senior leaders 
establish policy, then use the elements of national power to achieve policy goals. The 
elements of national power are wide-ranging, and include political, diplomatic, legal, 
military, economic, scientific, technological, informational, psychological, ideological, 
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moral, human, environmental, geophysical, and aerospace resources. The adept government 
combines the elements of national power into a coherent, adaptable, and synergistic strategy. 
To be most effective, strategy focuses on short- and long-term national goals, war as well as 
peace, and keeps within the nation’s standards and ideals.  
Policy and strategy ‘cascade’––that is, the policy of the higher decisionmaker becomes 
the strategy for the next level. To use the military as an example, the U.S. president has a 
policy regarding the defense of the nation. The secretary of defense develops a strategy to 
implement the president’s policy. The military services then take the secretary of defense’s 
strategy as their policy, and each service develops a strategy to implement that policy. In this 
way, the process continues through the different levels of military command to the 
operational level and the actual units and servicemembers who execute the mission.  
The concepts are the same at every level. A squad leader uses policy and strategy in 
leading his or her squad. His policy is his goal, and his strategy is his plan for how he 
intends to accomplish his goals.”150 
 
A second example of Policy & Strategy follows:  
 
“US. Policy & Strategy. The Constitution is the source of core U.S. policy & strategy, and 
U.S. national security policy & strategy. 
1. Core U.S. Policy & Strategy. The Preamble to the Constitution sets forth the American 
people’s national policy, or purpose: ‘To form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.’ 
The Constitution also contains the national strategy, or plan, to achieve U.S. policy. 
Through the Constitution, the American people assigned specific responsibilities to 
Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court. With these responsibilities, the American 
people also entrusted the necessary authority so that the designated individuals can carry out 
their responsibilities. 
2. U.S. National Security Policy & Strategy. The Constitution is also the source of core 
US. national security policy & strategy. The United States’ national security policy is 
contained in the Preamble: ‘To…insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common 
defence...and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.’ The 
Constitution further contains the United States’ national strategy to achieve its national 
security policy. The responsibilities delegated to Congress, the President, and the Supreme 
Court include responsibilities for national security (with the primary responsibility being the 
President’s).”151   
 
At the national level, strategy is the art and science of developing, allocating, coordinating, 
using, and directing resources and the tools of national strategy to achieve goals. “Strategy is 
resource allocation…. The strategy of the United States is not what a president says. It is what a 
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president does with the resources available to this country. Where does he put our money? Where 
does he put our armed forces? Where does he put his time and energy and that of his cabinet? That 
is what our strategy is.”152  
Strategy involves selecting the tools that will be most effective, and involves a thorough and 
objective understanding of the entire range of tools, and the strengths, capabilities, pitfalls and 
potential consequences of each. This understanding can help ensure that the contribution of tools 
that may not appear to be directly related to a security problem are not overlooked, for most tools 
of strategy can contribute to achieving a policy or goal. Some notes follow: 
––All tools have the capability to exert some form of power. These capabilities include the 
capacity to influence, attract, induce, pressure, or coerce. Different situations may call for using 
different forms of power, for forms of power vary in how effective they will be in given 
situations. The forms of power vary in their strength and in the length of time that each lasts. 
Inducing can be an effective power, particularly over time, because the willingness of other 
people or nations to support, cooperate, or comply can add to the force of a policy or law. In 
contrast, coercion can be effective in the short term, but unless it is combined with other forms of 
power may not be effective in the long term.  
––Many tools are interrelated, and can reinforce, or conflict with, other tools or policy 
objectives. Some tools can directly support all other tools. Intelligence, for example, can be used 
to support all other tools and actions. Good organizational structure and efficient processes can 
make every tool more effective.  
––Many tools are flexible and can be used for more than their primary purpose. The military 
is an example: “Military forces do not exist for themselves; they are instruments…. You all know 
that a hammer’s purpose is to drive and remove nails. Of course, a hammer can do many other 
things…. Like a hammer, [the Army is] capable of doing other things. In the 218 years the Army 
has been around, we’ve done a lot of things. We mapped the United States; we explored the 
frontier; we built the ports; the locks and dams. You name it; the Army has done it.”153 
––Some tools need to be used together in order to be effective. Trying to build a stable and 
secure environment in a country that is experiencing ethnic conflict can illustrate. It is extremely 
difficult to build civil institutions while violence is ongoing, which means that peacekeepers may 
be required to create and maintain a secure environment. But without the establishment of 
democratic institutions and a functioning judiciary through which grievances can be resolved, 
violence may recur if people take the law into their own hands or revert to vendettas.  
––Tools are double-edged. The use of a tactic or tool by a person, group, or government 
implicitly gives the “OK” for that tactic or tool to be used against them. (Governments, therefore, 
need to be careful about the tools they use.) 
––Tools need to be used with both a short- and long-term focus. Strategists think on at least 
two time levels—the immediate and the long term, for immediate requirements must be met, but 
without long-term thinking and planning, it can be difficult to get beyond the day-to-day.    
In summary, strategy combines the tools of strategy in a coordinated plan, and used together 
well, produces the synergy that increases effectiveness. Strategists at the national level need to 
think comprehensively, objectively, and multidimensionally about the tools of strategy; take all 
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factors into consideration when developing and recommending policy; consider the tradeoffs 
between policy goals and strive to strike the right balance; continually consider the relationships 
between the dimensions of security; think through the short- and long-term consequences of the 
use of the tools; try to identify the potential unforeseen consequences and perverse effects of 
decisions; pursue synergy through the effective use of the tools of strategy; and perhaps most 
important, keep policy and the use of the tools within core democratic principles. 
Admiral Stansfield Turner spoke of this need in dealing with terrorism: “We will strengthen 
defenses in many ways, but we must also be careful to avoid violating our rights in the name of 
searching out terrorists. In fighting terrorism, you can go overboard and jeopardize the very 
democratic foundations that you have. Every time we take an action against terrorism, we have 
to weigh it against the impact on our basic standards as a democracy—we cannot become 
terrorists in order to fight terrorism. We cannot give up democracy in order to defend 
democracy. If there is any logic in attacks like those [in 2001] on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon, it is precisely in wanting us to overreact and undermine our core values.”154 
 
X-2. Organizational Structures and Processes. The design of organizational structures is 
intended to aid the implementation of policy. One goal is an organizational structure that 
provides unity, focus, coordination, cooperation, synergy, and effective and efficient resource 
use towards a goal. A second goal is the development of effective and efficient processes to 
implement policy—the step-by-step methods and operations.  
Organizational structure and processes are intended to be both effective and efficient. 
(Effectiveness and efficiency support each other but are not the same. “Effectiveness directs 
attention to results such as achieving organizational goals and accomplishing the mission. 
Efficiency addresses how well the process was accomplished and is part of, but does not 
necessarily address, the outcome…. Both are necessary to achieve success.”155) 
The National Security Council staff, which supported the National Security Council (NSC), 
can illustrate organizational structure and processes (and efficiency and effectiveness).156 The 
NSC staff, directed by the National Security Advisor (the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs), developed policy options and recommendations for the President, considered 
implications, worked with departments, coordinated operational problems that required 
interdepartmental consideration, and monitored policy implementation. The way that the staff is 
organized affects the policy process, and the level of staffing can affect the effectiveness 
(including that too many staff members can impede effectiveness). “Effective organization [of 
the NSC staff] matters in determining policy outcomes. While good organization does not 
guarantee good policy, bad organization makes bad policy much more likely. Getting top-level 
government organization right is therefore enormously important.”157 
Organizational Structures. Organizational structure can be described as the way that 
responsibilities in an organization are divided. The organization of the National Security Council 
staff can illustrate an organizational structure to support the US national security decisionmaking 
process.  
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The National Security Council staff has used different organizational structures to ensure 
effective processes, and to include the different aspects of security in the consideration and 
decision process.158 Along with a focus on geographical areas and the political and military 
aspects of security, different administrations have incorporated other areas such as the economic, 



















The NSC staff structure was designed to ensure 
that conflicts or tensions between legitimate policy 
objectives were considered. “Few decisions in 
foreign policy are black and white, and most 
difficult decisions are neither. Problems that get to 
the level of the National Security Council staff are 
difficult to solve—if they were easy, they would 
have been resolved at a lower level. One reason for 
the difficulty is that the problem often involves  
conflicts between two or more legitimate policy objectives, values, or government 
responsibilities. Therefore, for many of these problems, the issue is not so much finding a right 
or wrong answer, as striking a balance between competing objectives or values.”159 
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Processes. Process has an important role in achieving policy. The OSCE “Helsinki process” 
can illustrate. The Helsinki process led to agreement on democratic values by the Soviet Union 
and the communist countries in Eastern Europe, an agreement that helped to end the Cold War, 
and expand democracy in Europe. “Since its beginnings, the OSCE has followed a ‘process’ 
approach. The Helsinki Final Act provides for regular follow-up conferences and meetings…. 
Firstly, it means that there is a forum for discussing the implementation of the standards agreed 
in previous meetings. Secondly, it has led to a set of successive OSCE documents specifying and 
elaborating the human dimension [human rights] commitments adopted in past documents.”160 
From 1975–1989, a particular method of the Helsinki process exerted a steady pressure for 
positive change, particularly in the areas of openness and respect for individual rights. The 
OSCE States would adopt a general principle or commitment in a document that was then  
further elaborated on in later 
documents. The issue of family 
reunification can illustrate. 
During the Cold War, an “Iron 
Curtain” divided Europe, 
separating many families on 
different sides of the Curtain, for 
the communist countries did not 
recognize the right of freedom of 
movement. However, in the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act, the States 
declared their aim to facilitate 
freer movement and contacts, 
and made commitments 
regarding contacts between 
people in Eastern and Western 
Europe.161 In the area of  
“Reunification of Families,” the States agreed in 1975 to the general 
principle that they would deal in a “positive and humanitarian spirit 
with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with 
members of their family” and process applications in this area “as 
expeditiously as possible.”162 In 1983, “as expeditiously as 
possible” was defined as normally within six months, and in 1989, 
the States recognized the right of freedom of movement, stating that 
“everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own, and 
to return to his country.”163 Hungary, a communist country at the 
time, used this commitment to allow tens of thousands of East 
Germans to cross the border to West Germany, an act that helped to 
end the Cold War. (The massive exodus contributed to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, a symbol of the end of the Cold War.) 
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“The important impact that the [OSCE] has had in the human rights area can be attributed, in 
part at least, to the follow-up process provided for by the [Helsinki Final Act (HFA)]. It calls for 
participating States to convene intergovernmental conferences for the purpose of achieving ‘a 
thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act…as 
well as…on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the 
development of cooperation in Europe, and the development of the process of détente in the 
future.’ These follow-up conferences have a dual purpose: they provide a conference forum to 
review compliance by the participating States and they establish a mechanism for the normative 
evolution of the [OSCE]. The existence of this unique negotiating process has permitted the HFA 
to be amplified, amended, reinterpreted, and extensively revised by succeeding conferences while 
focusing public attention on the failure of certain States to live up to their human rights 
commitments.”164  
 
Wilhelm Hoynck spoke about the effect that the ideas in the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent 
OSCE documents played in ending the Cold War, reshaping Europe, and advancing democracy: 
“Few could probably imagine twenty years ago at the signing of the Final Act how powerful its 
ideas would become. Few could imagine how fundamentally the face of the continent would 
change with their contributions. [The OSCE] provided a political platform and moral support 
for the champions of democratic change inside the Warsaw Pact countries, like ‘Charter 77’ in 
Czechoslovakia or ‘Solidarity’ in Poland. They were the true victors in the 1989 ‘autumn of 
peoples.’ They derived legitimacy and a certain power from the ideas enshrined in the Helsinki 
Act…. By building an elaborate system of political channels and bridges, the [OSCE] made it 
possible for the West, including many neutral and non-aligned countries, to build continuously 
on the ongoing changes within the ‘socialist system.’  I think it was also a result of these ‘links’ 
and ‘bridges’ that the collapse of communist societies was not accompanied by major and 
violent convulsions.”165 Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen echoed this idea: “The [OSCE] 
process helped to avert a major war and gave hope to people struggling for freedom.”166 
 
In 1990, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke of the role the OSCE had played in the 
reunification of Germany: “If proof of the [O]SCE’s vitality were ever needed, then it has been 
provided not least by the propitious turning-point in the history of my country and people. After 
than more than forty years of division, we Germans were able at the beginning of October to 
achieve our unity…. Without the foundation laid fifteen years ago for a peaceful order 
encompassing the whole of Europe, it would not have been possible today to achieve German 
unity and to restore the historical unity of our continent, as we are doing here in Paris. As an 
idea and as a forum for forward-looking policies, the [OSCE] has stood the test of time.”167  
 
“The genius of the Final Act was that it was not merely an expression of goals and principles; it 
was also a program of practical steps for turning our hopes into reality. It provided a standard 
toward which to strive and against which to measure our behavior.”168  
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X-3. Leadership and Management. Leadership and management are systems of action that 
work together to achieve a goal or objective. The purpose of leadership is to accomplish a goal— 
to get a job done. Leaders at all levels set policy and direction, 
and then steer to get there. Management establishes, develops, 
and controls the techniques, systems, and processes needed to  
accomplish goals, and follows-up on plans and programs to ensure policy implementation. 
Both leadership and management are necessary. “A key part of leadership—at every level—is 
the management of resources. Do not fool yourself—you’ve got to have some managerial skills 
to be a great leader.”169 The combination of good strategy, leadership, and management results 
in synergy—a greater capability than the sum of the parts.  
In executing policy, democratic leaders try to keep within core values. This responsibility is 
the same regardless of the challenges that every era brings: “We must adjust to changing times, 
but still hold to unchanging principles.”170  
 
Some further thoughts on leadership: “Leadership is both an art and a science. Leadership must 
be studied as a science and applied as an art.”171 
 
Respect for others is crucial for effective leadership, in part by bringing out peoples’ capabilities: “I 
learned in combat during World War II to look at the ‘whole person’ because life and death 
depended on the effective functioning of the crew as a team, and whether each person could do his 
part. Each member brought strengths and weaknesses to the team, which adapted to get the mission 
accomplished.”172 One military leader pointed out that leaders needed to “look past color and sex and 
simply see soldiers,” but his thought applies in all areas.173 
 
“Looking back over 35 years as an officer, as leader and led, I have often times ‘taken pulse’ on how 
I thought I was doing. There were times when I didn’t quite measure up to the high standard of 
personal and professional excellence that I had set for myself, times when I knew I had to work 
harder to improve myself. You know how I could tell? I could see it in the eyes of those around me. 
You can fool bosses, and at times even peers, but you can’t fool your subordinates. Look into their 
eyes—you’ll really learn something…. 
Leaders are made, not born. They are made by a life-long study of history, of the influence of 
leaders on it, and by absorbing the real-life teaching of role model leaders. Leaders are made by the 
day-to-day practice and fine-tuning of leadership talents, because leading is an art as well as a 
science and best developed by application. Leaders are made by the steady acquisition of 
professional knowledge and by the development of 24-karat character during the course of a career. 
These traits foster inner strength, self-confidence, and the capacity to inspire by examples of 
professional, as well as personal, excellence.”174 
 
A summary of the tools of strategy follows: 
 
                                                 
169 General John Wickham, in The Chiefs of Staff, United States Army: On Leadership and The Profession of Arms, 
2016, 32.  
170 Julia Coleman, quoted in Jimmy Carter, Sources of Strength (New York: Random House, 1997), 173. 
171 Master Sergeant Douglas E. Freed, “Learning to Lead,” (Army Trainer) Fall 1987. 
172 Edward Scheffelin, in Margaret Merrick Scheffelin: A Life of Courage and Dedication (Carmichael, CA: Visual 
Tutor Company, 2016), 27. 
173 Corporal Johnnie Lee Smith, in “What Do My Soldiers Look for in Their NCO Leaders?” Sergeants’ Business 
(May–Jun 1988). 
174 General John Wickham, in The Chiefs of Staff, United States Army: On Leadership and The Profession of Arms, 
2016, 31.  
Lead: To guide on a way 
especially by going in advance.  
 
 





   
 




The Tools of National Strategy for the Democratic State 
 
 
I. Political Tools 
 1. International political tools 
1-1. Core values and assumptions regarding 
international security 
1-2. The structure of the international system 
1-3. International relations and security principles 
1-4. International organizations, alliances, and 
coalitions 
1-5. Diplomacy, including diplomatic pressure, public 
diplomacy, cultural and educational activities 
1-6. Conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, conflict 
resolution (including post–conflict measures) 
1-7. Governance assistance to States 
1-8. Peaceful regime change/democracy promotion 
1-9. International leadership and cooperation, and honor 
1-10. Moral force/force of example/ethical pressure  
 2. National political tools 
2-1. Core values and assumptions (attitude toward 
others/respect) 
2-2. Leadership vision (the goal or policy) 
2-3. Policy setting/reform 
2-4. Leadership, including character, competence, 
and honor 
2-5. Moral force/force of example/ethical pressure 
 
II. Legal Tools 
1. National and international laws, conventions, regimes, 
standards, and agreements (legally-binding and 
politically-binding) 
2. Law enforcement/legal cooperation/judicial actions 
3. Actions to enforce laws, conventions, standards 
 
III. Military & Security Tools  
 1. Military force actions  
1-1. Offensive and defensive combat operations 
1-2. Operations that may or may not involve the use of 
military force 
1-3. Deterrence/threat of force 
 2. Preventive defense (i.e., defensive postures, 
confidence- and security-building measures, military 
engagement activities) 
 3. Security relationships (i.e., alliances, coalitions, 
security assistance, joint training) 
 4. International security regimes (i.e., arms control 
regime/nonproliferation regime) 
 5. Organization and training of military forces 
 6. Physical security  
 7. Domestic preparedness/emergency response 
 
 
IV. Economic Tools 
  1. International economic tools 
     1-1. Leadership/teamwork in economic organizations 
     1-2. Economic policy coordination 
     1-3. Trade/trade regimes 
     1-4. Financial controls 
     1-5. Development assistance/foreign aid; 
             disaster/humanitarian assistance 
     1-6. Economic leverage—incentives, coercive  
             economic measures (i.e., sanctions) 
  2. National economic tools 
     2-1. Economic strength/financial (budget) security     
     2-2. Economic policy setting/reform 
     2-3. Resource development, use, and security 
     2-4. Mobilization base—human and industrial  
 
V. Environmental Tools 
  1. Actions to ensure an environment that protects 
human, animal, agricultural, and physical resources  
  2. Protection against transnational hazards 
  3. Prevention/resolution of disputes over resources 
 
VI. Knowledge & Technology Tools 
  1. Knowledge, information, technology, and R&D 
    1-1. Education and training (development of human 
resources and the research base) 
    1-2. Information & technology development and 
control (share and deny) 
  2. Training/equipment assistance 
  3. Tracking and movement control of materials/people 
 
VII. Intelligence Tools  
  1. Intelligence collection, analysis, control, and    
        dissemination 
  2. Covert action 
 
VIII. Communications & Media Tools  
  1. Communications technology 
  2. Communications security 
  3. The media 
  4. Social media 
 
IX. Ideological & Moral Tools 
  1. Core values (individual rights and freedoms) 
  2. The protection of individual rights and freedoms 
     2-1. Democracy, rule of law, and market economy 
     2-2. Democratic institutions, civil society, and 
individual action 
  3. The strengthening and advancement of values 
  4. The projection of values 
 
 
X. Organization & Implementation Tools 
(The Means to Coordinate and Control the Tools of Strategy in Implementing Policy) 
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